THE subject next in order among those not published, on which we might have submitted our thoughts to the public, is of too delicate a nature to be divulged, as it refers less to the defence of the kingdom in times past, which therefore may be spoken of without hazard, than to time present, when every honest subject will consider caution, and sometimes silence, as an important part of his duty to his country. What other articles of a similar description we have been favoured with, cannot well be comprised in the remaining numbers of this volume; they will therefore appear in the succeeding volume; and we propose, at this time, to avail ourselves of what intelligence has been officially communicated in the Papers relative to the Negociation with France, presented, by His Majesty's Command, to both Houses of Parliament, 22d December, 1806.

These papers have been already reviewed, as to their main subject, by two Most Honourable corps of Reviewers; which have reported their opinion concerning them. Undoubtedly, we have not the smallest intention of impugning the decision of those eminent critics, who, we learn, expressed their approbation" without a division;" but, as we have often seen circumstances that escaped the first reporters on works of importance, become interesting under the consideration of others, we are tempted to hazard a few thoughts on the contents of this publication. We believe that our remarks have not been anticipated by any of the literati who had taken their seats in those critical assemblies to which we refer.

It appears by these documents, that the negociation commenced about March, 1896. That, it was, at first, understood, VOL. I. [Lit. Pan. Feb. 1807.]

that each party should keep the countries, then in its actual possession, unless exchanges should induce either to accept others in cempensation, whether for a part, or for the whole of them. M. Talleyrand states expressly, April 1, that, the Emperor of France covets nothing England possesses. This may be admit ted, as to Buonaparté himself; but, if we reflect on the possessions of England at that moment, we shall discover obstacles which we wonder Buonaparté should be so blind as to have overlooked, though but for a time. The ancient and established possessions of England could not, on the slightest pretence, be called to recollection on this occasion; they could, on no account, be separated from the parent state but, the recent acquisitions of Britain could hardly be forgotten by a well-informed statesman. These were, the Cape of Good Hope, taken from the Dutch; Sicily, held on behalf of the King of Naples; and lastly Buenos Ayres, very lately taken from Spain. Buonaparté having placed one of his brothers as King over the Dutch, and another brother as King of Naples, discovered, or more probably was informed by them, during the negociation, that their respective kingdoms were not worth holding, under these privations. The reasons of this, may be worth our inquiry.

Holland is a country of dense population, but of small extent; and part of its surface produces little that can serve as food for man. Unable to support its inhabitants, it draws supplies from abroad; and receives corn for its sustenance from foreigners. For this accommodation Holland must pay: and having enjoyed a flourishing commerce, it was able to pay, with great ease, for whatever foreigners could furnish. But if once the source of its ability to pay be interrupied or exhausted, by what means should it acquire

2 H

that wealth which might enable it to remuncrate foreigners for their commodities? and that this source of its ability was, and still is, in the power of Britain, may easily be demonstrated

Foreign colonies belonging to Holland, were some in the West Indies, the Cape,Ceylon, the Spice Islands, Batavia,&c. Those in the West-Indies had been taken, and occupied by the British, some years ago; when a British capital of nearly, or quite, £20,000,000 had been employed in improving them. This naturally led to British connections: and the interest of this capital was a debt due to Britain; to be paid before any profits could be thought on. Add to this, the customary expenses attending all governments, and some peculiar to the most considerable of these settlements, such as, the necessity of maintaining a force capable of overawing the run away negroes established in the woods, and we shall perceive that the wealth derived from the West-Indies by Holland could be but very moderate.

The commerce of the Cape of Good Hope never was worth mentioning, in a national point of view. The importance of the Cape consists in its situation, as being a kind of half-way house, where vessels bound to India, (Batavia, &c.) find (Batavia, &c.) find succour and refreshment. The directors of the British East-India Company gave it up, without reluctance, at the peace of Amiens; because, their ships were under no necessity of calling there, being prepared adequately to the voyage, and visiting other ports on their passage: but the Dutch ships must make the Cape, as they sail slower than the English, and are more liable to disorders among their crews, from which alone the land can relieve them. Moreover, whoever possesses the Cape, and stations a cruising fleet there, commands the high naval road to the east, and interrupts all commerce but what he protects. If then, the commerce of Holland with her eastern possessions was interrupted, or the accommodation of those who engaged in it was abridged, Batavia, with its dependencies, was proportionately diminished in value.

