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for the construction of the work, the complainant in the name of the San Francisco Bridge Company and the defendant in the name of Hoffman & Bates; that the bids should not be in reality competitive, but should be submitted to each other before they were put in, and their terms should be mutually agreed upon, the higher bids to be merely formal, and the bids themselves as agreed upon should be delivered to the water committee; that if either party received the contract, they should both share in the profit or loss resulting from its performance, but that their mutual interest in each other's bids should not be made known when the bids were offered, so that it would appear that they were apparently competing for the various classes of the work and for furnishing the material, when in fact they were not. This agreement, the defendant alleged, was carried out, and the contract secured by means thereof.

The court upon motion of the complainant granted a temporary injunction as prayed for in the bill. Exceptions were taken to certain parts of the answer of the defendant as being insufficient. Material portions of these exceptions were overruled by the court upon the ground that the answer set up an illegal contract between the parties, and one which could not be enforced by either. 69 Fed. Rep. 509.

Upon the final hearing of the case the same judge, becoming convinced that he had erred in his former decision in overruling the exceptions to the answer, decided that the case as made on the part of the defendant showed no defense to the complainant's cause of action, and thereupon he made a decree for an accounting substantially as asked for in the complainant's bill. 75 Fed. Rep. 547.

An appeal from the decree of the circuit court was taken to the United States circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit, and that court held that the contract between the parties was illegal, and that no action could be maintained thereon by either, and the decree in favor of the complainant was therefore reversed. 48 U. S. App. 596. Complainant then applied to this court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the circuit, court of appeals, which was granted May 9, 1898. 170 U. S. 705, mem.

Messrs. William A. Maury and L. B. Cox, for petitioner:

duty of Hoffman to account to him for half their earned profits, which duty grew or al and rested upon their relationship as partners.

Hanks v. Baber, 53 111. 292; Chace v. Trafford, 116 Mass. 532, 17 Am. Rep. 171; Tenant v. Elliott, 1 Bos. & P. 3; Farmer v. Russcll, 1 Bos. & P. 296.

An obligation will be enforced, though indirectly connected with an illegal transac tion, if it is supported by an independent consideration, so that the plaintiff does not require the aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case.

Swan v. Scott, 11 Serg. & R. 155; Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 33 L. ed. 747; Frost v. Plumb, 40 Conn. 111, 16 Am. Rep. 18; Wright v. Pipe Line Co. 101 Pa. 204, 47 Am. Rep. 701.

The grounds upon which McMullen is entitled to recover in this suit have been established and repeatedly declared by this court and by other courts of the Union, both Federal and state.

Planters' Bank v. Union Bank, 16 Wall. 483, 21 L. ed. 473; Union P. R. Co. v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576, 24 L. ed. 391; Wann v. Kelly, 2 McCrary, 628; Hipple v. Rice, 28 Pa. 406; Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss. 641; Willson v. Owen, 30 Mich. 474; Owen v. Davis, 1 Bail. L. 315; Harvey v. Varney, 98 Mass. 118; Lewin, Trusts, 68; McDaniel v. Maxwell, 21 Or. 202; Smith v. Hubbs, 10 Me. 71; Ownes v. Ownes, 23 N. J. Eq. 60; King v. Winants, 71 N. C. 469, 17 Am. Rep. 11.

Each portion of said agreement between Hoffman and McMullen was readily severable from the other, and each was substantially a distinct contract, which could, if necessary, be enforced quite independently of the other.

Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 70, 22 L. ed. 319; Pickering v. Ilfra combe R. Co. L. R. 3 C. P. 235; Bank of Australasia v. Breillat, 6 Moore, P. C. c. 200; Treadwell v. Davis, 34 Cal. 601, 94 Am. Dec. 770; Erie R. Co. v. Union Locomotive & Exp. Co. 35 N. J. L. 240.

The action of McMullen in submitting a high bid for the work in suit had no rational tendency to deceive the water committee.

Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 18 L. ed. 752; Veazie v. Williams, How. 134, 12 L. ed 1018; Conolly v. Parsons, cited in 3 Ves. Jr. 625, note e; National Bank of the Metropolis v. Sprague, 20 N. J. Eq. 159.

Mr. Rufus Mallory, for respondent: No partnership touching the work in conMcMullen and Hoffman combined, not as troversy resulted from anything which honest bidders, but to prevent competition. transpired between Hoffman and McMullen Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147, 3 Am. prior to the award made upon Hoffman's Rep. 678; Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns. 195; bid, nor until they had signed the partner-Wilbur v. How, 8 Johns. 444; Swan v. Chorship agreement of March 6, and entered upon the performance of the work contemplated therein.

Powell v. Maguire, 43 Cal. 11; Reboul v. Chalker, 27 Conn. 114; Wilson v. Campbell, 10 Ill. 383; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Barringer, 73 Ill. 230; Doyle 7. Bailey, 75 Ill. 418; Meagher v. Reed, 14 Colo. 335, 9 L. R. A.

455.

McMullen's cause of suit was not based upon the partnership contract, but upon the

penning, 20 Cal. 182; Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J. L. 107; Thompson v. Davies, 13 Johns. 112; Holladay v. Patterson, 5 Or. 177; Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348; Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592; Engelman v. Skrainka, 14 Mo. App. 438; Woodruff v. Berry, 40 Ark. 251; Jenkins v. Frink, 30 Cal. 586, 89 Am. Dec. 134; Hunter v. Pfeiffer, 108 Ind.

197.

Agreements, the natural tendency of which is to prevent competition in sales at

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[644] *Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The foregoing statement shows that there is a difference of opinion in the courts below [645]as to the law applicable to the case. The question is one of importance, involving as it does the principles which should control in regard to the procurement of contracts at public lettings for work to be awarded to the lowest bidder. Assuming the same facts, the courts below have come to opposite conclusions upon the character of the contract and upon the right of the complainant to obtain redress for his alleged wrongs.

It was on account of the general importance of the question and the many lettings for public works by the government and by municipal corporations which are affected by the law relative to bidding, that this court thought it a proper case to issue the writ of certiorari herein. The cases upon the subject are not entirely harmonious, and we think it well to again consider some of them and so far as possible to remove the doubts which seemingly have arisen in this branch of the law.

Looking in the record before us, we find that the pleadings, and proofs taken herein, show that for some time prior to the 6th of March, 1893, the city of Portland intended to add to its water supply by bringing to the city the water from a creek or river called Bull Run, some thirty miles distant, and for that purpose it had issued through its water committee proposals for bids to build the works, which proposals were divided into several different classes as already stated.

The complainant McMullen, living in San Francisco and being a large stockholder in and manager of the San Francisco Bridge Company, came to Portland for the purpose of giving his attention to the matter, and if possible to make an arrangement with the defendant by which they might together become bidders for the work. He and the defendant had many interviews before the time of delivering the bids arrived, and they finally agreed that each party should put in separate bids in his own or his firm name, or in the name of his company, for certain classes of the work, but that they both should have a common interest in each bid if any were accepted. This community of interest was to be kept secret and concealed from all persons, including the water committee. Each was to know the amount of

the other's bid, and all bids were to be put[646] in only after mutual consultation and agreement. Bids for the various classes of work were put in as above set forth, and among them the bid for the manufacture and laying of the pipe, which was accepted by the water committee. All of them were put in pursuant to this agreement, part of them in the name of Hoffman & Bates and part in the name of the San Francisco Bridge Company. The bid in the name of the San Francisco Bridge Company for the manufacture of the pipe was nearly $50,000 higher than the amount bid in the name of Hoffman & Bates, and was put in after consultation with and approval by the defendant. This last bid was put in, as stated by Mr. McMullen in his evidence, as a matter of form only, and to keep the name of his company before the public, but it appeared on its face to be a bona fide bid. The water committee received the bids in ignorance of the existence of this agreement and in the supposition that all the bids which were received were made in good faith, and they all received consideration at the hands of the committee. After the computations were made by which it appeared that the bid of the defendant was the lowest for the manufacture and laying of the pipe, the contract was awarded him, and afterwards that portion of the agreement which had been made between the parties to this combination, viz., that relating to the partnership, was reduced to writing, and is set out in the foregoing statement.

