tion of this court to review its judgment? | in which it is said that the point raised must Such a construction would always place it in appear on the record, and that the particuthe power of a state court to determine our lar act of Congress, or part of the Constitujurisdiction. Such, certainly, has not been tion supposed to be infringed by the state the understanding, and such certainly would law, ought to be pointed out, it has never [118]seem to set at naught the purpose of the *Fed- been held that this should be done in express eral Constitution to prevent a state from words. But the true and rational rule is, nullifying by its legislation a contract which that the court must be able to see clearly, it has made, or authorized to be made. In from the whole record, that a certain provi Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 94-98 [7: 67-69], sion of the Constitution or act of Congress Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opin- was relied on by the party, who brings the ion of the court, said: writ of error, and that the right thus claimed by him was denied. ever, that it is not the validity of the act of 1860 which is complained of by the plaintiffs, but the construction placed upon that act by the state court. If this construction is one which violates the plaintiff's contract, and is the one on which the defendants are acting, it is clear that the plaintiffs have no relief except in this court, and that this court will not be discharging its duty to see that no state legislature shall pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract, unless it takes jurisdiction of such cases."

"In the construction of that section (the twenty-fifth) the court has never required that the treaty or act of Congress under which the party claims, who brings the final judgment of a state court into review before this court, should have been pleaded specially or spread on the record. But it has always been deemed essential to the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case that the record should show a complete title under the treaty or act of Congress, and that the judgment of the court is in violation of that treaty or act." And in Wilson v. The Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Pet. 245, 250 [7: 412, 414], the same Chief Justice also said:

"But we think it impossible to doubt that the constitutionality of the act was the question, and the only question, which could have been discussed in the state court. That question must have been discussed and decided. This court has repeatedly decided in favor of its jurisdiction in such a case. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 [4: 97]; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311 [4: 578]; and Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117 [6:571], are expressly in point. They establish as far as precedents can establish anything, that it is not necessary to state in terms on the record that the Constitution or a law of the United States was drawn in question. It is sufficient to bring the case within the provisions of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act, if the record shows that the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States must have been misconstrued, or the decision could not be made. Or, as in this case, that the constitutionality of a state law was questioned, and the decision has been in favor of the party claiming

under such law."

In Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380, 410 [7: 458, 468], Mr. Justice Washington observed:

If it sufficiently appear from the record itself, that the repugnancy of a statute of a state to the Constitution of the United [119]States was drawn into question, or that that question was applicable to the case, this court has jurisdiction of the cause under the section of the act referred to; although the record should not, in terms, state a misconstruction of the Constitution of the United States, or that the repugnancy of the statute of the state to any part of that Constitution was drawn into question."

In Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 1 Wall. 116, 143 [17: 571, 576], an act passed by the state in 1860 was claimed to be in violation of a contract created by an act of 1790, and it was said:

"Now, although there are other decisions

It is said, how

There are also some cases involving alleged contract exemptions from taxation which are worthy of notice. In Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648, 655 [29: 1021, 1024], the plaintiff in error claimed to hold real estate exempt from taxation by virtue of a contract alleged to have been contained in a law of the New Jersey colonial legislature passed August 12, 1758. The validity of this exemption had been sustained in New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164 [3: 303], notwithstanding which, for about sixty years before the assessment in question was laid, taxes had been regularly assessed upon the land and paid without objection. The highest court[120] of New Jersey upheld the tax, on the ground that the long acquiescence of the landowners raised a presumption that the exemption which had once existed had been surrendered. The jurisdiction of this court to review such judgment was sustained, the court saying:

"Where it is charged that the obligation of a contract has been impaired by a state law, as in this case by the general tax law of New Jersey as administered by the state authorities, and the state courts justify such impair ment by the application of some general rule of law to the facts of the case, it is our duty to inquire whether the justification is well grounded. If it is not, the party is entitled to the benefit of the constitutional protection."

In Yazoo & M. Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 184 [33: 302, 306], the plaintiff in error was given by its charter, which became a law on February 17, 1882, a certain exemption from taxation. In 1888 the legislature passed an act for the collection of taxes for past years, which by its terms was not applicable to railroad companies exempt by law or charter from taxation. The supreme court of the state held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the exemption named in the acts of 1888. The jurisdiction of this court to review that judg ment was challenged. But the court, by the Chief Justice, said:

