and the default having continued for thirty to repledge the same as security for further days, Tod & Co., on a request of a majority of advances." That "the fair inference from the note holders, declared the principal due, the entire evidence is that the trust company and advertised the securities for sale on consented to the repledging of these securiSeptember 19, in accordance with the inden- ties, in order that further funds might be ture of trust, due notice being given, which procured for carrying on the work in quessale was adjourned to September 26, at the tion, but by so doing it did not abandon its instance of the creditors of the Union Loan *lien upon or equity in the securities, but [493] & Trust Company, when the sale took place, only subordinated its rights to those created and Tod & Co. bought the securities as pur- by the repledging of the securities." chasing trustees, thereto duly appointed, and That the sale of the securities by Tod & held the same for the benefit of the holders Co. under the provisions of the trust agreeof the notes. Certificates were issued by ment of December 31, 1892, did not devest the Tod & Co. as such purchasing trustees that trust company, or its assignee, of the junior they so held the securities and that each of lien on the securities, and that its right to the note holders was entitled to a three-hun- redeem remained because the $1,500,000 of dredth part interest for every $5,000 note de- notes were not purchased in the ordinary posited. course of business, nor in fact issued by the bridge company in connection with its business, but made at the dictation of the syndicate on the suggestion of Tod & Co., and operated as a fraud on the bridge company; that the use of its name was in reality a matter of form merely, and was so understood; and that the transaction must be considered as a loan to the syndicate, secured by a pledge of the collateral, which lien was superior to that existing in favor of the trust After the interest had defaulted Tod & Co. were interviewed on behalf of some of the creditors of the Union Loan & Trust Company, and an offer to pay the defaulted interest was made on condition that such creditors should be put in control of the board of directors of the Sioux City & Northern Railroad Company, but with this condition Tod 192]& Co. were without authority to comply, and the creditors committee declined to pay. No money was tendered. According to the evidence of the Tods it was then, for the first time, that Tod & Co. received any intimation that their right to hold the securities was questioned by the Union Loan & Trust Company or its cred itors. The circuit court entered a final decree authorizing the redemption of the securities by the intervener on payment to Tod & Co., as trustees, of the sum of $1,500,000, with interest thereon from December 30, 1892, computed with semiannual rests, to the date of payment. company. The suggestion as to usury was dismissed on the ground that in any view equity required the payment of the sums advanced with interest, and no offer to do this was made by the intervener. From the decree the intervener prosecuted The opinion is reported 65 Fed. Rep. 559, sustain objections to certain evidence; the The cause was heard in the court of ap- After a brief review of the formation of the syndicate and its dealings with the Union Loan & Trust Company, the conclusion was drawn "that the trust company, as against the members of the syndicate, is entitled to the benefit of the securities which were placed in its possession, and upon the faith of which it may be assumed it indorsed the syndicate paper," but that it was fairly deducible from the evidence that "the trust The intervener then applied to this court Company parted with the possession of the for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. securities, knowing that it was intended to rehypothecate them," and that "it is not now open to the trust company to repudiate the acts of its secretary and treasurer in regard to these securities, by whose action in placing the same in the possession and under the control of Garretson the latter was enabled Messrs. John C. Coombs, Henry J. Taylor, and William Faxon, Jr., for appellant: An equitable lien may be created by agreement of the parties. Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654, 664 41 L. producing the sinking." 11 Pet. 219, 220 | military or usurped power." The facts, as The maxim has been largely expounded and defined by this court in cases of insurance against fire. found by the circuit court and stated in the which blew the fire against her woodwork, cases In Etna F. Insurance Co. v. Boon a policy of insurance against fire, issued during the war of the rebellion, for one year, upon goods in a store in the city of Glasgow, in the state of Missouri, provided that the insurers should not be liable for "any loss or damage by fire which may happen or take place by means of any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power." The city of Glasgow, being occupied as a military post by the United In Howard F. Insurance Co. v. Norwich & States forces, was attacked by a superior N. Y. Transportation Co. 12 Wall. 194 [20: armed force of the rebels, and defended by 378], a large steamboat on Long Island the *United States forces; and during the bat-[457] sound was insured against fire, excepting fire tle the commander of these forces, upon its happening “by means of any invasion, insur-becoming apparent that the city could not rection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any be successfully defended, and, in order to pre238 171 U. S. vent military stores, which had been placed | caused by the attack. It was one of a conin the city hall, from falling into the hands tinuous chain of events brought into being of the rebels, caused them to be destroyed by by the usurped military power,-events so burning the city hall; and the fire, spreading linked together as to form one continuous from building to building, through three in- whole." 