ceded that the words “in the United States" | facture, but we may say generally that an should be considered as being incorporated article which can only be used for a particular into the section after the word "manufac-purpose, in which the process of manufacture tured." The provision would be senseless stops short of the completed article, can only without this interpolation. The objects of the be said to be partially manufactured within section were evidently not only to build up the meaning of this section; nor can we rean export trade, but to encourage manufac-gard the mere assembling and nailing totures in this country, where such manu-gether of parts complete in themselves and factures are intended for exportation, by destined for a particular purpose as a comgranting a rebate of duties upon the raw or plete and separate manufacture. Thus, prepared materials imported, and thus en-chairs are made of bottoms, backs, legs, and abling the manufacturer to compete in for- rounds, each one of these parts being_made eign markets with the same articles manu- separately and in large quantities. If imfactured in other countries. In determining ported in this condition from abroad, and the whether the articles in question were wholly parts were assembled and glued or screwed manufactured in the United States, this ob- together here, we think it entirely clear that ject should be borne steadily in mind. such chairs would not be wholly manuThe primary meaning of the word "manufactured in the United States; and the same facture" is something made by hand, as dis- may be said of the staves heads, and hoops tinguished from a natural growth; but as ma- which constitute a barrel Upon the theory chinery has largely supplanted this primitive of the claimant, if all the parts which method, the word is now ordinarily used to constitute a wooden house were made denote an article upon the material of which separately, as they sometimes are, and imlabor has been expended to make the finished ported from abroad and put together in this product. Ordinarily, the article so manu- country in the form of a house, it would folfactured takes a different form, or at least low that the house must be said to have been subserves a different purpose from the orig. wholly constructed in this country. inal materials; and usually it is given a different name. Raw materials may be and often are subjected to successive processes of manufacture, each one of which is complete in itself, but several of which may be required to make the final product. Thus, logs are first manufactured into boards, planks, joists, scantlings, etc., and then by entirely different processes are fashioned into boxes, furniture, doors, window sashes, trimmings, and the thousand and one articles manufactured wholly or in part of wood. The steel spring of a watch is made ultimately from iron ore, but by a large number of processes or transformations, each successive step in which is a distinct process of manufacture, and for which the article so manufactured receives a different name. The material of which each manufacture is formed, and to which reference is made in § 2173019, is not necessarily the original raw material-in this case the tree or log-but the product of a prior manufacture; the finished product of one manufacture thus becoming the material of the next in rank. This case, then, resolves itself into the question whether the materials out of which these boxes were constructed were the boards which were manufactured in Canada or the shooks which were imported into the United States. It may be said generally, although not universally, that a complete manufacture is either the ultimate product of prior *succes-[218] sive manufactures, such as a watch spring, or a penknife, or an intermediate product which may be used for different purposes, such for instance as pig iron, iron bars, lumber, or cloth; while a partial manufacture is a mere stage in the development of the material toward an ultimate and predestined product, such for instance as the different parts of a watch which need only to be put together to make the finished article. If, for instance, the wheels, chain, springs, dial, hands, and case of a watch were all imported from abroad, and merely put together in this country, we do not think it could be said that the watch was wholly manufactured within the United States. The same remark think may be made with reference to the shooks in this case, which were practically worthless except for being put together for a box of a definite size. we The distinction here made was alluded to in the opinion of this court in Worthington v. Robbins, 139 U. S. 337 [35: 181], in which the question arose whether "white hard enamel," used for various purposes, including watch dials, was dutiable as "watch mate rials," or as a simple manufacture. In deivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice While the planing and cutting of the boards Blatchford said: "The article in question was, in Canada into the requisite lengths and to all intents and purposes, raw material. If shapes for the sides, ends, tops, and bottoms it were to be classed as 'watch materials,' it of the boxes, was doubtless a partial manu- would follow that