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company could not avail itself, in favor of its own alleged claim, of such an infirmity, if it existed, nor could the holders of the notes, which had passed into their hands as strangers, be deprived of the securities on the faith of which they had advanced their money; or have their rights adjudicated in their absence.

However, whatever the contention in the courts below may have been the errors assigned here merely put forward the theory that the alleged usurious character of the contract by reason of the options granted and commissions paid, and its invalidity for lack of power in the bridge company, so took the transaction out of the ordinary course of 503]business as to charge Tod & Co. and the loanholders with bad faith and notice of the alleged claims of the trust company.

But we cannot perceive that the fact of usury between the parties to the contract, if usury there were, or action in excess of power, if that existed, either or both, can be laid hold of to justify the imputation of notice that Garretson was dealing with the securities in derogation of rights of the trust company. Doubtless there are cases where commercial paper or securities may be of fered for negotiation under circumstances so out of the usual course of business as to throw such grave suspicion on the source of title that lack of inquiry, assuming that it would disclose defects, might amount to culpable negligence. But that doctrine has no application here.

Respondents had possession of all the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western bonds, and 7,200 shares of Sioux City & Northern stock, in pledge to secure payment of $1,000,000 of Garretson's notes payable on demand, which amount had been borrowed for the purposes of, and was used in, acquiring the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western Railroad for the syndi

cate.

The syndicate was engaged in constructing a bridge across the Missouri river to connect the railroad in Nebraska with that in Iowa. The stock of the bridge company was all owned by the syndicate, and had been pledged with the bonds of the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western Railway.

Garretson applied for a new loan of $1,500,000,with which to take up the million dollar loan and get additional funds for the construction of the bridge.

As the railroads whose bonds and stock constituted the security were new, and the securities were then without market value, the negotiation of the loan was made more attractive to the debenture company by the allowance of the commission and certain options. And since there seems to have been a question as to whether the agreements might not be obnoxious to the New York usury statutes, and as notes of a corporation were supposed to be more readily salable than those of an individual, it was thought best to make the loan directly to one of the corporations owned by Garretson and his associates. The original suggestion was that the loan 504]*should be made to the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western Railway Company, but objections!

being raised to this in view of certain provi sions of the statutes of Nebraska, it was arranged between Tod & Co. and Garretson and his associates that the bridge company, which was equally owned by the syndicate, and to the purposes of which $500,000 of the loan were ostensibly to be devoted, should become the borrower. The sale of the securities, the issue of the notes secured thereby, and the making of the loan followed.

Garretson executed the indenture of trust to Tod & Co., the debenture company paid over $1,500,000 and interest to them, and they took up the million dollar loan, thereby releasing the Sioux City, O'Neill, & Western bonds and 7,200 shares of Sioux City & Northern stock; the balance of the latter stock was sent to Tod & Co. by the trust company; Tod & Co., as trustees, certified on the notes that the collateral had been deposited with them, and the notes were sold to various purchasers, who apparently advanced their money in good faith.

If the transactions, thus briefly stated, were unaffected by notice of any want of authority in Garretson in respect of the trust company as now alleged, it is not for that company to say that Tod & Co., or the holders of the loan, should be held chargeable with notice simply because the commissions and options might have constituted usury as between the parties to the loan, or the bridge company, its stockholders, or judgment creditors might have had cause of complaint of defect of power.

In letting petitioner in to redeem the circuit court went at least as far as the record would permit. Whether or not there was error in the decree of which respondents might have complained, we do not feel at liberty to decide.

Decree affirmed.

UNITED STATES*

v.

JOINT-TRAFFIC ASSOCIATION et al.

(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 505-578.)

Joint-traffic association, when illegalpower of Congress to prohibit—agreement by which competition is prevented—freedom of contract-valid statute-agreement between railroad companies.

1. The right of a railroad company in a jointtraffic association to deviate from the rates prescribed, provided it acts on a resolution of its board of directors and serves a copy thereof on the managers of the association, who, upon its receipt, are required to "act promptly for the protection of the parties hereto," does not relieve the association from condemnation as an illegal restraint of competition, as the privilege of deviating from the rates would be exercised upon pain of a war of competition against it by the whole association.