95 U. S. 133 [24: 400]. termediate buildings, to that containing the goods insured, destroyed them. This court held that the loss was within the exception in the policy, because the rebel military power was the predominating and operating cause of the fire; and in the opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Strong, and strongly supported by authority, the true rule and its application to that case were stated as follows: In general accord with the opinions above quoted are two cases in this court upon the meaning and effect of the term "dangers of navigation," or "perils of the sea," in a bill of lading. The Mohawk, 8 Wall. 153 [19: 406]; The Portsmouth, 9 Wall. 682 [19: 754]. In The Mohawk, a steamboat carrying wheat under a bill of lading containing an exception of "dangers of navigation" "The question is not what cause was near-grounded on the flats, and, in the effort to get est in time or place to the catastrophe. her off, became disabled by the bursting of That is not the meaning of the maxim, her boiler, and afterwards sank. It was arCausa proxima non remota spectatur. The gued, among other things, on the one side, proximate cause is the efficient cause, the that the explosion was not a danger incident one that necessarily sets the other causes in to navigation; and, on the other, that the operation. The causes that are merely in- sinking of the vessel was the immediate cause cidental or instruments of a superior or con- of the damage to the wheat. The question at trolling agency are not the proximate causes issue was whether the vessel was entitled to and the responsible ones, though they may be freight pro rata itineris. This court, speakneare in time to the result. It is only when ing by Mr. Justice Nelson, said that "the exthe causes are independent of each other that plosion of the boiler was not a peril within the nearest is, of course, to be charged with the exception of the bill of lading," and the disaster." 95 U. S. 130 [24:399]. "The therefore the case fell within that class in conclusion is inevitable, that the fire which which the ship is disabled or prevented from caused the destruction of the plaintiff's prop-forwarding the goods to the port of destinaerty happened or took place, not merely in tion by a peril or accident not within the ex-[459] consequence of, but by means of, the rebel ception in the bill of lading. 8 Wall. 162 invasion and military or usurped power. The [19: 409]. Although this statement was fire occurred while the attack was in prog- perhaps not absolutely necessary to the deci ress, and when it was about being success- sion, it was upon a point argued by counsel, ful. The attack, as a cause, never ceased to and shows clearly that the court was of operate until the loss was complete. It was opinion that the explosion, and not the sinkthe causa causans which set in operation ing, was the proximate cause of the loss. every agency that contributed to the destruc- In The Portsmouth, it was decided that a tion. It created the military necessity for jettison made to lighten a steamboat which the destruction of the military stores in the had been run aground by her captain's negcity hall, and made it the duty of the com-ligence was not within an exception of "the manding officer of the Federal forces to de- dangers of lake navigation," in a bill of ladstroy them. His act, therefore, in setting fire ing; and Mr. Justice Strong, in delivering by a jettito the city hall, was directly in the line of the judgment, said: "A loss force set in motion by the usurping power." occasioned by a peril of the 95 U. S. 132 [24:399]. "The court below re- is, in ordinary cases, a loss by perils garded the action of the United States mili- of the sea. But it is well settled that, tary authorities as a sufficient cause inter- if a jettison of a cargo, or a part of it, [458]vening *between the rebel attack and the de- is rendered necessary by any fault or breach struction of the plaintiff's property, and of contract of the master or owners of the therefore held it to be the responsible prox-vessel, the jettison must be attributed to that imate cause. With this we cannot concur. fault, or breach of contract, rather than to The proximate cause, as we have seen, is the the sea peril, though that may also be presThis is a prindominant cause, not the one which is inci- ent, and enter into the case. dental to that cause, its mere instrument, ciple alike applicable to exceptions in bills though the latter may be nearest in place of lading and in policies of insurance. and time to the loss. In Milwaukee & St. Though the peril of the sea may be nearer Paul Railway Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469 in time to the disaster, the efficient cause, [24: 256], we said, in considering what is the without which the peril would not have been proximate and what the remote cause of an incurred, is regarded as the proximate cause injury: "The inquiry must always be whether of the loss. And there is, perhaps, greater there was any intermediate cause discon- reason for applying the rule to exceptions in nected from the primary fault, and self-op- contracts of common carriers than to those erating, which produced the injury.' In the in policies of insurance, for, in general, negpresent case, the burning of the city hall and ligence of the insured does not relieve an unthe spread of the fire afterwards was not a derwriter, while a common carrier may not, new and independent cause of loss. On the even by stipulation, relieve himself from the contrary, it was an incident, a necessary in- consequences of his own fault." 