Court has recently promulgated, and I do not want to thrust upon the Supreme Court another labor of the same sort. I trust, therefore, that this report will not be adopted, but that the committee will be asked to reconsider it, and to see if they cannot frame some proposition that will bring the matter up in a better form than is presented by the present report. Walter George Smith, of Pennsylvania: My friend from Massachusetts has overlooked the fact that this matter has heretofore been presented to the Association and has received its unanimous approval. The bills now pending in Congress have been approved by the Conference of Commissioners and by the committees of this Association. Therefore, however pertinent the gentleman's suggestion, it is too late, unless the Association should think proper to rescind its former action and begin over again. At all events, whatever may be the merits of the criticism, I submit that it comes too late. Warren E. Lloyd, of California: It is never too late to make the best solution of a difficulty. If there is a way into trouble, there is always some way out. The rules in respect of bankruptcy, hurried through by high authority, are also very difficult of application. I think the suggestion made by the gentleman from Massachusetts shows that the time is not past for working out a uniform system of federal procedure. But is that the real difficulty? Isn't the difficulty the fact that the different states have different procedure which must be conformed to, if there is to be any uniformity? As it is, although the federal rules in the various states do not fully conform to the state procedure, yet the lawyers in the respective jurisdictions find some way of getting around it, and it approximates what they are used to. If there is a solution of this question, it will be found through a commission that will thoroughly study the subject and report upon it. I think the Association should approach the problem anew, if necessary. James D. Andrews, of New York: May I inquire of the gentleman from Pennsylvania whether or not the situation of this question is that the committee has devised and drawn the proposed act? The Chairman: Will the Chairman of the committee inform us whether the committee itself has drafted the specific act that it wants adopted? Thomas W. Shelton, of Virginia: The specific act was drafted by Judge Clayton of the House Committee. James D. Andrews, of New York: If we have committed the Association to the approval of this bill, I should be in favor of supporting the report of the committee, with the recommendation of submitting it to the Supreme Court for sanction; otherwise, I should think the action we have taken is not sufficient in deliberating on so momentous a question as the reform of procedure. Walter George Smith, of Pennsylvania: May I rise again. It is obvious that the work of so large a body as this Association must be done by committees. It. is impossible in the few hours that we have together to give that calm, deliberate consideration to an important, far-reaching question in open debate. Therefore, in all of these matters it has long been the custom for the Association to act through its committees. The subject was presented by the gentleman from Virginia several years ago, and a committee was appointed. That committee made a report, and it was to this effect: That it was unfortunate that there should be different systems of common law pleading and statutory pleading on common law subjects, in the various jurisdictions of the United States; that if one definite system of common law pleading could be formulated by some competent body for the United States Courts, then the states would gradually adopt it, or there would be a tendency thereto, and therefore the chance of obtaining uniformity would be reached in that way, or would be more favorable, if approached in that way. The matter was very fully and carefully presented, and the opinion of the profession was taken privately about it. I am not speaking as a member of the committee, for I am not such, but I well remember the care taken in ascertaining the opinion of the profession. I do not presume to criticise the weighty criticism of the gentleman from Massachusetts, a distinguished lawyer and an ex-President of the Association, upon the work of the Supreme Court of the United States in formulating new equity rules. I agree we all must agree that that court is weighted to the very limit of human endurance. But where can be found a body as competent to submit a form of procedure for the United States Courts in common law pleading? That, no doubt has been the reason why the committee reached its conclusion. If we are to make any progress at any time in a shifting body like this Association when assembled in annual meeting, there must be some end to debate of a subject I agree fully with the gentleman who preceded me, that we should approach the consideration of these matters with extreme care and deliberation, and however greatly we respect authority, we should not accept reports of committees and recommendations on such matters as these without careful consideration. Our by-laws provide for that by requiring the reports to be printed; I think, therefore, I am warranted in insisting that this plan has met the matured approval of the Association, and it would be exceedingly unwise--and I say it with profound respect to the distinguished gentleman who thinks we made a mistake-to attempt now to rescind our action. Frederick N. Judson, of Missouri: I agree with the views of the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I regret to differ with my friend from Massachusetts on any subject but I cannot agree in his criticism of the work of the Supreme Court of the United States in framing the new equity rules. I have had occasion to study those rules and to practice under them. I believe their adoption by the Supreme Court was a tremendous step forward. There is no other authority which could have worked such a reform and we owe the court our thanks for the time taken in framing them. No doubt it is true that their efficiency will depend upon their construction and enforcement by Judges who administer them, but I think there can be no question that their adoption was a step forward, and points the way in which we are to progress if we are to reform our antiquated systems of procedure and make them answer the demands of the people for the prompt administration of justice. I hope, therefore, we shall take no step backward, but that we shall adopt the report. Stephen H. Allen, of Kansas: I am heartily in favor of the principle of the report of this committee that of uniform procedure throughout the United States. I agree with the gentleman from Missouri that the Supreme Court has made a most notable advance in procedure in equity cases, and that the good work ought to be carried on. I have, however, one difference of opinion with the committee. I think that whenever the Congress of the United States acts on this subject, it should do thorough work and that the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity should be abolished at that time, and then that the whole subject of procedure-a uniform system of procedure throughout the United States in the federal courts-should be adopted, and that then we may safely hope to have the states fall in line and have a uniform sensible procedure throughout all of the states in all of the courts. Procedure is something which may be uniform. There is no reason why there should be this vast diversity, this utter complexity, this interminable tangle of rules of procedure. The way to get rid of the tangle is along the lines of the work of this committee by getting away from the various state systems of procedure at law, and having uniformity with procedure in the federal courts. That is a matter of mere minor detail, because it is local. It applies only to the particular state. We are breaking down state lines in business affairs. We have got to have uniformity; we have to be able to get on; and the only way to get on with procedure and to dispose of cases is to have a sensible system. The distinction between suits in equity and actions at law has been abolished in England for forty years. Why do we keep it here? What is the sense of continuing the distinction? I move that the report be referred back to the committee, with instructions to embody the principle to abolish distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. The Chairman: The question is upon the motion to recommit with instructions. Levi Cooke, of District of Columbia: I rise for information. Would it be in order to defer the vote on this question until some time later in the meeting? The Chairman: Anything that is possible and that is in order which will expedite business and not tangle it up may be suggested; and, therefore, I rule anything in order that does not violate any standing rule of the Association. Levi Cooke, of District of Columbia: It occurs to me that a number of members present would probably vote more accurately upon this subject after an opportunity for reflection, in view of what has been said this morning. Therefore, if it is in order, I move that the vote on this subject be deferred until tomorrow. The motion was seconded, but was lost. F. M. Etheridge, of Texas: I move to table the motion that was made a moment ago to recommit the report to the committee. Waldo G. Morse, of New York: I hope that will not be done, because it would carry the original motion. Nathaniel W. Ladd, of Massachusetts: I think that we are just as well prepared to vote on this subject now as we ever will be-except that many of us have not had an opportunity, perhaps, to read the report. For that reason it might be that the plan to recommit is a wise one; but I hope that the mover of the motion will approve of obtaining the approval of the Supreme Court of the United States, or its dis |