receiver of the bank on the 3d day of August, 1893, and took possession of the assets of the bank on the 8th day of the same month.

"The capital stock of the bank was 3,000 shares of the par value of $100 each. On the 25th day of October, 1893, an assessment was ordered by the Comptroller of $100 per share on the capital stock of the bank, to enforce the individual liability of stockholders, and an order made to pay such assessment on or before the 25th day of November, 1893; and the defendant was duly notified thereof.

"The defendant, being a national banking association, duly organized, and authorized to do business at Concord, N. H., on the 21st day of May, 1889, with a portion of its surplus funds, purchased of a third party, authorized to hold and make sale, 100 shares of the stock of the Indianapolis National Bank as an investment, and has ever since held the same as an investment. The defendant bank has appeared upon the books of the Indianapolis bank as a shareholder of 100 shares of its stock, from the time of such purchase to the present time. During such holding the [366]defendant bank received annual dividends declared by the Indianapolis bank *prior to July, 1893. The defendant has not paid said assessment or any part thereof."

After argument the court, on July 28, 1896, entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $11,646.67 and costs. From that judgment a writ of error from the United States circuit court of appeals for the first circuit was sued out, and by that court the judgment of the trial court was, on March 5, 1897, affirmed. 33 U. S. App. 747. From the judgment of the circuit court of appeals a writ of error was allowed to this


Mr. Frank S. Streeter for plaintiff in


The recent decision in California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 42 L. ed. 198, determines the point raised in this case.

No power is granted by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5136 to national banks to buy and sell stocks generally; nor is such power incidental to the business of banking.

First Nat. Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U. S. 122, 23 L. ed. 679; Logan County Nat. Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67, 73, 35 L. ed. 107, 110; Re Royal Bank of India, L. R. 4 Ch. 252; Fowler v. Scully, 72 Pa. 456, 13 Am. Rep. 699; Weckler v. First Nat. Bank, 42 Md. 581, 20 Am. Rep. 95; Nassau Bank v. Jones, 95 N. Y. 115, 47 Am. Rep.


Upon principle and authority a stockholder's liability to assessment is a contractual liability.

Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 30 L. ed. 864; Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 966; Hodgson v. Cheever, 8 Mo. App. 321; Manville v. Edgar, 8 Mo. App. 324; Queenan v. Palmer, 117 Ill. 619; Aultman's Appeal, 98 Pa. 505; Sackett's Harbour Bank v. Blake, 3 Rich. Eq. 225; Woods v. Wicks, 7 Lea, 40: Ex parte Van Riper, 20 Wend. 614; Grand Rapids Sav. Bank's Appeal, 52 Mich. 557; Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119; Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47.

The Concord Bank had no power to make the contract, and it cannot be enforced against it.

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 6 L. ed. 552; Head v. Providence Ins. Co. 2 Cranch, 127, 2 L. ed. 229; Beaty v. Knowler, 4 Pet. 152, 7 L. ed. 813; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 10 L. ed. 274; Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. 9 How. 172, 13 L. ed. 92; Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Oregonian R. Co. 130 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 837; Logan County Nat. Bank v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67, 35 L. ed. 107; Wiley v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Vt. 546; Whitney v. First Nat. Bank, 50 Vt. 388, 28 Am. Rep. 503; Talmage v. Pell, 7 N. Y. 328; Franklin Co. v. Lewiston Inst. for Savings, 68 Me. 43, 28 Am. Rep. 9; Crocker v. Whitney, 71 N. Y. 161.

The Concord Bank is not estopped to insist upon the defense of ultra vires.

Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 24, 35 L. ed. 55; Pennsylva nia R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. 118 U. S. 290, 30 L. ed. 83; Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. 101 U. S. 85, 25 L. ed. 953; Atty. Gen. v. Great Eastern R. Co. L. R. 5 App. Cas. 473; Small v. Smith, L. R. 10 App. Cas. 119; Wenlock v. River Dee Co. L. R. 10 App. Cas. 354; Trevor v. Whitworth, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 409; McCormick v. Market Nat. Bank, 165 U. S. 538, 41 L. ed. 817; Union P. R. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 163 U. S. 564, 41 L. ed. 265.

Messrs. John G. Carlisle and J. W. Kern, for defendant in error:

This court, recognizing the policy of the law in this respect, has decided that the comptroller has authority to make assessments upon the shareholders to pay debts, and that an assessment made for that purpose is conclusive both as to necessity for making it and as to the amount of each shareholder's liability.

Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 19 L. ed. 476; Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 680, 24 L. ed. 168, 170; National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628, 25 L. ed. 448; Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 527, 24 L. ed. 181.

