plete and separate manufacture. Thus, chairs are made of bottoms, backs, legs, and rounds, each one of these parts being made separately and in large quantities. If imported in this condition from abroad, and the parts were assembled and glued or screwed together here, we think it entirely clear that such chairs would not be wholly manu ceded that the words "in the United States" | facture, but we may say generally that an should be considered as being incorporated article which can only be used for a particular into the section after the word "manufac- purpose, in which the process of manufactur tured." The provision would be senseless stops short of the completed article, can only without this interpolation. The objects of the be said to be partially manufactured within section were evidently not only to build up the meaning of this section; nor can we rean export trade, but to encourage manufac-gard the mere assembling and nailing totures in this country, where such manu-gether of parts complete in themselves and factures are intended for exportation, by destined for a particular purpose as a comgranting a rebate of duties upon the raw or prepared materials imported, and thus en abling the manufacturer to compete in foreign markets with the same articles manufactured in other countries. In determining whether the articles in question were wholly manufactured in the United States, this object should be borne steadily in mind. The primary meaning of the word "manufactured in the United States; and the same facture" is something made by hand, as distinguished from a natural growth; but as machinery has largely supplanted this primitive method, the word is now ordinarily used to denote an article upon the material of which labor has been expended to make the finished product. Ordinarily, the article so manufactured takes a different form, or at least subserves a different purpose from the original materials; and usually it is given a different name. Raw materials may be and often are subjected to successive processes of manufacture, each one of which is complete in itself, but several of which may be required to make the final product. Thus, logs are first manufactured into boards, planks, joists, scantlings, etc., and then by entirely different processes are fashioned into boxes, furniture, doors, window sashes, trimmings, and the thousand and one articles manufactured wholly or in part of wood. The steel spring of a watch is made ultimately from iron ore, but by a large number of processes or transformations, each successive step in which is a distinct process of manufacture, and for which the article so manufactured receives a different name. may be said of the staves heads, and hoops which constitute a barrel Upon the theory of the claimant, if all the parts which constitute a wooden house were made separately, as they sometimes are, and imported from abroad and put together in this country in the form of a house, it would follow that the house must be said to have been wholly constructed in this country. It may be said generally, although not universally, that a complete manufacture is either the ultimate product of prior succes-[218] sive manufactures, such as a watch spring, or a penknife, or an intermediate product which may be used for different purposes, such for instance as pig iron, iron bars, lumber, or cloth; while a partial manufacture is a mere stage in the development of the material toward an ultimate and predestined product, such for instance as the different parts of a watch which need only to be put together to make the finished article. If, for instance, the wheels, chain, springs, dial, hands, and case of a watch were all imported from abroad, and merely put together in this country, we do not think it could be said that the watch was wholly manufactured within the United States. The same remark we think may be made with reference to the shooks in this case, which were practically worthless except for being put together for a box of a definite size. The material of which each manufacture is formed, and to which reference is made in [217]3019, is not necessarily the original raw material-in this case the tree or log-but the product of a prior manufacture; the finished product of one manufacture thus be- The distinction here made was alluded to coming the material of the next in rank. in the opinion of this court in Worthington This case, then, resolves itself into the ques-v. Robbins, 139 U. S. 337 [35: 181], in which tion whether the materials out of which the question arose whether "white hard enthese boxes were constructed were the boards anel," used for various purposes, including which were manufactured in Canada or the shooks which were imported into the United States. watch dials, was dutiable as "watch materials," or as a simple manufacture. In deivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice While the planing and cutting of the boards Blatchford said: "The article in question was, in Canada into the requisite lengths and to all intents and purposes, raw material. If shapes for the sides, ends, tops, and bottoms it were to be classed as 'watch materials,' it of the boxes, was doubtless a partial manu- would follow that any metal which could ulfacture, it was not a complete one, since the timately be used, and was ultimately used, boards so cut are not adaptable as material in the manufacture of a watch, but could be