nopolies," and in the prosecution of this un- | defendants, and copies of the articles of as-
lawful combination they had agreed to hin-sociation and by-laws of the exchange were
der and delay the business of buying and attached to the affidavit of the president of
selling cattle at the market named, and the exchange and read on the motion.
had confederated together in restraint of
trade and commerce between the states,
and that the object of the defendants in
organizing the exchange was to prevent
the sale by any commission merchant
at the Kansas City stock yards of any cattle
to any person who might be a buyer and spec-
ulator upon the market who is not a member
of the exchange.

Accompanying this bill were several affidavits of individuals not members of the exchange, but who were traders or speculators at the stock yards, and those persons said that they were acquainted with the association in question and with the officers and members, and that they did everything in their power to prevent other persons who were not members from trading at the stock yards, and a number of instances were given in which the affiants who were not members of the exchange were endeavoring to do business with commission merchants and others at the exchange in question, when the affiants were notified that they could not continue in business unless they became members of the association, and where partnerships were engaged in business where one partner was a member of the association, the partner who was a member was notified that he could not continue in the partnership business with the other unless such other also became a member; that they had attempted to buy cattle from a great many commission firms and from their salesmen at these stock yards, [609]*but as soon as they went into the yards where the cattle were that were consigned to commission firms, and attempted to purchase them, some of the defendants would appear, call the salesman aside, and, after having a conversation with such salesman, the latter would invariably return to affiant and say that he could not price cattle to the affiant or sell the same to him, as he had been warned by members of the exchange not to do so; that the Traders' Live Stock Exchange would not permit other traders and speculators upon the market, and that the exchange does not permit commission firms at the stock yards to sell cattle consigned to them to any trader or speculator upon the market who is not a member of the exchange, and that commission firms had been notified by the officers of the stock exchange not to sell to speculators on the market who were not members of the Live Stock Exchange, and where commission firms sold cattle to traders and speculators upon the market who were not members of the exchange, the association and members thereof would boycott the commission firm making such sales, and refuse to purchase any cattle from them, and refuse to go into the lots and look at cattle which had been consigned to them.

Among other affidavits was that of the general superintendent of the stock-yards company, who said that he had known the organization, the Traders' Live Stock Exchange, since its formation, and that it had been a benefit to the live-stock market at Kansas City by furnishing constant buyers for cattle shipped to the market. no matter how large the receipts for any one day or series of days might be, and also by raising the standard of business integrity among its members, because it required every member to comply with his business promises *and verbal agree-[610] ments; that no embargo was placed upon anyone purchasing or desiring to purchase cattle at the yards, but a free and open market was offered to all buyers and sellers; that the members of the organization were engaged in the business of buying and selling cattle on the market, and were competitors among and against each other; that their organization did not restrain or interfere with interstate or local commerce, and the members did not monopolize or attempt to monopolize the business of buying and selling cattle at Kansas City, nor did the organization in any manner tend to limit or decrease the number of cattle marketed at Kansas City, but that it had the contrary effect; that about eightyfive per cent of the total_receipts for the years 1895, 1896, and 1897, at the Kansas City market of cattle had been billed to the Kansas City market alone for purposes of sale there.

Other affidavits were presented to the same effect. Also the affidavit of the president of the exchange. The president denied all allegations in relation to conspiracies to prevent other persons than members of the exchange from buying and selling cattle upon the Kansas City market, and on the contrary alleged that in buying cattle the defendants were in competition with each other, with the representative buyers of all the packing houses, with the representatives of the various commission merchants, who buy constantly on orders from a distance, and with others who buy on orders on their own account, none of whom are menbers of the exchange, and that with these various classes of buyers the defendants constantly deal, and that in selling cattle they compete with each other and with shippers and commission merchants offering stock for sale on the market, that the business in which these defendants are engaged is that of buying and selling cattle known as "stockers and feeders;" that the business is purely local to that market; that the defendants do not deal in quarantine cattle subject to government inspection or cattle shipped through to other markets, with or without the privilege of the Kansas City market, nor in fat cattle sold on the local Upon the bill and affidavits application market shipped to other states or to foreign was made to the circuit court for the west-countries; that except in rare instances both ern division of the western district of Missouri for an injunction as prayed for in the bill, in opposition to which application various affidavits were read on the part of the

purchases and sales made by the defendants [611]
are made from and to persons not members of
the exchange, and that in the judgment of
the president about ninety-nine per cent of

the transactions by the defendants are with | Live Stock Exchange, 143 III. 210, 18 L. R persons not members of the exchange.

