the applicability to the new commercial submarine of the rights of visit and search. Are they entitled to a warning and provision for the safety of the crew and any possible passengers, as maintained by our Government in the cases of the Lusitania, Arabic, etc.?

In an interview with Dr. William Bayard Hale, Dr. von Jagow, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, is reported to have said:

We claim nothing for this new type of merchantman save that she is entitled to be hailed, visited, and the crew placed in safety before she is destroyed-the precise rights which have been insisted upon for every other merchant ship by your government.

If, after she is hailed, she attempts to escape, she does so at her own risk, and may properly be attacked and sunk. But to allow the attack without warning upon an unarmed, fragile boat, with the lives of the crew at the mercy of a single shot, that is something of which we refuse to believe the United States is capable.

While the Deutschland is purely a commercial enterprise, the German Government is naturally watching with a high degree of interest the treatment accorded her by the Government of the United States, and it is certain that the German people are prepared to accept the attitude of Washington on this question almost as decisive on the whole subject of the sincerity of the professions of American neutrality.1

True it is that the Deutschland is a merchantman, entitled to the provisional hospitality of our ports as long as she and others of like kind remain unarmed for offensive purposes and engaged in purely peaceful commercial pursuits. But she is also a blockade-runner, engaged in a highly dangerous business, and must run the risks involved in such an enterprise.

AMOS S. HERSHEY.

THE PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

On August 4, 1916, the Secretary of State, the Honorable Robert Lansing, and the Danish Minister, the Honorable Constantin Brun, signed a treaty, by the terms of which the United States agreed to purchase and Denmark to sell the Danish West Indies for the sum of $25,000,000. The treaty was sent by the President to the Senate on August 9th, accompanied by a letter of transmittal by the Honorable Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, together with a declaration made by the Secretary of State that the United States will not object 1 Cited from The Fatherland for July 26, 1916.

to the extension by Denmark of its political and economic interests to the whole of Greenland.

The treaty was favorably reported to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and on September 7th, it was advised and consented to by the Senate. As, however, the injunction of secrecy has not been removed, and as the two governments appear to have agreed that the text of the treaty will not be published without a special agreement on their part, the Journal cannot print the treaty, and it is only in a position to state its terms in the very general way in which they have appeared in the press. When the injunction of secrecy has been removed and the treaty is made public, the Journal will print the text from official sources. In the meantime, it is of interest to give in summary form the terms of the treaty as they appear in the press, and to make some observations upon the previous attempts to purchase the islands and upon the principles of policy involved.

It appears that the treaty consists of twelve articles, as compared with the treaty of 1902 which consisted of seven for the purchase of the islands, ratified by the United States but rejected by Denmark. It is said that the most important changes in the new treaty are those to be found in Article 3, enumerating the grants and concessions relating to the islands which the United States assumes and agrees to maintain. The territory ceded is said to be the Islands of St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix, together with the adjacent islands and rocks. The summary states further that Denmark conveys all its rights of property of all and every kind or description which it holds in the islands, and all appurtenances thereto. Doubtless the treaty, as is usual in such cases, enumerates the rights, franchises, and privileges, in order that there may be no doubt as to the exact nature and extent of the conveyance, but for present purposes, the above seems to be a sufficient statement.

In the next place, it is said that Article 2 guarantees that the conveyance is free from all encumbrances excepting such as are specifically stated and set forth in the treaty, and it is understood that Article 3 deals with this subject. In the absence of the official text, it is perhaps unwise to attempt to give the contents of this article, as the enumeration may be either inaccurate or fragmentary. Doubtless the reservations from the grant and the obligations assumed by the United States were satisfactory in themselves or were explained to the satisfaction of the Senate, otherwise that cautious body would not have given its advice and consent.

The treaty is also said to contain agreements to the effect that Danish subjects of the islands desiring to retain their citizenship may do so by a declaration made within a year of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, and that in default thereof, the allegiance of Danish subjects shall be considered as passing with the cession of the islands to the United States; that cases on trial or on appeal in the courts shall be prosecuted to final judgment in accordance with the law and procedure in force at the time of cession; that Danish subjects of the islands shall be accorded the enjoyment of any interests that they may legally have in copyrights and patents at the date of the convention; and that in default of stipulations to the contrary, all treaties, conventions and international agreements to which the two countries are parties and existing at the time of the cession shall be extended and shall apply to the islands. It is to be expected that a treaty of this nature, including as it does a conveyance with reservations, may give rise to differences of opinion, and that the applicability to the islands of treaties, conventions and international agreements may well be the subject of disputes. The treaty, however, foresees such contingencies, and provides, as was to be expected, that differences of opinion regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty which diplomacy has failed to adjust, shall be referred for settlement to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Assuming that the treaty is in its main lines as above set forth it is in itself proof positive that the United States wants to acquire the islands, because if it were not very desirous to obtain them, it would not offer the tidy sum of $25,000,000 for their cession.

