"Error was likewise assigned to the refusal of the court to charge that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and proof in respect to the description of the letters, for the stealing or embezzling of which the defendant was indicted.

emies. When arrested the defendant had up- I mailed them and by whom they were to be on his person the three bills and the fifty-intercepted and to be withdrawn from the cent piece which had been marked by the mails before they reached the persons to postoffice inspectors and placed in the letter whom they were addressed, was no defense, and deposited in the letter box, addressed as and that such letters were in reality instated. Appreciating his position, the de- tended to be conveyed by mail within the fendant endeavored then and there to ac- meaning of the statute on that subject. In count for his possession of the money, and he that case the court, speaking through Mr. accounted for it by saying that someone, some Justice Shiras, said: enemy of his at the office, had done him a dirty trick, by which, as he testified, he meant to say that someone had deposited that money [348]in his coat pocket while his coat hung up in the sorting room, and while he was absent from that room. This evidence of defendant was an attempt to raise a suspicion, at least, "In the indictment it was averred that the that some enemy of his in the building had letters in question had come into the defendplaced this money in his coat, and thereby to ant's possession as a railway postal clerk, relieve himself from the suspicion of having to be conveyed by mail, and to be delivered to stolen it and to show his own innocence. It the persons addressed. It was disclosed by was an attempt at an explanation showing the evidence that the letters and money thus an honest possession of the money. It was mailed belonged to the inspectors who mailed therefore admissible, upon cross-examina-them, and were to be intercepted and withtion, for the purpose of showing the improbability of the explanation, to obtain from the witness all the circumstances which might throw light upon the subject. For that purpose he was asked if he had any enemies in the department, and he said that he had, naming two employees at this particular station, one the superintendent and the other a fellow letter carrier.

drawn from the mails by them before they reached the persons to whom they were addressed.

"There is no merit in this assignment. The letters put in evidence corresponded, in address and contents, to the letters described in the indictment, and it made no difference, with respect to the duty of the carrier, whether the letters were genuine or decoys with a fictitious address. Substantially this question was ruled in the case of Goode v. United States, above cited."

In the last-cited case, which is reported in 159 U. S. 663 [40: 297], the court said, at page 671 [40: 301], speaking through Mr. Justice Brown:

If this were true, it might have been argued to the jury that the explanation of defendant was strengthened, and the inference that one or both of these enemies had done this trick might for that reason have been maintained with more plausibility. To show that no such inference could properly be drawn, the government proved that the men "It makes no difference, with respect to the defendant named as enemies were not the duty of the carrier, whether the letter be such in fact. The evidence was not collateral genuine or a decoy, with a fictitious address. to the main issue of guilt or innocence, nor Coming into his possession, as such carrier it was the subject first drawn out by the gov-*is his duty to treat it for what it appears to[350] ernment. The district attorney on the cross-be on its face-a genuine communication; to examination simply obtained the names of make an effort to deliver it, or, if the address those upon whom the defendant attempted to cast a suspicion by his statement in chief. He could not escape from the possibility of being contradicted, by the failure to name the enemies on his direct examination. That examination suggested an explanation which, if believed, showed an innocent possession, and however improbable it was, the government had the right to pursue the subject and to show that it was unfounded. The objection to the evidence cannot therefore be sustained.

We think the court below was also right in its refusal to charge as above requested regarding the decoy letter. The correctness of the ruling has in substance been already upheld in this court.

be not upon his route, to hand it to the proper carrier or put it into the list box. Certainly he has no more right to appropriate it to himself than he would have if it were a genuine letter. For the purposes of these sections a letter is a writing or document, which bears the outward semblance of a genuine communication, and comes into the possession of the employee in the regular course of his official business. His duties in respect to it are not relaxed by the fact or by his knowledge that it is not what it purports to be-in other words, it is not for him to judge of its genuineness."

In this case the letter was addressed although to a fictitious personage, yet to a postoffice within the territory of Arizona. It [349] *In Montgomery v. United States, 162 U. was properly stamped, and it was placed S. 410 [40: 1020], we not only decided that, and came within the jurisdiction and au upon an indictment against a letter carrier, thority of the Postoflice Department by be charged with secreting, etc., a letter con- ing dropped into a United States street lettaining money in United States currency, ter box, in the city of New York. The duty the fact that the letter was a decoy was no of the defendant was, as above stated predefense, but it was also held that the further cisely the same in regard to that as to any fact that the decoy letters (mentioned in the and all other letters that came into his poscase) and the moneys inclosed therein, al-session from these various letter boxes. The though belonging to the inspectors who intention to convey by mail is sufficiently

proved in such a case as this, by evidence of the delivery of a letter into the jurisdiction of the Postoffice Department by dropping it in a letter box as described herein.