any metal which could ulfacture, it was not a complete one, since the timately be used, and was ultimately used, boards so cut are not adaptable as material in the manufacture of a watch, but could be for other and different objects of manu-used for other purposes also, would be dutiafacture, but were designed and appropriate ble as 'watch materials.' In order to be only for a particular purpose, i. e., for the 'watch materials' the article must in itself manufacture of boxes of a prescribed size, and bear marks of its special adaptation for use were useless for any other purpose. It is in making watches. The fact that the arnot always easy to determine the difference ticle in question was used in the manufacture between a complete and a partial manu-of watches has no relation to the condition V. Wilcox, 12 Wend. 503; Green v. Putchen, 13 Wend. 293; Mooers v. Allen, 35 Me. 276, 58 Am. Dec. 700; Crooker v. Buck, 41 Me. 355; Eddings v. Gillespie, 12 Heisk. 548; Jewell v. Blankenship, 10 Yerg. 439; Muckey v. Pierce, 3 Wis. 307; Cunningham v. Craig, 53 Ill. 252. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: their award, and the submission itself implies The decision of this controversy involves It is true that an executor, at common two propositions. Did the commissioners of law, had the power to submit to an award. the District of Columbia have the power to But this power arose by reason of the full agree to submit the claim in issue to the don-inion which the law gave the executor award of an arbitrator? And if they did or administrator over the 'assets, and the full have the power, did they lawfully exercise discretion which it vested in him for the setit? To answer either of these questions it be- tlement and liquidation of all claims due to comes essential to ascertain whether an agree- and from the estate. Wheatley v. Martin, ment to submit to arbitration involves the 6 Leigh, 64; Wamsley v. Wamsley, 26 W. Va. power to contract. Both of the matters above 46; Wood v. Tunnicun, 74 N. Y. 43. Whilst, stated depend upon this last inquiry, because however, the agreement of the executor to a both the claim that the District of Columbia common-law submission was binding upon did not in valid form exercise the power to him, such a consent on his part did not prosubmit to arbitration, and the assertion that tect him from being called to an account by if they so did they were not authorized to the beneficiaries of the estate, if the submisthat end, rest on the claim that the submission proved not to be to their advantage, be[171]sion was not made in the form *required by cause the submission was a voluntary act of law to constitute a contract, and even if the al- the executor and was not the equivalent of leged award was in legal form, nevertheless a judicial finding. 3 Wms. Exrs. p. 326, and the District commissioners were without authorities cited. So, also, the power of a power to contract for that purpose. municipal corporation to arbitrate arises from "As a general proposition, municipal cor- In determining whether an agreement to arbitrate involves the power to contract we eliminate at once from consideration consents to arbitrate made under a rule of court, by consent, in a pending suit, and shall consider only whether an agreement to arbitrate not under rule of court or within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose is or is not a contract. We do this, because there is no pretense in the case at bar that the submission to arbitration was under a rule of court or equivalent thereto. Indeed, the courts be-a municipal corporation, unless disabled by low held that the submission of the claim in question to arbitration was a purely commonlaw one and not made under a statute or rule of court; and in consequence of these views the courts held it to be their duty to make the award executory by rendering a judgment thereon, on the assumption that the parties, having agreed to a common-law submission, were bound by reason thereof to abide by the award of the arbitrator. positive law, could submit to arbitration all In the early case of Brady v. Mayor, etc. of Brooklyn, 1 Barb. 584, 589, the power of a municipal corporation to submit to arbitration was ascribed to the capacity to contract, The general rule is, "that everyone who is with a liability to pay, and it was held that capable of making a disposition of his prop-corporations have all the powers of ordinary erty, or a release of his right, may make a parties as respects their contracts, except submission to an award; but no one can, who when they are restricted expressly, or is either under a natural or civil incapacity by necessary implication. In the case[173] of contracting." Kyd, p. 35; Russell, Arbi- of minor public officials or corporations, trators, p. 14. And Morse, in the opening such as selectmen and school districts, paragraph of his treatise on Arbitration and the power to arbitrate has been clearly Award (p. 3), says: "A submission is a con- rested upon the existence of the right tract." And again, at p. 50: "The submis- to adjust and settle claims of the parsion is the agreement of the parties to refer. ticular character which had been subIt is therefore a contract, and will in general mitted