oeding this, granting public lands to the no title to the lands at the time of the tresstate of Wisconsin to aid in the construction pass, and no right to the possession of the of railroads in that state, and precisely simi- timber, are in no position to maintain this lar to this act in its terms, was construed by suit. Neither a deed of land nor an assignthis court as a grant in præsenti of title to ment of a patent for an "invention carries[218) the odd sections designated, to be afterwards with it a right of action for prior trespasses located; that when the route was fixed their or infringements. Such rights of action are, location became certain, and the title, which it is true, now assignable by the statutes of was previously imperfect, acquired precision most of the states, but they only pass with and became attached to the lands. “As it is a conveyance of the property itself where the stipulated in this case that the lands from language is clear and explicit to that effect. which the timber was cut were a part of the i Chitty, Pl. 68; Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. grant of June 3, 1856, to the state of Michi. 297, 299; Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass. 219, gan, and were a part of the lands within the 223 [4 Am. Rep. 532); Moore v. Marsh, 7 six-mile limit, certified and approved to the Wall. 515 [19:37]; Dibble v. Augur, 7 state by the Secretary of the Interior, no Blatchf. 86; Merriam V. Smith, 11 Fed. question arises with respect to the identity Rep. 588; Alay v. Juneau County, 30 Fed. of the lands.

Rep. 241; Kaolatype Engraving Company v. The case of Schulenberg v. Harriman was IIoke, 30 Fed. Rep. 444. also an action for timber cut upon lands So, where a landowner, intrusts another granted to the state, against an agent of the with the possession of his lands, either by state who had seized the logs, which had been lease, by contract to sell, or otherwise, the cut after the ten years had expired for the right of action for trespasses committed dur:

construction of the railroad, but before any ing such tenancy belongs to the latter, and (811]action had been taken by Congress *to forfeit except under special circumstances an action

the grant. The complaint in the case alleged for a trespass, such as the cutting of timber, property and right of possession in the plain will not lie in favor of the landlord. Greber tiffs. It was stipulated by the parties that v. Kleckner, 2 Pa. 289; Campbell v. Ar. the plaintiffs were in the quiet and peacea- nold, 1 Johns. 511; Tobey v. Webster, 3 ble possession of the logs at the time of their Johns. 468; Cutts v. Spring, 15 Mass. 135; seizure by the defendants, and that such pos- Lienow v. Ritchie, 8 Pick. 235; Ward v. session should be conclusive evidence of title Macauley, 4 T. R. 489; Revett v. Brown, 6 in the plaintiffs against evidence of title in Bing. 7; Harper v. Charlesworth, 4 Barn. a stranger, unless the defendant should con- & c. 574; Graham v. Peat, 1 East, 244; Lunt nect himself with such title by agency, or au. v. Brown, 13 Me. 236; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 616. thority in himself. The title of the plain Although, as was said by Lord Kenyon in tiffs was not otherwise stated. It was held Ward v. Macauley, 4 T. R. 489, “the distincthat the title to the lands did not revert to tion between the actions of trespass and trov. the United States after the expiration of the er is well settled; the former are founded on ten years, in the absence of judicial proceed. possession; the latter on property;”-yet ings in the nature of an inquest of office, or they are concurrent remedies to the extent a legislative forfeiture, and that until a for- that, wherever trespass will lie for the un. feiture had taken place the lands themselves lawful taking and conversion of personal and the timber cut from them were the prop. property, trover may also be maintained. erty of the state. Said Mr. Justice Field, in The plaintiff is bound to prove a right of posdelivering the opinion of the court, p. 64: session in himself at the time of the conver. "The title to the land remaining in the state, sion, and if the goods are shown to be in the the lumber cut upon the land belonged to the lawful possession of another by lease or simistate. While the timber was standing it lar contract he cannot maintain trover for constituted a part of the realty; being sev them. Smith v. Plomer, 15 East, 607; ered from the soil its character was changed; Wheeler v. Train, 3 Pick. 255; Gordon v. it became personalty, but its title was not Harper, 7 T. R. 9; Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. affected; it continued, as previously, the 156; Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 Pick. 535. property of the owner of the land, and could It does not aid the plaintiffs' case to take be pursued wherever it was carried. All the the position (the soundness of which we by remedies were open to the owner which the no means concede) that the state held the law affords in other cases of the wrongful lands as trustee to deliver them over to the removal or conversion of personal property.” railroads upon certain contingencies, and to[218] The same rule regarding the construction of return them to the United States in case the this identical land grant was applied by this conditions subsequent were not performed, court in Lake Superior Ship Canal, R. & 1. since nothing is better settled than that a Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354 [39: 183]. trustee has the legal title to the lands, and Indeed, the principle is too well settled to require the citation of authorities. The case