As a matter of fact, the United States has wanted the islands for a long time, so that in a very young country such as ours, their acquisition may be said to be the traditional policy of the United States. The project seems to have originated with Secretary of State Seward, who, as Senator and before becoming Secretary of State, uttered a famous prediction, not verified indeed during his lifetime, but which at the present day can not be gainsaid. "The Pacific Ocean," he ventured to say, "its shores, its islands, and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great Hereafter." 1

On November 18, 1901, the so-called Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was signed between Great Britain and the United States, giving the latter a free hand in the construction of a ship canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific. On November 18, 1903, a treaty was negotiated between 1 John W. Foster's American Diplomacy in the Orient, 1903, p. 135.

Panama and the United States granting the latter an exclusive right of way through the Isthmus of Panama to construct this ship canal. The canal was opened to the commerce of all countries upon equal terms on May 18, 1914.

It was natural that Mr. Seward should have, as Secretary of State, taken the first steps to acquire an approach to the Pacific and indeed a further foothold upon its waters, which in his opinion, were to become "the chief theatre of events in the world's great Hereafter." He acquired by purchase from Russia, as we all know, the vast domain of Alaska for the bagatelle of $7,200,000. He attempted to acquire also by purchase the outpost to the Pacific. At a dinner at the French Legation in January, 1865, Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State, expressed to the Danish Chargé d'Affaires the desire of the United States to buy the Danish West Indies. The Chargé was himself opposed to the sale and, under instructions from his government, advised that the negotiations be dropped. In April, President Lincoln was assassinated, and Mr. Seward himself gravely wounded. Upon his recovery, he broached the subject again to the Danish Chargé, who stated that, although his government did not desire to sell, it was nevertheless not unwilling to consider the Secretary's propositions. Mr. Seward visited St. Thomas, and convinced himself of the necessity of the purchase. On July 17, 1867, Secretary Seward offered on behalf of the United States the sum of $5,000,000 for the three Danish Islands of St. Thomas, St. John and Santa Cruz. As Denmark was not desirous of selling, it was natural that the price should be objected to. The Dane asked $15,000,000 for the three islands, or $10,000,000 for St. Thomas and St. John, with the option of taking Santa Cruz for an additional $5,000,000. It was also explained to Mr. Seward that the Danish Parliament would need to consent to the cession and that the consent of the islanders, freely and formally given, would be a further requisite.2 Secretary

2 Denmark was especially anxious to have the islands vote upon the cession because it hoped that a vote of the inhabitants of Schleswig would, under the terms of Article V of the Treaty of Prague of 1866, result in the reacquisition of the northern part of Schleswig-Holstein, of which it had been dispossessed by Prussia and Austria two years previously. Article V of the treaty provided that "the populations of the North of Schleswig shall be again united with Denmark in the event of their expressing a desire so to be by a vote freely exercised."

But the Dane was doomed to disappointment. This provision was a sop to Napoleon III, the high priest of the plebiscite; it was not a promise made in a treaty with Denmark, but in one to Austria, and it was abrogated with the assent of Austria in the Treaty of Vienna of October 11, 1878.

Seward rejected the price, and balked at the consent of the islanders. But as he was set upon the acquisition, at least of St. John and St. Thomas, he agreed on behalf of the Government to pay $7,500,000 for them and to concede the question of vote. Denmark agreed to these terms and, therefore, on October 24, 1867, the treaty was signed.

But a lion stood in the way-a very formidable one, which could be neither flattered nor cajoled into approval of the transaction. One Charles Sumner, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, opposed the purchase. And although the islanders voted in favor of the cession, and although Secretary Seward urged favorable action on the part of the Senate, the date named in the treaty for ratification, February 22, 1868, passed without action. The time was extended, and Seward again urged the Senate to act, but Sumner was both deaf and obdurate. He was bitterly opposed to President Johnson, as he was later opposed to President Grant, and during the presidency of the latter Sumner reported the treaty adversely on March 24, 1870 and the Senate declined its advice and consent. The treaty therefore was never ratified. The reason and consequences are thus stated by the late Eugene Schuyler:

Denmark had no particular desire to sell to the United States, but was persuaded to do so. The inhabitants of the islands had already voted to accept the United States as their sovereign. The late Mr. Charles Sumner, then Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, who was engaged in a personal quarrel with the administration, simply refused to report back the treaty to the Senate, and he was supported by a sufficient number of his committee and of Senators to enable the matter to be left in this position. It required new negotiations to prolong the term of ratification, and it was with great difficulty that in a subsequent session the treaty was finally brought before the Senate and rejected. As may be imagined, our friendly relations with Denmark were considerably impaired by this method of doing business.3

In 1892, negotiations were re-opened during the Secretaryship of State of the Honorable John W. Foster, but in view of a change of administration, no steps were taken. The matter was also considered by Mr. Olney, when Secretary of State, and the Spanish-American War, the acquisition of Porto Rico, and the negotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty brought the purchase again to the fore because the three islands are, as it were, a prolongation of Porto Rico, which was ceded by Spain to the United States in 1898.

3 Eugene Schuyler's American Diplomacy, 1886, pp. 23-24.