2.

Congress has the power to prohibit, as in restraint of interstate commerce, a contract or combination between competing railroad companies to establish and maintain interstate rates and fares for the transportation

[505]

:

2.R. 4 C. P. 117; The Southgate [1894] P.
329; The Xantho, L. R. 12 App. Cas. 503;
Hamilton v. Pandorf, L. R. 12 App. Cas.

518.

The loss being prima facie by a danger of the sea, and hence within the exception, the burden of proof was upon the libellant to defeat its operation.

The Hindoustan, 35 U. S. App. 173, 67 Fed. Rep. 794, 14 С. С. А. 650; The Victory and The Plymothian, 168 U. S. 410, 423, 42 L. ed. 519, 528; Western Transp. Co. v. Downer, 11 Wall. 129, 20 L. ed. 160; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Reeves, 10 Wall. 176, 189, 190, 19 L. ed. 909, 913.

If the loss may as well have occurred by a peril of the sea as by negligence, the libellant cannot recover.

Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272, 280, 13 L. ed. 985, 988; Muddle v. Stride, L. R. 9 C. & P. 380; The R. D. Bibber, 8 U. S. App. 42, 50 Fed. Rep. 841, 2 C. C. A. 50: Searles ▼. Manhattan R. Co. 101 N. Y. 661.

the

If the vessel be deemed to have been unseaworthy when she broke ground on voyage, nevertheless the shipowner "exercised due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied."

A presumption of competency arises under the circumstances.

Butler v. Boston & S. S. Co. 130 U. S. 527, 554, 32 L. ed. 1017, 1023; Pickup v. Thames Marine Ins. Co. L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 594.

The Harter act exempts shipowners from responsibility for faults in the management of the ship's appliances, the ordinary use and control of which are committed to the officers and crew, even though such mismanagement may occur prior to sailing, and may leave the ship unseaworthy.

The Delaware, 161 U. S. 459, 471, 40 L. ed. 771; The Colima, 82 Fed. Rep. 665; The Mary L. Peters, 68 Fed. Rep. 919; The Flamborough, 69 Fed. Rep. 470; The Alvena, 74 Fed. Rep. 252; The Carron Park, L. R. 15 Prob. Div. 203; The Mexican Prince 82 Fed. Rep. 484; The Glenochil [1896] P. 10. The proper closing of the ports was an act belonging to the management or navigation of the ship.

juries to a cargo of sugar owned by the libel-
lant, which had been shipped on or about
February 15, 1894, upon the Silvia at Ma-
tanzas, Cuba, for Philadelphia, under a bill
of lading by which the sugar was "to be de-
livered in the like good order and condition
at the port of Philadelphia (the dangers of
the seas only excepted)," upon payment of
agreed freight, "and all other conditions as
per charter party dated New York 31st Jan-
uary, 1894."

The charter party, which had been made
and concluded at New York January 31, 1894,
provided that the Silvia, then at Tucacas,
Venezuela, should proceed as soon as possi-
ble in ballast to Matanzas for a voyage
thence to Philadelphia, New York, or Boston,
and contained these provisions: "The vessel
shall be tight, staunch, strong, and in every
way fitted for such a voyage, and receive on
board, during the aforesaid voyage, the mer-
chandise hereinafter mentioned (the act of
God, adverse winds, restraint of princes and
rulers, the Queen's enemies, fire, pirates, ac-
cidents to machinery or boilers, collisions,
collisio
errors of navigation, and all other dangers
and accidents of the seas, rivers, and naviga-
tion, of whatever nature and kind soever
during the said voyage, always excepted).
"The said party of the second part doth en-[464]
gage to provide and furnish to the said ves-
sel a full cargo, under deck, of sugar in
bags. The bills of lading to be signed with-
out prejudice to this charter."