Upon these facts the question arising is whether a contract between the parties themselves, such as is above set forth, is illegal? In order to answer the question we would first naturally ask what is its direct and necessary tendency? Most clearly that it tends to induce the belief that there is really competition between the parties making the different bids, although the truth is that there is no such competition, and that they are in fact united in interest. It would also tend to the belief on the part of the committee receiving the bids that a bona fide bidder, seeking to obtain the contract, regarded the price he named, although much higher than the lowest bid, as a fair one for the purpose of enabling him to realize reasonable profits from its performance. A bid thus made *amounts to a representation that[647] the sum bid is not in truth an unreasonable or too great a sum for the work to be done. We do not mean it is a warranty to that effect or anything of the kind, but simply that a committee receiving such a bid and assuming it to be a bona fide bid would naturally regard it as a representation that the work to be done, with a fair profit, would, in the opinion of the bidder, cost the amount bid. Hence it would almost certainly tend to the belief that the lower bid was not an unreasonably high one, and that it would be unnecessary and improper to reject all the bids and advertise for a new letting. The fact that there were other bids even higher than that of the San Francisco Bridge Company, for the manufacture and laying of the pipes, does not alter the tendency of the agreement, when carried into effect, to create

or to strengthen the belief on the part of | the committee in the fact of an active competition and the bona fide character of that competition, and that the lowest bid would be in all probability a reasonable one. It is, in truth utterly impossible to accurately or fully predict all the vicious results to be apprehended as the natural effect of this kind of an agreement. It cannot be said in all cases just what the actual effect may have

been.

The natural tendency and inherent character of the agreement are also unaffected by any evidence produced on the part of the complainant, that the chairman of the water committee had, when examined nearly three years after the occurrence, no recollection as to the bid of the bridge company or that it had any particular effect upon his mind, and that he said that the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder simply because he was the lowest bidder, and without reference to the bid of the bridge company.

depend upon the success which attends the
execution of any particular agreement.
In Providence Tool Company v. Norris, 2
Wall. 45, 56 [17: 868, 871], the court said, in
speaking as to illegal agreements:

"It is sufficient to observe, generally, that
all agreements for pecuniary considerations
to control the business operations of the gov
ernment, or the regular administration of
justice, or the appointments to public of.
fices, or the ordinary course of legislation,
are void as against public policy, without
reference to the question whether improper
means are contemplated or used in their exe-
cution."

*And in King v. De Berenger, 3 Maule & S.[649] 67, 72, cited in Scott v. Brown [1892] 2 Q.B. 724, 730, Lord Ellenborough, Ch. J., said:

"A public mischief is stated as the object of this conspiracy; the conspiracy is by false rumors to raise the price of the public funds and securities; and the crime lies in the act of conspiracy and combination to effect that purpose, and would have been complete, although it had not been pursued to its consequences, or the parties had not been able to carry it into effect. The purpose itself is mischievous; it strikes at the price of a vendible commodity in the market, and if it gives it a fictitious price by means of false rumors, it is a fraud levelled against all the public, for it is against all such as may possibly have anything to do with the funds on that particular day."