for other and different objects of manu-used for other purposes also, would be dutiafacture, but were designed and appropriate ble as 'watch materials.' In order to be only for a particular purpose, i. e., for the 'watch materials' the article must in itself manufacture of boxes of a prescribed size, and bear marks of its special adaptation for use were useless for any other purpose. It is in making watches. The fact that the arnot always easy to determine the difference ticle in question was used in the manufacture between a complete and a partial manu-of watches has no relation to the condition court. It is undoubtedly true that, ac- | of the citizen, to wit, to make compensation or cording to our general railroad statutes and give security for it. For this injury the the special charters in this state, the pay-citizen is entitled to redress. But his redress ment or deposit of the amount of the land cannot extend beyond his injury. It cannot damages assessed or agreed is a condition extend to taking the personal chattels of the precedent to the vesting of the title, or of any railroad company. They are not his and canright in the company to construct their road, not increase his remedy. The injury was and that if they proceed in such construction to what the landholder had himself, not to without this, they are trespassers. And what he had not. Then why should the mathis has been repeatedly so held by this terials laid down for the benefit of the publie be treated as dedicated to him? In the case of "This may have led to the misapprehension a common trespasser the owner of the land in the present case, but it certainly is a very may take and keep his structures, nolens [272]serious misapprehension. In these great pub-volens, but it is not so in this case; for though lic works the shortest period of clear acquies- the original entry was a trespass it is well setcence, so as fairly to lead the company to in- tled that the company can proceed, in due for that the party intends to waive his claim course of law, to appropriate the land, and for present payment, will conclude the right consequently to reclaim and avail itself of the to assert the claim in any such form as to structures laid thereon." stop the company in the progress of their In Provolt v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. works, and especially to stop the running Co. 57 Mo. 256, it was held that the conduct of the road after it has been put of a landholder in standing by while a railin operation, whereby the public acquire road company constructed its road, precluded an important interest in its continuance. him from recovering physical possession of the The party does not, of course, lose land covered thereby. Judge Wagner, after his claim or the right to enforce it in all quoting with approval the language of Chief proper modes. He may possibly have some Justice Redfield in McAulay v. Western Verrights analogous to the vendor's lien in mont Railway Co., hereinbefore cited, said: England, and here till the legislature cut it "The plaintiff did not attempt to obstruct off. But it is certain, according to the Eng- or in any wise impede the progress of the lish decisions, that he cannot stop the work, work. The plain `inference was that he and especially the trains upon the road, if waived his right for prepayment of his damhe has in any sense, for the shortest period, ages and only intended to follow his clearly given to the company, either by his remedy on his judgment. His conduct express consent, or by his silence, to under- surely led the company to believe such stand that he did not intend to object to their was his purpose and induced them proceeding with their construction and opera- to pursue a course and expend large tion. If there was, then, a waiver in sums of money which, otherwise, they would fact, either express or implied, by acquiescence not have done. If plaintiff intended to rely in the proceedings of the company to the ex- on his rights and make present payment tent of not insisting upon payment as a condi- condition precedent he should have objected tion precedent, but consenting to let the dam- and forbidden the company to interfere or to ages be and remain a mere debt, with or with- do any work on his land till the question of out a lien upon the roadbed, as the law may damage was settled. But this he did not do. turn out to be, then it is impossible to regard He acquiesced in the proceedings of the comthe defendants in any sense in the light of pany to the extent of not insisting upon the trespassers or liable in ejectment." prepayment as a condition* precedent; and af{274 ter having done so, we do not think that he can maintain ejectment. Justice v. Nesquehoning Valley R. R. Co. 87 Pa. 28, was a case where a railroad company was a trespasser, and its entry upon land not in conformity with law, and it was held that these irregular proceedings did not operate as a dedication to the landowners of the property of the company, placed upon the land, so as to entitle said landowners to include said property in an assessment of damages under the railroad law, and recover their value as an accession to the value of the land taken by the company. In delivering the opinion of the supreme court, Chief Justice Agnew said: "This is not the case of a mere trespass by one having no authority to enter, but of one representing the state herself, clothed with the power of