[26: 565, 567], is also very much in point. In Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, That case involved the validity of a statute 459-461 [29:691, 695, 696], the principal of Virginia providing that "any person who *question was as to the validity of certain[676] shall sell or offer for sale the manufactured legislation in Michigan, which, it was conarticles or machines of other states or ter- tended, discriminated against the manufacritories, unless he be the owner thereof and tured products of other states. This court taxed as a merchant, or take orders therefor held the Michigan statute to be invalid, sayon commission or otherwise, shall be deemed ing: "It is suggested by the learned judge to be an agent for the sale of manufactured who delivered the opinion of the supreme

articles of other states and territories, and should not act as such without taking out a license therefor. No such person shall, under his license as such, sell or offer to sell such article through the agency of another, but a separate license shall be required from an agent or employee who may sell or offer to sell such articles for another. For any violation of this section, the person offending shall pay a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense. The specific license tax upon an

court of Michigan in this case, that the tax imposed by the act of 1875 is an exercise by the legislature of Michigan of the police power of the state for the discouragement of the use of intoxicating liquors, and the preservation of the health and morals of the people. This would be a perfect justification of the act, if it did not discriminate against the citizens and products of other states in a matter of commerce between the states, and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national legislature. The police power cannot

agent for the sale of any manufactured ar- be set up to control the inhibitions of the [675]ticle or machine of other states or *territo Federal Constitution, or the powers of the ries shall be twenty-five dollars; and this tax United States government created thereby. shall give to any party licensed under this New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light, section the right to sell the same within the H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650 [29:516].

county or corporation in which he shall take out his license; and if he shall sell or offer

to sell the same in any other of the counties or corporations of this state, he shall pay an additional tax of ten dollars in each of the counties or corporations where he may sell or offer to sell the same. All persons other than resident manufacturers or their agents, selling articles manufactured in this state, shall pay the specific license tax imposed by

this section." §§ 45, 46.

pay a

specific tax

Another argument used by the supreme eme court of Michigan in favor of the va lidity of the tax is, that it is merely a tax on an occupation, which, it is averred, the state has an undoubted right to impose, and reference is made to Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,444 [6:678, 687]; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73, 80 [12:993, 995]; Peirce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 593 [12: 296]; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 [19:387]; Howe Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676 [25:754]. None of these cases, however, sustain the doctrine that an occupation can be taxed if the tax is so specialized as to operate as a discriminative burden against the introduction and sale of the products of another state, or against the citizens of another state."

This court said: "By these sections, read together, we have this result: The agent for the sale of articles manufactured in other states must first obtain a license to sell, for which he is required to for each county in which he sells or offers to sell them; while the agent for the sale of articles manufactured in the state, if acting for the manufacturer, is not required to obIn Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 81tain a license or pay any license tax. Here 83 [34:862, 863, 864, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. there is a clear discrimination in favor of 485], the question was as to the validity of home manufacturers and against the manua statute relating to the sale of meats in facturers of other states. Sales by manuVirginia. This court said: "The recital in facturers are chiefly effected through agents. the preamble that unwholesome meats were A tax upon their agents when thus engaged being offered for sale in Virginia cannot exis therefore a tax upon them, and if this is clude the question of the conformity of the made to depend upon the foreign character act to the Constitution. of the articles, that is, upon their having ute now before us liable to the objection that, been manufactured without the state, it is by its necessary operation, it interferes with

to that extent a regulation of commerce in the articles between the states. It matters not whether the tax be laid directly upon the articles sold or in the form of licenses for their sale. If by reason of their foreign character the state can impose a tax upon them or upon the person through whom the sales are effected, the amount of the tax will be a matter resting in her discretion. She may place the tax at so high a figure as to exclude the introduction of the foreign article and prevent competition with the home product. It was against legislation of this discriminating kind that the framers of the Constitution intended to guard when they vested in Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states."

Is the stat

the enjoyment of rights granted or secured
by the Constitution? This question admits
of but one answer. The statute is, in effect,
a prohibition upon the sale in Virginia *of [677]
beef, veal, or mutton, although entirely
wholesome, if from animals slaughtered one
hundred miles or over from the place of sale.
We say prohibition, because the owner of
such meats cannot sell them in Virginia un-
til they are inspected there; and being re
quired to pay the heavy charge of one cent
per pound to the inspector, as his compensa-
tion, he cannot compete, upon equal terms,
in the markets of that Commonwealth, with
those in the same business whose meats of
like kind, from animals slaughtered within
less than one hundred miles from the place

of sale, are not subjected to inspection at to the sale by peddlers in Missouri of sewing all. Whether there shall be inspection or machines made in other states, and not to not, and whether the seller shall compensate be a regulation of interstate commerce. The the inspector or not, is thus made to depend decision was placed upon the ground that entirely upon the place where the animals the statute made no discrimination against from which the beef, veal, or mutton is taken, the goods of other states as compared with

were slaughtered. Undoubtedly, a state may establish regulations for the protection of its people against the sale of unwholesome meats, provided such regulations do not conflict with the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, or infringe rights granted or secured by that instrument. But

domestic goods.