The Silvia, with the sugar in her lower hold, sailed from Matanzas for Philadelphia on the morning of February 16, 1894. The compartment between decks next the forecastle had been fitted up to carry steerage passengers, but on this voyage contained only spare sails and ropes and a small quantity of stores. This compartment had four round ports on each side, which were about eight or nine feet above the water line when the vessel was deep laden. Each port was eight inches in diameter, furnished with a cover of glass five eighths of an inch thick, set in a brass frame, as well as with an inner cover or dummy of iron. When the ship sailed, the weather was fair, and the glase covers were tightly closed, but the iron cov

Carmichael v. Liverpool Sailing Shipowners were left open in order to light the com

ers' Mut. Indemnity Asso. L. R. 19 Q. B.
Div. 242; The Warkworth, L. R. 9 Prob. Div.
20, and 145; The Sandfield, 79 Fed. Rep.
371; The Castleventry, 69 Fed. Rep. 475,

note.

The libellant is not in privity with the charter party between the owner and J. H. Winchester & Co.

Russell v. Niemann, 17 C. B. 163; Serraino ▼. Campbell [1890] 1 Q. В. 283.

[463] *Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a libel in admiralty, filed June 14, 1894, in the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by the Franklin Sugar Refining Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania, against the steamship Silvia, of Liverpool, owned by the Red Cross Line of Steamers, to recover damages for in

partment should it become necessary to get
anything from it, and the hatches were bat-
tened down, but could have been opened in
two minutes by knocking out the wedges.
In the afternoon of the day of sailing, the
ship encountered rough weather, and the
glass cover of one of the ports was broken,-
whether by the force of the seas or by float-
ing timber or wreckage was wholly a marter
of conjecture, and the water came
through the port and damaged the sugar.

in

The decree of the district court dismissed the libel, and was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 64 Fed. Rep. 607. and 35 U.S. App. 395. The libellant applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari from this court.

It was adjudged by this court at the last term that the act of Congress of February 13, 1893, chap. 105, known as the Harter act, has not released the owner of a ship from the duty of making her seaworthy at the begin

the law, to aid in enforcing the law. The railroads shatter the law, and then combine to support the fragments.

It was contended below that the bill was multifarious. There is but one cause of action in the bill,-namely, the agreement. Upon that the bill is based. It seeks to enjoin the execution of an illegal contract. The averments of intent in the bill are unnecessary and immaterial. At the most they are conclusions of law. The court will examine the agreement and determine the question of law with respect to its meaning and effect; will determine whether the agreement restrains trade or commerce in any way so as to violate the law. If the agreement is prohibited by the anti-trust law the court will enjoin its execution; and the court will do this irrespective of whether the agreement does or does not also violate the Interstate Commerce Act, or those general principles of law which prevent any interference with interstate commerce.

It is not necessary for the government to insist that the agreement violates more than one law. It is clearly illegal as a contract in restraint of trade or commerce under the anti-trust law. The fact that it also violates some other law, if it does, assuredly will not cure its illegality under this law, or prevent the court from enjoining its execution. A thing which is doubly bad does not, therefore, become good. The rule of double negatives does not apply. Nor is the government deprived of the power to restrain the execution of a contract in restraint of trade or commerce under the anti-trust law because the contract contains a provision under which individuals have committed, or may commit, offenses punishable under the Interstate Commerce Act. If a man threatens my life I am not to be deprived of the right to put him under bond to keep the peace be cause he has also stolen my property.

The authority of the government to maintain this suit is sustained in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 343, 41 L. ed. 1007, 1028; citing Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184, 40 L. ed. 935, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 391; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. ed. 940, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405.

Messrs. James C. Carter and Lewis Cass Ledyard, for the Joint Traffic Association, appellee:

The object of the bill is to procure an adjudication that a certain agreement entered into between a large number of railroad companies forming most, but not all, of the lines or systems engaged in the business of railroad transportation between Chicago and the Atlantic coast, for the purpose of forming an association for the better regulation of a certain part of the traffic of those lines and systems, is illegal and void, and enjoining its

execution.

Congress in 1887 enacted the Interstate Commerce Law, the main design of which was to abolish discrimination in rates and secure a greater degree of uniformity, and to

that end it required all railroads engaged in interstate transportation to file with the Commission and publish schedules of their respective rates, and forbade the carriage of goods for any greater or less compensation than that specified in the published rates.