"Although by the terms of the act of 1888

the taxes therein referred to were not to be levied as against a railroad exempt by law or charter, yet the supreme court held that this company is not exempt, and is embraced within the act; so that if a contract of exemption is contained in the company's charter, then the obligation of that contract is impaired by the act of 1888, which must be considered, under the ruling of the supreme court, as intended to apply to the company. The result is the same, although the act of 1888 be regarded as simply putting in force revenue laws existing at the date of the company's charter, rather than itself imposing taxes, for if the contract existed those laws became inoperative, and would be reinstated by the act of 1888. The motion to dismiss

the writ of error is therefore overruled." [121] In Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U. S. 279, 293 [36: 972, 978], the state court, conceding the validity of a contract of exemption from taxation, held that certain property was not within its terms, and on this ground a motion to dismiss the writ of error was made by the defendant. In respect to that the Chief Jus

tice said:

"The jurisdiction of this court is questioned, upon the ground that the decision of the supreme court of North Carolina conceded the validity of the contract of exemption contained in the act of 1834, but denied that particular property was embraced by its terms; and that, therefore, such decision did not involve a Federal question.

"In arriving at its conclusions, however, the state court gave effect to the revenue law of 1891, and held that the contract did not confer the right of exemption from its operation. If it did, its obligation was impaired by the subsequent law, and as the inquiry whether it did or not was necessarily directly passed upon, we are of opinion that the writ of error was properly allowed."

In Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Tennes see, 153 U. S. 486, 492, 493 [38: 793, 796], Mr. Justice Jackson, reviewing prior deci sions, said:

"It is well settled that the decision of a

United States Treasury notes, national bank currency, and nothing else." This command was re-enacted in the Code of 1887. Under these statutes the state demanded payment of its taxes in money and repudiated its promise to receive coupons in lieu thereof. True, in its opinion, the court of appeals did not specifically refer to these statutes, but by declaring that the contract provided for in the act of 1871 was void it did give full force and effect to them, as well as to the general revenue law of the state. Now, it is one of the duties cast upon this court by the Constitution and laws of the United States to inquire whether a state has passed any law impairing the obligation of a prior contract. No duty is more solemn and imperative than this, and it seems to us that we should be recreant to that duty if we should permit the form in which a state court expresses its conclusions to override the necessary effect of its decision.

It must also be borne in mind that this is
not a case in which, after a statute asserted
to be the foundation of a contract, acts are
passed designed and tending to destroy or
impair the alleged contract rights, and the
first time the question is presented to the
highest court of the state it takes no notice
of the subsequent acts, but inquires simply
Here it appears that the state courts had re-
as to the validity of the alleged contract.
peatedly held the act claimed to create a
contract valid, and had passed upon the va-
lidity of subsequent acts designed and calcu-
lated to destroy and impair the rights given
by such contract, sustaining some and annul-
ling others. Some of those judgments had
beeen brought to this court, and by it the
validity of the original act had been uni-
formly and repeatedly sustained, and the in-
validity of subsequent and conflicting acts
adjudged, and now, at the end of many years
still standing on the statute books unre-
of litigation, with these subsequent statutes
pealed by any legislative action, the state
court, with only a casual reference to those
later statutes, goes back to the original act,
void, thus in effect putting at naught the re-
and, reversing its prior rulings, adjudges it
peated decisions of this court as well as its[123]
own. Under such circumstances it seems to
us that it would be a clear evasion of the
duty cast upon us by the Constitution of the
United States to treat all this past litigation
and prior decisions as mere nullities and to
It would be shutting our eyes to palpable
consider the question as a matter de novo.
facts to say that the court of appeals of Vir-
ginia has not by this decision given effect
to these subsequent statutes.

state court holding that, as a matter of con-
struction, a particular charter or a charter
provision does not constitute a contract, is
not binding on this court. The question of
the existence or nonexistence of a contract in
cases like the present is one which this court
will determine for itself, the established rule
being that where the judgment of the high-
est court of a state, by its terms or necessary
operation, gives effect to some provisions of
the state law which is claimed by the unsuc-
cessful party to impair the contract set out
and relied on, this court has jurisdiction to
determine the question whether such a con-
Finally, it is urged that since the judg
tract exists as claimed, and whether the statement in the trial court and prior to the de-
law complained of impairs its obligation."