I am unable to reconcile the opinion and judgment in the present case with the principles announced in the above cases. A tax upon the capital employed by the manufacturing corporation or company is pro tanto a tax upon the goods manufactured by it.

it may not, under the guise of exerting its If this be not so, there are many expressions

police powers, or of enacting inspection laws, make discriminations against the products and industries of some of the states in favor of the products and industries of its own or other states. The owner of the meats here in question, although they were from animals slaughtered in Illinois, had the right, under the Constitution, to compete in the markets of Virginia upon terms of equality with the owners of like meats, from animals slaughtered in Virginia or elsewhere within one hundred miles from the place of sale.

in the former opinions of this court which
should be withdrawn or modified. A cor-
poration or company wholly engaged in man-
ufacture in New York has an advantage, in
the sale of its goods in the markets of that
state, over a corporation or company manu-
facturing like goods in other states, if the
former is altogether exempted from taxation
in respect of its franchise or business, and
the latter subjected to taxation of its "fran-[679]
chise or business measured by the amount
of its capital employed in New York.
That state may undoubtedly tax capi-

Any local regulation which, in terms or by tal employed within its limits by cor

its necessary operation, denies this equality in the markets of a state is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other states, a direct burden upon commerce among the states, and therefore void. Wel ton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 281 [23: 347, 350]; Hannibal & St. J. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 [24:527]; Minnesota v. Barber, above cited. The fees exacted, under the Virginia statute, for the inspection of beef, veal, and mutton, the product of ani

porations or companies of other states,
impose restrictions that will
but it cannot impose
necessarily prevent such corporations or
companies from selling their goods in New
York upon terms of equality with corpora-
tions or companies wholly engaged there in
manufacturing goods of like kind. By this
statute New York says to the manufacturing
corporations and companies of other states:
"Remove your plant to New York, and the
capital employed by you in this state shall

mals slaughtered one hundred miles or more be exempt from taxation. But if you perfrom the place of sale, are in reality a tax; sist in keeping your plant where it is already and 'a discriminating tax imposed by a state, established, your franchise or business shall [678]*operating to the disadvantage of the product be taxed upon the basis of the capital emof other states when introduced into the first ployed by you in New York, while the capital mentioned state, is, in effect, a regulation of similar corporations or companies wholly

engaged in manufacturing in New York,
shall be exempt from taxation." Observe,
that the statute of New York does not apply
exclusively to corporations. It applies
equally to companies.

in restraint of commerce among the states,
and, as such, is a usurpation of the powers
conferred by the Constitution upon the Con-
gress of the United States.' Walling v.
Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 455 [29:691, 694].
Nor can this statute be brought into har-
mony with the Constitution by the circum-
stance that it purports to apply alike to the
citizens of all the states, including Virginia;
for 'a burden imposed by a state upon inter-
state commerce is not to be sustained simply
because the statute imposing it applies alike to a tariff protecting goods manufactured

to the people of all the states, including the people of the state enacting such statute.' Minnesota v. Barber, above cited; Robbins ▼. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 [30: 694, 697, 1 Inetrs. Com. Rep. 45]. If the object of Virginia had been to obstruct the bringing into that state, for use as human food, of all beef, veal, and mutton, however wholesome, from animals slaughtered in distant states, that object will be accomplished if the statute before us be enforced."

In Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 311 [39:430, 434, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 68], a Missouri statute requiring the payment of a license tax by peddlers was held to apply

In my judgment, this statute cannot be
sustained in its application to the plaintiff
in error without recognizing the power of
New York, so far as the Federal Constitu-
tion is concerned, to enact such statutes as
will, by their necessary operation, amount

in that state against competition in the mar-
kets there with goods manufactured in other
states. And if such legislation as is embod-
ied in the statute in question is held to be
consistent with the Federal Constitution,
why may not New York, while exempting
from taxation the franchises or business of

corporations or companies wholly engaged
in carrying on their manufacturing in that
state, put such taxation upon the franchise
or business of corporations or companies do-
ing business in that state, but not wholly
engaged in manufacture there, as will
amount to an absolute prohibition upon the
sale in New York of the goods manufactured
in other states? If each state in the Union