Even before the passage of the law the rtval lines engaged in an effort to agree upon the schedules which each should file, and had reached such agreement in time to file and publish them in compliance with the provi sions of the law.

The agreement in question was believed to promise great benefits and to make it in the interest of all to comply with the Interstate Commerce Act, and to detect, expose, and punish any who, from a mistaken view of interest, should violate it.

It made no effort to prevent competition: but sought to devise a scheme which would compel any competition to be fair, lawful, and open, and enable any rival to meet it without violating any law.

are

Unfortunately, large corporations viewed with a jealousy which does not confine itself at all times within the bounds of reason, and this sentiment creates hostilities to which it is but natural, at least, that public officials should yield. Transactions which, in the absence of political prejudice and passion, would pass unnoticed by those not immediately affected by them, are subject to hostile scrutiny; and it was not unnatural that such an agreement should raise a clamor that it was designed to raise rates. There never was a pretense, however, that under the agreement there was the slightest exaction of unreasonable charges. On the contrary the schedules of rates agreed upon and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission had never been objected to by that body, and were notoriously lower than those imposed for similar services in any other part of the world.

The answer denies every allegation of unlawful act or of unlawful intent, unless the making of the agreement itself was an unlawful act.

It may seem at first that we are aiming to persuade the court to reconsider its reasoning and determinations in the recent case of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association.

It may be that one of the questions now sought to be presented might have been made in that case and a decision of it obtained; but it is quite certain that the question was not raised.

The precise question which was considered and determined in the case above referred to was this: Assuming that the agreement was one in restraint of trade, would the circumstance that the restraint actually imposed by it was reasonable relieve it from the condemnation of the statute? Or, in other words, does the statute by a true construction condemn all agreements in restraint of interstate trade and commerce, or such only as were at common law unlawful?

Prior to, and at the time of, the passage of this law there were, as there still are, certain tendencies in the industrial world which drew widespread attention and excited in

Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: [467] "The controversy in this case was between the executor and two creditors of Charles M. Briggs, and arose as follows:

On April 18, 1862, during the war of the rebellion, Charles S. Morehead, of Kentucky, executed and delivered to his nephew, Charles M. Briggs, a bill of sale of cotton in Mississippi, in these terms:

"For and in consideration of money loaned and advanced heretofore by C. M. Briggs, and further valuable consideration by way of suretyship for me by said Briggs, I hereby sell and transfer to said C. M.

Briggs died in 1875, after repeated and unsuccessful efforts, through his attorneys, to obtain the proceeds of the cotton in question; and his executor continued the efforts and through the same attorneys procured the passage of the act of Congress of June 4, 1888, chap. 348, copied in the margin.,

*Under the provisions of that act, Briggs's [469] executor brought suit in the court of claims, and therein recovered the sum of $88,000. See Briggs v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 126, 143 U. S. 346 [36:180], 27 Ct. Cl. 564. Half of that sum was paid to the attorneys, pursuant to a contract between them and

Briggs all the cotton on my two plantations Briggs; and the rest, being the sum of $44,in Mississippi near Eggspoint and Green-000, came to the hands of the executor. ville. Said cotton so sold embraces all I Thereupon the executor, in a suit pre

have, baled and unbaled, gathered and ungathered. This is intended to cover all cotton that I have now or may have this year on said two plantations, supposed to be about 2,000 bales."

At the same time, Briggs executed and delivered to Samuel J. Walker, Morehead's son-in-law, a writing in these terms:

"In consideration of the sale and transfer this day made to me by C. S. Morehead of all the cotton on his two plantations near Eggspoint in the state of Mississippi, as specified in said sale and transfer in writing, I hereby assume and agree to pay to Samuel J. Walker the sum of forty thousand dollars due and owing to said Walker by said C. S. Morehead, upon condition, however, that I realize sufficient amount from any cotton on or from said plantations or proceeds of same, together with about twenty-five thousand dollars due me from said C. S. Morehead for moneys advanced and liability for him as surety; also about ten thousand dollars, more or less, being a claim of A. S. Shotwell as he may hereafter establish against said C. S. Morehead; but in case I should not realize sufficient to pay all of said claims or amounts above named in full, then I am to pay or divide the amount that may be realized from said cotton, proportionately or rata according to the respective amounts named, to the parties above named. [468] first, *however, paying and refunding any moneys paid by the respective parties for or on account of expenses pertaining to same; and in case more should be realized than sufficient to pay said amounts, with interest thereon to the time of realization and payment, then any surplus to be divided, one half to said Shotwell and C. M. Briggs jointly for any services, and the remaining one half to said Samuel J. Walker, but no other consideration to be paid to said Shotwell and Briggs for their service."