that actions at law for trespasses must be of Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 brought by him, and by him alone. 1 Perry, (22: 551), differs from the one under consid- Trusts, § 328, and cases cited; Fenn v. eration in the fact that no act forfeiting the Holme, 21 How. 481 [16: 198). grant was ever passed; but it is pertinent as

Certain cases having a contrary bearing showing that under a statute precisely like will now be considered. Several of these are the present the title to the timber cut before to the effect that if a man leases an estate such forfeiture is in the state, and not in the for a term of years, and the tenant unlawfully general governinent.

cuts timber, the lessor may sue in trespass, It follows that the United States, having and perhaps in trover, upon the ground that

the title to the land remains in the lessor dur certain mill inachinery, together with the ing the pendency of the lease.

mill, had been demised for a term to a tenIn Richard Liford's Case, 11 Coke, 46, ant, and he, without permission of his land. which was an action of trespass by a tenant lord, severed the niachinery from the mill, against the agent of the owner of the inherit- and it was afterwards seized under execu. ance for certain trees cut, it was said "that tion by the sheriff and sold by him. It was when a man demises his land for life or held that no property passed to the vendee, years the lessee has but a particular interest and the landlord was entitled to bring trover in the trees, but the general interest of the for the machinery, even during the continu. trees remains in the lessor; for the lessee ance of the term, upon the ground that the shall have the mast and fruit of the trees, machinery attached to the mill was a part and shadow for his cattle, etc., but the inter- oi the inheritance which 'the tenant had a est of the body of the trees is in the lessor right to use, but not to sever or remove. as parcel of his inheritance; and this appears. So, in United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 in 29 Hen. VIII. [Malever v. Spinke] 1 [22: 210), it was held that timber standing Dyer, 36, where it is held in express words

upon lands occupied by Indians cannot be that it cannot be denied that the property of cut by them for the purposes of sale, although great trees, scil. the timber, is reserved by it may be for *the purpose of improving the[215] the law to the lessor, but he cannot grant it land, as the Indians had only the right of without the termor's license, for the termor occupancy, and the presumption was against has an interest in it, scil. to have the mast their authority to cut and sell the timber. and fruit growing upon it, and the loppings In such case the property in the timber does thereof for fuel, but the very property of the

of the not pass from the United States by severance, tree is in the lessor as annexed to his inherit

and they may maintain an action for unlawance.” Again, speaking of disseisin and the

ful cutting and carrying it away. To the respective rights of the disseisee and disseis.

lisseis same effect is E. E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Co. or when the former regains possession, it is v. United States. 106 U. S. 432 527 : 230] said: “That after the regress of the dissei. see the law adjudges, as to the disseisor him

11 In Wilson v. Hoffman, 93 Mich. 72, the

.. self, that the freehold has continued in the

" same principle was extended to a plaintiff disseisee, which rule and reason doth extend this

in ejectment, who was held entitled to mainas well to corn as to trees or grass, etc. The

|tain an action for trover for logs cut by the

| defendant during the pendency of the suit, same law, if the feoffee, or lessee, or the sec- | ond disseisor, sows the land, or cuts down

which had been determined in the plaintiff's

favor, although the defendant was in postrees or grass, and severs, and carries away, or sells them to another, yet after the regress

session of the land under a bona fide claim of the disseisee he may take as well the corn

of title adverse to the plaintiff. This is but as the trees and grass to what place soever

another application of the doctrine which al[214]they are carried; for the regress of the dis

lows the plaintiff in ejectment to recover seisee has relation as to the property, to con

mesne profits upon the theory that the land tinue the freehold against them all in the

has always been his, and that the defendant disseisee ab initio, and the carrying them out

illegally obtained possession of it. See also of the land cannot alter the property.”