The question is not whether in this particular case any member of the water committee did or did not remember the fact that the bridge company had made a bid, or that such bid had no effect upon his mind. The question is not as to the effect a particular act in fact had upon a member of the water committee, but what is the tendency and character of the agreement made be18]tween the parties; and that tendency *or character is not altered by proof on the part of a member of the committee, given several years afterwards, that he had no special recollec- legal in their nature and tendency, and for tion that such a bid had been made. The that reason no inquiry is necessary as to the evidence is that all the bids that were given particular effect of any one contract, because received the consideration of the committee, it would not alter the general nature of conand there can be no doubt that the more bids tracts of this description or the force of the there were, seemingly of a bona fide char-public policy which condemns them. acter, the more the committee would be im

pressed with the idea that there was active

competition for the work to be done.

Contracts of the nature of this one are il

In the case at bar the illegal character of fact that it tends to lessen competition, but the agreement is founded, not alone upon the It might readily be surmised that if these also upon the fact of the commission of a parties had bid in competition, one or both of fraud by the parties in combining their inthe bids would have been lower than their terests and concealing the same, and in subcombined bid. It was not necessary, how-mitting different bids as if they were bona ever, to prove so difficult a fact. The inference would be natural.

In Richardson v. Crandall, 48 N. Y. 348, 362, the court said: "In all cases where contracts are claimed to be void as against public policy, it matters not that any particular contract is free from any taint of actual fraud, oppression, or corruption. The law looks to the general tendency of such contracts. The vice is in the very nature of the contract, and it is considered as belonging to a class which the law will not tolerate," citing Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147 [3 Am. Rep. 678].

Although these remarks were made when the court was dealing with the case of a bond taken colore officii, yet the principle applies equally to a case like the one at bar, and indeed it is seen that such was the view of the judge delivering the opinion, since he cited Atcheson v. Mallon, which in its nature is a case very similar to the one now before us.

The vice is inherent in contracts of this kind, and its existence does not in the least 174 U. S. U. S., Book 43.

fide, when they knew that one of them was so much higher than the other that it could not be honestly accepted, and when they put it in for the sake of keeping up the form and of strengthening the idea of a competition which did not in fact exist. The tendency of such agreements is bad, although in some particular case it might be difficult to show that it actually accomplished a fraud, while its intention to do so would be plain enough. Therefore, when it is urged that these parties had no intention of bidding for this work alone, and that unless they had combined their bids neither would have bid at all, and hence the agreement between them tended to strengthen instead of to suppress competition, this answer to *the illegality of the trans-[650] action is insufficient. The evidence, however, does not show that if these parties had not agreed upon a combination neither would have bid alone. It shows complainant came to Portland to see the defendant and to conclude their arrangements to go into the combination, but we are by no means of the opinion that the evidence shows that if they had 71

1121

not combined they would not have bid at all. Complainant's company had bid alone at a prior letting, some time before, and had then been the lowest bidder for the contract, which the city did not award because of a lack of means of payment for the work consequent upon a veto by the governor of the bill providing for the issuing of bonds to make such payment. And it seems that the defendant himself was well able to carry on the contract alone.

If it be granted that the fact was proved that neither party would have bid separately and that by virtue of the combination a bid was made which otherwise would not have been offered, the significance of the other facts in the case is not thereby altered. Those other facts are the concealment of the interest which the parties had in each other's bids, and the making of what were under the circumstances nothing more than fictitious bids for this and the other classes of work for which both parties put in bids, evidently for no other purpose than to endeavor thereby to deceive the committee into believing that there was real competition between them, when in fact there was none. If there had been competition, the bid of each for the contract that was obtained might very likely have been lower than the one that was accepted. It is not necessary to prove that fact in order to show the nefarious character of the agreement.

The reason given for the making of these fictitious bids by the complainant, that it was a formal matter and to keep the name of his company before the public, is entirely inadequate. The bids actually put in by them for the other classes of work had the same tendency to strengthen belief in the reality of the competition which in fact did not exist between these persons. The whole transaction was intentionally presented to the water committee in a false and deceptive light.

