plomas which are issued to that effect by the | have been maintained by two or more of what supreme executive power. "Art. 11. If, in virtue of the decree alluded lo in the last article, and taking into view the probabilities of life, the supreme executive power should deem it expedient to alienate any portion of land in favor of any officer, whether civil or military, of the federation, i can do so from the vacant lands of the territories." "Art. 16. The government in conformity with the provisions established in this law will proceed to colonize the territories of the Republic." were formerly provinces, are at the disposal The 8th article gives to the national government all the revenues derived from the territories. Obviously the entire management of the affairs of the territories was reserved to the general government, and any revenue derived therefrom passed into the general treasury. The 9th article is indefinite in that it fails to define what is national property. It asIt is not pretended that the grant in ques-sumes that certain things pass within the tion was made under this colonization law, description of national property, and affirmaand we only refer to it as showing a recogni- tively includes within that description the tion by the general government of some au- property taken from the clergy. The lan-[284 thority on the part of the states in reference guage used is broad enough to include all pubto the vacant lands. It will be seen that lic lands within the limits of the nation, and while article 2 speaks of "the lands of the yet if it was intended to include such lands it nation," article 3 directs the states to enact would seem scarcely necessary to add the colonization laws in conformity to the gen-clause, including those taken from the clergy. eral provisions of the Constitution. So that Certain is it that according to our methods of the actual management of colonization affairs legislation, and our use of language, this was put within the control of the states, sub-article would not be considered as defining the ject, of course, to the superior dominion of property the revenues from which it assigns the general government. Article 10 provides to the national government. The 10th that military rights to lands, though created by the nation, shall be attended to by the states, thus implying at least that, for convenience, administration of the vacant lands was intrusted to the states. Obviously the thought here was that there should not be two places in which the administration of the public lands should be carried on, and so in article 11 it was provided that if in the [283]judgment of the nation it was expedient to grant to a military or civil officer any public lands, it was to be made from vacant lands in the territories. And, finally, in article 16, as though to separate the administration of the public lands in the states from those in the territories, it is distinctly declared that the national government will colonize the territories of the Republic. As heretofore said, all this, of course, amounts only to assigning to the states the administration of the vacant lands for purposes of colonization. article seems to have little significance in this connection, and refers obviously to public buildings and the grounds attached, and not to vacant public lands. While the 11th article concedes to the states revenues not included in the foregoing articles, it does not define those revenues, and depends for its scope upon the significance and force of the prior articles. If these articles were all that called for consideration it would be difficult to infer from them that the vacant public lands were given to the states for purposes of sale or for appropriation of the proceeds of such sales. But in the same statute is a provision that "the sum of $3,136,875, estimated as the deficit in the general expenses, shall be apportioned among the states of the federation," and following that is the apportionment. Other sections required delivery by the states every month of their part of the above apportionment and the final adjustment of the The other act to which we have referred, amount thereof between the government and the one which is relied upon by the treasurer the states. Of course this implies that within general as giving authority for this ex- the limits of the state there were cerpediente, is that in reference to general and tain matters of revenue reserved, out of which special revenues. It commences with the the states were to collect the sums appor declaration that the following belong to the tioned to them, and to return the same to the general revenues of the federation, and then general treasury. Subsequent legislation in ten articles are named revenues derived throws light upon the meaning of this revenue from different sources, such as import and law. Thus, on April 6, 1830, a decree was export duties, tobacco, and powder, etc. The passed, the third article of which is as fol8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th articles are as follows: lows (Reynolds, p. 118): "The government shall have power to ap"8. That from the territories of the federa-point one or more commissioners to visit the tion. "9. National property, in which is included that of the inquisition and temporal property of the clergy, or any other rural or urban property that belongs, or shall hereafter be long, to the public exchequer. "10. The buildings, offices, and the lands attached thereto, which belong or have belonged, to the general revenues and those that colonies of the frontier states, to contract with the contracts upon the entry of new col- | cree the following provisional law for the pur- "To present annually to each one of the houses of the general congress a minute and comprehensive report of the amounts that are received and paid out at the treasuries within their limits, together with a statement of the origin of the one and the other, and touching the different branches of agricul ture, commercial and manufacturing indusAnd also, "To forward to the two chambers (of the federal government) and when they are in recess, to the council of the government, a certified copy of their constitutions, laws, and decrees.' It may be assumed that these requirements of the national Constitution were complied