Morgan v. Varick, 8 Wend. 587; Busch v.
In Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9, it was held

as hela Nester, 62 Mich. 381, 70 Mich. 525. that wbere goods had been leased as furni

In Moores v. Wait, 3 Wend. 104, a person ture with a house, and had been wrongfully

full entered into possession of wild lands under a taken in execution by the sheriff, the landlord contract of sale giving him the right of entry could not maintain trover against the sher- and occupancy, reserving to the landlord the iff, pending the lease, because he did not land as security

se he did not land as security until the payment of the have the right of possession as well as the consideration by withholding the deed. It right of property at the time. The case was was held that he had a right to enter and en. distinguished from one where the thing was joy the land for agricultural purposes, but attached to the freehold, and the doctrine of that he had no right to cut timber for any Liford's Case was reiterated. that where other purpose than for the cultivation, imtimber is cut down by a tenant for years the provement and enjoyment of the land as a owner of the inheritance may maintain

farm; and that the owner of the inheritance, trover for the timber notwithstanding the who had never parted with his title, might lease because the interest of the lessee in it maintain an action of trover for it against remained no longer than while it was grow

| anyone in possession, although a bona fide ing on the premises, and determined instant- purchaser under the occupant. This was ally when it was cut down. See also Mears v. so upon the principle that the vendor had London & S. W. Rwy. Oo. 11 C. B. N. S. 850: | never parted with title to his land. But see Randall v. Cleaveland, 6 Conn. 328; Elliot v.

Scott v. Wharton, 2 Hen. & M. 25; Moses Smith, 2 N. H. 430; Starr v. Jackson, 11 |

| Bros. v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517. Mass. 519.

In Burnett v. Thompson, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, These cases obviously have no application L.) 210, the plaintiff had a life estate pur to one where there has been a conveyance of autre vie in a lease of Indian lands for ninethe fee of the land prior to the cutting of the ty-nine years, and also a reversion after the timber, and no re-entry or analogous pro- expiration of the term. A stranger entered ceeding on the part of the vendor for a and cut down *cypress trees and carried them[216) breach of a condition subsequent.

off. The plaintiff was permitted to recover. It The same distinction was taken in Farrant was held that "if there be a tenant for years v. Thompson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 826, in which or for life, and a stranger cuts down a tree,


the particular tenant may bring trespass, with the property in the timber which had and recover damuages for breaking his close, been cut while the lands belonged to the treading down his grass, and the like. But state of Michigan. Had this act of forfeitthe remainderman, or reversioner in fee, is ure not been passed, there could be no ques. entitled to the tree, and, if it be converted, tion that, under the case of Schulenberg v. may bring trover and recover its value. The Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 (22:551], this timber reason is, the tree constituted a part of the would have belonged to the state of Michland, its severance was waste, which is an in- igan, and no other action therefor could have jury to the inheritance, consequently the been brought by the United States. party in whom is vested the first estate of But conceding all that is contended for by inheritance, whether in fee simple or fee tail the plaintiffs with respect to the revestiture (for it may last always), is entitled to the of the title to the lands by this act, it does tree, as well after it is severed, as before; not follow that the title to the timber which his right of property not being lost by the had been cut in the meantime was also rewrongful acts of severance by which it is vested in the United States. As was said in converted into a personal chattel.” See also | Schulenberg v. Harriman, the title to the Halleck v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574.

timber remained in the state after it had been While these cases run counter to some of

severed. But it remained in the state as a those previously cited, they are all distin

separate and independent piece of property, guishable from the one under consideration and if the state had elected to sell it a good in the fact that the plaintiff was the owner

title would have thereby passed to the purof the inheritance, and had the legal title to

chaser, notwithstanding the subsequent act the land at the time the trespass was com- of forfeiture. It did not remain the proper mitted. We see nothing in them to disturb ty of the state as a part of the lands, but as the doctrine announced by this court in a distinct piece of property, although the Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 [22:

state took its title thereto through and in 551], that timber cut upon the lands prior

consequence of its title to the lands. From to the forfeiture belongs to the state. The

the moment it was cut the state was at liberfact is that nothing remained of the original

ty to deal with *it as with any other piece of(218) title of the United States but the possibil

personal property. Brothers v. Hurdle, 32 ity of a reversion, a contingent remainder,

| N. C. (10 Ired. L.) 490 [51 Am. Dec. 400]. which would be an insufficient basis for an