[651] *Upon general principles it must be apparent that biddings for contracts for public works cannot be surrounded with too many precautions for the purpose of obtaining perfectly fair and bona fide bids. Such precautions are absolutely necessary in order to prevent the successful perpetration of fraud in the way of combinations among those who

are ostensible rivals but who in truth are

secretly banded together for the purpose of obtaining contracts from public bodies such as municipal and other corporations at a higher figure than they otherwise would. Just how the fraud is to be successfully worked out by the combination, it is not necessary to show. It is enough to see what the natural tendency is. Public policy requires that officers of such corporations, acting in the interest of others, and not using the sharp eye of a practical man engaged in the conduct of his own business and not controlled by the powerful motive of self-interest, should, so far as possible and for the sake of the public whom they represent, be protected from the dangers arising out of a concealed combination and from fictitious bids.

To hold contracts like the one involved in

this case illegal is not to create any new rule of law for the purpose of affording the pro tection spoken of. It is but enforcing an old rule, and applying it to such facts as exist in this case because it naturally fits them. Its enforcement here is to but carry into effect the public policy upon which the rule itself is founded. People who have been guilty of the conduct exhibited in this record cannot be heard to say that although their arrangement was fraudulent and illegal, they would nevertheless have obtained the contract even if they had not been guilty of the fraud, because the bids show they were the lowest bidders. The bids might have been lower yet if there had been competition where there was in fact combination. The parties must accept the consequences resulting from entering into the agreement proved in this case all of which they carried out, and included in which and as a consequence thereof was the agreement with the city and the written agreement of partnership between themselves.

In Hyer v. Richmond Traction Company, 168 U.S. 471 [42 L. ed. 547], in *speaking as to[652] the character of the agreement in that case, Mr. Justice Brewer remarked that the vice of a combination "lies in the fact of secrecy, concealment, and deception; the one applicant, though apparently antagonizing the other, is really supporting the latter's application, and the public authorities are misled by statements and representations coming from a supposed adverse, but in fact friendly, source.'

In that case the demurrer admitted the allegation of the complaint that the combina tion of the two interests asking for the concession from the common council was known and announced to that body before its decision was made. The case simply shows the part which concealment takes in a combination, being in fact one of the great dangers springing therefrom.

In Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N. Y. 147, 151,

Judge Folger, in delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"But a joint proposal, the result of honest co-operation, though it might prevent the rivalry of the parties, and thus lessen competition, is not an act forbidden by public policy. Joint adventures are allowed. They are public and avowed, and not secret. The risk, as well as the profit, is joint, and openly assumed. The public may obtain at least the benefit of the joint responsibility, and of the joint ability to do the service. The public agents know, then, all that there is in the transaction, and can more justly estimate the motives of the bidders, and weigh the merits of the bid."

We have here nothing to do with a combination of interest which is open and avowed. which appears upon the face of the bid and which is therefore known to all. Such a combination is frequently proper, if not essential, and, where no concealment is practised and the fact is known, there may be no ground whatever for judging it to be in any manner improper.

But in this case there is more even than

concealment. There is the active fraud in the putting in of these, in substance, fictitious bids, in their different names, but in truth forming no competitive bids, and put in for the purpose already stated. It is not Itoo much to say that the most perfect *good faith is called for on the part of bidders at these public lettings, so far as concerns their position relating to the bids put in by them or in their interest. The making of fictitious bids under the circumstances detailed herein is in its essence an illegal and most improper act; indeed, it is a plain fraud, perpetrated in the effort to obtain the desired result.