And

this was to them a serious evil; because, Batavia as a seat of commerce is not what it was: 1. The expenses of government are more, while the commerce of the place is less: 2. The port, which was its

glory, is filling up. The spice islands, too, have lost much of their importance; because, 1. They have suffered by the inroads of the English: 2. The spices themselves have been transplanted to other countries, so that these productions are no longer exclusively found in the Dutch islands. Ceylon, which furnishes cinnamon, &c. is British property. We may, therefore, safely infer, that the east was not likely to pour an abundance of riches into the lap of Holland, while England detained her present possions.

We refer to Panorama, p. 681, in proof that the European establishment of Holland has suffered in its very vitals: 1. As its carrying trade is diminished: 2. As its independence, and consequently its political dignity, is now out of the question 3. As the recovery of its mercantile connections to a political extent is extremely problematical. To these considerations may be added others, arising from the actual state not so much of the inhabitants as of the country: and these we shall now submit to the reader.

Dec. 5, 1806, the following observations were addressed from the Dutch King to the Dutch States: their authority, therefore, is indisputable. "We cannot conceal that, independently of the enormous imposts which render the situation of our subjects so afflicting, the suppres sion of all the neutral flags, and particularly the general blockade, have anniz hilitated the last resources of commerce. As to the finances,- —we are justly astonished at the prodigality of expenses, and the want of economy.-We attribute this to party-spirit. Holland has been every year in danger of losing its existence, political and natural.”

We shall not here repeat what we have said concerning the general languor of commerce in Holland: commerce will long continue in transitu there: but not, comparatively, in a flourishing state. The danger of Holland's losing its natural existence has been noticed, and commented on by several; but none has yet explained the full import of the phrase. To us, it appears to refer to two distinct objects: the first is the conservation of the dykes, the artificial defences of this coun try from the Ocean; these require, annually, great reparations, and of course great sums of money. These sums have

been of late years but ill paid; and the works have been accordingly, ill executed. Should an uncommon storm produce breaches, the extent of the evil would be prodigious, and probably beyond the power of this state to repair.

We have seen (Panorama, p. 412,) that the port of Amsterdam is threatened with being choked up, by an increasing accumulation of mud; and it is suspected, that the rivers which pass through this country, and have greatly contributed to its riches, are gradually filling up with silt, sand, &c. in different places, forming bars. If both these evils should prevail, broken dykes, and shallowed rivers, the natural existence of Holland, a country wrested from the sea, must inevitably incur great danger. And both these evils are avoidable only by labour, which must be paid for, the funds for which payment must ultimately be derived from commerce. There is, then, a peculiar emphasis in the language of the French negociator (Panorama, p. 877), supposing that Holland were deprived of its colonies, what could maintain such a nation, having nothing but debts and no commerce? We presume that a statement, not remote in its reasonings from those we have here adduced, was among the new circumstances which M. Talleyrand assigned to Lord Yarmouth as causes of his tergiversation.

We shall now direct our attention to the state of those dominions over which another branch of the Buonaparté family has been placed by the fiat of his imperial brother.

On contemplating the state of the kingdom of Naples, we shall find grounds for many of the same inferences, as those we have made concerning Holland. The revenues of this kingdom, used to be taken at about £750,000: and though the present king may not think himself bound to pay the creditors of the state, to whom more than half of this revenue was mortgaged, yet the expenses of his government, the little dependence he can place on the loyalty of his subjects, which implies an extensive espionage, and some douceurs, either openly or secretly, with the almost total stagnation of commerce in bis dominions, will, of course, impover ish his finances. Nor is this all; for though the Italian provinces of the Neapolitan government produce corn, wine,

oil, silk, wool, and fruit, yet the major part of these articles which was consumed in Naples came from Sicily, by sea, rather than from the interior, by land; and the customs on these importations formed a considerable portion of the royal receipts. Naples had few or no manufactories worth mentioning, in regard to exportation; of course, its commerce was a trifle. The burden, also, of superintending, and occasionally (in policy) of supporting 30,000 houseless Lazaroni, must be felt by the new sovereign, on whom the effect of suspended commerce falls with all its weight. The taxes were enormous: even the silks, when manufactured, paid 25 per cent, if sent from one province to another. To diminish these taxes, is to diminish the revenue; to increase them, is to extinguish commerce entirely. Nor had the people of this country that just sense of the importance of activity in labour, which might serve as a foundation for better regulations. A multitude of ecclesiastics, was unfavourable to labour. A multitude of festival days was an incredible interruption to labour.