9 Wall. 684, cident and consequence, of the hostile rebel 685 [19: 755, 756]. attack on the town,-a military necessity son sea Generally speaking, the words "perils of The damage was not owing to any violent action of winds or waves, or to the ship coming against a rock or shoal or other external object; but it was owing to an explosion within the ship, and arising out of the nature of the cargo, which cannot be considered, either in common understanding or according to the judicial precedents, as a peril of the sea" have the same meaning in a bill of | of the explosion; and it was one of a conlading as in a policy of insurance. There tinuous chain of events brought into being is a difference, indeed, in their effect in the by the explosion, events so linked together two kinds of contract, when negligence of as to form one continuous whole. the master or crew of the vessel contributes to a loss by a peril of the sea; in such a case, an insurer against "perils of the sea" is liable, because the assured does not warrant that his servants shall use due care to avoid them; whereas an exception of "perils of the sea" in a bill of lading does not relieve the carrier from his primary obligation to carry with reasonable care, unless prevented by the sea. the excepted perils. But when, as in the [460]present case, it is *distinctly found that there was no negligence, there is no reason, and much inconvenience, in holding that the words have different meanings in the two kinds of commercial contract. The Portsmouth, above cited; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transportation Co. 117 U. S. 312, 322-S. 131 [24: 399]. If damage done by water 325 [29:873, 879, 880]; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 438, 442 [32:788, 791, 792]; Compania La Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U. S. 104 [42:398]; The Xantho, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 503, 510, 514, 517. As was observed by this court in Etna F. Insurance Co. v. Boon, above cited: "Often in case of a fire, much of the destruction is caused by water applied in efforts to extinguish the flames. Yet it is not doubted all that destruction is caused by the fire, and insurers against fire are liable for it." 95 U. thrown on by human agency to put out a fire Upon principle and authority, therefore, her, be considered as "occasioned by accidents In the case at bar, the explosion of the case of detonators, besides doing other damage, burst open the side of the ship below the water line, and the sea water rapidly flowed in through the opening made by the explosion, and injured the plaintiff's sugar. The explosion, in consequence of which, and through the hole made by which, the water Nor can the damage to the sugar, attribuimmediately entered the ship, must be con- table, not to a peril of the sea, but to the sidered as the predominant, the efficient, the explosion of part of the cargo after the ship proximate, the responsible cause of the dam- had ended her voyage, and had beer finally age to the sugar, according to each of the and intentionally moored at the dock, there tests laid down in the judgments of this to remain until her cargo was taken out of court, above referred to. The damage to the sugar was an effect which proceeded inevitably, and of absolute necessity, from the explosion, and must therefore be ascribed to that cause. The explosion concurred, as the efficient agent, with the water, at the instant when the water entered the ship. The inflow of the water, seeking a level by the mere Much reliance was placed by the appellee force of gravitation, was not a new and in- upon a recent English case, in which the dependent cause, but was a necessary and in- House of Lords, reversing the decision of [462] stantaneous result and effect of the bursting Lord Esher and Lords Justices Bowen and open of the ship's side by the explosion. Fry in the court of appeal, and restoring the There being two concurrent causes of the judgment of Lord Justice Lopes in the damage the explosion of the detonators, and Queen's bench division, held that damage to the inflow of the water-without any ap-goods by sea water which, without any negpreciable interval of time, or any possibility lect or default on the part of the shipownof distinguishing the amount of damage ers or their servants, found its way into the done by each, the explosion, as the cause hold of a steamship through a hole which had which set the water in motion and gave it been gnawed by rats in a leaden pipe conits efficiency for harm at the time of the dis- nected with the bath room of the vessel, was aster, must be regarded as the predominant within the exception of "dangers or accidents cause. It was the primary and efficient of the seas" in a bill of lading. Hamilton v. cause, the one that necessarily set the force Pandorf, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 