the result of that law in regard to illegal contracts. They are cited in all law books upon the subject, and are known to all of us. They mean substantially the same thing and are founded upon the same principles and reasoning. They are: Ex dolo malo non oritur actio; Ex pacto illicito non oritur aotio; Ex turpi causa non oritur actio. About the earliest illustration of this doctrine is almost traditional in the famous case of The Highwayman. It is stated that Lord Kenyon once said, by way of illustration, that he would not sit to take an account be tween two robbers on Hounslow Heath, and it was questioned whether the legend in reThe evidence shows that this written part-gard to the highwayman did not arise from nership agreement was only a part of the en- that saying. It seems, however, that the tire agreement existing between the parties. case was a real one. He did file a bill in That agreement covered and was clearly in- equity for an accounting against his partner, tended to cover their whole action from the although it was no sooner filed and its real time they agreed to put in their bids in a nature discovered than it was dismissed common interest up to and including the with costs, and the solicitors for the plainexecution and performance of the contract tiff were summarily dealt with by the court obtained from the city. The agreement (of as for a contempt in bringing such a case which that for a partnership was but a por- before it. 1 Lindley, Partnership, 5th ed. tion) was that they should combine their 94, note n; 9 Law Quarterly Review (Loninterests; that they should put in bids don), pp. 105-197. known to each; that they should conceal the fact of their combination; that they should put in fictitious bids without expectation or purpose of having them taken; that if the contract were procured they should perform the work as partners and share expenses and divide profits. No division of that contract into two periods, the one prior and the other subsequent to the written agreement between the parties, can be made. The complainant cannot count only upon the contract of partnership as evidenced by the writing of March, 1893. That writing evidenced only a portion of the agreement that had been made between these parties, the result being that, although their agreement was in the first instance by parol, a portion of it was subsequently reduced to writing. The whole contract is none the less one and indivisible, just as much as if it had all been put in writing. If it had been, it would scarcely be argued that complainant might maintain an action by relying on that part of it which was valid and relating to the partnership between them, and that he might discard or omit to prove that portion which was illegal. If the complainant did not, the defendant could, prove the whole contract, as well the part lying in parol as that which was reduced to writing, so that the court might, upon an inspection of the whole contract, determine therefrom its 54]character. The unity of the contract is not severed or its meaning or effect in any degree altered by putting part of it in writing and leaving the rest in parol.

Concluding as we do that this agreement between these parties is as a whole of an illegal nature, and that the portion thereof which is reduced to writing cannot be separated from the balance of the agreement, the question then arises as to the result of such conclusion upon the parties to the agreement. There are several old and very familiar maxims of the common law which formulate

The authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously hold that no court will lend its assistance in any way towards carrying out the terms of an illegal contract. In case any action is brought in which it is necessary to prove the illegal contract in order to maintain the action, courts will not enforce it, nor will they enforce any alleged rights directly springing from such contract. In cases of this kind the maxim is Potior est conditio defendentis.

*The following are only a few of the numer-[655] ous cases upon the subject in England and in this country: Holman v. Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp. 341; Booth v. Hodgson (1796) 6 T. R. 405: Thomson v. Thomson (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 470; Shiffner v. Gordon (1810) 12 East, 296; Sykes v. Beadon (1879) L. R. 11 Ch. Div. 170; Scott v. Brown (1892) 2 Q. B. 724; Belding v. Pitkin (1804) 2 Cai. 147a; Atcheson v. Mallon (1870) 43 N. Y. 147; Leonard v. Poole (1889) 114 N. Y. 371 [4 L. R. A. 728]; Wheeler v. Russell (1821) 17 Mass. 258, 281; Snell v. Dwight (1876) 120 Mass. 9; Marshall v. Baltimore & O. Railroad Company (1853) 16 How. 314, 334 [14: 953, 961]; McBlair v. Gibbes (1854) 17 How. 232 [15: 132]; Coppell v. Hall (1868) 7 Wall. 542 [19: 244]; Trist v. (1874) 21 Wall. 441, 448 [22: 623, 624]; Woodstock Iron Company v. Richmond & D. Extension Company (1888) 129 U. S. 643 [32: 819]; 1 Lindley, Partnership, 5th ed. 93, note, giving the result of the American cases.

Child

The general proposition is not disputed, but certain explanations as to its meaning and extent have been announced by the courts in cases now to be referred to, and the effort has been to show that the case before us comes under some of the exceptions to the rule, and ought not to be governed by the so-called harshness of the rule itself.

If the partnership agreement that is contained in the writing above set forth is in

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