FOOTE, J. (dissenting): I dissent and vote for affirmance. The question of defendant's guilt was clearly a question for the jury as the opinion concedes and as appears from many circumstances pointing to his guilt in addition to those stated. I think the defendant had a fair trial and that the conduct of the district attorney which alone is criticized was not so prejudicial as to justify a reversal. Judgment of conviction and order reversed and new trial granted; the said reversal is solely for errors of law and not for errors or questions of fact or as a matter of discretion; this court having reviewed all questions of fact and found no error therein. SUPREME COURT — APPELLATE DIVISION - March 14, 1919. THE PEOPLE v. MIKE NOVIK. (186 App. Div. 877.) APPEAL RECORD STIPULATED BY DEFENDANT TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT CANNOT BE CONTRADICTED BY HIM. Where a defendant appeals from a judgment of the County Court affirming as modified a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions, convicting him of the crime of petit larceny, and stipulates that the record is true and correct, he cannot contend that he did not plead guilty as stated in said record or did not understand the proceedings or that the interpreter did not properly perform his duty. APPEAL by the defendant, Mike Novik, from so much of an order of the County Court of Westchester county, entered in the office of the clerk of said county on the 26th day of April, 1918, as affirms as modified a judgment of a Court of Special Sessions convicting him of the crime of petit larceny. Elias Rosenthal, for the appellant. Thomas A. McKennell, Assistant District Attorney (Lee Parsons Davis, District Attorney, with him on the brief), for the respondent. PER CURIAM: The record before this court contains a notice of defendant's appeal from an order of the County Court of Westchester county, affirming, as modified, a judgment of a Court of Special Sessions in that county. A police justice in a village "may hold a Court of Special Sessions therein and shall have in the first instance exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try and determine charges of a misdemeanor committed within such village and triable by a Court of Special Sessions." (Village Law [Consol. Laws, ch. 64; Laws of 1909, ch. 64], § 182.) There is no separate Court of Special Sessions in the village of Hastingson-Hudson. The record contains an information charging the defendant with the crime of petit larceny. (Penal Law, S 1298.) The crime was triable before a Court of Special Sessions. (Code Crim. Pro., § 56.) The record shows the arraignment of the defendant before the police justice. Witnesses were examined. The defendant pleaded guilty, and the justice holding a Court of Special Sessions accepted the plea and imposed the sentence which as modified has been affirmed by the County Court. The objections sought to be urged, that defendant did not plead guilty or did not understand the proceedings, or that the interpreter did not properly perform his duty, are not available upon this appeal, which comes before this court upon a record which defendant stipulates is true and correct. The order of the County Court of Westchester county is, therefore, affirmed. JENKS, P. J., MILLS, RICH, BLACKMAR and KELLY, JJ., concurred. Order of the County Court of Westchester county affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. BENJAMIN HOROWITZ v. JOHN J. HANLEY. WRIT OF PROHIBITION-EXTRAORDINARY TERM OF SUPREME COURT-CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCE-COURTS. Where an order granting an absolute writ of prohibition restraining the imposition of a sentence entered upon a plea of guilty at an Extraordinary Term of the Supreme Court which was illegally constituted, does not prohibit further proceedings upon the indictment and plea, a regularly constitued criminal term of said court has authority to impose sentence. The Extraordinary Term, though declared illegally constituted, was a de facto court, and all proceedings had before it and taken without objection prior to the issuance of the alternative writ of prohibition are valid and must prevail. APPLICATION for a writ of habeas corpus. George Edwin Joseph, for relator. Robert S. Johnstone and Edward Swann, for respondent. COHALAN, J.: He was The relator applies for a writ of habeas corpus. indicted by the grand jury of the county of New York in the Court of General Sessions, and on February 26, 1918, an order was made removing the indictment to the Supreme Court. On April 19, 1918, at an Extraordinary Trial Term of the Supreme Court the relator entered a plea of guilty, and his bail was continued and sentence adjourned without date. On December 27, 1918, the Appellate Division granted an absolute writ of pro * See note, Vol. 27, p. 368 hibition, which prevented sentence being passed upon the relator by the Extraordinary Trial Term of the Supreme Court. The relator's contention upon this application is that the appellate court having granted a writ of prohibition restraining the imposition of a sentence upon the plea of guilty, filed at the Extraordinary Trial Term, the proceedings theretofore had in that term have been adjudicated illegal, void and of no effect. In a word that sentence may not be imposed upon a plea that is invalidly taken, and that all proceedings in the Extraordinary Trial Term are invalid because of the illegal constitution of the court. I am unable, however, to agree with this view. The order of the Appellate Division did not prohibit the Supreme Court from proceeding further upon the indictment and plea; it did not annul or vacate any of the proceedings theretofore had before the extraordinary term. The prior proceedings remained in full force and effect. The Supreme Court as a court had the power and jurisdiction to proceed with the action already taken and to pass judgment upon the conviction theretofore had by the plea of guilty. The decision in this case with respect to the prohibition order was based upon the prior decision in the case of People ex rel. Childs v. Extraordinary Trial Term (184 App. Div. 829). In that case, because of a defect in the publication of the notice of its appointment, the extraordinary term was held to have been illegally constituted. The important point, however, of the decision in the present connection is that the Appellate Division held in the Childs case that the extraordinary term was a de facto court and that its proceedings up to the time the writ of prohibition was issued were valid. It must be held here that the court was a de facto court, and all proceedings had before it and taken without objection prior to the issuance of the alternative writ of prohibition are valid and must prevail. The writ of prohibition was concerned only with future happenings and not with past events. (People v. Ullman, 184 App. Div. 93.) The situa |