National banks are not expressly prohib ited by the law from acquiring or holding shares of stock in other corporations, but on the contrary, are permitted to do so under certain circumstances.

California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 42 L. ed. 198; Anderson v. Philadel phia Warehouse Co. 111 U. S. 479, 28 L. ed. 478; National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628, 25 L. ed. 448; Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251, 27 L. ed. 386.

One is estopped from denying his liability by voluntarily holding himself out to the public as the owner of stock.

Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328, 24 L. ed. 818; Sanger v. Upton, 91 U. S. 56, 23 L. ed. 220; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 23 L. ed. 203; Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65, 23 L. ed. 384; Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, 24 L. ed. 168.

The express language of the act of Congress imposing the liability on the party to whom the shares are transferred on the

books of the bank estops the plaintiff in error to deny its obligation to pay the amount, and thus deprive the creditors of the failed bank of a security which the law clearly intended to afford them. The liability is not contractual, but statutory.

Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 125 U. S. 60, 31 L. ed. 689; Welles v. Larrabee, 36 Fed. Rep. 866, 2 L. R. A. 471; Witters v. Sowles, 32 Fed. Rep. 767; Pauly v. State Loan & T. Co. 165 U. S. 606, 41 L. ed. 844; Citizens' State Bank v. Hawkins, 34 U. S. App. 423, 71 Fed. Rep. 369, 18 C. C. A. 78; Cooper Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 34 U. S. App. 428, 71 Fed. Rep. 373, 18 C. C. A. 81; Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 33 L. ed. 531.

366] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion

of the court:

The questions presented for our consideration in this case are whether one national bank can lawfully acquire and hold the stock of another as an investment, and, if not, whether, in the case of such an actual purchase, the bank is estopped to deny its liability, as an apparent stockholder, for an assessment on such stock ordered by the Comptroller of the Currency.

By section 5136 of the Revised Statutes a national banking association is authorized "to exercise by its board of directors, or duly authorized officers and agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of indebtedness; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of this


In construing this provision, it was said 367]by this court, in *First National Bank v. Na tional Exchange Bank, 92 J. S 122 [23: 679], that "dealing in stocks is not expressly prohibited, but such prohibition is implied from the failure to grant the power. In the honest exercise of the power to compromise a doubtful debt owing to a bank, it can hardly be doubted that stock may be accepted in payment and satisfaction, with a view to their subsequent sale or conversion into money so as to make good or reduce an anticipated loss. Such a transaction would not amount to a dealing in stocks."

And in the recent case of California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362 [42: 198], it was said to be "settled that the United States statutes relative to national banks constitute the measure of the authority of such corporations, and that they cannot rightfully exercise any powers except those expressly granted, or which are incidental to carrying on the business for which they are established. No express power to acquire the stock of another corporation is conferred upon a national bank, but it has been held that, as incidental to the power to loan money on personal security, a bank may, in the usual course of doing such business, accept stock of another corporation as collateral, and by the enforcement of its rights 174 U. S. U. S., Book 43.

as pledgee it may become the owner of the
collateral and be subject to liability as other
stockholders. So, also, a national bank may
be conceded to possess the incidental power
of accepting in good faith stock of another
corporation as security for a previous indebt-
edness. It is clear, however, that a national
bank does not possess the power to deal in
stocks. The prohibition is implied from the
failure to grant the power."

Accordingly it was held in that case that
a provision of the laws of the state of Cali
fornia, which declared a liability on the part
of stockholders to pay the debts of a savings
bank, in proportion to the amount of stock
held by each, could not be enforced against a
national bank, in whose name stood shares
that the stock of the savings bank had not
of stock in a savings bank, it being admitted
been taken as security, and that the transac
tion by which the stock was placed in the

name of the national bank was one not in the

course of the business of banking for which
the bank was organized.

*It is suggested by the learned circuit [368}
for a rehearing in the circuit court of ap-
judge, in his opinion overruling a petition
peals, that the question considered in the
case of California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy
was the liability of a national bank as a
the question in the present case is as to its
stockholder in a state savings bank, while
liability as a stockholder in another national
bank, and that therefore it does not follow
beyond question that the decision in the form-
er case is decisive of the present one. 50
U. S. App. 178.

No reason is given by the learned judge in support of the solidity of such a distinction, and none occurs to us. Indeed, we think that the reasons which disqualify a national bank from investing its money in the stock of another corporation are quite as obvious when that other corporation is a national bank as in the case of other corporations. The investment by national banks of their surplus funds in other national banks, situated, perhaps, in distant states, as in the present case, is plainly against the meaning and policy of the statutes from which they derive their powers, and evil consequences would be certain to ensue if such a course of conduct were countenanced as lawful. Thus, it is enacted, in section 5146, that "every director must, during his whole term of service, be a citizen of the United States, and at least three fourths of the directors must have resided in the state, territory, or district in which the association is located for at least one year immediately preceding their election, and must be residents therein during their continuance in office."