to arbitration. Dix v. Town of Dumbe governed by the law concerning contracts." In Witcher v. Witcher, 49 N. H. 176, the supreme court of New Hampshire said (p. 180): 'A submission is a contract between two or more parties, whereby they agree to refer the subject in dispute to others and be bound by merston, 19 Vt. 262; District Township of the owner through mesne conveyance of a large tract of land in the territory of Arizona, known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita; that he had not voluntarily come into the court to seek a consideration of his title; that the title was open to question, and was in fact invalid and void; that the other defendants claimed some interests in the land, and praying that they all might be brought into court and be ruled to answer the petition, set up their titles and have them settled and adjudicated. In an amended answer the administrator set forth the nature and extent of his title, and prayed that it be inquired into and declared valid. Reply having been filed, the case came on for trial, which resulted in a decree on March 30, 1894, that the claim for 221 confirmation of title be disallowed *and rejected. The opinion by Associate Justice Sluss contains this general statement of the facts: the fees and charges required to be paid, and The conclusion reached was that "the entire proceedings set forth in the expediente of this title and the final title issued thereon were without warrant of law and invalid." "On the 29th day of May, 1821, Leon Two of the justices dissented. Thereupon Herreros presented his petition to the in- the administrator secured an order of severtendente of the provinces of Sonora and Sin-ance and took a separate appeal to this court. aloa, asking to obtain title to two sitios of land at the place known as Sonoita. The intendente referred the petition to the commander at Tubac, directing him to cause the tract to be surveyed, appraised, and the proposed sale thereof to be advertised for thirty days. Messrs. Rochester Ford and James C. Carter for appellant. John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for apMessrs. Matthew G. Reynolds and pellee. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: "In obedience to this order the officer proceeded to make a survey of the tract, which The controversy in this case does not turn was made on the 26th and 27th days of June, upon any defect in the form of the papers. 1821, and on the completion of the survey he The contentions of the government are that caused it to be appraised, the appraised value the officers who assumed to make the grant being one hundred and five dollars. There-and to execute title papers had no authority upon the proposed sale was advertised for thirty consecutive days by proclamation made by a crier appointed for that purpose, beginning on June 29, and ending on the 28th day of July, 1821. Thereupon, on the 31st day of July, 1821, the officer took the testimony of three witnesses to the effect that Herreros had property and means to occupy the tract. On October 20, 1821, the proceedings above mentioned, being reduced to writing, were by the officer returned to the intendente. "On October 25, 1821, the intendente referred the proceedings to the promoter fiscal for his examination. "On November 7, 1821, the promoter fiscal reported to the intendente the regularity of the proceedings and recommending that the land be offered for sale at three public auctions, and thereupon the auctions were ordered to be held. "The first auction was held on November 8, 1821, the second on November 9, and the third on November 10, 1821. "At the conclusion of the third auction the land was struck off to Herreros at the appraised value by the board of auction, of which board the intendente was a member and the president. "All these proceedings being concluded, on the 12th day of November, 1821, Herreros paid to the officers of the treasury the amount of tire appraisement, together with to do so, and upon this ground it was held by the court of private land claims that the grant was in its inception invalid. Secondly, that if a valid grant was made it was one of quantity, and should be sustained for only that amount of land which was named in the granting papers and paid for by the grantee. It appears that the proceedings to acquire title were *initiated by a petition to the in [223] tendant, or intendente, as he is called in the opinion of the court below, of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa, on May 29, 1821; that, so far as that officer was concerned, they were concluded and the sale completed on November 12, 1821. Nothing seems to have been done after this date until May 15, 1825, when the commissary general of the Republic of Mexico for the State of the West on application issued a title in the usual form. So the question is as to the power of these officers to bind the government of Mexico. Few cases presented to this court are more perplexing than those involving Mexican grants. The changes in the governing power as well as in the form of government were so frequent, there is so much indefiniteness and lack of precision in the language of the statutes and ordinances, and the modes of procedure were in so many