We know of no principle of law under action of trover. Gordon v. Lowther, 75 N.

which it can be said that timber which was C. 193; Matthews v. Hudson, 81 Ga. 120;

'400': the property of the state when cut becomes Farabow v. Green, 108 N. C. 339; Sager v.

| the property of the United States by an act Galloway, 113 Pa. 500. To sustain this ac

of Congress resuming title to the land from tion there must be an immediate right of

| which it was cut, although the timber may

in the meantime have been removed hundreds possession when the timber is cut. This

of miles from the lands, and passed into the might arise if the severance of the timber in.

| hands of one who knew nothing of the source volved a breach of obligation on the part of

from which it was derived. It may be, in the tenant, but if the timber were cut by a

such a case, that if the state sues for and rethird person, the question would be as to

covers the value of such timber, it might be the right to the timber so cut as against the

accountable to the United States for the protrespasser, and unless the case of Schulen

ceeds in case the government resumed title to berg v. Harriman is to be overruled, it must

the lands. be held to be that of the state.

Two cases cited by the Solicitor General 2. As the United States can take title to lend support to the doctrine that the resumo[217]the timber involved in this case only through tion of' title by the United States operates its ownership of the lands, it remains to con

it remains to con: upon the timber already cut, as well as upon sider whether the act of March 2, 1889, (25 l the lands. In the first of these. Heath v. Stat. at L. 1008, chap. 414), forfeiting the Ross, 12 Johns. 140, the action was in trover lands granted by this act to aid in the con- | for a quantity of timber cut upon lands for struction of a railroad from Marquette to

which the plaintiff had applied for a patent Ontonagon, operated by relation to revest in

before the timber was cut. The patent was the United States title to the timber which not. granted until after the timber was ent. had been cut during the winter of 1887 and The patent was held, upon well-settled prin1888 and prior to the act of forfeiture. This ciples. to relate back to the date of applica

: provided that “there is hereby forfeited tion. The defendant knew he had no title to the United States, and the United States to the lot or right to cut the timber. The hereby resumes title thereto, all lands here- plaintiffs were held entitled to recover. tofore granted to the state of Michigan | The other case is that of Musser v. McRae, ... which are opposite to and cotermin- 44 Minn. 343. In that case an act of Conous with the uncompleted portion of any gress granting lands to the state of Wisconrailroad, to aid in the construction of which sin in aid of the construction of railroads, said lands were granted or applied, and all provided that it should be lawful for the such lands are hereby declared to be a part agents appointed by the railway company, of the public domain."

entitled to the grant, to select, subject to the The position of the plaintiffs must neces. approval of the Secretary of the Interior, sarily be that this act of forfeiture not only from the public lands of the United States, revested in the United States the title to the "deficiency” lands within certain indemnity lands as of a date prior to the cutting of the limits. It was held that the issuance of a timber in question, but also revested them patent to the railway company for the lands

so selected was evidence that the company | States. The road was never built, and the had complied with all the conditions of the granted land was forfeited by act of Congrant, and was entitled to the lands described gress, because of noncompliancí, with the con. therein, and that the title passed from the ditions contained in the grant. United States at the date of the selection. The issue presented for decision is tho And it was further held that where, after the right of the United Stater, to recover in an

lands had been so selected, but prior to the action of trover the proceeds of timber cut (219]issue of the patent, *timber had been wrong from the land by a trespasser while the legal

fully cut and removed by trespassers, the title was in the state, but after the period title acquired by the patents must be held to had elapsed when the right in the United relate back to the selection of the lands, so States to assert a forfeiture had arisen. The as to save the purchasers to whom the lands decision of the court is that a recovery can. had been granted, a right of action for the not be had, because at the time of the severtimber wrongfully removed from the land, or ance of the timber by the trespasser the leits value.

ga) title was in the state. It is thus in effect These cases are distinguishable from the decided that it was in the power of a tresone under consideration in the fact that the passer, while the legal title to the land and plaintiffs had an inchoate title to the lands, its incidents was in the state, to destroy the <a title which no one could disturb, and value of the land by severing and appropriatwbich the state was bound to perfect by the ing the timber, and that there exists no remissue of a patent, provided the plaintiffs edy by which the right of property of the followed up their application. We do not United States can be protected. "Such a conthink the doctrine of these cases ought to sequence strikes me as so abnormal that I be extended.

