court jurisdiction, the state court must in
words allude to the subsequent legislation
and in terms give effect to it. It may be as-
sumed that if the real substance and neces-
sary effect of the judgment of the state court
was the determination of a Federal question
or the giving effect to subsequent legislation,
this court would have jurisdiction to review
that judgment, notwithstanding the particu-
lar language used in the opinion. But when
the case before the state court could have
been decided upon two distinct grounds, one
only of which embraced a Federal question,
the sole way of determining upon which of
those grounds the judgment was rested
would be to examine the language used in
the opinion of the state court. If that
language showed the judgment was founded
wholly upon a non-Federal question, this
court would be without power to review it.
Whether the state court has decided this
case wholly without reference to subsequent
legislation can only be learned from its opin-
ion. To this extent it has always been
within the power of the state court to de-
termine the jurisdiction of this court. If[128]
the former court chooses to decide a case up-
on a non-Federal question, when it might
have decided it upon one which was Federal
in its nature, the effect of such choice is to
deprive this court of jurisdiction, no matter
how erroneous we may regard the decision
of the state tribunal. The power is with
the state court in such cases to deprive us
of jurisdiction to review its determination,
and we are wholly without any power to
control its action in that respect. This is
what has been done, and all that has been
done in this case. The opinion of the state
court shows that the judgment went upon
the original and inherent invalidity of the
coupon statutes and its judgment in that
respect, as I shall hereafter attempt to show,

If by the judgment of the state court in
this case no effect has been given to any
statute passed subsequently to either of the
coupon acts, this court is without jurisdic-
tion to review that judgment. Lehigh
Water Company v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388
[30: 1059]; New Orleans Waterworks Com-
pany v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Company, 125
U. Š. 18 [31: 607]; St. Paul, M. & M. Rail-gave no effect to any subsequent legislation.
way Co. v. Todd County, 142 U. S. 282 [35: That is the material question in this case
1014]; Central Land Company v. Laidley, upon which the jurisdiction of this court
159 Ú. S. 103 [40: 91]; Bacon v. Texas, 163 hangs. Prior decisions of this court in
U. S. 207 [41: 132].
other cases holding the contract valid, where
[127] *If there had never been any subsequent we had jurisdiction to determine such cases,
legislation regarding these coupon acts, and can have no effect upon the question of our
the highest court of the state had adjudged jurisdiction to review the judgment in the
that they were void as being in violation of case at bar. Prior decisions in such event
the Constitution of the state existing at the constitute no ground of jurisdiction.
time of their passage, of course there would
be no jurisdiction in this court to review
that judgment. And the state court might
have decided the case in different ways, at
one time holding the acts valid and subse-
quently holding them void, and still this
court would have no jurisdiction to re-ex-
amine the judgments of that court. This
would be true even if millions of dollars had
been invested in the bonds upon the strength
of the judgment of the state court first giv.
en holding the acts valid.

I concede, plainly and fully, the power of this court to review a judgment of the state court when effect has been given by that judgment to subsequent legislation claimed to impair the validity of a contract. But that vital fact must appear in order to support the jurisdiction, and without it the jurisdiction does not exist, no matter how important the question may be or how many times it may have been heretofore decided.

The

The cases above cited show that even if there has been subsequent legislation, if the judgment of the state court does not give that legislation any effect, and decides the case without reference thereto, this court is also without jurisdiction to review that judgment.

To say that the duty is cast upon this court to inquire whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligations of a prior contract is but to half state the case. inquiry must be further prosecuted to the extent of learning whether the state court has, by its judgment, given effect to such subsequent legislation, and, if it has not, then no duty or right rests upon this court to review the judgment.

I do not say that in order to give this

provision denying to any state the right to
pass any law impairing the obligation of a

contract.

In all the litigation arising in the state courts, by reason of the subsequent legislation by Virginia upon the subject, the claim was made, on a review of the judgments in this court, that the judgments of the state courts had given effect to statutes which were passed subsequently to the original coupon statutes, and that the original contract made by those statutes had been impaired by reason of those subsequent statutes to which effect was given by the judgments of the state courts. It was the giving effect by the judgment of the court to the subsequent statutes, which it was alleged impaired the contract, that gave jurisdiction to this court to decide for itself whether there was a contract, and, if so, what the contract was, as a preliminary to the decision of the question whether the subsequent statutes impaired the contract as construed by this court. The cases in which this court decides for itself, without reference to the decision of the state court, what the contract was, are cases where there has been, not only subsequent legislation which is alleged to impair the contract, but also legislation which has been given some effect to by the judgment of the state court. Such is the case of Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436, 443 [17:173, 177], and such are all the other cases decided in this court upon that subject.