eminent domain, having a right to enter, and to place these materials on the [273] and taken for a public *use-materials essential to the very purpose which the state has declared in the grant of the charter. It is true the entry was a trespass, by reason of the omission to do an act required for the security "If from negotiation in regard to the price of the land, or for any other reason, there is just ground of inference that the works have been constructed with the express or implied assent of the landowner, it would seem wholly at variance with the expectations of the parties and the reason of the case, that the landowner should retain the right to enter upon the land, or to maintain ejectment. There are other effective and sufficient remedies. A court of equity would unquestionably interfere, if necessary, and place the road in the hands of a receiver until the damages were paid from the earnings. 2 Redf. Am. Railw. Cas. 2d ed. 353. But the only question we are called upon to decide is whether under the facts and circumstances of this case eject ment will lie, and we think it will not." A similar question was decided in the case of the Omaha and Northern Nebraska R. W. Co. v. Redick, 16 Neb. 313. This was an action of ejectment for the possession of a 40 the owner through mesne conveyance of a large tract of land in the territory of Arizona, known as the Rancho de San Jose de Sonoita; that he had not voluntarily come into the court to seek a consideration of his title; that the title was open to question, and was in fact invalid and void; that the other defendants claimed some interests in the land, and praying that they all might be brought into court and be ruled to answer the petition, set up their titles and have them settled and adjudicated. In an amended answer the administrator set forth the nature and extent of his title, and prayed that it be inquired into and declared valid. Reply having been filed, the case came on for trial, which resulted in a decree on March 30, 1894, that the claim for 221]confirmation of title be disallowed and rejected. The opinion by Associate Justice Sluss contains this general statement of the facts: the fees and charges required to be paid, and The conclusion reached was that "the entire proceedings set forth in the expediente of this title and the final title issued thereon were without warrant of law and invalid." "On the 29th day of May, 1821, Leon Two of the justices dissented. Thereupon Herreros presented his petition to the in- the administrator secured an order of severtendente of the provinces of Sonora and Sin-ance and took a separate appeal to this court. aloa, asking to obtain title to two sitios of land at the place known as Sonoita. The intendente referred the petition to the commander at Tubac, directing him to cause the tract to be surveyed, appraised, and the proposed sale thereof to be advertised for thirty days. Messrs. Rochester Ford and James C. Carter for appellant. Messrs. John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for apMatthew G. Reynolds and pellee. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: "In obedience to this order the officer proceeded to make a survey of the tract, which The controversy in this case does not turn was made on the 26th and 27th days of June, upon any defect in the form of the papers. 1821, and on the completion of the survey he The contentions of the government are that caused it to be appraised, the appraised value the officers who assumed to make the grant being one hundred and five dollars. There-and to execute title papers had no authority upon the proposed sale was advertised for thirty consecutive days by proclamation made by a crier appointed for that purpose, beginning on June 29, and ending on the 28th day of July, 1821. Thereupon, on the 31st day of July, 1821, the officer took the testimony of three witnesses to the effect that Herreros had property and means to occupy the tract. On October 20, 1821, the proceedings above mentioned, being reduced to writing, were by the officer returned to the intendente. "On October 25, 1821, the intendente referred the proceedings to the promoter fiscal for his examination. "On November 7, 1821, the promoter fiscal reported to the intendente the regularity of the proceedings and recommending that the land be offered for sale at three public auctions, and thereupon the auctions were ordered to be held. "The first auction was held on November | 8, 1821, the second on November 9, and the third on November 10, 1821. to do so, and upon this ground it was held by the court of private land claims that the grant was in its inception invalid. Secondly, that if a valid grant was made it was one of quantity, and should be sustained for only that amount of land which was named in the granting papers and paid for by the grantee. It appears that the proceedings to acquire title were initiated by a petition to the in [229] tendant, or intendente, as he is called in the opinion of the court below, of the provinces of Sonora and Sinaloa, on May 29, 1821; that, so far as that officer was concerned, they were concluded and the sale completed on November 12, 1821. Nothing seems to have been done after this date until May 15, 1825, when the commissary general of the Republic of Mexico for the State of the West on application issued a title in the usual form. So the question is as to the power of these officers to bind the