cannot bring my mind to assent to its cor3. Nor are the plaintiffs entitled to avail rectness; and, thinking as I do that it inthemselves of the rule that in an action of volves a grave denial of a right of property, trover a mere trespasser cannot defeat the not only harmful in the case decided, but plaintiff's right to possession by showing a harmful as a precedent for cases which may superior title in a third person without show. arise in the future, I state the reasons for ing himself in privity or connecting himself my dissent. with such third person. The cases in which At the outset it becomes necessary to dethis principle is applied are confined to those termine the nature of the rights of the state where the plaintiffs were either in possession and those of the United States created by of the property or entitled to its immediate and flowing from the act of donation. That possession, and thus showed a prima facie the land from which the timber was cut beright thereto. It has no application to cases longed to the United States at the time of wherein the plaintiff has shown no such right the grant goes without saying. It was conto bring the action. Jeffries v. Great West. veyed by the act of Congress to the state, ern Railway Co. 5 El. & Bl. 802; Weymouth not for the use and benefit of the state, but [221) v. Chicago do N. W. Railway Co. 17 Wis. 550 for the sole purpose of aiding in the con(84 Am. Dec. 763];Wheeler v. Larson, 103 struction of a railroad. The state had no N. Y. 40; Halleck v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 674; right to dispose of the land except for the Terry v. Metevier, 104 Mich. 50; Stevens v. declared object; and while it is true that a Gordon, 87 Me. 564; Fiske v. Small, 25 Me. power to sell the land was vested by the 453. Counsel are mistaken in supposing act in the state, it was a power which the that the plaintiffs had an immediate right to state could only call into being as the work the possession of this, timber. They had no progressed, and, to quote from the act, "for right to the possession of the land until Con- the purposes aforesaid and no other,”— gress passed the act of March 2, 1889, forfeit- l that is, the specific object stated, namely, the ing the grant. Up to that time the title was construction of the railroad referred to. in the state, and until then the United States The granting act clearly imported that in had no more right to enter and take posses- the event of a forfeiture before the land had sion than they would have had to take pos- / been earned and conveyed by the state, the session of the property of a private individu- land should be restored to the United States al.

in its integrity.
As the plaintiffs failed to show title to or I submit that the effect of the act of Con-
right of possession to the timber in question, gress was to create a trust in the land and
there was no error in the action of the court to vest the legal title thereto, with incidents
of appeals, and its judgment is therefore such as timber, in the state of Michigan for

the purposes of the trust, to hold, primarily,

for the benefit of the owners of a line of 420) "Mr. Justice White, with whom concur railrond if constructed, and, secondarily, for

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice the benefit of the United States, in the con-
Harlan, dissenting:

tingency that a forfeiture was declared for The United States donated the land from a breach of the condition subsequent as to which the timber was cut to the state of the time of completion of the road. The Michigan in aid of a contemplated railroad. state, in all reason, was bound to restore the The donating act dedicated the property thus land and timber which passed to its possesconveyed to the state, for the sole purpose of ion to the United States, upon the declara. aiding in the construction of the railroad, tion of the forfeiture, retaining no benefit and it contained a provision that if the road whatever from the land for itself by reason was not built within a designated period the of such custody and control. Being clothed land conveyed was to revert to the United with the legal estate in the land, the state,

while it so held the land, “possessed all the gendered an express trust, is wholly unner power and dominion over it that belonged essary, since it is admitted that had the to an owner." Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 167 the state through its agents cut timber upon [18: 510]. As the timber when severed be the land before the passage of the forfeiture longed to the true owner of the land, the act, a right of action would have arisen on state, as the trustee of an express trust and behalf of the United States against the representing such owner, was the proper state as upon a covenant by the state that party, during tne continuance of the trust, it would keep the land and its incidents for to recover any portion of the inheritance railway purposes only. This conclusion necwrongfully converted by a trespasser, and essarily carries with it as a legal resultant this would have been the case even if the the proposition that the granting act contained United States had stipulated to retain pos- an express trust. How, then, I submit, can session until a conveyance of the land by it in reason be held that there was a right the state. Wooderman v. Baldock, 8 Taunt. which could only exist upon the hypothesis 676; White v. Morris, 11 C. B. 1015; Barker of an express trust arising from the grantv. Furlong [1891] 2 Ch. 172; Myers v. Hale, ing act, and yet it at the same time be de17 Mo. App. 204. Clearly this was so, be cided that there was no trust whatever im.