However true it may be that in many prior | ers when reviewing a judgment of a state cases this court has held there was a valid court. contract created by the coupon statutes, so In this class of cases the absolutely uncalled, which could not be impaired by any bending and essential fact which must exist, [129]subsequent *legislation, the fact remains that in order to give jurisdiction to review a judg unless such subsequent legislation has been ment of a state court, is subsequent legislagiven effect to by the judgment in this case, tion to which effect has been given by the there is not the slightest shadow of a claim judgment of the state court. This court is for jurisdiction in this court to review that not the Mecca to which all dissatisfied suitjudgment. Millions or hundreds of millions ors in the state courts may turn for the corof dollars may have been invested in reliance rection of all the errors said to have been upon a judgment of this court declaring the committed by the state tribunals. Nor is it law to be that there was a valid contract, and confided to this court to supervise the judg yet a state court might in a subsequent ac- ments of a state court in all cases where we tion adjudge that there never was a valid may think that court has by its later decicontract, because the statute which it was sion invalidated a contract which it had once claimed created it was in violation of the held to be lawful, and the judgment in which state Constitution. If that judgment did this court had upheld. The right of the not, in effect, put in operation any subse-state court in another case to reverse its quent legislation, the solemn adjudications former ruling is wholly unaffected by the fact of this court in some former cases that the that its former judgment had been affirmed contract was valid, could not affect the judg- here. Unless the Federal question exists in ment in question nor furnish ground for the this case there is no ground of jurisdiction jurisdiction of this court to review that judg- founded upon any prior decisions. ment. This court is not intrusted with the duty of supervising all decisions of state courts to the end that we may see to it that such decisions are never inconsistent, contradictory, or conflicting. We supervise those decisions only when a Federal question arises. It is said this court is not bound to follow the last decision of a state court reversing its prior rulings upon a question of the validity of a contract, when bonds have been issued and taken in reliance upon the decision of the state court adjudging the validity of the law under which the bonds were issued. I do not dispute the proposition, but it has nothing to do with this case. Where an action has been brought under such circumstances in a Federal court, it has been frequently held that such court was not bound to follow the latest decision of the state court which invalidated the law under which bonds had been issued, at a time when the state court had held the law valid. In such case the Federal court would follow the prior decision of the state court and apply it to all the securities which had been issued prior to the time when the state court changed its decision. But such a case raises no question of jurisdiction in this court to review the judgment of a state court. When that question of jurisdiction does arise, the right of review cannot rest upon the fact that the state court has refused to follow its former decision, and, on the contrary, has directly [180]* overruled it. The jurisdiction of this court to review the state court in this class of cases is confined in the first instance to an inquiry as to the existence of subsequent legislation upon the subject, and if none has been enacted to which any effect has been given by the state court, this court cannot review the decision of the state tribunal, even though that decision makes worthless a contract which it had prior thereto held valid.

Now, has this judgment of the state court given effect to any subsequent legislation? At the time of the passage of the coupon acts there was no prior statute in Virginia permitting taxes to be paid in coupons of any kind whatever. The sole authority for such attempted payment of taxes rested in the coupon statutes under consideration. If they gave no such authority, then none existed, and no payment of taxes by means of coupons was valid. This is wholly irrespective of the subsequent acts. The state court has held the coupon *acts to be entirely void, because[131] in violation of the state Constitution in existence when they were passed. Under that decision those acts are to all intents and purposes as if they never had been passed. They therefore furnished not the slightest form of legality to a payment of taxes in coupons. It was not a statute to forbid paying taxes in coupons that was necessary in order to deprive such payments of legality. A statute, a valid statute authorizing such payment, was necessary in the first instance, and if there were no such statute there was no authority existing to receive coupons in payment of taxes. The supreme court of appeals of Virginia, in a case in which it had jurisdiction, decided there was no such statute, and consequently no such authority, because the statute purporting to confer that authority was void, as in violation of the Constitution of the state. This judgment did not give the slightest effect to the legis lation subsequent to the coupon statutes. It simply held there were no coupon statutes, because those which purported to be such were totally void. No subsequent statute was necessary, and none such was given effect to. Striking down the coupon statutes effectually destroyed any assumed right to pay taxes in coupons, and the subsequent legislation was needless and ineffectual. Thus the whole groundwork upon which to base our jurisdiction in this case falls to the ground, and we are left to maintain it upon the insufficient claim of prior decisions of this