government of Mexico. Few cases presented to this court are more perplexing than those involving Mexican grants. The changes in the governing power "At the conclusion of the third auction the land was struck off to Herreros at the ap-as well as in the form of government were so praised value by the board of auction, of which board the intendente was a member and the president. "All these proceedings being concluded, on the 12th day of November, 1821, Herreros paid to the officers of the treasury the amount of tire appraisement, together with frequent, there is so much indefiniteness and lack of precision in the language of the statutes and ordinances, and the modes of procedure were in so many respects essentially different from those to which we are accustomed, that it is often quite difficult to determine whether an alleged grant was made by officers who, at the time, were authorized to act for the government, and was consummated according to the forms of pro cedure then recognized as essential. It was undoubtedly the duty of Congress, as it was its purpose in the various statutory enact ments it has made in respect to Mexican titles, to recognize and establish every title and right which before the cession Mexico recognized as good and valid. In other words, in harmony with the rules of international law, as well as with the terms of the treaties of cession, the change of sovereignty should work no change in respect to rights and titles; that which was good before should be good after; that which the law would enforce before should be enforceable after the cession. As a rule, Congress has not specifically determined the validity of any right or title, but has committed to some judicial tribunal the duty of ascertaining what were good and valid before cession, and provided that when so determined they should be recognized and enforced. Of course in proceeding under any particular statute the limitations prescribed by [224]that statute must control; and whatever *may be the obligations resting upon the nation by virtue of the rules of international law or the terms of a treaty, the courts cannot pass beyond such limitations. In the case of Hayes v. United States, just decided, 170 U. S. 637 [42: 1174], we called attention to the fact that in the act creating the court of private land claims there was a prohibition upon the allowance of any claim "that shall not appear to be upon a title lawfully and regularly derived from the government of Spain or Mexico, or from any of the states of the Republic of Mexico having lawful authority to make grants of land," and pointed out the difference between this statute and those construed in the Arredondo Case, 6 Pet. 691 [8: 547]; and the act of March 3, 1851, considered in the Peralta Case, 19 How. 343 [15: 678]. We held that under the act of 1891 the court must be satisfied, not merely of the regularity in the form of the proceedings, but also that the official body or person assuming to make the grant was vested with authority, or that the exercise of power, if unwarranted, was subsequently lawfully ratified. We are not to presume that, because certain officials made a grant, therefore it was the act of the Mexican government and to be sustained. It must appear that the officials did have the power, and we are not justified in resting upon any legal presumption of the existence of power from the fact of its exercise. While this is true, yet when the statutes and ordinances defining the powers and duties of an officer are somewhat indefinite and general in their terms, and that officer was in the habit of exercising the same power as was exercised in the case presented, and such exercise of power was not questioned by the authorities of Mexico, and grants purporting to have been made by him were never challenged, there is reason to believe that the true construction of the statutes or ordinances supports the existence of the power. Cases now before us disclose that about the time the intendant acted in this case similar action was taken by him in respect to other applica tions for the purchase of land; that through a series of years from 1824 downward, the commissary general, the officer created by the act of September 21, 1824, recognized his acts as creating equitable[225] obligations on the part of the government, and attempted to consummate the sales by papers passing the legal title; that the title papers thus executed were duly placed of record in the proper office, and fail to show that subsequently thereto the Mexican government took any steps to question the title or disturb the possession. While this may not be conclusive as to the validity of the grants and the existence of the power exercised by the intendant, it certainly is persuasive, and we should not be justified in lightly concluding that he did not possess the power which he was in the habit of exercising. What powers did the intendant possess at the time this sale is alleged to have taken place? It is conceded by the government that by the ordinance of December 4,1786 (at which time Mexico was a province of Spain), the intendants had full authority in referenee to the sale of lands. Article 81 of that ordinance (Reynolds' Spanish & Mexican Land Laws, p. 60) is as follows: Art. 81. "The intendants shall also be judges, with exclusive jurisdiction over all matters and questions that arise in the provinces of their districts in relation to the