respects essentially different from those to which we are accustomed, that it is often quite difficult to determine whether an alleged grant was made by officers who, at the time, were authorized to act for the government, and was consummated according to the forms of pro cedure then recognized as essential. It was undoubtedly the duty of Congress, as it was its purpose in the various statutory enact ments it has made in respect to Mexican titles, to recognize and establish every title and right which before the cession Mexico recognized as good and valid In other words, in harmony with the rules of international law, as well as with the terms of the treaties of cession, the change of sovereignty should work no change in respect to rights and titles; that which was good before should be good after; that which the law would enforce before should be enforceable after the cession. As a rule, Congress has not specifically determined the validity of any right or title, but has committed to some judicial tribunal the duty of ascertaining what were good and valid before cession, and provided that when so determined they should be recognized and enforced. now before us disclose that about the time What powers did the intendant possess at Of course in proceeding under any partic- the time this sale is alleged to have taken ular statute the limitations prescribed by place? It is conceded by the government [224]that statute must control; and whatever *may that by the ordinance of December 4,1786 (at be the obligations resting upon the nation which time Mexico was a province of Spain), by virtue of the rules of international law the intendants had full authority in reference or the terms of a treaty, the courts cannot to the sale of lands. Article 81 of that pass beyond such limitations. In the case of ordinance (Reynolds' Spanish & Mexican Hayes v. United States, just decided, 170 U. Land Laws, p. 60) is as follows: S. 637 [42: 1174], we called attention to the Art. 81. "The intendants shall also be fact that in the act creating the court of pri-judges, with exclusive jurisdiction over all vate land claims there was a prohibition upon matters and questions that arise in the the allowance of any claim "that shall not ap- provinces of their districts in relation to the pear to be upon a title lawfully and regularly sale, composition, and distribution of crown derived from the government of Spain or and seignioral lands. The holders thereof, Mexico, or from any of the states of the Re- and those who seek new grants of the same, public of Mexico having lawful authority to shall set up their rights and make their ap make grants of land," and pointed out the plications to said intendants, who, after the difference between this statute and those con matter has been duly examined into by an strued in the Arredondo Case, 6 Pet. 691 attorney of my royal treasury, appointed by [8: 547]; and the act of March 3, 1851, con- themselves, shall take action thereon, in aesidered in the Peralta Case, 19 How. 343 [15: cordance with law, and in conjunction with 678]. We held that under the act of 1891 their ordinary legal advisers. They shall the court must be satisfied, not merely of the admit appeals to the superior board of the regularity in the form of the proceedings, but treasury, or, should the parties in interest also that the official body or person assuming fail to employ that recourse, submit a report to make the grant was vested with authority, thereto, together with the original proceedor that the exercise of power, if unwarranted, ings, when they consider them in condition was subsequently lawfully ratified. We are to issue the title. The board shall, after exnot to presume that, because certain officials amination thereof, return them either for ismade a grant, therefore it was the act of the sue of title, if no correction is necessary, or, Mexican government and to be sustained. It before doing so, for such other proceedings as must appear that the officials did have in the opinion of the board are required, with the power, and we are not justified in resting the necessary instructions. In the meantime, upon any legal presumption of the existence and without further delay, the necessary con of power from the fact of its exercise. While this is true, yet when the statutes and ordinances defining the powers and duties of an officer are somewhat indefinite and general in their terms, and that officer was in the habit of exercising the same power as was exercised in the case presented, and such exercise of power was not questioned by the authorities of Mexico, and grants purporting to have been made by him were never challenged, there is reason to believe that the true construction of the statutes or ordinances supports the existence of the power. Cases firmation may be made, which said superior It is, however, contended that prior to the transfer of title in this case this authority was taken away from the intendant. In support of this contention four matters are referred to by counsel: 1. The adoption of the Constitution of March 18, 1812, and the promulgation of the law of January 4, 1813. 2. The resolution of the council of the Indies, before a full board at Madrid, December 23, 1818. 