tricts, the first hearing shall be had in the district in which the debtor has his domicile, and the petition may be amended by inserting an allegation of an act of bankruptcy committed at an earlier date than that first alleged, if such earlier act is charged. in either of the other petitions; and in case of two or more petitions against the same partnership in different courts, each having jurisdiction over the case, the petition first filed shall be first heard, and may be amended by the insertion of an allegation of an earlier act of bankruptcy than that first alleged, if such earlier act is charged in either of the other petitions; and, in either case, the proceedings upon the other petitions may be stayed until an adjudication is made upon the petition first heard; and the court which makes the first adjudication of bankruptcy shall retain jurisdiction over all proceedings therein until the same shall be closed. In case two or more petitions shall be filed in different districts by different members of the same partnership for an adjudication of the bankruptcy of said partnership, the court in which the petition is first filed, having jurisdiction, shall take and retain jurisdiction over all proceedings in such bankruptcy until the same shall be closed; and if such petitions shall be filed in the same district, action shall be first had upon the one first filed. But the court so retaining jurisdiction shall, if satisfied that it is for the greatest convenience of parties in interest that another of said courts should proceed with the cases, order them to be transferred to that court." 10 It has been held: that where subsequent to the filing 10 The word "individual," in the General Order is equivalent to persons and includes a corporation. Re R. H. Pennington & Co., 228 Fed. 388; Re Vanoscope Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 53. Where a bankrupt corporation has its domicile in one judicial district, and its principal place of business in another, the courts of bankruptcy of both districts have concurrent jurisdiction of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against it. International Silver Co. v. N. Y. Jewelry Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 945; Re Continental Coal Corp., C. C. A., 238 Fed. 113, 117. The proximity of a majority in number and claims of the bankrupt's creditors is not conclusive, Re United Button Co., 137 Fed. 688; but the preference of such a majority has great influence with the court. Ibid.; Re New Era Novelty Co., 241 Fed. 298. The term "parties in interest" is not limited to unsecured creditors of the bankrupt, but includes all persons whose pecuniary interests are directly affected by the bankruptcy proceedings, Re United Button Co., 137 Fed. 668, including the bankrupt, Re Okmulgee Producing & Refining of a petition for involuntary bankruptcy, a petition for voluntary bankruptcy of the same person is filed in another district, the General Order applies; 11 but that before adjudication notice of the filing of the latter petition must be given to the petitioning creditors in the former proceeding.12 1 § 615. Practice in bankruptcy proceedings. In general. Courts of bankruptcy are courts of equity with limited and special powers. "In proceedings in equity, instituted for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the act, or for enforcing the rights and remedies given by it, the rules of equity practice established by the Supreme Court of the United States shall be followed as nearly as may be. In proceedings at law, instituted for the same purpose, the practice and procedure in cases at law shall be followed as nearly as may be. But the judge may, . by special order in any case, vary the time allowed for return of process, for appearance and pleading, and for taking testimony. and publication, and may otherwise modify the rules for the preparation of any particular case so as to facilitate a speedy hearing."2 "All necessary rules, forms, and orders as to procedure and for carrying this Act into force and effect shall be prescribed, and may be amended from time to time, by the Supreme Court of the United States." 