is engaged. But I do question the power of | but that the exemption is allowed to such any state to exact a tax from corporations corporations or companies of other states as or companies not wholly engaged in manu-may carry on their manufacturing or minfacturing within its limits, if it exempts ing business wholly in New York. This from such taxation corporations and com- view falls far short of meeting the difficulty panies wholly engaged, and only because presented, namely, that the statute, by its they are wholly engaged, in manufacturing necessary operation, injuriously discrimiin such state. If this be not a sound view nates against goods manufactured in other of the Constitution, it follows that local tax states, in that such goods are not permitted laws may be so framed as to destroy the to go into the markets of New York and principle, frequently announced and often compete there upon equal terms with like recognized by this court, that the products goods wholly manufactured in that state. of the respective states may go into the mar- This court has often said that the objection kets of the country without being discrimi- that a local statute was invalid, as restrainnated against because of the place of their ing or binding commerce among the states, origin. was not met by the suggestion that it operated equally upon citizens of the state which enacted it. The only case which seems to give any support whatever to the opposite view is Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305 [36: 164, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 57]. But a careful examination of the report of that case and of the opinion shows that [683] counsel did not present, nor did the court consider or determine, the precise point here presented, as to the authority of the state to exercise the power of taxation so as to place burdens upon goods, the manufacture of other states, solely because they were not produced in the state imposing the taxation. Some stress seems to be laid upon the fact that the exemption given by the statute to corporations or companies wholly engaged in carrying on manufactures or in mining ores within the state of New York is not limited to corporations or companies of that state; 171 U. S. I am of opinion that the statute of New York in its application to the plaintiff in error is inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, and with that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. It is well settled that corporations are persons within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522 [42: 819, 840]. For the reasons stated, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court. Mr. Justice Brown authorizes me to say that he concurs in this dissent. 333 CLXXI UNITED STATES.. 171 U. S. 1-30, 18 S. Ct. 757, SCHOLLENBERGER v. PENNSYLVANIA. Commerce. If Congress declares product to be article of commerce, Supreme Court will so regard it, p. 8. Commerce.- Act of August 2, 1886, declares oleomargarine to be article of commerce, p. 8. Approved in Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 566, 573, 70 Am. St. Rep. 705, 709, 48 S. W. 306, 308, court may judicially notice that cigarettes are not legitimate subjects of commerce. Commerce.- State may regulate introduction of any article so as to secure purity, but cannot exclude it, p. 12. Approved in In re Brundage, 96 Fed. 967, Minnesota anti-oleomargarine law (1889) is void as to original packages; Fox v. State, 89 Md. 387, 73 Am. St. Rep. 198, 43 Atl. 777, evidence is admissible to show that oleomargarine was an importation and sold in original package; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 569, 70 Am. St. Rep. 706, 48 S. W. 307, upholding act prohibiting importation of cigarettes; Rasch v. State, 89 Md. 757, 43 Atl. 932, generally. Commerce.- Importation of pure articles cannot be prohibited to keep out impure ones, p. 13. Approved in Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 569, 70 Am. St. Rep. 707, 48 S. W. 307, cigarettes being wholly deleterious, importation may be prohibited. Commerce. State cannot prohibit importation because article may be adulterated, p. 15. Commerce. State may prohibit sales within its borders so long as interstate commerce is not interfered with, p. 15. Cited in Rasch v. State, 89 Md. 758, 759, 43 Atl. 933, arguendo. Commerce.-State cannot prohibit sales of oleomargarine in original packages, either to wholesaler or consumer, p. 23. Approved in Fox v. State, 89 Md. 385, 73 Am. St. Rep. 196, 43 Atl. 777, oleomargarine law is invalid as far as prohibiting importation and sale in original packages; Fox v. State, 89 Md. 386, 73 Am. St. Rep. 197, 43 Atl. 777, Maryland oleomargarine law is void wherein it attempts to prohibit importation; Commonwealth v. Paul, 189 Pa. St. 559, 42 Atl. 1117, on remand from Supreme Court. 