A copy of the articles of association is annexed to the affidavit, which contains the following preanible:

"We, the undersigned, for the purpose of organizing and maintaining a business exchange, not for pecuniary profit or gain, but to promote and protect all interest connected with the buying and selling of live stock at the Kansas City Stock Yards, and to cult1vate courteous and manly conduct towards each other, and give dignity and responsibility to yard traders, have associated ourselves together under the name of Traders' Live Stock Exchange, and hereby agree, each with the other, that we will faithfully observe and be bound by the following rules and by-laws and such new rules, additions, or amendments as may from time to time be adopted in conformity with the provisions thereof from the date of organization."

Rules 10, 11, 12, and 13 are as follows: "Rule 10. This exchange will not recognize any yard trader unless he is a member of the Traders' Live Stock Exchange.

"Rule 11. When there are two or more parties trading together as partners, they shall each and all of them be members of this exchange.

"Rule 12. No member of this exchange shall employ any person to buy or sell cattle unless such person hold a certificate of membership in this exchange.

"Rule 13. No member of this exchange shall be allowed to pay any order buyer or salesman any sum of money as a fee for buy. ing cattle from or selling cattle to such party."

These are the rules which are specially obnoxious to the complainants, and are alleged to be in their effect in violation of the Federal statute above mentioned.

Messrs. R. E. Ball, I. P. Ryland, and John L. Peak, for appellants:

Conceding all the facts charged in the bill, even those in which the bill contradicts itself, the appellants are not engaged in, and their organization does not relate to, inter

state commerce.

Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257; Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. Rep. 468; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 60 Fed. Rep. 306; Re Greene, 52 Fed. Rep. 104; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577, 39 L. ed. 539, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 30.

No act or agreement of appellants, charged in the bill, and no act or agreement not so charged, but from the doing or enforcing of which they are enjoined, constitutes any violation of the act of Congress, or is otherwise


Prescott & A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 73 Fed. Rep. 438; Mogul S. 8. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. Div. 544; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. 54 Fed. Rep. 730, 19 L. R. A. 387; American Live Stock Commission Co. v. Chicago

A. 190; Ducber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock Co. 35 U. S. App. 16, 66 Fed. Rep. 637, 14 C. C. A. 14; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 78 Fed. Rep. 712.

The decree is violative of the rights secured by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, forbidding that any person be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law; and, if the act of July 2d, 1890, is correctly construed by the circuit court, it is itself violative of said amendment.

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 123, 24 L. ed. 83; Kuhn v. Detroit, 70 Mich. 534; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 108, 29 L. R. A. 79; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389; Cald well v. Texas, 137 U. S. 697, 34 L. ed. 818; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 Ú. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832.

Messrs. John R. Walker and John K.

Richards, Solicitor General, for appellee:

The transportation of persons from one state into another is interstate commerce.

Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 34 L. ed. 394, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 178; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Pennsylva nia, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. ed. 146; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999; State, Wolf, v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 16 Fed. Rep. 193.

Telegraph messages passing over lines from one state to another constitute a por

tion of interstate commerce.

Western U. Teleg. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 40 L. ed. 1105; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Ratterman, 127 U. S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 59; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 306; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Norman, 77 Fed. Rep. 13; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 59.

The right to import from one state into another carries with it, by necessary implication, the right of sale at the place where the importation terminates.

Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Ined. 150, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 143; Leisy v. 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. ters. Com. Rep. 36; Brennan v. Titusville, Rep. 58; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.

125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347.

Not until merchandise in the original packages is once sold by the importer does it become subject to taxation by the state.

Wering v. Mobile, 8 Wall. 110, 19 L. ed. $12.

The right to bring an article into a state earries with it the right to sell it.

Spellman v. New Orleans, 45 Fed. Rep. ➜, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 575; Re Harmon, 43 Fed. Rep. 372.

The buying, selling, and transportation ineident thereto, constitute commerce.

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. ed. 672, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 87; Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 392; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; W. A. Vandercook Co. v. Vance, 80 Fed. Rep. 786.

The statutes of the state intended to regulate or tax, or to impose any other restrictions upon, the transmission of persons or property, or telegraphic messages from one state to another, are void.

Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 117 U. S. 34, 29 L. ed. 785.