One of the evident purposes of this enactment is to confine the management of each bank to persons who live in the neighborhood, and who may, for that reason, be supposed to know the trustworthiness of those who are to be appointed officers of the bank, and the character and financial ability of those who may seek to borrow its money. But if the funds of a bank in New Hampshire, instead of being retained in the custody and management of its directors. are 64


invested in the stock of a bank in Indiana, the policy of this wholesome provision of the statute would be frustrated. The property of the local stockholders, so far as thus in[369]vested, would not be managed by directors of their own selection, but by distant and unknown persons. Another evil that might result, if large and wealthy banks were permitted to buy and hold the capital stock of other banks, would be that, in that way, the banking capital of a community might be concentrated in one concern, and business men be deprived of the advantages that attend competition between banks. Such accumulation of capital would be in disregard of the policy of the national banking law, as seen in its numerous provisions regulating the amount of the capital stock and the methods to be pursued in increasing or reducing it. The smaller banks, in such a case, would be in fact, though not in form, branches of the larger one.

Section 5201 may also be referred to as indicating the policy of this legislation. It is in the following terms:

"No association shall make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, nor be the purchaser or holder of any such shares, unless such security or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith; and stock so purchased or acquired shall, within six months from the time of its purchase, be sold or disposed of at public or private sale; or, in default thereof, a receiver may be appointed to close up the business of the association."

This provision forbidding a national bank to own and hold shares of its own capital stock would, in effect, be defeated if one national bank were permitted to own and hold a controlling interest in the capital stock of another.

Without pursuing this branch of the subject further, we are satisfied to express our conclusion, upon principle and authority, that the plaintiff in error, as a national banking association, had no power or authority to purchase with its surplus funds as an investment, and hold as such, shares of stock in the Indianapolis National Bank of Indianapolis.

The remaining question for our determi nation is whether the First National Bank of Concord, having, as a matter of fact, but without authority of law, purchased and held as an investment shares of stock in the [370]Indianapolis National Bank, *can protect itself from a suit by the receiver of the latter brought to enforce the stockholders' liability, arising under an assessment by the Comptroller of the Currency, by alleging the unlawfulness of its own action.

This question has been so recently answered by decisions of this court that it will be sufficient, for our present purpose, to cite those decisions without undertaking to fortify the reasoning and conclusions therein reached.

In Central Transportation Company v. Pullman's Palace Car Co. 139 U. S. 24 [35: 55], after an examination of the authorities, the conclusion was thus stated by Mr. Justice Gray:

"It was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that, even if the contract sued on was void, because ultra vires and against public policy, yet that, having been fully performed on the part of the plaintiff, and the benefits of it received by the defendant, for the period covered by the declaration, the defendant was estopped to set up the invalidity of the contract as a defense to this action to recover the compensation agreed on for that period. But this argument, though sustained by decisions in some of the states, finds no support in the judgment of this court. The view which this court has taken of the question presented by this branch of the case, and the only view which appears to us consistent with legal principles, is as follows:

"A contract of a corporation which is ultra vires in the proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation as defined in the law of its organization, and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, is not voidable only, but wholly void and of no legal effect. The objection to the contract is, not merely that the corporation ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it. The contract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not be authorized by either. No performance on either side can give the unlawful contract any validity, or be the foundation of any right of action upon it.

"When a corporation is acting within the general scope of the powers conferred upon it by the legislature, the corporation, as well as persons contracting with it, may be estopped to deny that it has complied with the[371] legal formalities which are prerequisites to its existence or to its action, because such requisites might in fact have been complied with. But when the contract is beyond the powers conferred upon it by existing laws, neither the corporation nor the other party to the contract can be estopped by assenting to it, or by acting upon it, to show that it was prohibited by those laws."

The principles thus asserted were directly applied in the case of California Nat. Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 367 [42: 198], where the question and the answer were thus stated by Mr. Justice White:

"The transfer of the stock in question to the bank being unauthorized by law, does the fact that, under some circumstances, the bank might have legally acquired stock in the corporation estop the bank from setting up the illegality of the transaction?

"Whatever divergence of opinion may arise from conflicting adjudications in some of the state courts, in this court it is settled in favor of the right of the corporation to plead its want of power, that is to say, to assert the nullity of an act which is an ultra vires act. The cases recognize as sound doctrine that the powers of corporations are such only as are conferred upon them by stat ute."