with, and that the constitutions, laws and decrees of the state and the proceedings had in reference to these several sales of land were reported to the congress of the nation. We find no act of that congress setting aside such legislation or sales. This is significant,[287] and it is not inappropriate to refer to Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 446 [20:659, 662], in which it was said: The language of this decree is very significant, and clearly recognizes some title in the states, for why should commissioners be authorized to contract with the legislatures of the states for the purchase of lands which belonged to the nation? It also clearly recog-tries," etc. nizes the right of the states to sell these vacant lands and apply the proceeds in settlement of the demands made against them by the general apportionment of the revenue law of 1824. It declares that the executive may take the lands he considers suitable for fortifications, arsenals, and for new colonies, and at the same time provides that he shall give the states credit on the amount they owe the confederation. But why should any credit be given if these lands so taken by the executive where the property of the nation, and the states without authority to sell them or receive the proceeds of sales? If during all these years the lands were the property of the nation, were to be held and sold only by the nation, and the proceeds thereof to be accounted for directly to the nation, why should it be decreed that if the nation takes any part of them for arsenals and other public purposes, credit for the value thereof is to be entered upon the amounts due by the states to the nation? We find it difficult to escape the force of this decree of 1830. It indicates that although the language of the revenue decree of 1824 is indefinite, and does not in terms name vacant public lands, yet both the nation and the states understood that its effect was to grant authority to the states to sell such lands and appropriate the proceeds in settle-approved by that body." ment of the amounts charged against them [286]by the nation. We see no other way in which to give reasonable force to the language of this decree of 1830, and it must be held to be a national interpretation of the revenue decree of 1824. "In the first place, we observe that the law has received the implied sanction of congress. It was adopted in 1859. It has been upon the statute book for more than twelve years. It must have been transmitted to congress soon after it was enacted, for it was the duty of the secretary of the territory to transmit to that body copies of all laws, on or before the first of the next December in each year. The simple disapproval by congress at any time would have annulled it. It is no unreasonable inference, therefore, that it was We are not insensible of the fact that the provisions of the act of September 21, 1824, creating the office of commissary general, an act which we had occasion to consider in Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220 [ante, 142] seem to make against the But we are not limited to this authoritative idea of the administration of vacant lands by national exposition of the meaning of the rev- the states, and it is difficult to work out from enue law of 1824. The testimony in the sev-all the statutes a consistent, continuous, and eral cases of a similar nature now before us, harmonious rule. We must in each case enincluding therein the reports of the officers deavor to ascertain what the Mexican gov of this government sent to examine the ernment recognized as valid, and when that archives of Mexico, discloses that the state is done the duty of respecting and enforcing of Sonora at least assumed that the revenue the grant arises. Other matters are referred act of 1824 authorized its disposal of the va- to by counsel in their briefs, but it would cant public lands, and acting on that as-needlessly prolong this opinion to refer to sumption did in a multitude of cases make them. Our conclusion is that at the time of sales thereof. In this connection it may be observed that the Constitution of the state of Sonora, or State of the West, declares, article 47, that the right of selling lands belongs to the state. This Constitution bears date May 11, 1825. Law No. 30 of that state, of May 20, 1825, the law referred to by the treasurer general in the expediente, recites that "the congress has seen fit to de these transactions the several states had authority to make sales of vacant public lands within their limits, and that such sales, unless annulled by the national government, must be considered as grants to be recognized by this government under the terms of the treaty of 1853. We pass, therefore, to a consideration of the effect of the decrees of Santa Anna. The 167 under the express condition of colonizing Juan Alvarez was president ad interim, a lands in controversy were obtained from Mexico under what is known as the Gadsden treaty of 1853. This treaty was concluded on December 30, 1853, and ratified June 30, 1854. At the time of the treaty Santa Anna was supreme executive and virtually dic-ter Santa Anna had been deposed and while tator in Mexico, and the treaty was negotiated with him. On November 25, 1853, only about a month before the signing of the Gadsden treaty, he published this decree: "Art. I. The decrees of November 25, 1853. [288] *"Art. 1. It is declared that the public and July 7th, 1854, which submitted to the lands, as the exclusive property of the na-revision and approval of the supreme governtion, never could have been alienated under ment the grants or alienations of public lands any title by virtue of decrees, orders, and en-made by the local governments of the states actments of the legislatures, governments, or or departments and territories of the republocal authorities of the states and territories lic from September, 1821, to that date, are reof the Republic. pealed in all their parts. "2. Consequently, it is also declared that the sales, cessions, or any other class of alienations of said public lands that have been made without the express order and approval of the general powers in the manner prescribed by the laws are null and of no value or effect. "Art. 2. Consequently, all the titles issued during that period