Section 5468, Revised Statutes, provides that the fact that any letter has been deposited in any postoffice, or branch postoffice, or in any authorized depository for mail matter, etc., shall be evidence that it was intended to be conveyed by mail, within the meaning of the two preceding sections. This prima facie evidence is not contradicted or modified by proof, as in this case, that the letter was a decoy and addressed to a fictitious person.

3, 1899.

N WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United

0 States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit to review a decree of that
court in an action brought by Theodore M.
Krumseig et al. against the Missouri, Kan-
sas, & Texas Trust Company, affirming the
decree of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Minnesota declar-
ing a certain mortgage and notes to be void
and enjoining their enforcement. Affirmed.
See same case below, 71 Fed. Rep. 350.

It was deposited in a proper Argued December 2, 1898. Decided January letter box, and it was intended that it should be taken and conveyed by defendant, a mail carrier, and his duty as such carrier was to convey it to the station postoffice, and while so being carried it was being conveyed by mail, and was under the protection of the Postoffice Department, and its safety provided for by the statute under consideration. 351]An intention to have the letter thus conveyed by the carrier is, within the statute, an intention to have it conveyed by mail. The difficulties of detecting this kind of crime are very great, and the statute ought not to be so construed as to substantially prevent a conviction under it. A decoy letter is not subject to the criticism frequently properly made in regard to other measures sometimes resorted to, that it is placing temptation before a man and endeavoring to make him commit a crime. There is no temptation by a decoy letter. It is the same as all other letters to outward appearance, and the duty of the carrier who takes it is the same.

The fact that it is to a fictitious person is in all probability entirely unknown to the carrier, and even if known is immaterial. Indeed, if suspected by the carrier, the suspicion would cause him to exercise particular care to insure its safety, under the belief that it was a decoy.

The other objections taken upon the trial we have examined and are of opinion they are without merit, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras:
*In May, 1894, Theodore M. Krumseig and[352)
Louise Krumseig filed in the district court of
the eleventh judicial district of Minnesota a
bill of complaint against the Missouri, Kan-
sas, & Texas Trust Company, a corporation
of the state of Missouri, praying that, for
reasons alleged in the bill, a certain mortgage
made by complainants on the 5th day of
September, 1890, and delivered to the defend-
ant, and by it recorded, and certain notes
therein mentioned, might be canceled, and
the defendant be permanently enjoined from
The defendant thereup-
enforcing the same.
on, by due proceedings removed the cause to
the circuit court of the United States for the
district of Minnesota, where the Union Trust
Company of Philadelphia was made a code-
fendant, and the case was so proceeded in
that, on October 22, 1895, a final decree was
entered, granting the prayers of the com-
plainants, declaring the said mortgage and
notes to be void, and enjoining the defend-

MISSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS TRUST ants from ever taking any action or proceed-
COMPANY, Petitioner,

v.

ing for their enforcement. 71 Fed. Rep. 350.
From this decree an appeal was taken to

THEODORE M. KRUMSEIG and Louise the circuit court of appeals for the eighth

Krumseig.

2. A plaintiff suing to cancel a Minnesota con-
tract for usury need not offer to repay the

On

circuit, where, on November 5, 1896, the de-
cree of the circuit court was affirmed.
March 20, 1897, on petition of the Missouri,
Kansas, & Texas Trust Company, a writ of
certiorari was awarded whereby the record
and proceedings in said cause were brought
for review into this court.

Mr. William C. White for petitioner.
Mr. J. B. Richards for respondents.

*Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion[352] of the court:

The bill of complaint alleged that on July 27, 1890, Theodore M. Krumseig, one of the complainants, made a written application to[353] defendant, a corporation of the state of Mis172 U. S.

souri, for a loan of $2,000, to be secured upon | operations, or in the manufacture, handling, real estate in the city of Duluth, Minnesota, and among the conditions in the said application was the following:

mining whether the contingency be a real
one, or a mere shift and device to cover
usury."