:

The

heat of the climate is an absolute prohibition to labour; and the very fertility of the country confirmed in the inhabitants habits of expecting-without exerting themselves to insure the attainment of their expectations. The ecclesiastics, monks, and nuns, were reckoned at about 110,000 being one in thirty-six of the population; and, in the city.of Naples, nearly one in twenty. Under these embarrassments, the first considerable exercise of the new sovereign's power has been, to suppress three of the best endowed convents, that he might receive their revenues; a pretty clear proof of the necessities of his treasury! The taxes drawn from the Calabrias cannot lately have been effective, nor from ravaged countries can they soon be rendered so: the stores in the public magazines have been exhausted, in securing the coasts. his fleet, indeed, we hear nothing; but it is clear, that if the king endeavours to form a maritime strength, he incurs fresh expenses, to an amount which his kingdom has no means of defraying. The nature of the tenures in this sovereignty, the low state of husbandry, the superstitions, and other lazinesses of the people, who content themselves with a bare existence, will long be insuperable obstacles

Of

to all the adroitness which the French can exert, and all the activity which Gallic vivacity can inspire.

We are now prepared to consider Sicily as of great importance to the possessor of Naples. This island is not only valuable by its productions, but by situation, also; it commands the whole Italian coast; can at any time effect incursions in any point; can keep up a correspondence with the interior of the country: affords a sure retreat for mal-contents: and, while in the hands of a power possessing shipping, it renders the whole Neapolitan dominions insecure. But, even supposing that no attempts were to be feared from it, the exportation of Sicilian commodities to any other place than Naples, the detention of Sicilian corn from Naples, and the non-importation of NeapoKitan productions into Sicily, would render the Italian territories insufficient to support a monarch. The knowledge of this, justly alarmed Bonaparte's brother, and added to the perplexities of Bonaparte himself. These suggestions are independent of any results from the formation of British connections in Sicily; from the succession of a more vigorous prince than the present, to the Sicilian throne; or from any obstacle which Sicily might prove to the projects of Bonaparte on the provinces of Greece.

By the mention of Greece, we are led to the consideration of a third sovereignty, which is implicated in the conduct of Talleyrand and Bonaparte. In Lord Yarmouth's dispatch of June 13, his Lordship states his enquiry of M. T. "whether the French government would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire?" The answer was, yes, but it must be -Beaucoup se prépare, mais rien n'est fait, much is preparing, but nothing is executed." This incautious expression of M. T. explains clearly what Bonaparte means, when he talks of guaranteeing the integrity, the indépendence, &c. of the Turkish dominions. He intends to render them as independent on himself, as Holland, Italy, or perhaps, as Spain! This he will find difficult to accomplish, while England holds Malta and Sicily, and Russia holds Cattaro and Corfou. He can send no fleet from Toulon to the Morea, without hazarding a rencontre at Malta. He can march no army from Dalmatia, without commit

ting its safety, unless accompanied by a fleet; neither dare he leave Cattaro in the rear of his army, marching by land, without exposing himself to absolute ruin, in case of a reverse.