No state can impose a tax on persons engaged in the sale of goods in such state, which are introduced into the state from

other states.

Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 29 L. ed. 691; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 24 L. ed. 547; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 20 L. ed. 449; Re Lebolt, 77 Fed. Rep. 587.

er v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 32 L. ed. 368, 2
Inters. Com. Rep. 241; Philadelphia & 9.
Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S.
326, 30 L. ed. 1200, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 308;
Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502, 30 L.
ed. 699, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 50; Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489,
30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Moran
v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 28 L. ed. 653;
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32
L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; The
Danicl Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 19 L. ed. 999;
Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 16 L. ed.
243; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed.
702; Re Bell, 25 U. S. App. 379, 68 Fed.
Rep. 183, 15 C. C. A. 360.

The conduct and method of doing business
by the members of this Traders' Live Stock
Exchange is an interference with interstate
commerce, and the association is illegal.

Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U. S. 578, 41
L. ed. 832; United States v. Trans-Missour
Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007;
Re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 35 L. ed. 572.

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the [612] facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

There is really no dispute in regard to the facts in the case. Although the bill contains various allegations in regard to conspiracies, agreements, and combinations in restraint of trade and in violation of the

Federal statute, yet there is no evidence of any act on the part of the defendants preventing access to the yards or preventing purchases and sales of cattle by anyone, other than as such sales may be prevented by the mere refusal on the part of the defendants as "yard traders" to do business with those who are also yard traders, but are not memwhat-bers of the exchange, or with commission merchants where such commission merchants themselves do business with yard traders who are not members of the exchange. In other words, there is no evidence and really no charge against the defendants that they have done anything other than to form this exchange and adopt and enforce the rules mentioned above, and the question is whether by their adoption and by peacefully carrying them out without threats and without violence, but by the mere refusal to do business with those who will not respect their rules, there is a violation of the Federal statute.

No state can, under any pretense ever, interfere with the right of any person who engages in interstate commerce, whether in the sale of goods introduced into the state from other states, or in soliciting orders for goods to be so introduced.

Ex parte Loeb, 72 Fed. Rep. 657; Southern R. Co. v. Asheville, 69 Fed. Rep. 359; Ex parte Hough, 69 Fed. Rep. 330, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 327; Re Minor, 69 Fed. Rep. 233, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 329; Aultman, M. & Co. v. Holder, 68 Fed. Rep. 467; Ex parte Scott, 66 Fed. Rep. 45; Re Schechter, 63 Fed. Rep. 695, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 849; Re Mitchell, 62 Fed. Rep. 576, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 767; Re Worthen, 58 Fed. Rep. 467, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 484; Re Rozelle, 57 Fed. Rep. 155; Re Ware, 53 Fed. Rep. 783; Re Sanders, 52 Fed. Rep. 802, 18 L. R. A. 549, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 305: Re McAllister, 51 Fed. Rep. 282; Re Nichols, 48 Fed. Rep. 164; Re Tyerman, 48 Fed. Rep. 167; Re Houston, 47 Fed. Rep. 539, 14 L. R. A. 719; Re Kimmel, 41 Fed. Rep. 775, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 114; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. ed. 683; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 41 L. ed. 586; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658; Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396, 37 L. ed. 216; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 35 L. ed. 649; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595; Ash

This case differs from that of Hopkins v. United States, ante, 290, in the fact that these defendants are themselves purchasers of cattle on the market, while the defendants in the Hopkins Case were only commission merchants who sold the cattle upon commission as a compensation for their services.

Counsel for the government assert that any agreement or combination among buyers of cattle coming from other states, of the nature of the by-laws in question, is an agree ment or combination in restraint of interstate trade or commerce.

The facts first set forth in the complainants' bill, upon which to base the claim that the business of defendants is interstate commerce, we have already decided in the Hopkins Case to be immaterial. The particular situation of the yards, partly in Kansas and



partly in Missouri, we there held was a fact without any weight, and one which did not [613]make business interstate commerce which otherwise would not partake of that charac