1055 U. S. Notes 171 U. S. 43 L. ed. 334-16 p. 171 U. S. 30-47 Notes on U. S. Reports. 1056 Distinguished in Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 358, 18 S. Ct. 867, upholding act providing for inspection of fertilizers; Wright v. State, 88 Md. 441, 443, 444, 445, 446, 41 Atl. 797, 798, 799, sustaining Maryland oleomargarine act, oleomargarine being made and sold within State; Rasch v. State, 89 Md. 760, 761, 43 Atl. 934, upholding prohibition of sale of oleomargarine. Approved in Wright v. State, 88 Md. 439, 41 Atl. 796, description of traverser as of “A. county, in State of M.," is equivalent to averment of citizenship in M. Commerce-Right to sell imported goods does not depend on suitability of original package for retail trade, p. 24. Approved in Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 580, 70 Am. St. Rep. 713, 48 S. W. 310, where packs of cigarettes are packed in baskets, baskets, not packs, are original packages." 66 171 U. S. 30-34, 18 S. Ct. 768, COLLINS v. NEW HAMPSHIRE. Commerce.- State law requiring adulteration of imported articles interferes with interstate commerce; e. g., coloring oleomargarine, p. 33. Approved in In re Brundage, 96 Fed. 967, 968, Minnesota antioleomargarine act (1889) is void wherein prohibiting sale in original packages. Distinguished in Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 569, 570, 70 Am. St. Rep. 706, 707, 48 S. W. 307, cigarettes not being legitimate articles of commerce, importation may be prohibited. Statutes. Direct and necessary result of statute must be considered in passing on its validity, p. 34. Approved in State v. Jackman, 69 N. H. 330, 41 Atl. 348, 42 L. R. A. 440, ordinance requiring owners or occupants to remove snow from sidewalks is invalid. 171 U. S. 35-38, 18 S. Ct. 729, POUNDS v. UNITED STATES. Internal revenue.- Indictment charging time and place of concealment and removal of spirits, in language of § 3296, R. S., is sufficient, p. 38. Criminal law.- Stated verdict agreed upon by counsel and returned before jury separated, is properly receivable, p. 38. Not cited. 171 U. S. 38-47, 18 S. Ct. 742, HARRISON v. MORTON. Supreme Court will not review State decision where Federal question was not necessarily involved, p. 47. Reaffirmed in McQuade v. Trenton, 172 U. S. 640, 19 S. Ct. 294. ANN 1057 Notes on U. S. Reports. 171 U. S. 48-92 171 U. S. 48-55, 18 S. Ct. 732, DETROIT, ETC., RY. v. DETROIT RY. Municipalities.- Under Michigan Constitution Detroit's power of streets was conferred by legislature and so limited, p. 51. Municipalities.- Detroit had no power to grant exclusive privileges to occupy streets for railway purposes, p. 53. Statutes. Expression "necessarily implied means " inevitably implied," p. 54. Municipality's powers must be construed with reference to public good, p. 55. Monopolies.— Easements given in perpetuity to monopolies must be explicitly conferred or inferred as indispensable, p. 55. Not cited. 171 U. S. 55-92, 18 S. Ct. 895, DEL MONTE MINING, ETC., Co. V. LAST CHANCE MIN., ETC., CO. Mines. In absence of statute or contract, owner of surface owns mining rights perpendicularly underneath, p. 60. Mines. Prior to passage of general mining law, district rules and customs governed, p. 62. Mines. In absence of local custom court must follow statute regarding rights to veins, p. 67. Mines. Party must comply with congressional conditions to acquire extra-lateral rights, p. 66. Mines. No location creates rights superior to previous location, p. 74. Mines.- Location need not correspond to permanent surveys, p. 75. Mines. Under act of 1872 end lines must be parallel to bound underground extralateral rights, p. 84. Mines.- Lines of junior lode location may be laid within, upon or across surface of senior location to define consistent underground rights, p. 85. Mines. Where main axis of junior location crosses senior location, side lines of latter are not end lines of former, p. 86. Mines." End lines" are those crossed by vein, p. 87. Mines. Surface location determines extent of rights below, p. 89. Mines.- Vein may be pursued to any depth beyond side lines by locator on whose claim apex lies, p. 89. Mines. End lines limit pursuit of vein; if vein crosses claim side lines are end lines, p. 89. Approved in Clark v. Fitzgerald, 171 U. S. 93, 18 S. Ct. 941, reaffirming rules laid down in principal case; Walrath v. Champion VOL. XII- 67 |