8 In pursuance of the statute, the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted certain general orders and forms in bankruptcy, which are con Co., 265 Fed. 736. General Orders VI, Where the debts were all contracted in one district in which the business of the bankrupt obliged him to spend a portion of his time, it was held that it would be "for the greatest convenience of the parties in interest" to proceed there, even if the bankrupt resided elsewhere. Re Waxelbaum, 98 Fed. 589; and where the only business transacted by a partnership for more than three months before the petition was filed was a winding up of its affairs within the district, it was held that the court there had jurisdiction. Re Blair, 99 Fed. 76. But see Re Marine Mach. & tained in the appendix of this work. It has been said that these rules and forms have the force and effect of law. The different courts of bankruptcy have also adopted special rules of practice. The State practice is not followed.5 Proceedings in bankruptcy are equitable in their nature and, in the absence of expressed provisions in the bankruptcy act or bankruptcy rules to the contrary, they must follow the general principles of equity jurisprudence and of the practice in equity; but the equity rules are not considered to be rules of the bankruptcy court and are not strictly followed. The equity docket is separate and distinct from the docket in actions at common law and suits in 6 4 Re Gerber, C. C. A., 186 Fed. 693. 5 Re Veler, C. C. A., 249 Fed. 633. 6 Orinoco Iron Co. v. Metzel, C. C. A., 230 Fed. 40; Clark v. Johnson, C. C. A., 245 Fed. 442. 7 Westall v. Avery, C. C. A., 171 Fed. 626. It has been held: that the pleadings and practice prescribed by the general equity rules must be followed in proceedings to set aside preferences. Ibid.; Re Veler, C. C. A., 249 Fed. 633, 645; that a motion to dismiss should be made in lieu of a demurrer. Re Brown, 228 Fed. 533; Pollack v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 861; that there should be no recitals in decrees or orders in controvention of the eighty-sixth equity rule, which then prevailed. Re Fischer, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 531; that, pending a motion to dismiss a petition upon the ground that all creditors had been paid, an order may be entered appointing a special master to hear proofs as to the validity and amount of unpaid claims and to dismiss all claims of which no proof is presented within a period of three months, prescribed in the petition. Re A. B. Baxter & Co., C. C. A., 152 Fed. 137. Where, pending a motion to dismiss petitions in bankruptcy upon the ground that all creditors had been paid, an order was entered. appointing a special master to hear proofs as to the validity and amount of unpaid claims; the court followed the analogy of the equity rules. Where the bankruptcy law and rules failed to regulate appeals, these follow the practice in equity. Re Stafford, 240 Fed. 155. 8 International Harvester Co. v. Carlson, C. C. A., 217 Fed. 736. It has been held that a court of bankruptcy may, in a proper case, order real or personal property to be sold at a private sale. Re Edes, 135 Fed. 595; and that it is not bound by the statute, 27 St. at L. p. 751; supra, § 394; providing that all sales of real estate made pursuant to the directions of a court of the United States, shall be by publie auction after a prescribed notice. Re Edes, 135 Fed. 595. Equity Rule 4 directing the clerk to serve notice ex parte is not followed. Re Stafford, 240 Fed. 155. Neither is Equity Rule 66 limiting the time for filing exceptions to masters' reports. International Harvester Co. v. Carlson, C. C. A., 217 Fed. 736. equity. The equity order book is not used.10 Courts of bankruptcy have the same powers to permit amendments which are vested in other Federal courts.11 By the Bankruptcy Act, "a. The death or insanity of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, but the same shall be conducted and concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not died or become insane: Provided, That in case of death the widow and children shall be entitled to all rights of dower and allowance fixed by the laws of the State of the bankrupt's residence." There is but one continuous term of bankruptcy.12 An order of the court, except a discharge,13 may be vacated at any subsequent time at least before the termination of the proceedings; 14 but, in case of unreasonable delay, an application for that purpose may be denied because of laches.15 1 § 616. Individuals who may become bankrupts. Proceedings in bankruptcy are either voluntary or involuntary. "Petitions of voluntary bankruptcy may be filed by any person who owes debts except a corporation." This provision is constitutional although it permits persons who are not traders to be adjudged bankrupts. A resident alien may file the petition. It has been held that a minor may become a voluntary bankrupt if he owes debts upon which he is absolutely bound, and which he cannot 9 Re Stafford, 240 Fed. 155. 