Similar views were expressed in the sub-
sequent case of Mathews v. Missouri, Kan-
sas, & Texas Trust Co. [69 Minn. 318], 72 N.
W. 121, where the supreme court of Minneso-
ta again reached the conclusion that the
notes and mortgage, forming a contract be-
tween the same trust company and one Math-
ews, were usurious and void.

noney any charge above ten per cent shall De usurious; and section 2217 provides that "whenever it satisfactorily appears to a court that any bond, will, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, contract, security, or evidence of debt has been taken or received in violation of the provisions of this act, the court shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any proceedings thereon, and shall order the same to be canceled and given up." As was said in De Wolf v. Johnson, above 1856]cited, it does not, *in general, comport with The next question for our consideration is a negotiation for a loan of money that any- one not free from difficulty. Can a borrower thing should enter into the views of the par- of money upon usurious interest successfully ties, but money, or those substitutes which, seek the aid of a court of equity in cancelfrom their approximation to money, circu-ing the debt without making an offer to relate with corresponding, if not equal, facil-pay the loan with lawful interest? ity. Still, however, like every other case, it is open to explanation, and the question always is whether it was or was not a subterfuge to evade the laws against usury. The books contain many cases where artful contrivances have been resorted to, whereby the lender is to receive some other advantage or thing of value beyond the repayment of the loan with legal interest. Sometimes the agreement has taken the form of the purchase of an annuity. More frequently there is a collateral agreement whereby the borrower is to purchase an article of property and to pay therefor more than its intrinsic value. It has been frequently held that to constitute usury, where the contract is fair on its face, there must be an intention knowingly to contract for or to take usurious interest, but mere ignorance of the law will not protect a party from the penalties of usury. Lloyd v. Scott, 4 Pet. 205 [7: 833].

The precise character of the contract between the present parties is not clear. It has some of the features of a loan of money; in other respects it resembles a contract of life insurance. But our examination of its various provisions and of their legal import has led us to accept the conclusion of courts below, that the scheme embodied in the application, notes, and mortgage was merely a colorable device to cover usury. The supreme court of Minnesota has more than once had occasion to consider this very question. In the case of Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Trust Co. v. McLachlan, 59 Minn. 468, that court said:

Undoubtedly the general rule is that courts of equity have a discretion on this subject, and have prescribed the terms on which their powers can be brought into ac tivity. They will give no relief to the borrower if the contract be executory, except on the condition that he pay to the lender the money lent with legal interest. Nor, if the contract be executed, will they enable him to recover any more than the excess he has paid over the legal interest. Tiffany v. Boatman's Sav. Inst. 18 Wall. 375 [22: 868].

But what, in such a case, is held to be the law by the courts of the state of Minnesota! Under the statutory provision already cited, that whenever it satisfactorily appears to a court that any bond, bill, note, assurance, pledge, conveyance, security or evidence of debt has been taken or received in violation of the provisions of this act the court shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any proceeding thereon, and shall order the same to be canceled and given up, the supreme court of Minnesota has repeatedly held that a plaintiff suing to cancel a Minnesota contract for usury need not offer to repay the money loaned. Scott v. Austin, 36 Minn. 460; Exley v. Berryhill, 37 Minn. 182; Mathews v. Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Trust Co. [69 Minn. 318] 72 N. W. 121.

*Under statutes providing that, in cases of[358] usury, the borrower is entitled to relief without being required to pay any part of the usurious debt or interest as a condition thereof, it has been held by the courts of New York and of Arkansas that courts of equity are constrained by the statutes, and must grant the relief provided for therein without applying the general rule that a bill or other proceeding in equity, to set aside or affect a usurious contract, cannot be maintained without paying or offering to pay the amount actually owed. Williams v. Fitzhugh, 37 N. Y. 444; Lowe v. Loomis, 53 Ark. 454.

"The peculiar and unusual provisions of this contract themselves constitute intrinsic evidence sufficient to justify the finding of the existence of every essential element of usury, viz., that there was a loan; that the money was to be returned at all events, and that more than lawful interest was stipulated to be paid for the use of it. The only one of these which could be seriously claimed to be lacking was that the money was not to But it is strenuously argued, and of that be paid back at all events, but only upon a opinion was Circuit Judge Sanborn in the [357 contingency, to wit, the continuance of the present case, that Federal courts, in the exlife of McLachlan; but the facts warrant the ercise of their equity jurisdiction, do not reinference that this contingency was not bona ceive any modification from the legislation fide, but was itself a mere contrivance to of the states or the practice of their courts cover usury. The mere fact that the contract having similar powers, and that consequenthas the form of a contingency will not ex-ly no act of the legislature of Minnesota empt it from the scrutiny of the court, which could deprive the Federal courts sitting in is bound to exercise its judgment in deter-equity of the power or relieve them of the

duty to enforce and apply the established | mortgagor twelve months to redeem, after a principle of equity jurisprudence to this sale under a decree of foreclosure, and to case, that he who seeks equity must do his creditor three months after that, conequity, and to require the appellees to pay ferred a substantial right; and it was so to the appellant what they justly owe for held, and that such right of redemption aft principal and lawful interest as a condition er sale was as obligatory on the Federal of granting the relief they ask. courts sitting in equity as on the state[360] courts; and that their rules of practice must be made to conform to the law of the state so far as may be necessary to give full effect to the right. The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice Miller, who said:

