Thomas I. Parkinson, of New York:

I do not like to interrupt, but I rise to the point of order that there is a fixed rule that a resolution offered from the floor is not debatable, but must first be referred to the Executive Committee.

The Chairman:

The point of order is well taken.

A. T. Clearwater, of New York:

In deference to the rule referred, I ask that the resolution be referred to the Executive Committee.

The Chairman:

The resolution will be received and referred to the Executive Committee.

Next in order is the disposition of the second and third resolutions favorably reported this morning by the Committee on Judicial Reform, and laid over to be acted upon after the address of Mr. Taft. The Chair recognizes General Ketcham.

W. A. Ketcham, of Indiana:

The first of those resolutions is in reference to the proposition that Judges of the United States Courts should not be appointed as now; the committee reports adversely to that recommendation. I move the approval of the recommendation of the committee. The motion was carried.

W. A. Ketcham, of Indiana:

The third recommendation of the committee is with respect to the tenure of office of judges, the proposition being to abolish life tenure. The committee reports unfavorably upon that proposition. I move the adoption of the report.

The motion was carried.

W. A. Ketcham, of Indiana:

The last recommendation of the committee is contained, I think, in the other-that there be no change in the law providing for the creation and the removal of United States Judges, and

that the life tenure of United States Judges be not abolished. In order that there may be no question, I move the adoption of that recommendation of the committee.

The motion was carried.

The Chairman:

The Special Committee to Oppose the Judicial Recall.

Rome G. Brown, of Minnesota :

The Committee to Oppose the Judicial Recall, appointed for the past year under the resolution of 1911, has been in session during the entire year. This does not mean occasional sessions nor even continuous sessions. We have been in session constantly, organized and working throughout the year, to fulfill the duty conferred upon us,-to expose the fallacy of the judicial recall. In view of the notable treatment of that subject which we have already had tonight, I shall not now attempt a discussion of the merits of the question; but I shall confine myself to a brief outline of the work we have been doing, referring you to our more extended report for further details.

Our work has been of two sorts: first, a general propaganda of education upon this subject, and, second, special work in various localities where contests in the legislature or at the polls were being made over this question. Our committee has circulated pamphlets containing discussions against the judicial recall throughout the United States, placing them where they would be the most accessible to students of the subject and where they would do the most good. For instance, we have sent them to every library in the country, to every one of the 25,000 students in the law schools of the United States, to editors, lawyers, judges, members of legislatures, members of debating teams who had this subject under discussion, and to citizens generally. During the past year, thus using eight different discussions, we have distributed over 350,000 pamphlets; and from reports which we received, we are convinced that this method of work has been and will continue to be promotive of good results. Besides this, the committee has assisted in the organization and promotion of effective opposition to the judicial recall in different parts of

the country, in connection with contests for its adoption, either in the form of recall of judges or of the recall of judicial decisions. We have furnished speakers and debaters from among our number and from the Bar in general. We have furnished speakers before universities, law schools, bar associations, economics clubs, business men's associations, and procured the publication of articles in different periodicals. We have also engaged in the contests in legislatures, courts, and at the polls to prevent the spreading of this fallacy. This work has also shown favorable results.

The recall of judges, adopted in Oregon in 1908, was followed by its adoption in California in 1911. During the past year it was adopted in Nevada and in Arizona; and also in Colorado, together with the recall of judicial decisions. These are all by constitutional amendment either proposed by the legislature or by the people under the initiative and referendum. In Kansas and Minnesota the legislatures of this year have proposed for adoption by the people at the election of 1914, constitutional amendments providing for the recall of judges; but in these two states the measure excludes from the recall election the choice of a successor in case the recall prevails. This elimination of one of the incidental objections is a sort of sugar coating of this so-called remedy and has misled many legislators into withdrawing their former opposition to the judicial recall. Colorado stands. as the only state with the recall of judicial decisions. As adopted there, it provides not only for the recall of a Supreme Court. decision involving state-wide interest; but it provides that if the Supreme Court of the state declares unconstitutional any charter amendment of certain cities, then by a majority vote at an election held by such municipality, such decision may be made unenforceable. The result is that we have in Colorado a decision recall provision so that at one time a city, as to a particular measure, may vote that the constitution shall be enforced, and at another time, as to the same measure, may say that the same constitutional prohibition shall not be enforced. One city may say today, for instance, that a certain constitutional provision prohibiting an ordinance impairing the obligation of contracts.

shall not be enforced and another city at the same time may say that it shall be enforced. As we say in our report, this establishes in Colorado a sort of local option as to the control of the decisions of the highest court of the state upon constitutional questions. The vice of the judicial recall is here demonstrated in concrete form. The mere statement of this application of the judicial recall in Colorado should be sufficient answer to any argument that may be made in its favor.

The advocacy of the judicial recall in this country started in Oregon and the movement in its agitation is from west to east. Minnesota is the first state having any of its territory east of the Mississippi to adopt, or to have its legislature propose for adoption, the judicial recall. It has been proposed, however, and urged for adoption not only in Wisconsin, Ohio, Illinois, Nebraska, Oklahoma, North Dakota and other western states, but in Massachusetts; and measures within the past year have been proposed in the Congress to apply it to the federal courts, both as to the recall of judges and the recall of judicial decisions. In some of these states the contests have been close; but in all, except those already mentioned as having adopted it, we have been able to defeat it. In North Dakota it lost in the legislature by a margin of one vote. In Arkansas a constitutional amendment for the recall of judges, initiated by the people, was passed at the 1912 election, but was held by the state Supreme Court not properly submitted and, therefore, not adopted. A case is now pending in Colorado to have the constitutional amendment adopted there declared unenforceable. The constitutional provision for the recall of judges in Oregon has been declared not self-executing and the passage of further enabling acts by the legislature has been prevented.

The agitation of the judicial recall is still persistent and widespread; but it is being met everywhere by organized opposition and altogether is growing in disfavor through the campaign of education which is being carried on by your Association.

We

We have stated these matters more fully in our report. have annexed the very interesting report of Judge Parker's New York Committee. We have appended also for reference a se

lected bibliography showing the very wide discussion of this question throughout the country.

Our recommendation is, that the work of the committee be continued and that they have your continued co-operation and sufficient appropriations to carry on their work of exposing the fallacy of the judicial recall. That is the only recommendation finally made in the report. I move the adoption of that report with its recommendation.

The motion was then carried.

(See Report in Appendix, page 579.)

Everett P. Wheeler, of New York:

I rise to a question of privilege. I desire to move a reconsideration of the vote upon the report of the Executive Committee in regard to the resolution offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin. I arose at the time, but was not recognized by the Chair. This is a matter of so much importance that I think we ought to put ourselves right upon the record.

The resolution was that a committee be now appointed to cooperate with the Special Committee on the law's delay to procure a rehearing in the Slocum case. We do not want that resolution adopted, and if the vote on the report is reconsidered, I shall move to lay the resolution on the table. It will be very unfortunate to have the matter go on record as it now stands, because this morning the report of our Special Committee was adopted, in which we stated that we had already moved for a rehearing. in the Slocum case and that report will be before the Supreme Court.

It cannot be said that the decision of the Supreme Court on a constitutional question is mere private litigation, particularly in a case where no constitutional question was raised on the record, or argued by counsel at the Bar. If I can judge at all from what members of the Association all over the country have said to the committee, and from the general consensus of opinion in legal periodicals, it would be most unfortunate to say that nobody should have a right to present a constitutional point to the Supreme Court excepting counsel for the parties litigant.