There is then quoted a passage from the decision of the court in McCormick v. Market National Bank, 165 U. S. 549 [41: 821], as follows:

"The doctrine of ultra vires, by which a

contract made by a corporation beyond the | It is doubtless within the scope of the Comp-
scope of its corporate powers is unlawful troller's duty, when informed by the reports
and void, and will not support an action, of the bank that such an investment has been
rests, as this court has often recognized and made, to direct that it be at once disposed
affirmed, upon three distinct grounds: The of, but the Comptroller's act in ordering an
obligation of anyone contracting with a cor- assessment, while conclusive as to the neces-
poration to take notice of the legal limits sity for making it, involves no judgment by
of its powers; the interest of the stockhold him as to the judicial rights of parties to be
ers not to be subject to risks which they have affected. While he, of course, assumes that
never undertaken, and, above all, the inter- there are stockholders to respond to his or-
est of the public that the corporation shall der, it is not his function to inquire or de-
not transcend the powers conferred upon it termine what, if any, stockholders are ex-
by law."

The conclusion reached was thus expressed:

"The claim that the bank, in consequence [372]of the receipt *by it of dividends on the stock of the savings bank, is estopped from questioning its ownership and consequent liability, is but a reiteration of the contention that the acquiring of stock by the bank, under the circumstances disclosed, was not void but merely voidable. It would be a contradiction in terms to assert that there was a total want of power by any act to assume the liability, and yet to say that by a particular act the liability resulted. The transaction being absolutely void could not be confirmed or ratified."

In the present case it is sought to escape the force of these decisions by the contention that the liability of the stockholder in a national bank to respond to an assessment in case of insolvency is not contractual, but statutory.

Undoubtedly, the obligation is declared by the statute to attach to the ownership of the stock, and in that sense may be said to be statutory. But as the ownership of the stock, in most cases, arises from the voluntary act of the stockholder, he must be regarded as having agreed or contracted to be subject to the obligation.

However, whether, in the case of persons sui juris, this liability is to be regarded as a contractual incident to the ownership of the stock, or as a statutory obligation, does not seem to present a practical question in the present case.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, the judgment of the Circuit Court is also reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to enter a judgment in conformity with this opinion.

WILLIAM M. PRICE, Administrator of
Henry C. Miller, Deceased, Appt.,


UNITED STATES and the Osage Indians.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 373-379.)

Act of March 3, 1891-jurisdiction of court of claims-property destroyed by Indians -construction of the act.





Under the act of March 3, 1891, a claimant may recover the value of his property taken from him by the Indians, but cannot recover consequential damages to other property resulting from the taking.

The jurisdiction of the court of claims cannot be enlarged by implication.

Consequential damages to property not taken or destroyed are not within the scope of the act authorizing recovery for damages The terms "damaged or destroyed" in the to property taken or destroyed. act of March 3, 1885, respecting allowances by the Interior Department of claims for Indian depredations, do not apply to property not damaged or destroyed, but which the owner was prevented from sending to market because his means of transportation were destroyed.

[No. 247.]


If the previous reasoning be sound, whereby the conclusion was reached that, by reason of the limitations and provisions of the national banking statutes, it is not competent for an association organized thereunder to take upon itself, for investment, owner- Argued April 19, 1899. Decided May 15, ship of such stock, no intention can be reasonably imputed to Congress to subject the stockholders and creditors thereof, for whose protection those limitations and provisions were designed, to the same liability by reason of a void act on the part of the officers of the bank, as would have resulted from a lawful act.

It is argued, on behalf of the receiver, that the object of the statute was to afford a speedy and effective remedy to the creditors of a failed bank, and that this object would be defeated in a great many cases if the Comptroller were obliged to inquire into the [373]validity of all the contracts by which the registered shareholders acquired their respective shares.

The force of this objection is not apparent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of

Claims in favor of William M. Price, administrator, etc., against the United States et al. for the taking of certain property of the claimant by the Osage Indians. Affirmed.

See same case below, 33 Ct. Cl. 106.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: This case comes to us on appeal from the Court of Claims. The matter of dispute is disclosed by the second and fourth findings of the court, which are as follows:

Second. "On the 26th day of June, 1847, near the Arkansas river, on the route from western Missouri to Santa Fé, at a place in

what is now the state of Kansas, Indians be- | R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 456, 33 L. ed. longing to the Osage tribe took and drove 980, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209. away 32 head of oxen, the property of said decedent, which at the time and place of tak[374]ing *were reasonably worth the sum of four hundred dollars ($400).