1

should enact a statute exempting from taxa-Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. tion the franchise and business of corpora- 259, 268 [23:543, 548]. This has often tions or companies wholly engaged in carry- been adjudged by this court. "There may ing on manufacture within its limits, but be no purpose," this court has said, "upon taxing the franchise or business of corpora- the part of a legislature to violate the pro[680]tions or companies *whose manufacturing is visions of that instrument, and yet a statute carried on in other states, it is easy to see enacted by it, under the forms of law, may, that commerce among the states would be as by its necessary operation, be destructive of much at the mercy of discriminating state rights granted or secured by the Constitulegislation as it was under the Articles of tion;" in which case, "the courts must susConfederation, when, as Mr. Justice Story tain the supreme law of the land by declarwell said, the government established to con- ing the statute unconstitutional and void." serve the interests of the people of all the Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 319 [34: states was competent to declare everything, 455, 457, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185], and aubut was without power to do anything. thorities there cited. Can it be doubted While the authority of the National govern- that, whatever may have been the ostensible ment to lay duties upon goods brought from object for which the New York statute was foreign countries into this country so as to passed, the natural and reasonable effect of build up and protect American industries the statute is to withhold from goods not has been recognized, I had not supposed it manufactured in New York-and because was competent for any state of the Union they were not there manufactured-that to exert its power of taxation so as to build equality in the markets of New York which, up and protect its local industries by means

we have often said, is secured by the national of injurious discriminations against the in- Constitution to the like products of other dustries of other states. I had supposed states? If the plaintiff corporation can be that the Constitution of the United States taxed on its capital employed in New York had established absolute free trade among in the business of selling its goods, manufrom injurious discrimination in the mar- factured in Michigan, while capital em

the states of the Union, that

kets of any state, against goods manufactured in this country, was a vital principle

of constitutional law.

The opinion of the court in this case says:

ployed in New York by a like manufacturing corporation is exempted from taxation because, and only because, it is wholly engaged in manufacture in that state, is it possible to deny that such legislation injuriously dis

criminates against the manufactures of Michigan in favor of the like manufactures

"If the object of the law in question was to impose a tax upon products of other states, while exempting similar domestic goods from taxation, there might be room to contend of New York? that such a distinction was constitutionally My brethren refer to the general rule that objectionable as tending to affect or regulate it is competent for a state to prescribe the

commerce between the states. But we think that obviously such is not the purpose of this legislation. 'Every corporation, jointstock company, or association whatever, now hereafter incorporated, organized, or formed under, by, or pursuant to, law in this state or in any other state or country and doing business in this state,

or

shall be

liable to and shall pay a tax as a tax upon its franchise or business into the state treasury annually, to be computed as follows.' It will be perceived that the tax is prescribed as well for New York corporations as for those of other states. It is true that manufacturing or mining corporations wholly engaged in carrying on manufacture or mining ores within the state of New York are exempted from this tax; but such exemption is not restricted to New York corporations, [681]but includes corporations of other states as well, when wholly engaged in manufacture within the state."

conditions upon which coporations of other
states may do business within its limits. But
I submit that that rule, however broadly[682]
stated, has no application here. The New
York statute has not assumed to prescribe
any rule applicable alike to all manufactur-
ing corporations or companies of other
states. It exempts from taxation all cor-
porations or companies, whether of New
York or of other states, that wholly carry
on their manufacturing business in New York,
Thus a distinction is made between manu-
facturing corporations and companies by ex-
empting ng from taxation on their capital em-
ployed in New York those, and those only,
that wholly carry on their manufacturing in
that state. Besides, this court has never,
in any case, adjudged that the power of a
state to prescribe the conditions upon which
the corporations of other states may do busi-
ness within its limits can be exerted by leg-
islation that directly, or by its necessary
operation, discriminates injuriously against
the products of other states in favor of the
products of such state. On the contrary, in
the cases above cited, it has directly adjudged
that such legislation was unconstitutional.

I submit that the validity of state legislation as affected by the Constitution of the United States is not to be determined altogether by what is supposed to be the "object" or "purpose" of such legislation, if by object or purpose is meant the motive which It is not necessary for me now to question

controlled members of the state legislature when they enacted such legislation. In a legal sense the object or purpose of legislation is to be determined by its natural and reasonable effect, whatever may have been the motives upon which legislators acted.

the soundness of the general proposition that a state may prescribe the conditions upon which corporations of other states may come within its limits for purposes of business. A good deal may depend upon the nature of the business in which the foreign corporation

is engaged. But I do question the power of but that the exemption is allowed to such any state to exact a tax from corporations corporations or companies of other states as or companies not wholly engaged in manu- may carry on their manufacturing or minfacturing within its limits, if it exempts ing business wholly in New York. This