We think it a satisfactory reply to such a proposition that the complainants in the present case were not seeking equity, but to avail themselves of a substantive right under the statutory law of the state. It seems to be conceded, or, if not conceded, it is plainly evident, that if the cause had remained in the state court where it was originally brought, the complainant would have been entitled, under the public policy of the state of Minnesota, manifested by its statutes as construed by its courts, to have this usurious contract canceled and surrendered without tendering payment of the whole or any part of the original indebtedness. The defendant company could not, by removing the case to the Federal court, on the ground that it was a citizen of another state, deprive the complainants of such a substantive [359]right. With the policy of the state legislation the Federal courts have nothing to do. If the states, whether New York, Arkansas, Minnesota, or others, think that the evils of usury are best prevented by making usurious contracts void, and by giving a right to the borrowers to have such contracts unconditionally nullified and canceled by the courts, such a view of public policy, in respect to contracts made within the state and sought to be enforced therein, is obligatory on the Federal courts, whether acting in equity or at law. The local law, consisting of the applicable statutes as construed by the supreme court of the state, furnishes the rule of decision.

In Clark et al. v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 [10: 123], it was said that "when the legislature declares certain instruments illegal and void, there is inherent in the courts of equity a jurisdiction to order them to be delivered up, and thereby give effect to the policy of the legislature; that the state legislatures have, certainly, no authority to prescribe the forms or modes of proceeding in the courts of the United States; but having created a right, and at the same time prescribed a remedy to enforce it, if the remedy prescribed is substantially consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding on the chancery side of the Federal courts, no reason exists why it should not be pursued in the same form as in the state courts; and that the undoubted truth is that when investigating and decreeing on titles in this country the court must deal with them in practice as it finds them, and accommodate the modes of proceeding to the nature of the case, and to the character of the equities involved in the controversy, so as to give effect to state legislation and state policy; not departing, however, from what legitimately belongs to the practice of a court of chancery."

The question in Brine v. Hartford F. Insurance Co. 96 U. S. 627 [24: 858], was whether a state statute which allowed to the

"It is denied that these statutes of Illinois (giving the right to redeem) are of any force in cases where the decree of foreclosure is rendered in a court of the United States, on the ground that the equity practice of these courts is governed solely by the precedents of the English chancery court as they existed prior to the Declaration of Independence, and by such rules of practice as have been established by the Supreme Court of the United States, or adopted by the circuit courts for their own guidance. And treating all the proceedings subsequent to a decree which are necessary for its enforcement as matter of practice, and as belonging solely to the course of procedure in courts of equity, it is said that not only do the manner of conducting the sale under a decree of foreclosure, and all the incidents of such a sale, come within the rules of practice of the court, but that the effects of such a sale on the rights acquired by the purchaser and those of the mortgagor and his subsequent grantees are also mere matters of practice to be regulated by the rules of the court, as found in the sources we have mentioned.

"On the other hand, it is said that the effect of the sale and conveyance made by the commissioner is to transfer the title of real estate from one person to another, and that all the means by which the title to real property is transferred, whether by deed, by will, or by judicial proceedings, are subject to, and may be governed by, the legislative will of the state in which it lies, except where the law of the state on that subject impairs the obligation of a contract. And that all the laws of a state existing at the time a mortgage or any other contract is made, which affect the rights of the parties to the contract, enter into and become a part of it, and are obligatory on all courts which assume to give remedy on such contracts.

"We are of opinion that the propositions last mentioned are sound; and if they are in[361] conflict with the general doctrine of the exemption from state control of the chancery practice of the Federal courts, as regards mere modes of procedure, they are of paramount force, and the latter must to that extent give way. It would seem that no argument is necessary to establish the proposition that where substantial rights, resting upon a statute which is clearly within the legislative power, come in conflict with mere forms and modes of procedure in the courts, the latter must give way, and adapt themselves to the forms necessary to give effect to such rights. The flexibility of chancery methods, by which it molds its decrees so as to give