cause, to maintain replevin or trover, it is plied in the act, or that the rights which (222]essential that the plaintiff *have at the time would obtain if there were a trust have no

of suit brought the legal title to the prop being? It cannot be doubted that the act erty, and, until the enactment of the forfeit- restricted the use to a particular purpose, ing act, the legal title to this timber was in nor can it be gainsaid that the right of rethe state of Michigan.

entry was stipulated only as respects the It was manifestly because the legal title non-completion of the railroad. "But the was in the state that this court in Schulen- failure to preserve a right of re-entry in berg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 [22: 551), case of the misuse of the property did not declared that a state was the owner oi tim. destroy the terms of the act restricting the ber which had been wrongfully cut by tres- use, and as, therefore, the restriction as to passers from land granted in aid of a rail- use was unaccompanied with a clause of reroad by a statute similar to the one above entry, the effect was to give rise to a trust referred to. The Schulenberg action was in upon the grantee with reference to such use. stituted, however, at a time when no for. This last principle, I submit, is sustained feiture had been declared, and the contro by authority. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119, versy was simply between a trespasser and 165 (18: 502, 509); Packard v. Ames, 10 the state as to their respective rights in tim-Gray, 329, and cases cited; Sohier v. Trinity ber which had been unlawfully severed from Church, 109 Mass. 1, 19. the granted land. That land so conveyed, As the state held the land with power simwith all that formed part thereof, was ply to sell on the happening of a particular deemed to be held upon trust is manifest event, until the occurrence of that event the from the opinion, for, speaking through Mr. state had no greater rights in the land than Justice Field, the court said, p. 59 [22: 554): would have existed in favor of one who was

"The acts of Congress made it a condition entitled to the mere use and occupancy of precedent to the conveyance by the state of the land. It could not therefore sell the timany other lands that the road should be con- ber for purposes of mere profit, for, as said structed in sections of not less than twenty in United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 [22: consecutive miles each. No conveyance in 210]: violation of the terms of those acts, the road "The timber while standing is a part of not having been constructed, could pass any the realty, and can only be sold as the land title to the company."

could be. The land cannot be sold, And this view was reiterated by this court, consequently the timber, until rightfully sev. speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, in ered, cannot be.” Lake Superior Ship Canal R. & I. Co. v. If, therefore, the state could not rightfully Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354 (39: 183], when, acquire the *absolute ownership, in its own[224] in interpreting the very statute now under right, of timber, the cutting of which it had consideration, it was said, p. 373 [39: 190]: authorized, it is clear that it would not be

"Further, the grant to the state of Mich- come such owner by reason of the unlawful igan was to aid in the construction of a rail- act of an unauthorized person. As the state road. Affirmatively, it was declared in the of Michigan was without power to have auacts of Congress that the lands should be thorized a sale of the timber contrary to the applied by the state to no other purpose. purpose of the trust, it is obvious that the Even if there had been no such declaration act of a mere trespasser, without authority such a limitation would be implied from the from the state, in denuding the land of its declaration of Congress that it was granted timber, could not operate to vest the state or for the given purpose. As the state of Mich- the trespasser with the absolute ownership, igan had no power to appropriate these lands in its or his own right, of said timber; and to any other purpose, certainly no act of it is the settled doctrine of this court that any executive officer of the state could ac. the sale of timber by a trespasser does not complish that which the state itself had no devest the title of the real owner, and that

a purchaser, even though acting in good To reason, however, to establish that, in so faith, is liable to respond to the true owner

far as the granting act restricted the state for the timber or its value. United States (223)to the use of the land and that *which ad. v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 [22: 210); E. E. Bolles

hered in it for a particular purpose, it en- Wooden-ware Co. v. United States. 106 U.S.

power to do."

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