by the superior authorities of the states or territories under the federal system, by virtue of their lawful faculties, or by those of the departments or territories, under the central system, with express authorization or consent of the supreme gov "3. The officials, authorities, and employ-ernment for the acquisition of said lands, all ees upon whom devolves the execution of this decree, shall proceed as soon as they receive it to recover and take possession, in the name of the nation, of the lands comprehended in the provisions of article 1, and that may be in the possession of corporations or private individuals, whatever may be their prerogatives or position. "4. The judicial, civil, or administrative authorities shall admit no claims of any kind nor petitions whose purpose is to obtain indemnifications from the public treasury for the damages the unlawful holders or owners may allege under the provisions of the preceding article; and they shall preserve their right only against the persons from whom they have the lands they are now compelled to return." Reynolds, p. 324. in conformity with the existing laws for the And again, on October 16, 1856, a decree "Art. 1. The decrees of November 25, 1853, and July 7, 1854, are void." Reynolds, p. 331. The court of private land claims was divided. Three of the justices were of opinion that as this government recognized *San-[290] ta Anna in negotiating with and purchasing On July 5, 1854, he published another de- from him the territory within the Gadsden cree, which was even more specific, contain-purchase, the courts must also recognize his ing these provisions: declarations in respect to titles as authori"Art. 1. The titles of all the alienations of tative, citing in support of these general proppublic lands made in the territory of the Re-ositions Wheaton's International Law, §§ public from September, 1821, till date, 31 and 32, and Halleck's International Law, whether by the general authorities or by those of the extinguished states and departments, shall be submitted to the revision of the supreme government, without which they shall have no value and shall constitute no right of property. "5. The alienations of public lands, of whatever nature they be, that have been made by the authorities and officials of the departments without the knowledge and approval of the general government, during the epoch when the central system was in force in the Republic, are void. [289] *"6. Those made by said authorities in the epoch of the extinguished federation are like wise void; provided they were not made for the purpose of extending and promoting colonization, which was the purpose proposed by the law of August 18, 1824. "7. Grants or sales of lands made to private individuals, companies, or corporations pages 47 and 62. Without questioning the While it is true that practically Santa determination of rights created during peace- | for. The decree of the Court of Private Land ful and regular eras. The devestiture of Claims will be reversed, and the case remandtitles once legally vested is a judicial act.ed for further proceedings. ROBERT PERRIN, Appt., v. Crittenden Land (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 292.) [292] & Camou v. United States, 171 U. S. 277 [ante, In governments subject to ordinary constitutional limitations a mere executive declaration disturbs no rights that have been vested, and simply presents in any given case to the judicial department the inquiry whether the rights claimed to have been UNITED vested were legally so vested. Undoubtedly this government dealing with Mexico, and finding Santa Anna in control, rightfully dealt with him in a political way in the negotiation of a treaty and the purchase of territory, and the judicial department of this government must recognize the action of its executive and political department as controlling. But when the courts are called upon to inquire as to personal rights existing Argued March 16, 17, 1898. Decided May in the ceded territory, a mere declaration by the temporary executive cannot be deemed absolutely and finally controlling. It is un#91Jnecessary to rest this case upon the fact disclosed that these decrees of Santa Anna were immediately thereafter revoked. It is not significant that the substance of them was thereafter re-established. We are compelled to inquire whether prior to such decree there were rights vested, rights which the Mexican government recognized, and then determine whether those rights were by such decree ab-manded for further proceedings. solutely destroyed. 31, 1898. APPEAL from a decree of the Court of Private Land Claime decreeing that the claim of the plaintiff, Robert Perrin, to a tract of land formerly in the state of Sonora in the Republic of Mexico, but now in the territory of Arizona, known and designated as the Rancho San Ygnacio del Babocomari, described in his petition, is invalid, and dismissing the petition. Reserved, and case re The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Byron Waters, John T. Mor Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: Turning to the decree of November 25, 1853, the first and second articles are mere declarations of law. The third article directs the officials to proceed to the execution of the decree and to recover and take possession of the lands coming within the scope of the prior articles. It does not appear that any steps were taken by any officials to carry So far as the question of title is concerned into execution this decree. Whether this particular grant came within the scope of the this case is similar to the one immediately two declarations of law was a question to be preceding. (Camou v. United States, 171 U. Š. considered and determined. On that ques-277 [ante, 163]). For reasons therein stated tion the grantee never was heard. There the decree of the court of private land claims never was a judicial adjudication that his will be reversed, and the case remanded for grant came within the scope of the first two further proceedings. It is true, as suggested articles. He was never dispossessed. His in its opinion, the court of private land property was never taken possession of. It is claims thought that there was no sufficient going too far to hold that the mere declara- location of the tract in