There remain in the bill of the complainants the allegations that the cattle come from various states and are placed on sale at these stock yards which form the only available market for many miles around, and that they are sold by the commission merchants and are bought in large numbers by the defendants who have entered into what the complainants allege to be a contract, combination, and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several states, which contract, etc., it is alleged is carried out by defendants unlawfully and oppressively refusing to purchase cattle from a commission merchant who sells or purchases cattle from any speculator (yard trader) who is not a member of the exchange; and it is further alleged that by these means the traffic in cattle at the Kansas City stock yards is interfered with, hindered, and restrained, and extra expense and loss to the owner incurred, and that thereby the defendants have placed an obstruction and embargo on the marketing of cattle shipped from other states. All these results are alleged to flow from the agreement among the defendants as contained in the by-laws of their association, particularly those numbered ten, eleven, twelve, and thirteen, copies of which are set forth in the statement of facts herein.

with its conditions of membership, and may
remain such as long as he comports himself
in accordance with its laws. A lessening of
sary nor direct effect of its formation, and in
the amount of the trade is neither the neces-
truth the amount of that trade has greatly
increased since the association was formed,
and there is not the slightest evidence that
the market prices of cattle have been lowered
by reason of its existence. There is no fea-
The defendants are engaged in buying what
ture of monopoly in the whole transaction.
are called "stockers and feeders;" being cat-
tle not intended for any other market, and
the demand for which is purely local. They
have arrived at their final destination when
offered for sale, and there is free and full
the members of the exchange, as well as be-
competition for their purchase between all
tween them and all buyers not members
thereof, who are not also yard traders.
With the latter the defendants will not com-
pete, nor will they buy of the commission
men if the latter continue to sell cattle to
such yard traders.

Have the defendants the right to agree to
conduct their own private business in this

Whether there is any violation of the act of Congress by the adoption and enforcement of the other rules of the association, above It is first contended on the part of the apreferred to, will be considered hereafter. state commerce or trade, and that therefore pellants that they are not engaged in inter-[615] There is no evidence that these defendants their agreement is not a violation of the act. have in any manner other than by the rules They urge that the cattle, by being taken above mentioned hindered or impeded others from the cars in which they were transin shipping, trading, or selling their stock, ported and placed in the various pens hired or that they have in any way interfered with by commission merchants at the cattle yards the freedom of access to the stock yards of of Kansas City, and there set up for sale, any and all other traders and purchasers, have thereby been commingled with the genor hindered their obtaining the same facil-eral mass of other property in the state, and ities which were therein afforded by the stock-yards company to the defendants as members of the exchange, and we think the evidence does not tend to show that the above results have flowed from the adoption and enforcement of the rules and regulations referred to.

In regard to rule 10, the question is
whether, without a violation of the act of
Congress, persons who are engaged in the
common business as yard traders of buying
[614] cattle at the *Kansas City stock yards, which
come from different states, may agree among
themselves that they will form an associa-
tion for the better conduct of their busi-
ness, and that they will not transact busi-
ness with other yard traders who are not
members, nor will they buy cattle from those
who also sell to yard traders who are r t
members of the association.

It will be remembered that the association
Those who are mem-
does no business itself.
bers thereof compete among themselves and
with others who are not members, for the
purchase of the cattle, while the association
itself has nothing whatever to do with trans-
with fixing the prices for
portation nor
which the cattle may be purchased or there-
after sold. Any yard trader can become a
member of the association upon complying
U. S., Book 43.
171 U. S.


that their interstate commercial character
has ceased within the decisions of this court
in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 [29:
257], and Pittsburg & S. Coal Company ▼.
Bates, 156 U. S. 577 [39: 538].

On the other hand, it is answered that the
cases cited involved nothing but the general
power of the state to tax all property found
within its limits, by virtue of general laws
providing for such taxation, where no tax
is levied upon the article or discrimination
made against it by reason of the fact that
it has come from another state, and it is
maintained that the agreement in question
acts directly upon the subject of interstate
commerce and adds a restraint to it which is
unlawful under the provisions of the stat-

In the view we take of this case we are not called upon to decide whether the defendants are or are not engaged in interstatə commerce, because if it be conceded they are so engaged, the agreement as evidenced by the by-laws is not one in restraint of that trade, nor is there any combination to monopolize or attempt to monopolize such trade within the meaning of the act.