pro

Briggs at once took steps to get possession of the cotton, but was prevented by the Federal forces and the Confederate forces in the vicinity. This cotton, amounting to four hundred and fifty bales, was finally seized, together with the other cotton, by Captain G. L. Fort, assistant quartermaster general in the United States Army, in behalf of the United States, and was by him sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury of the

United States.

viously brought against him for the settlement of Briggs's estate, in the chancery division of the circuit court for the county of Jefferson and state of Kentucky, set up, by amended answer, that he had collected this sum of $44,000; and prayed that Walker's widow (to whom Walker had assigned his

claim) and Shotwell's administrator might be made parties to the suit, and be required to set up their claims to this sum. And Mrs. an Act for the Relief of the Estate of C. M. Briggs, Deceased.

Be It enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the court of claims is hereby given, subject to the proviso hereinafter mentioned, like jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim of the legal representatives of C. M. Briggs, deceased, for the proceeds of four hundred and fifty-five bales of cotton, now in the Treasury of the United States, alleged to have been owned, in whole or in part, by said

Briggs, as is given to said court by the acts of

March twelfth, eighteen hundred and sixtythree, and July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, upon petition to be filed in said court at any time within two years from the passage of this act, any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided, however, that unless the said court shall, on a preliminary inquiry, find that said Briggs was in fact loyal to the United States government, and that

the assignment to him hereinafter mentioned was bona fide, the court shall not have jurisdiction of the case. and the same shall, without further proceedings, be dismissed: And provided further, that if the court shall find that the alleged, assignment from one Morehead to said Briggs. of date April eighteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two. under which said Briggs claimed said cotton, was intended only as security to said Briggs for indebtedness, and against

contingent liabilities assumed by him for said Morehead, judgment shall be rendered for such portion of the proceeds of said cotton as will satisfy the debts and claims of said Briggs to secure which said assignment was given: Pro

vided, said judgment shall not be paid out of the general fund in the Treasury arising from the sale of captured and abandoned property, but shall be paid out of the special fund charged to and accounted for by Captain G. L. Fort, assistant quartermaster at Memphis, arising from the sale of the two thousand two hundred and nine bales of cotton, received by him, with which claimant's cotton was intermingled, said

claimant to receive only the proportion which his cotton bears to the net proceeds accounted

for by said Fort. 25 Stat. at L. 1075, chap.

348.

Walker and Shotwell's administrator filed Messrs. Wm. Stone Abert, Charles H. petitions in the cause, claiming the sums Gibson, John Marshall, and D. W. mentioned as due to Walker and to Shotwell, Sanders for plaintiff in error, opposed to respectively, in the writing signed by Briggs, motion. April 18, 1862, and above set forth.

To these petitions the executor of Briggs filed supplemental answers, in which, among other things, he set up the act of Congress of June 4, 1888, and the proceedings in the court of claims; and alleged that" in pursuance to the said act this defendant, through his said counsel, instituted an action against the United States in the court of claims to recover the proceeds of sale of the cotton aforesaid. and in and by said action it was finally determined and adjudged 47C that the said testator was loyal to the United States, and that the assignment made by said Morehead to defendant's testator was bona fide and founded on a valuable consider

ation; but this defendant was, by the act aforesaid, as well as the final judgment of the court of claims, limited in his recovery to such sum as would satisfy the debts and claims of his testator, to secure which the said assignment was given; and this defendant says that by the final judgment of said court of claims he only received and recovered from the United States such sum as was owing directly to his testator by said Morehead, and uid not recover anything whatsoever for or on account of anything that may have been owing by said Morehead to A. L. Shotwell or Samuel J. Walker;" and further

*Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case, [471] delivered the opinion of the court:

The motion to dismiss must be overruled.