In the case before us, after the act of 1871 and in 1872, the general assembly passed an act requiring that all taxes should be paid in "gold or silver coin, United States Treasury notes, or notes of the national banks of [122]the United States;" and "again, in 1882, a further statute commanding tax collectors to receive in payment of taxes "gold, silver,

cision in the court of appeals the general assembly of the state of Virginia passed an act (Acts Gen. Assembly, 1893-94, p. 381) in terms repealing the statute authorizing this particular form of suit; that no state can be sued without its own consent; that such consent has thus been withdrawn, and therefore the whole proceeding abates and this suit must be dismissed. It is true that such an

act was passed, and that in Maury v. Com-314, 317 [21: 357, 358]), but it is equally monwealth, 92 Va. 310, its validity was sus- well settled that changes in the forms of actained by the court of appeals, but the judg- tion and modes of proceeding do not amount ment in this case did not go upon the effect to an impairment of the obligations of a conof that repealing statute. It was not noticed tract, if an adequate and efficacious remedy in the opinion, and the decision was not that is left." Upon this ground it was held that the suit abate by reason of the repeal of the the new remedy being adequate and efficastatute authorizing it, but that the judg- cious, the taking away of the old right of ment of the trial court be reversed, and a proceeding by mandamus was valid, and new judgment be entered against the peti- the coupon holder must be content with the tioner for costs. If the action had abated it new remedy. Now the statute *creating this 125 was error to render judgment against him new remedy was, as we have seen, repealed for costs. by the act of 1894. That act does not in terms revive the former remedy. Indeed, the right to use the writ of mandamus in tax cases was specifically taken away, after the act of January 14, 1882, by the act of January 26, 1882. It was said, however, in the argument of counsel that the former remedy was one arising under the common law, and that the settled law of Virginia is that when an act is passed repealing an act creating a statutory remedy it operates to revive the former common-law remedy. Insurance Company of Valley of Virginia v. Barley's Adm'r, 16 Gratt. 363; Booth v. The Commonwealth, 16 Gratt. 519, and Moseley, Trustee, v. Brown et al., 76 Va. 419. If this be still the law of Virginia and applicable to the case at bar, so that the repeal of the act of 1882 revives the former remedy by mandamus, then it is undoubtedly true that new suits can no longer be maintained under the act of 1882 and a party must proceed by mandamus. But that is a question yet to be settled by the court of appeals of Virginia. It is not decided in the case of Maury v. Commonwealth, and, so far as we have been advised, has not yet been determined by that court. If it shall finally be held by that court that the remedy by mandamus does not exist, then it will become a question for further consideration whether the act repealing the act of 1882 can be sustained. But it is not necessary now to determine that question, inasmuch as the judgment in the trial court was rendered, as we have seen, prior to the repealing act, and the right acquired by the judgment creditor was not and could not constitutionally be taken away.

But there are more substantial reasons than this for not entertaining this motion. At the time the judgment was rendered in the circuit court of the city of Norfolk the act of 1882 was in force, and the judgment was rightfully entered under the authority of that act. The writ of error to the court of appeals of the state brought the validity of that judgment into review, and the question presented to that court was whether at the time it was rendered it was rightful or not. If rightful the plaintiff therein had a vested right which no state legislation could disturb. It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation [124]may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when those actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases. So, properly, the court of appeals, in considering the question of the validity of this judgment, took no notice of the subsequent repeal of the act under which the judgment was obtained, and the inquiry in this court is not what effect the repealing act of 1894 had upon proceedings initiated thereafter, or pending at that time, but whether such a repeal devested a plaintiff in a judgment of the rights acquired by that judgment. And in that respect we have no doubt that the rights acquired by the judgment under the act of 1882 were not disturbed by a subsequent repeal of the statute.

Even if the repeal had preceded the judgment in the trial court, or if in a proceeding like this, equitable in its nature, the mere taking of the case to the court of appeals operated to vacate the decree, there would still remain a serious question. When the act of 1871 was passed the coupon holder had a remedy by writ of mandamus to compel the acceptance of his coupons in payment of taxes. The form and mode of proceeding were prescribed by statute. (Code Va. 1873, p. 1023.) On January 14, 1882, the general assembly passed the act providing a new remedy for the coupon holder. This act came before this court in Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 774 [27: 468,471], and was sustained, the court holding that while it is true that, "as a general rule, laws applicable to the case which are in force at the time and place of making a contract enter into and form part of the contract itself, and 'that this embraces alike those laws which affect its validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement' (Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Peckham dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case because I think that the ground upon which the state court has based its decision deprives this court of any jurisdiction. The case having originated in a state court, we have no jurisdiction to re-[126] examine its judgment unless there is some Federal question involved therein, the decision of which by the court below was unfavorable to the claim set up, and its decision was necessary to the determination of the case, or the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361 [37: ĭ111]. Jurisdiction is said to exist herein because of the alleged violation of the constitutional

provision denying to any state the right to
pass any law impairing the obligation of a

contract.