10 Ibid. 11 Morrison v. Rieman, C. C. A., 249 Fed. 97. 12 30 St. at L. 544, as amended 32 St. at L. 279, 34 St. at L. 267, 36 St. at L. 838, § 8a. It has been held that this applies to both voluntary and involuntary proceedings, even when the death occurs before the adjudication, and in such a case the administrator of the bankrupt may file an application for a discharge. Re Agnew, 225 Fed. 650; Re Ives, 111 Fed. 495; Re Jemison, Mercantile Co., C. C. A., 112 Fed. 966; Re Henschel, 114 Fed. 968; Tucker v. Curtin, C. C. A., 153 Fed. 91; Re Barker Piano Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 522. Supra, § 65. 13 Re Cuthbertson, 202 Fed. 666; infra, § 658. 14 Re Ives, 111 Fed. 495; Re Jemison Mercantile Co., C. C. A., 112 Fed. 966; Re Henshel, 114 Fed. 968; Tucker v. Curtin, C. C. A., 153 Fed. 91; Re Barker Piano Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 522. 15 Re Hoyt & Mitchell, 127 Fed. 968; Traub v. Marshall Field & Co., C. C. A., 182 Fed. 622; Re Merwin v. Willoughby Co., 208 Fed. 293. See Sandusky v. First Nat. Bank, 23 Wall. 289, 23 L. ed. 155. $ 616. 130 St. at L. 544, 547, § 4. 2 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 46 L. ed. 1113. 8 Re Boynton, 10 Fed. 277; Brandenburg on Bankruptcy (2d ed.), 78, 4 disaffirm; but that he cannot be made an involuntary bankrupt where the debts are such as can be repudiated by him.5 It is doubtful whether a lunatic can be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. He cannot be before a committee or guardian ad litem has been appointed; nor, it has been held, for an act committed after he has become insane.8 Married women are subject to bankruptcy proceedings, wherever debts can be collected out of their separate estates by proceedings in equity or otherwise; even in States where a judgment in personam cannot be taken against them; but not, it has been said, where their debts cannot be collected in any manner.10 Insolvency is not essential to voluntary bankruptcy,11 nor the ownership of property.12 9 It has been held that a single debt will support the voluntary petition,18 but it must be provable, and that a judgment for a tort which is stayed by security upon an appeal will not.14 Petitions for involuntary bankruptcy may be filed by or against any natural person, except a wage-earner,15 or a person citing: Re Kaiy Chung, 1 N. B. N. 22. 4 Re Brice, 93 Fed. 942. See § 617, infra. Contra, Re Duguid, 100 Fed. 274, where the petition was filed by the infant's mother, who was his partner. 5 Re Dunnigan, 95 Fed. 428; Re Eidemiller, 105 Fed. 595. 6 Re Marvin, 1 Dillon, 178; Re Funk, 101 Fed. 244; Re Burka, 107 Fed. 674. It has been said that he can be. Re Kehler, C. C. A., 159 Fed. 55. A voluntary petition was sustained when filed by a man over whose person and estate, by reason of physical disability, a guardian had been appointed upon his own petition in another State. Kingsley, 160 Fed. 275. 7 Re Burka, 107 Fed. 674. Re 8 Re Funk, 101 Fed. 244; Re Kehler, C. C. A., 159 Fed. 55, holding that an answer by his committee setting forth an inquisition, which adjudged him to have been insane with, lucid intervals since a date prior to the commission of the acts charged, was prima facie evidence that he was insane at the time when such acts were committed, and that the petitioning creditors had the burden to show that these acts were performed during a lucid interval. 9 MacDonald v. Tefft-Weller Co., C. C. A., 65 L.R.A. 106, 128 Fed. 381. 10 Re Brice, 93 Fed. 942. 11 Re Jehu, 94 Fed. 638; Re Chappell, 113 Fed. 545. 12 Re Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 239 Fed. 155; Blackstone v. Blackstone, C. C. A., 265 Fed. 249. 18 Re Schwaninger, 144 Fed. 555. But see 656, infra. 14 Re Yates, 114 Fed. 365. 15 A wage-earner, within the meaning of the bankruptcy law, is |