"At the time said oxen were taken they were being used by said decedent in the transportation of goods along the route aforesaid, and in consequence of such taking decedent was compelled to abandon the trip and to sell his portion of said goods and four (4) wagons belonging to him for the sum of one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200).

"The goods and wagons of said decedent at the time of the depredation were reasonably worth the sum of seven thousand six hundred dollars ($7,600).

"Said property was taken as aforesaid without just cause or provocation on the part of the owner or his agent in charge and has not been returned or paid for."

Fourth. "A claim for the property so taken was presented to the Interior Department in June, 1872, and evidence was filed in support thereof.""

Judgment in that court was entered for $400 (33 Ct. Cl. 106), to review which judgment the petitioner appealed.

Messrs. John Goode and F. N. Judson, for appellant:

The purpose of the statute of 1891 was remedial, and the construction which the court of claims placed upon it in the case at bar defeats the primary purpose of the enactment.

United States v. Northwestern Express Stage & Transp. Co. 164 U. S. 686, 41 L. ed 599; United States v. Gorham, 165 U. S. 316, 41 L. ed. 729; Corralitos Stock Co. v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 342; Salois v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 68.

Messrs. Frank B. Crosthwaite and John G. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

*Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin-[374 ion of the court:

claim was presented to the Interior Depart
The fourth finding simply shows that a
ment and evidence filed in support thereof.
the presentation of the claim and of the fil-
The petition alleges, not merely the fact of
ing of evidence to sustain it, but also an
award by the Secretary of the amount of $6,-
800, a sum covering both the value of the
property taken by the Indians and the conse
quential damages resulting therefrom. A
demurrer by the defendants having been over-
ruled, a traverse was filed, denying all the
allegations of the petition. Taking the[375]
pleadings with the findings we might justly
assume that there had never been any award
by the Secretary of the Interior, but only a

The damages found by the Secretary of the
Interior were the damages actually sus-
tained by the plaintiff from the Indian dep-presentation of a claim and evidence in sup-

Price v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 106; Eaton v. Boston, C. & M. R. Co. 51 N. H. 504, 12 Am. Rep. 147; McAfee v. Crofford, 13 How. 447, 14 L. ed. 217; Hale, Dam. p. 43; Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. ed. 256.

The term "consequential," as applied to these damages, is essentially misleading. They were in no sense remote.

1 Sedgw. Dam. (8th ed.) §§ 110, 124, 133; Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718.

The act of 1891 and the act of 1885 must be construed together, and the words "taken and destroyed," in the act of 1891, must be construed as the equivalent of "damaged or destroyed," in the act of 1885.

Valk v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 241, 29 Ct. Cl. 62; Swope v. United States, 33 Ct. O. 223; Friend v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 425; Johnson v. United States, 160 U. S. 550, 40 L. ed. 531.

The court of claims erred in holding that
the act of March 3, 1891, limited the juris-
diction of the court in allowance of damages
from the depredation to cases of total loss or

Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13
Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; Eaton v. Boston, C.
& M. R. Co. 51 N. H. 504; Story v. New York
Elev. R. Co. 90 N. Y. 122, 43 Am. Rep. 146;
Re Chestnut Street, 118 Pa. 593; Spencer v.
Point Pleasant & O. River R. Co. 23 W. Va.
415; Jones v. Erie & W. Valley R. Co. 151
Pa. 46, 17 L. R. A. 758; Chicago, M. & St. P.

port thereof; but we notice that the court of claims speaks of the award as though it was a fact found. We feel, therefore, constrained to consider the case on that basis.

The conclusions of the Secretary, both as to liability and amount, were placed before the court for consideration by the election of the defendants to reopen the case. This election opened the whole case. Leighton v. United States, 161 U. S. 291 [40: 703].

The liability of the defendants is not disputed. The single question presented is as to the amount which may be recovered. The value of the property taken was awarded, and the only question is whether the plaintiff was entitled, not merely to the value of that property, but also to the damages to other property which resulted as a consequence of the taking. The property which was not taken or destroyed, which remained in the possession of the plaintiff's intestate, which he could do with as he pleased, the title and possession of which were not disturbed, was, as the findings show, reasonably worth $7.600. Because out in the unoccupied terri tory in which the taking of the oxen took place there was no market, and because he had no means of transporting the property not taken to a convenient market, he was subject to the whim or caprice of a passing traveler, and sold it to him for $1,200. The loss thereby entailed upon him he claims to recover under the provisions of the statute of March 3, 1891. 26 U. S. Stat. at. L. chap. 538, p. 851.

The right of the plaintiff to recover is

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