In all the litigation arising in the state courts, by reason of the subsequent legislation by Virginia upon the subject, the claim was made, on a review ef the judgments in this court, that the judgments of the state courts had given effect to statutes which were passed subsequently to the original coupon statutes, and that the original contract made by those statutes had been impaired by reason of those subsequent statutes to which effect was given by the judgments of the state courts. It was the giving effect by the judgment of the court to the subsequent statutes, which it was alleged impaired the contract, that gave jurisdiction to this court to decide for itself whether there was a contract, and, if so, what the contract was, as a preliminary to the decision of the question whether the subsequent statutes impaired the contract as construed by this court. The cases in which this court decides for itself, without reference to the decision of the state court, what the contract was, are cases where there has been, not only subsequent legislation which is alleged to impair the contract, but also legislation which has been given some effect to by the judgment of the state court. Such is the case of Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436, 443 [17:173, 177], and such are all the other cases decided in this court upon that subject.

court jurisdiction, the state court must in
words allude to the subsequent legislation
and in terms give effect to it. It may be as-
sumed that if the real substance and neces-
sary effect of the judgment of the state court
was the determination of a Federal question
or the giving effect to subsequent legislation,
this court would have jurisdiction to review
that judgment, notwithstanding the particu-
lar language used in the opinion. But when
the case before the state court could have
been decided upon two distinct grounds, one
only of which embraced a Federal question,
the sole way of determining upon which of
those grounds the judgment was rested
would be to examine the language used in
the opinion of the state court. If that
language showed the judgment was founded
wholly upon a non-Federal question, this
court would be without power to review it.
Whether the state court has decided this
case wholly without reference to subsequent
legislation can only be learned from its opin-
ion. To this extent it has always been
within the power of the state court to de-
termine the jurisdiction of this court. If[128]
the former court chooses to decide a case up-
on a non-Federal question, when it might
have decided it upon one which was Federal
in its nature, the effect of such choice is to
deprive this court of jurisdiction, no matter
how erroneous we may regard the decision
of the state tribunal. The power is with
the state court in such cases to deprive us
of jurisdiction to review its determination,
and we are wholly without any power to
control its action in that respect. This is
what has been done, and all that has been
done in this case. The opinion of the state
court shows that the judgment went upon
the original and inherent invalidity of the
coupon statutes and its judgment in that
respect, as I shall hereafter attempt to show,
gave no effect to any subsequent legislation.
That is the material question in this case
upon which the jurisdiction of this court
hangs. Prior decisions of this court in
other cases holding the contract valid, where
we had jurisdiction to determine such cases,
can have no effect upon the question of our
jurisdiction to review the judgment in the
case at bar. Prior decisions in such event
constitute no ground of jurisdiction.

If by the judgment of the state court in this case no effect has been given to any statute passed subsequently to either of the coupon acts, this court is without jurisdiction to review that judgment. Lehigh Water Company v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388 [30: 1059]; New Orleans Waterworks Company v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Company, 125 U. S. 18 [31: 607]; St. Paul, M. & M. Railway Co. v. Todd County, 142 U. S. 282 [35: 1014]; Central Land Company v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 [40: 91]; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207 [41: 132]. [127] *If there had never been any subsequent legislation regarding these coupon acts, and the highest court of the state had adjudged that they were void as being in violation of the Constitution of the state existing at the time of their passage, of course there would I concede, plainly and fully, the power of be no jurisdiction in this court to review this court to review a judgment of the state that judgment. And the state court might court when effect has been given by that have decided the case in different ways, at judgment to subsequent legislation claimed one time holding the acts valid and subse- to impair the validity of a contract. But quently holding them void, and still this that vital fact must appear in order to supcourt would have no jurisdiction to re-ex-port the jurisdiction, and without it the juamine the judgments of that court. This risdiction does not exist, no matter how imwould be true even if millions of dollars had portant the question may be or how many been invested in the bonds upon the strength times it may have been heretofore decided. of the judgment of the state court first giv. en holding the acts valid.

The cases above cited show that even if there has been subsequent legislation, if the judgment of the state court does not give that legislation any effect, and decides the case without reference thereto, this court is also without jurisdiction to review that judgment.

I do not say that in order to give this

The

To say that the duty is cast upon this court to inquire whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligations of a prior contract is but to half state the case. inquiry must be further prosecuted to the extent of learning whether the state court has, by its judgment, given effect to such subsequent legislation, and, if it has not, then no duty or right rests upon this court to review the judgment.