518, L. R. 17 Q. of the water in operation; it was the su- B. Div. 670, L. R. 16 Q. B. Div. 629. There perior or controlling agency, of which the is nothing in the report of any stage of that water was the incident or instrument. The case to show that the sea water entered the inflow of the sea water was not an inter- ship immediately upon the gnawing by the mediate cause, disconnected from the pri- rats of the hole in the pipe; and any such inmary cause, and self-operating; it was not ference would be inconsistent with one of a new and independent cause of damage; the opinions delivered in the House of Lords [461]*but, on the contrary, it was an in-in which Lord Fitzgerald said: "The re cident, a necessary incident and consequence, mote canse was in a certain sense the action the balance were applied with Smith's knowledge, without objection on his part, or that of any other officer or director of the trust company, to taking up notes secured thereby, which had been given by Garretson to acquire the Nebraska & Western bonds, which he afterwards pledged to Tod & Co., and which were exchanged for the bonds of the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western Railroad in controversy. None of the securities ever stood in the name of the Union Loan & Trust Company. And they were delivered in such form as to enable Garretson to hold himself out as the owner or lawful holder thereof, with full power of disposition. everything belonging or appertaining to said Conveyances by insolvent debtors in fraud The trust company did not own these securities, and did not transfer them in fraud of its creditors, prior to the assignment, so as to entitle the assignee to treat the transfers as void and the securities as belonging to the company. The district judge well said [65 Fed. Rep. 564]: "It is entirely clear that E. R. Smith, the secretary and treasurer of the trust company, dealt with these securities as though he had full authority from the company so to do, and he obeyed Garretson's instructions in regard to the same without demur; and *And it must be remembered that this prc [499] it does not appear that the trust company, ceeding is an attempt on behalf of the holders or any officer thereof, ever objected to such of railroad syndicate paper, which constidisposition of the securities; and, further-tuted only a portion of the liabilities of the more, so far as the evidence in this case discloses, the general management of the business of the trust company was intrusted to Smith, with but little, if any, supervision on part of the directors or other officers of the corporation." The truth of the matter seems to be, as the circuit court held, that, in order that the various properties represented by the stock and bonds should become valuable, it was necessary that the enterprises on which they were based should be carried through, and this required additional funds, to procure which the trust company consented to Garretson's negotiations with Tod & Co., and the debenture company, and the pledging of the urities. 98] The presumption on the facts is that the curities were delivered by the company to Garretson for use, and, if they had ever been pledged to the company, that the pledge was discharged by the voluntary parting with possession. There is nothing to show an intention to limit the use to a hypothecation in subordination to a prior pledge, let alone the question whether any such pledge existed, and the absence of evidence of any as sertion thereof. trust company, to establish equities in the The difficulty with the contention that the The securities were railroad bonds, payable to bearer, and certificates of stock in the names of Garretson and his associates, with transfers indorsed by them in blank; and they were, in large part, sent to Tod & Co. by the trust company, at Garretson's request, with presumably full knowledge that they Certainly, under the circumstances, the were to be used as collateral to loans he was company could not be allowed to set up its procuring, without anything to indicate that alleged title as against third parties taking the trust company had any interest in them, in good faith and without notice. And the or any intimation of such interest. The sesame principle is applicable to its assignee curities did not stand in the name of the and to creditors seeking to enforce rights in trust company, and Garretson did not, in his name. So far as this case is concerned there is nothing to the contrary in the stat- any of his dealings with Tod & Co., assume to ute of Iowa regulating assignments for the act for the company. The mere fact that he benefit of creditors as expounded by the su- cient to call for an inference that he was act preme court of the state. Code Iowa, title 14. chap. 7; Schaller v. Wright, 70 Iowa, ing as such in these transactions, nor did he 667; Mehlhop v. Ellsworth, 95 Iowa, 657. make his requests of Smith in that capacity, Section 2127 of the Code provides: "Any nor were they complied with by Smith as on assignee as aforesaid, shail have as full pow- that theory. er and authority to dispose of all estate, real and personal, assigned, as the debtor had at the time of the assignment, and to sue for and recover in the name of such assignee U. S., Book 43. 171 U. S. 17 was one of its officers was not in itself suffi There was no actual notice, and as the visible state of things was consistent with Garretson's right to deal with the securities as he did, such notice cannot be presumed or 257 |