It has already been stated in the Hopkins Case, above mentioned, that in order to come within the provisions of the statute the di


rect effect of an agreement or combination | was not formed for pecuniary profits, and a must be in restraint of that trade or com- careful perusal of the whole agreement fails, merce which is among the several states, or as we think, to show that its purpose was with foreign nations. Where the subject- other than as stated in the preamble. In matter of the agreement does not directly re- other words, we think that the rules adopted late to and act upon and embrace interstate do not contradict the expressed purpose of commerce, and where the undisputed facts the preamble, and that the result naturally clearly show that the purpose of the agree- to be expected from an enforcement of the ment was not to regulate, obstruct, or re- rules would not directly, if at all, affect instrain that commerce, but that it was en- terstate trade or commerce. tered into with the object of properly and now under discussion differs radically from The agreement fairly regulating the transaction of the busi- those of United States v. Jellico Mountain ness in which the parties to the agreement Coal & Coke Company, 46 Fed. Rep. 432 [3 were engaged, such agreement will be upheld Inters. Com. Rep. 626, 12 L. R. A. 753]; [616]as *not within the statute, where it can be United States v. Coal Dealers' Association, seen that the character and terms of the S5 Fed. Rep. 252, and United States v. Adagreement are well calculated to attain the dyston Pipe & Steel Company [54 U. S. App. purpose for which it was formed, and where 723], 85 Fed. Rep. 271. The agreement in the effect of its formation and enforcement all of these cases provided for fixing the upon interstate trade or commerce is in any prices of the articles dealt in by the different event but indirect and incidental, and not its companies, being in one case iron pipe for purpose or object. As is said in Smith v. gas, water, sewer, and other purposes, and Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 473 [31; 508, 510, coal in the other two cases. 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804]: "There are many ceded that these cases were well decided, cases, however, where the acknowledged they differ so materially and radically in powers of a state may be exerted and applied their nature and purpose from the case under in such a manner as to affect foreign or inter- consideration that they form no basis for its state commerce without being intended to decision. This association does not meddle operate as commercial regulations." The with prices and itself does no business. In same is true as to certain kinds of agree- refusing to recognize any yard trader who is ments entered into between persons engaged not a member of the exchange, we see no purin the same business for the direct and bona restraining interstate commerce, which, if pose of thereby affecting or in any manner affected at all, can only be in a very indirect and remote manner. The rule has no direct

fide purpose of properly and reasonably regu-
lating the conduct of their business among
themselves and with the public. If an agree-
ment of that nature, while apt and proper
for the purpose thus intended, should pos-
sibly, though only indirectly and uninten-
tionally, affect interstate trade or commerce,
in that event we think the agreement would
be good. Otherwise, there is scarcely any
agreement among men which has interstate
or foreign commerce for its subject that may
not remotely be said to, in some obscure way,
affect that commerce and to be therefore
void. We think, within the plain and ob-
vious construction to be placed upon the
act, and following the rules in this regard
already laid down in the cases heretofore
decided in this court, we must hold the agree-
ment under consideration in this suit to be


If it were con

tendency to diminish or in any way impede

or restrain interstate commerce in the cat

tle dealt in by defendants. There is no tendency as a result of the rule, directly or indefendants for the class of cattle dealt in by directly, to restrict the competition among the market composed of defendants, and also them. Those who are selling the cattle have composed of the representative buyers of all the packing houses at Kansas City, and also of the various commission merchants who are constantly buying on orders and of those who are buying on their own account. This makes a large competition wholly outside of the defendants. The owner of cattle for sale [618) is therefore furnished with a market at From very early times it has been the cus- which the competition of buyers has a broad tom for men engaged in the occupation of effect. All yard traders have the opportubuying and selling articles of a similar na-nity of becoming members of the exchange, ture at any particular place to associate and to thus obtain all the advantages there themselves together. The object of the association has in many cases been to provide for the ready transaction of the business of the associates by obtaining a general headquarters for its conduct, and thus to insure a quick and certain market for the sale or purchase of the article dealt in. Another purpose has been to provide a standard of business integrity among the members by adopting rules for just and fair dealing among them and enforcing the same by penalties for their violation. The agreements [617]have been voluntary, and the penalties have been enforced under the supervision and by members of the association. The preamble adopted by the association in this case shows the ostensible purpose of its formation. It


The design of the defendants evidently is to bring all the yard traders into the association as members, so that they may become subject to its jurisdiction and be compelled by its rules and regulations to transact business in the honest and straightforward manner provided for by them. If, while enforcing the rules, those members who use improper methods or who fail to conduct their business transactions fairly and honestly are disciplined and expelled, and thereby the number of members is reduced, and to that extent the number of competitors limited, yet all this is done, not with the intent or purpose of affecting in the slightest degree interstate trade or commerce, and such trade

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