sale, composition, and distribution of crown and seignioral lands. The holders thereof, and those who seek new grants of the same, shall set up their rights and make their applications to said intendants, who, after the matter has been duly examined into by an attorney of my royal treasury, appointed by themselves, shall take action thereon, in accordance with law, and in conjunction with their ordinary legal advisers. They shall admit appeals to the superior board of the treasury, or, should the parties in interest fail to employ that recourse, submit a report thereto, together with the original proceedings, when they consider them in condition to issue the title. The board shall, after examination thereof, return them either for issue of title, if no correction is necessary, or, before doing so, for such other proceedings as in the opinion of the board are required, with the necessary instructions. In the meantime, and without further delay, the necessary confirmation may be made, which said superior board shall issue at the proper time, proceeding in this matter, as also the intendants[226] their deputies and others, in accordance with the requirements of the royal instructions of October 15, 1754, in so far as they do not conflict with these, without losing sight of the wise provisions of the laws therein cited and of law 9, tit. 12, book 4.” It is, however, contended that prior to the transfer of title in this case this authority was taken away from the intendant. In support of this contention four matters are referred to by counsel: 1. The adoption of | ficers would simply have to respond to new Nor do we think that the re-establishment "The governor intendants shall resume all the powers appertaining to them before the promulgation of the Constitution, so called; and shall consequently exercise said powers, as well in matters of government as in those of economy and litigation relating to the royal treasury, agreeably to the laws and ordinances respecting intendants." sided over by the superior chief." Article 326: "This deputation shall be composed of the president, the intendant, and seven members elected in the manner that shall be stated." While it may be that under the terms of these and subsequent articles the general control over the affairs of a province was vested in the provincial deputation, of which deputation the intendant was to be one member, we find nothing in them that either put an end to the office of intendant or had any other effect than to subject his actions to the control of the provincial depu tation. The question is not what the prov. incial deputation when organized would do, but whether the mere re-establishment of the Constitution, which provided for a provincial deputation, operated before any action taken under it, to put an end to the powers thereOn December 23, 1818, a resolution passed tofore vested in the intendants. It may by the council of the Indies, at Madrid, and well be that in thus arranging for a new sysapproved by the King, provided that all busi- tem of control, without abolishing the office ness pertaining to the alienation of lands in of intendant, but on the contrary, in terms New Spain should belong to the department of recognizing its continuance, the purpose was the oflice of the treasury of the Indies at not to create an interim in which no person Madrid. Hall, Mexican Law, p. 76, § 188. should have power to act for the government In March, 1820, Ferdinand VII., under in the alienation of its lands, but that the inpressure from the people, adopted the tendant should continue to exercise the Constitution of 1812 and took an oath powers he had theretofore exercised until the to support it. Did this resolution of King should appoint a superior chief, and the December, 1818, or this re-establish- other members of the deputation be elected. Clearly thereafter the intendants had the [227]powers given them by the ordinance of 1786. Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U. S. 261 [31: 430]. ment of the Constitution, or both together, put an end to the power of the intendants in respect to the sale of lands? Clearly the resolution of December, 1818, would not have that effect. The mere placing of the control over land matters in a particular government department at Madrid would in no manner affect the powers of local officers until and unless such department should so order, and there is no suggestion that any orders to that effect were ever issued. The resolution would have no more effect on the powers of local officers than would a transfer of the land department of this government from the control of the Secretary of the Interior to that of the Secretary of the Treasury. The local of171 U. S. U. S., Book 43. The very next year witnessed the separation of Mexico from the kingdom of Spain. On February 24, 1821, a declaration of independence was made in the form known as the plan of Iguala, and this declaration of independence was made good by the surrender of the city of Mexico on September 27, 1821. The 15th section of this plan provided that "the junta will take care that all the revenues of departments of the state remain without any alteration whatever, and all the employees, political, ecclesiastical, civil, and military, will remain in the same state in which they exist to-day." Prior to that time, and on August 24, 1821, what is known as the treaty of Cordoba was signed at that village 10 145 1 |