serve, on account of the little weight attached to them, merely to point out the person who did the deed.

above cited.

D. C. Glenn, attorney general.

HANDY, J.:

Vide authorities

The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted in the court below of burning a gin and cotton-house, contrary to the statute; and the case is brought here for review upon two grounds of error.

1st. The master of the slave was offered as a witness in behalf of the state, and for the purpose of proving confessions by the prisoner of his guilt. The witness testified that the prisoner was taken up about sixty miles from the place where the burning took place, and two or three days thereafter. That when the witness got possession of him, he chained his legs together, and brought him home in the stage-coach along with him. That witness then asked him why he burned the gin-house, and he replied that he did so because he wished to be hung; and that witness assumed, in the questions he asked him, that he had burnt the gin-house, but that no force was used to extort the confessions, and that the witness knew nothing of his own knowledge as to how the gin-house was burned, though he knew the fact that it was burned. The prisoner objected to the admission of the statements of the prisoner to his master; but the objection was overruled and exception taken; and this is the first ground of error relied on.

It is contended that it is not competent to give evidence of the confessions of a slave made to his master, because he is under the constraint of the master; and the confessions cannot be considered as being made freely and voluntarily, and without some degree of influence arising from the presence of the master, and obedience to his wishes.

The relation which the slave bears to the master is certainly one of dependence and obedience; but it is not necessarily one of constraint and duress. It is not to be presumed that the master exercises an undue influence over his slave to induce him to make confessions tending to convict him of a capital

offense; because, besides the feelings of justice and humanity which would forbid such efforts, it would be against the interest of the master that the slave should make confessions which would forfeit his life; for he would thereby sustain a loss to the amount of one-half of the value of the slave. Nor is it to be presumed that the slave will make confessions to his master tending to convict him of a crime for which he would suffer death, with a view of yielding to the wishes of the master, and when he was aware of the consequences of the commission of the crime; for that would be in opposition to all the promptings of self-preservation-the most powerful of all motives. It is rather to be presumed that he would deny his guilt, relying on the protection of the master, in the absence of inculpatory evidence. For the hope of protection from the master, in consequence of the denial, is a much more natural and reasonable motive, and far more just to the humane feelings of the master, than that of self-sacrifice to the master's cruelty. And the force of this motive is illustrated by the humane conduct which constant experience shows to be exhibited by masters, in the just and reasonable defence of their slaves when charged with the commission of crimes.

Although such confessions should be received with great caution, and excluded where there is anything tending to show that they were induced by fear, or by hopes of favor, or by undue influence of any description, we do not consider them inadmissible where there are no such circumstances shown; and we can perceive no danger in submitting them to be weighed by the jury. Such confessions are not incompetent upon any sound legal principle; and to establish the rule that they are incompetent, would be highly impolitic and dangerous; because, from the nature of the connection between master and slave, if confessions fully made to him should not be admissible, they would not be likely to be made to any others; and thus, however true the confessions, and however strongly corroborated by circumstances, all violations of law committed by slaves the proof of which depended on that sort of evidence, would go unpunished in the courts of justice. And the consequence of this would be, that a disposition would be created to punish slaves otherwise

than according to the rules and restraints of the law, which should operate both in its protection and in its punishments upon them as well as upon the white man.

We, therefore, think that this objection was properly overruled.

2d. It is objected that, as there was no evidence of the felonious burning besides the confessions of the prisoner, his confessions alone were not sufficient to support the indictment, upon the established principle that where the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, the prisoner's confession is not sufficient to warrant his conviction; and it is said that the corpus delicti consists in the felonious burning of the gin-house.

The main fact necessary to be established as the basis of the prosecution was, that the house had been burned; for, without that, there could be no guilt in any one. After proof of that fact, it was necessary to prove how it was done, and by whom; and these particulars could be established by any evidence which was competent in law, and sufficient in its force to satisfy the mind. The rule with regard to proof of the corpus delicti, apart from the mere confessions of the accused, proceeds upon the reason that the general fact, without which there could be no guilt, either in the accused or in any one else, must be established before any one could be convicted of the perpetration of the alleged criminal act which caused it; as in cases of homicide, the death must be shown; in larceny, it must be proved that the goods were lost by the owner; and in arson, that the house had been burned; for otherwise the accused might be convicted of murder, when the person alleged to be murdered was alive; or of larceny, when the owner had not lost the goods; or of arson, when the house was not burned. But when the general fact is proved, the foundation is laid, and it is competent to show, by any legal and sufficient evidence, how and by whom the act was committed, and that it was done criminally. Here the burning was proved apart from the prisoner's confessions; and the confessions were, therefore, properly admitted in evidence.

We think that there is no error in the record, and consequently the judgment must be affirmed.

SHARKEY V. STATE, 33 Miss. R., 353.

GAMING.

Betting money in this state is indictable, no matter if the subject-matter of the bet might not be within the state.

Error to Attala circuit court. HENRY, J.

M. C. Sharkey was indicted in the circuit court of Attala, for betting with one Matthews on the result of the election for electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, held in the state of Kentucky, in November, 1856.

The defendant demurred to the indictment, and his demurrer being overruled, he excepted, and sued out this writ of error.

J. A. P. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.

It is not a violation of the statute to bet on the result of an election to be held in another state. The act was intended to embrace all elections which may be held in this state. Code, 951.

Hutch.

In Delaware, it has been held to be no violation of her statute against gaming, to bet there on a horse-race to take place outside of Delaware. 4 Harr. 308.

Alabama has a statute similar to ours, and her supreme court has decided, that it was not a violation of her law to bet there on an election which has been consummated, though the result is unknown at the time of the bet. 2 Ala. 340.

D. C. Glenn, attorney general, argued the case orally. HANDY, J.:

This was an indictment for betting money in this state upon the result of the last Presidential election, held in the state of Kentucky.

The objection to the indictment is, that the offense charged is not within the mischief intended to be prohibited by the statute upon which it is founded; that the statute intended to suppress the practice of betting upon elections to be held in this state, the tendency of which was to produce undue excite

ment amongst our citizens, and improper interference with the elective franchise.

But this, though it may have been an evil intended to be prevented, is manifestly not the primary object of the statute. The statute was passed "to discourage and suppress gaming," and its provisions are directed against gaming, or wagering, or betting money, in various forms, and amongst others, "upon the result of any election, of any kind whatever." It is, therefore, the betting money in this state which was intended to be punished, though the subject-matter of the bet might not be within the limits of the state.

Upon this view, the judgment of the court below sustained the indictment; and it must be affirmed.

MILLER V. STATE, 33 Miss. R., 356.

GAMING.

Under the laws of this state, betting on the unknown result of an election which has already been held, is an indictable offense.

It is not necessary, as a general rule, to prove the offense to have been committed on the very day named in the indictment. But whenever time is of the essence of the offence, or a necessary part of the description of it, the time must be proved as laid. Time is not essential or descriptive of the offense of betting on an election. Objection to an illegal grand jury may be made by motion in arrest of judgment.1

In error from the circuit court of Attala county. Hon. E. G. HENRY, J.

J. A. P. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.

The record of this case presents two questions. First, upon the bill of exceptions; and second, upon the motion in arrest of judgment.

In the court below defendant was on trial, under an indictment for gaming, which charged that on the 28th day of

This provision has been modified by statute (Revised Code of 1857, p. 449, art. 181), which makes the empanelling of a grand jury conclusive evidence of competency and qualification; but permits exception to the array for fraud.