3. The decrees of Ferdinand VII. re-establishing the Constitution of 1812, and convoking the Cortes, March 6, 7, 9, 1820. 4. The imperial colonization law of January 4, 1823. "The governor intendants shall resume all the powers appertaining to them before the promulgation of the Constitution, so called; and shall consequently exercise said powers, as well in matters of government as in those of economy and litigation relating to the royal treasury, agreeably to the laws and ordinances respecting intendants." ficers would simply have to respond to new superiors, and that is all. Nor do we think that the re-establishment of the Constitution, even if the re-establishment of that instrument carried with it the re-enactment of the law of the Cortes of January 4, 1813, put an end to the office of intendant, or wholly abrogated his powers. So far as the act of January 4, 1813, is concerned, while it did authorize the distriOf these in their order, though it may be bution of part of the lands on account of milwell here to note that the colonization law itary service, it still provided that half of the was not passed until after the sale in contro- public and crown lands should be reserved to versy had taken place. serve as a mortgage for the payment of the On March 18, 1812, in the midst of troub-national debt, and recognized the disposition lous times in Spain, a Constitution (Reynolds, of such lands by the "provincial deputation," p. 79) was adopted, and by it and the law of as it was called. Turning to the Constituthe Cortes of January 4, 1813 (Reynolds, p. tion we find the following provisions in chap83), it is insisted that a different mode of ter 2, article 324: "The political governdisposing of the public lands was created. ment of the provinces shall reside in the suAs, however, this continued in force only un-perior chief appointed by the King in each til May 4, 1814, when the King, Ferdinand one of them." Article 325: "In each prov[228] VII., returned to the throne and issued a ince there shall be a deputation called decree refusing to recognize the existing order provincial, to promote its prosperity, preof things and declaring the Constitution of sided over by the superior chief." Article 1812 revoked, it would seem that the powers 326: "This deputation shall be composed of theretofore vested in the intendants were re- the president, the intendant, and seven memestablished. Indeed, on December 28, 1814, bers elected in the manner that shall be the King issued a royal cédula or edict, the stated." While it may be that under the minth article of which is as follows (2 White, terms of these and subsequent articles the New Recopilacion, p. 168): general control over the affairs of a province was vested in the provincial deputation, of which deputation the intendant was to be one member, we find nothing in them that either put an end to the office of intendant or had any other effect than to subject his actions to the control of the provincial deputation. The question is not what the prov incial deputation when organized would do, but whether the mere re-establishment of the Constitution, which provided for a provincial deputation, operated before any action taken under it, to put an end to the powers thereOn December 23, 1818, a resolution passed tofore vested in the intendants. It may by the council of the Indies, at Madrid, and well be that in thus arranging for a new sysapproved by the King, provided that all busi- tem of control, without abolishing the office ness pertaining to the alienation of lands in of intendant, but on the contrary, in terms New Spain should belong to the department of recognizing its continuance, the purpose was the office of the treasury of the Indies at not to create an interim in which no person Madrid. Hall, Mexican Law, p. 76, § 188. should have power to act for the government In March, 1820, Ferdinand VII., under in the alienation of its lands, but that the inpressure from the people, adopted the tendant should continue to exercise the Constitution of 1812 and took an oath powers he had theretofore exercised until the to support it. Did this resolution of King should appoint a superior chief, and the December, 1818, or this re-establish- other members of the deputation be elected. ment of the Constitution, or both together, The very next year witnessed the separaput an end to the power of the intendants in respect to the sale of lands? Clearly the resolution of December, 1818, would not have that effect. The mere placing of the control overland matters in a particular government department at Madrid would in no manner affect the powers of local officers until and unless such department should so order, and there is no suggestion that any orders to that effect were ever issued. The resolution would have no more effect on the powers of local officers than would a transfer of the land department of this government from the control of the Secretary of the Interior to that of the Secretary of the Treasury. The local of171 U. S. U. S., Book 43. Clearly thereafter the intendants had the [227]powers given *them by the ordinance of 1786. Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 261 [31: 430]. 10 tion of Mexico from the kingdom of Spain 145 |