However true it may be that in many prior | ers when reviewing a judgment of a state cases this court has held there was a valid court. contract created by the coupon statutes, so In this class of cases the absolutely uncalled, which could not be impaired by any bending and essential fact which must exist, [129]subsequent *legislation, the fact remains that in order to give jurisdiction to review a judg unless such subsequent legislation has been ment of a state court, is subsequent legislagiven effect to by the judgment in this case, tion to which effect has been given by the there is not the slightest shadow of a claim judgment of the state court. This court is for jurisdiction in this court to review that not the Mecca to which all dissatisfied suitjudgment. Millions or hundreds of millions ors in the state courts may turn for the corof dollars may have been invested in reliance rection of all the errors said to have been upon a judgment of this court declaring the committed by the state tribunals. Nor is it law to be that there was a valid contract, and confided to this court to supervise the judg yet a state court might in a subsequent acments of a state court in all cases where we tion adjudge that there never was a valid may think that court has by its later decicontract, because the statute which it was sion invalidated a contract which it had once claimed created it was in violation of the held to be lawful, and the judgment in which state Constitution. If that judgment did this court had upheld. The right of the not, in effect, put in operation any subse-state court in another case to reverse its quent legislation, the solemn adjudications former ruling is wholly unaffected by the fact of this court in some former cases that the that its former judgment had been affirmed contract was valid, could not affect the judg- here. Unless the Federal question exists in ment in question nor furnish ground for the this case there is no ground of jurisdiction jurisdiction of this court to review that judg-founded upon any prior decisions. ment. This court is not intrusted with the Now, has this judgment of the state court duty of supervising all decisions of state given effect to any subsequent legislation? courts to the end that we may see to it that At the time of the passage of the coupon acts such decisions are never inconsistent, contra- there was no prior statute in Virginia perdictory, or conflicting. We supervise those mitting taxes to be paid in coupons of any decisions only when a Federal question aris- kind whatever. The sole authority for such es. It is said this court is not bound to fol- attempted payment of taxes rested in the low the last decision of a state court revers- coupon statutes under consideration. If they ing its prior rulings upon a question of the gave no such authority, then none existed, validity of a contract, when bonds have been and no payment of taxes by means of coupons issued and taken in reliance upon the deci- was valid. This is wholly irrespective of the sion of the state court adjudging the validity subsequent acts. The state court has held of the law under which the bonds were issued. the coupon *acts to be entirely void, because[131] I do not dispute the proposition, but it has in violation of the state Constitution in exnothing to do with this case. Where an ac- istence when they were passed. Under that tion has been brought under such circum- decision those acts are to all intents and stances in a Federal court, it has been fre- purposes as if they never had been passed. quently held that such court was not bound They therefore furnished not the slightest to follow the latest decision of the state form of legality to a payment of taxes in coucourt which invalidated the law under which pons. It was not a statute to forbid paying bonds had been issued, at a time when the taxes in coupons that was necessary in order state court had held the law valid. In such to deprive such payments of legality. A case the Federal court would follow the prior statute, a valid statute authorizing such paydecision of the state court and apply it to all ment, was necessary in the first instance, and the securities which had been issued prior to if there were no such statute there was no the time when the state court changed its de-authority existing to receive coupons in paycision. But such a case raises no question of jurisdiction in this court to review the judgment of a state court. When that question of jurisdiction does arise, the right of review cannot rest upon the fact that the state court has refused to follow its former decision, and, on the contrary, has directly [130]* overruled it. The jurisdiction of this court to review the state court in this class of cases is confined in the first instance to an inquiry as to the existence of subsequent legislation upon the subject, and if none has been enacted to which any effect has been given by the state court, this court cannot review the decision of the state tribunal, even though that decision makes worthless a contract which it had prior thereto held valid.

ment of taxes. The supreme court of ap-
peals of Virginia, in a case in which it had
jurisdiction, decided there was no such stat-
ute, and consequently no such authority, be-
cause the statute purporting to confer that
authority was void, as in violation of the
Constitution of the state. This judgment
did not give the slightest effect to the legis
lation subsequent to the coupon statutes. It
simply held there were no coupon statutes,
because those which purported to be such
were totally void. No subsequent statute
was necessary, and none such was given ef-
fect to. Striking down the coupon statutes
effectually destroyed any assumed right to
pay taxes in coupons, and the subsequent leg-
islation was needless and ineffectual. Thus
the whole groundwork upon which to base
our jurisdiction in this case falls to the
ground, and we are left to maintain it upon
the insufficient claim of prior decisions of this

The cases of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 [17: 520], and Ohio & M. Railroad Company v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 [19: 997] illustrate this difference between the powers of this court when reviewing a judg-court. ment of a lower Federal court and its pow- In truth, the particular question decided