controversy, and that tion of a rule of law made by a temporary probably the grant was void for uncerdictaor, never enforced as against an individ-tainty in the description of the property. It ual grantee in possession of lands, is to be regarded as operative and determinative of the latter's rights. As for the reasons heretofore mentioned we are of opinion that a valid grant was made in this case, we think this arbitrary declaration by a temporary dictator was not potent to destroy the title. The decree of the court of private land claims must therefore be reversed. As shown by the statement of facts the survey of the land claimed in the petition is in excess of the four sitios granted and paid for. While the excess is not so great as in many cases, yet we think the rule laid down in Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220 [ante, 142] should control, and that this government discharges its full duty under the treaty when it recognizes a grant as valid to the amount of land paid may be that this conclusion was right. At the same time, in view of what has been recently said by this court in respect to boundaries, description and area, we think that justice requires that we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Perhaps the claimants may be able to satisfactorily identify a tract not larger than the area purchased and paid for which should equitably be recognized as the tract granted. 169 (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 293-312.) Rights under mining claim-end lines-declarations of superintendent-end lines must be straight. 1. The right to follow a vein on the dip is limited by the end lines of the mining claim, In case of a patent under the act of 1866, as well as in case of a location under the act of 1872. 2. The end lines of a mining claim under the act of 1866 must be the end lines of all the veins found within the surface boundaries which are given to the locator by the act of 1872. 3. A corporation is not bound by the declarations of its superintendent outside the scope of his agency or authority. to the prejudice of its property rights. 4. The end lines of a lode mining claim under the act of 1866 must be straight, whether they need to be parallel or not. [No. 230.] Argued April 22, 1898. Decided May 31, 1898. APPEAL from a decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming as modified the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, which was mainly in favor of the complainant, Austin Walrath, in an action brought by him against the Champion Mining Company, for a perpetual injunction, restraining defendants and their agents and servants from entering upon certain lands in the county of Nevada, state of California, and mining therein, and from extracting or removing therefrom any gold bearing quartz. Affirmed. See same case below, 44 U. S. App. 291, 72 Fed. Rep. 978, 19 C. C. A. 323. Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna: This action, brought in the superior court of Nevada county, California, involves title to a triangular shaped section of what is known as the "Contact," "Ural" or "Back" ledge of gold-bearing ore, situated in the same county, claimed by appellant to be a portion of the Providence Mine, to which complainant has title through a patent from the United States, and by appellee, a corporation, to be a part of the New Years Extension Mine owned by it. The relative situation of the two properties and the portion of the ledge in controversy is shown by the following figure No. 1; the disputed section being contained between the lines thereon marked "Line claimed by Providence" and "Line claimed by Champion." [See cut on opposite page.] The figures marked "New Years" and "New Years Extension" represent the surface of the mining properties owned by defendant while that marked "Providence Mine" represents the surface of the patented ground of the plaintiff. The action was brought May 24, 1892, to recover $300,000 damages for ore extracted from the ledge and carried away by the defendant, and for an injunction against further trespasses thereon. Upen motion of appellee the action was removed to the United States circuit court, as involving a Federal question, where the conplainant recast his pleadings so as to separate the action into a bill in equity, upon which the action is now proceeding, and an action at law for the damages alleged. The suit in equity was tried in the circuit court and decided mainly in favor of the appellee. From this decree the appellant appealed to the court of appeals for the ninth circuit.[296] where it was modified, and, as modified, affirmed. The appellant now brings the case to this court upon writ of error from the court of uppeals. The appellant's title is deraigned as follows: In 1857, under the miners' rules and customs then in force, thirty-one locators located 3,100 feet of the Providence or Granite lode. By mesne conveyances the title to this location became vested in the Providence, Gold & Silver Mining Company and on April 28, 1871, that company obtained a patent to 3,100 feet of the lode and for surface ground as described in the patent. The title thus granted to the Providence Gold & Silver Mining Company was, before the commencement of this suit, vested in the appellant. The ledge, as granted by the patent, extends 30 feet north of the north surface line of the location and some 680 feet south of the south surface line. The patent conveyed only the Providence ledge and the surface ground. All other ledges contained within the surface lines were expressly reserved. It is also contended by appellants that, by the act of Congress of May 10, 1872, exclusive possession of all the surface included within the lines of the location was granted to the owners of the Providence, together with all other lodes or ledges having their tops or apexes within such surface lines. This grant, of course, included the Contact vein, subsequently discovered within said boundaries, and now constituting the bone of contention in this action. NOTE. As to ownership of mines; United As to title to water by appropriation; comStates statutes as to; right of support of sur- mon-law rule; rule of mining states, see note face, see note to United States v. Castillero, to Atchison v. Peterson. 22: 414. 17: 448. 170 171 U. S. |