It is difficult to say, whether Bonaparte depends on the professions of the Greeks, in favour of liberty: if he does, we think them very likely to fail him, when most needed. But, we may safely infer, the little vigour possessed by that power, which suffers rebellion, year after year, to occupy its fairest provinces, and to desolate those which are unfortunately its neighbours. More than one revolt at this time, weakens and ravages the Turkish empire. We cannot estimate very highly the opposition which this power could make to the arms of France, unless the necessity of events should call out some man of superior intellect, vigour, and good fortune, whose enlightened understanding might turn to account those capabilities of which this empire is not yet wholly deprived, and that strength which is rather shrouded in its imbecility than absolutely departed from it. Such a man may arise: and thenwoe to every Frenchman found on Ottoman territory! That the Sultan himself is not that man, neither has yet fixed his eye on any one answering to this character, we inter, from M Pouqueville's description of Sultan Selim. He is, says that writer, "just, humane, but anxious;

this sovereign has constantly in his imagination the idea of a disastrous futurity. During the last ten years he frequently sheds tears at the state of the empire under his sway; and the greater his knowledge, the deeper is his conviction of the inferiority of his subjects to Europeans. The various revolts in his empire leave him no rest; the last war plunged him into perpetual alarms; and his resolution unhap pily fluctuates too frequently for a situation only fitted for the most determined mind."

authority to shadowy titles, instead of efficacy; to the enumeration of provinces invaded by its own officers, now in revolt; and of towns-the inhabitants of which refufe to obey the mandates of their master, and lord.

We intend on a future opportunity to introduce such representations from late travellers, as may justify this account of the situation of the Turkish empire. We could not have believed the degree of insubordination extant in many of the Turkish provinces, and pervading their population, if we had not had, beside various published accounts, the advantage of perusing the MSS. of British officers, whose services to that government were performed amidst perils and dangers, arising no less from friends than from foes.

It is proper, here, that we should notice the date of the change in Bonaparte's politics. He had suffered the Dutch colonial possessions held by England, to have been, at first, so determinately mentioned in the conferences, and in written evidence, that nothing could be done, in a direct manner, by way of recovering them; and his idea was, if we may judge by his later actions, to compensate the privation of these, by encreasing the territories of Holland, on the side of Germany. But, there were no territories in Italy which could compensate Sicily to Naples. The commanding position of that island, its accessibility to British assistance, by means of a fleet, and the check which the occupier of it would always possess on operations in the Le vant, rendered the expulsion of the English, with that of the present sovereign, and the admission of the French, absolutely necessary. The idea of exchanging other dominions for this, was started, though unsuccessfully; but, supposing it had been accomplished, a new difficulty had now arisen in the capture of Buenos Ayres, from Spain. The London G zette, communicating this event, was published September 13. And the first direct written refusal on the part of Tal leyrand, was delivered to Lord Lauderdale, Sept. 18. In this interval of five or six days, the intelligence must have reached Paris. Bonaparte, unable, con sistently with his schemes, to propose an equivalent for Sicily, only, found himself

still more perplexed to propose equivalents for Buenos Ayres also: yet, unless this colony was restored to Spain, he would not have made a peace "honourable for his allies." The ill-humour into which this perplexity appears to have thrown him, marked the paper which Talleyrand brought from St. Cloud, and probably composed there, in conjunction with Bonaparte and it should seem, that the idea of still further conquests being made by Britain, for which he could imagine no compensation, consistently with his schemes, as already observed, was the turning point on which his mind revolved from some desire of peace, to an abandonment of that desire, persuaded that war would answer his purposes better.

It may be true then, that the Emperor himself coveted nothing that England possessed: but it is equally true, that his connections forbad him from accepting the terms of uti possidetis; since they perceived their inconvenience, though he did not.

We might prolong these remarks by particularizing those other states which Bonaparte intends to subject to great changes, such as Switzerland and Portugal; but these do not appear to have been prominent considerations in the negocia tion before us. Neither shall we enquire what progress his misunderstanding with Prussia was now making. The probability is, that the free surrender of Hanover to its lawful sovereign by Bonaparte, disgusted Prussia, who saw this loss replaced by nothing adequate. She now held Hanover: but was commanded to resign it and this resignation vexing her avidity, she grumbled so loudly, that her friend thought proper to teach her better manners. But these, with other considerations, involved, we doubt not, in the labyrinth of politics, we wave, and con tent ourselves with having elucidated those which more intimately concerned us as Britons.

We presume that we have now explained the reasons, which induced M. Talleyrand to consider "change of circumstances" [he should have said "farther information;" as indeed he does, n versation with Lord Yarmouth, June 19, "the Emperor had received reports from his brother, and the general oicers under his orders, stating that Naples could