An executor represents the person of the tes-
tator, and is charged with the duty of resist
ing unfounded claims against the fund in his
hands. Co. Lit. 209a; McArthur v. Scott,
113 U. S. 340, 396 [28:1015, 1033]. The
record, therefore, does present the Federal
question whether the right given by the act
of Congress to the "legal representatives" of
Charles M. Briggs was for the benefit of his
next of kin to the exclusion of his creditors.

But we are of opinion that this question,
which is the only Federal question in the
case, must be answered in the negative, and
consequently that the judgment of the court
of appeals of Kentucky must be affirmed.

The primary and ordinary meaning of the words "representatives," or "legal representatives," or " "personal representatives," when there is nothing in the context to control their meaning, is "executors or administra tors," they being the representatives constituted by the proper court. Re Crawford's Trust, 2 Drew. 230; Re Wyndham's Trusts, L. R. 1 Eq. 290; 2 Jarman on Wills, chap. 29, § 5 (5th ed.), 957, 966; Williams on Executors, pt. 3, bk. 3, chap. 2, § 2 (7), (9th

alleged that "the passage of the act afore- ed.) 992; Cox v. Curwen, 118 Mass. 198;

said was an act of grace on the part of the

United States for the sole benefit of this defendant, and to permit this defendant to assert a claim against the proceeds of said cotton to the extent that said Morehead was in

debted to his testator; that long prior thereto all claim that had existed in favor of said testator as against the United States for any part of the proceeds of said cotton had been barred by limitation, and said claim was out lawed and worthless;" " and that "it was not intended by said act that this defendant should recover anything for the benefit, di rectly or indirectly, of any other person." The circuit court of Jefferson county sustained demurrers of the petitioners to the

Halsey v. Paterson, 37 N. J. Eq. 445.
In Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 Ves. Jr. 140, 152,
a claim by the next of kin of a naval officer
to the share awarded him in a prize con-
demned after his death, and ordered by

treasury warrant to be paid to his "repre-
sentatives," was rejected by Sir William
Crown in all cases of this kind is to put what
is in strictness matter of bounty upon the

Grant, who said that the intention of the

footing of matter of right, and not to exer-
cise any kind of judgment or selection with
regard to the persons to be ultimately bene-[472]

fited by the gift; that the representatives to
whom the Crown gives are those who legally
sustain that character; but the gift is made
in augmentation of the estate, and is to be

supplemental answers of the executor; and, considered as if it had been actually part of

upon a hearing, found that there was due to Walker the sum of $40,000 and to Shotwell the sum of $6,681.21; and adjudged that the sum of $44,000, in the hands of the executor,

the officer's property at the time of his death.
In this court, it is well settled that moneys
received by the United States from a foreign
American vessels, and granted by

after deducting his commissions, be applied government by way of indemnity for the depro rata to the payment of these two sums, act of Congress to the owners of those ves

and of the further sun of $25,000 due from

sels, without directing to whom payment

Morehead to Briggs. The executor appealed shall be made in case of death or insolvency,
to the court of appeals of Kentucky, which
affirmed the judgment. 43 S. W. 479.
Thereupon he sued out this writ of error.

The case was submitted to this court upon miss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, or to affirm the judgment.

a motion by the defendants in error to dis

Messrs. James P. Helm, Helm Bruce, Samuel B. Vance, Charles M. Walker, and William B. Dixon, for defendants in error, in favor of motion.

pass to the assignees in bankruptcy for the
benefit of the creditors of such owners, al-
though such assignees have been appointed
before the act of Congress making the grant.
Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193 [7:108]; Er-
win v. United States, 97 U. S.392 [24:1065];
Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 529 [35:550].

In Emerson v. Hall, 13 Pet. 409 [10:223],
cited by the plaintiff in error, in which
money paid by the United States to the heirs
at law, as "the legal representatives of Wil-
liam Emerson," under the act of March 3,

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