The cases of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 [17: 520], and Ohio & M. Railroad Company v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 [19: 997], illustrate this difference between the powers of this court when reviewing a judg-court. ment of a lower Federal court and its pow- In truth, the particular question decided

affirmed, as to that point, by this court. In this decision now before us it has given no effect to subsequent legislation, and not having done so, but simply decided a question of local law regarding its own Constitution, the state court has given no decision which raises a Federal question, and therefore none that this court can review.

in this case has never been before this court. In some of the former cases this court decided the general proposition that the coupon legislation was valid and created a contract. After it had thus decided, a case came before it where a subsequent statute provided that, in the case of the school tax, coupons should not be received in payment thereof. The state court had decided that the coupon stat- Under all the circumstances I can only see ute was invalid so far as it related to the a determination to take jurisdiction in this school tax, because the Constitution in exist-case simply because this court, as it is said, ence when the coupon acts were passed required in substance that such tax must be paid in lawful money, and consequently the coupon act was unconstitutional as to such [132]tax. This court affirmed that judgment. Vashon v. Greenhow, 135 U. S. 662, 713 [34: 304, 320]. Part of the coupon statute was thus held invalid by the state court and also by this court.

The state had also passed a subsequent statute providing that the tax for a license to retail liquor should be paid in lawful money. This court (affirming in that respect the court below) held that act valid, because it was in effect a regulation of the liquor traffic, and the state could at all times legislate upon that subject, notwithstanding the coupon acts and the alleged contract therein created. Hucless v. Childrey, 135 U. S. 662, 709 [34: 304, 319]. Both of these decisions were made subsequently to the time when this court had held the coupon statute valid, and that a valid contract was therein created.

The state court has now decided in this case that as the coupon acts were invalid as to the payment of the school tax in coupons (a proposition concurred in by this court), the result was that the whole acts were invalid, that they could not stand partly valid and partly void, and that the whole coupon scheme was unconstitutional. This phase of the controversy has never before reached this court, and the court has therefore never before decided this particular point. It has said, generally, that the legislation was valid, but it said SO only in cases where the general power of the legislature to enact the coupon statutes was in question, and it has never decided squarely the point that if the coupon acts be unconstitutional in some particulars they are nevertheless valid in all others. The fact is alluded to simply as matter of history.

But even if it had, that fact confers no jurisdiction upon this court to review this judgment, if it otherwise is without it. In other words, because this court has hereto

fore decided the question of the validity of

has in cases in which it had jurisdiction decided the question differently from the decision in this case by the state court. That ground does not give jurisdiction, and that is the only ground that does exist.

The writ of error should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

UNITED STATES, Appt.,

v.

RANLETT & STONE.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 133-148.)

Appraiser of imported goods-when appraisement is valid-duty on American bags-foreign-made bags.

1.

2.

3.

4.

The judgment of an appraiser after actual examination, that imported goods are not as described, but fall within a different classification, must stand as against the importer, unless reversed on reappraisement, or by the board of general appraisers on protest filed.

An appraisement is not invalid as against the importer because the examination was not made in accordance with U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2901, which is intended for the benefit of the government.

The separation of American-made bags, which are free from duty, from foreign-made bags imported in the same bales, should be made by the importer if he wishes to obtain the exemptions on the former, and he cannot require the separation to be made by the goverument.

The prima facie showing that bags imported are of American manufacture is overturned when it appears that foreign bags in large numbers are included in the same bales with those of American make.

[No. 20.]

Argued and Submitted April 20, 1898. Restored to docket, and certiorari to bring up entire record ordered April 25, 1898. Submitted October 11, 1898. Decided December 5, 1898.

N WRIT of certiorari to the United

"Name the articles.

"If the packages are empty, Insert statement of the facts, as 'and were exported from the United States filled with the produce of that country.'

"If the packages contain foreign merchan

"Art. 332. To guard against fraud, and to dise, insert filled with' and a description of the insure identity, the collector shall require, in addition to proof of clearance, the production of a statement, certified by the

did not come under the provisions of section
2910 of the Revised Statutes.

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the action of the collector. General Appraisers' Decisions, No. 2623.

The importers applied for a review of this decision to the circuit court of the United States for the fifth circuit, which, without taking any additional testimony, reversed the decision of the board, and entered a decree that the duties paid by Ranlett & Stone, namely, two cents per pound on the several consignments of bags, enumerating them, be refunded; "that the examination heretofore made of said bales of bags is void and not in conformity to law or the regulations of the Treasury Department, and any liquidation of duties based on said examination is illegal and void, and the liquidation of duties heretofore made be set aside, and the money received from Ranlett & Stone[139] as duties be refunded as aforesaid; and the court doth further order and decree that the collector direct a re-examination of said bales of bags to be made according to law, and on such re-examination to reliquidate the duties which may be lawfully due thereon."