THE DECISIONS OF THE Supreme Court of the United States AT OCTOBER TERM, 1898. [Authenticated copy of opinion record strictly followed, except as to such reference words and figures as are inclosed in brackets.] V. FRANK H. PIERCE, Petitioner, TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & RAILROAD COMPANY. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 1-17.) Settlement of railroad company_with_employee for injuries—contract for perma nent employment—damages for its breach. 1. When a railroad company promised to pay one of its employees, who had been injured by its cars, certain wages and to furnish him with certain supplies so long as his disability to do full work continued by reason of his injury, in settlement of his claim for such injury; and in consideration of these promises the employee agreed to do for the company such work as he was able to do and to release the company from all liability for damages for such injuries, which caused his disabilIty, the company cannot at its own will and pleasure cease to perform its obligations which were the consideration of the release. 2. Such contract is sufficiently definite as to time, and binds the railroad company to its performance so long as the employee shall be disabled by reason of such injuries, which, if he is permanently disabled, will be for life. 8. Where the railroad company after a time abandoned the contract and discharged the employee without cause, the latter may maintain an action, once for all, as for a total breach of the entire contract, and may recover all he would have received in the future, as well as in the past, if the contract had been kept, deducting any sum he might have earned in the past or might earn in the future, and any loss the company had sustained by loss of his services without its fault. [No. 174.] Northern District of Alabama in favor of Frank H. Pierce, the plaintiff, for the sum of $5,893. The plaintiff sued in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, which court sustained a demurrer to his complaint, but upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama the judgment was reversed and the case remanded to the County Court, and upon motion of the defendant the case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Northern District of Alabama. Judg. ment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Circuit Court of the United States re versed, and the case remanded to said Cir cuit Court for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of this court. See same case below, 110 Ala. 533, 52 U. S. App. 355, 365. Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: This was an action brought January 22, 1892, in the circuit court of Jefferson coun ty in the state of Alabama, by Frank H Pierce, a citizen of the state of Alabama, against the Tennessee Coal, Iron, & Railroad Company, a corporation of the state of Tennessee, doing business in the state of Ala bama, upon a written contract, signed by the parties, and in the following terms: Pratt Mines, Ala., 4th June, 1890. Whereas I. F. H. Pierce, while in the em ploy of the Tennessee Iron, Coal & Railroad Company, Pratt Mines Division, as a ma chinist, was seriously hurt by a trip of tram cars on the main slope of the mine known as Slope No. 2, and operated by the Tennesse Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, under cir cumstances which I claim render the said company liable to me for damages; but Argued and Submitted January 19, 20, 1899. whereas they disclaim any liability for said Appeals cuit to review a judgment of that court re versing a judgment of the United States Circuit Court for the Southern Division of the accident or the injuries to me resulting from same; and both parties being desirous of settling and compromising said matter; and Railroad Company did make me a proposi tion on the day of November, 1888 said accident having occurred on the 21st 591 day of May, 1888, that they would furnish | in the sum of $50,000, for the defendant's me such supplies from the commissary at breach and abandonment of the contract. No. 2 prison, as I might choose to take, pay The defendant demurred to the complaint, me regular wages while I was disabled, and upon the ground that the contract set out give me my coal and wood for fuel at my therein was one of hiring, terminable at the dwelling, and the benefit of the convict gar will of either party, and not one of hiring den at No. 2; and whereas said proposition for life, as alleged in the complaint; and was accepted by me, and carried out by the that it appeared from the obligations of the said company; and whereas in May, 1889, complaint, that the defendant, in terminatafter I had resumed work, a further proposi- ing the contract of hiring, had only exertion was made to me to give me work, such cised its legal right under the contract. The as I could do, paying me therefor the wages court sustained the demurrer, and the plainpaid me before said accident, that is, $60 tiff declining to amend his complaint, renper month, and in addition free house rent dered judgment for the defendant; and the for in lieu of house rent a certain amount of plaintiff on February 21, 1894, appealed supplies from the convict commissary at No. from that judgment to the supreme court of 2 prison, which supplies were to amount to Alabama. about the sum paid by me for house rent]; The record transmitted to this court does and whereas said agreement has been faith- not show any further proceedings in the sufully kept by both parties; and whereas on preme court of Alabama. But the official the 4th day of June, 1890, it is mutually reports of its decisions show that at Novemagreed between myself and the said company ber term, 1895, it reversed that judgment, that it will be better to give me the house and remanded the case to the county court. rent than the supplies of about equal amount Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. 110 from the commissary; now therefore it is Ala. 533. And the record before this court agreed, in view of the above propositions, necessarily implies that fact, by setting forth which have been faithfully carried out, that that in March, 1896, on motion of the demy wages from this date are to be $65 a fendant, suggesting that from prejudice and month, and in addition I am to have, free of local influence it would not be able to obtain charge, my coal and wood necessary for my justice in the state courts, the case was rehousehold use at my dwelling, and the same moved from the county court into the cirbenefit from the garden as is had by others cuit court of the United States for the southwho are allowed the garden privilege; andern division of the northern district of AlaI on my part agree and bind myself to release the said company from any and all liability for said accident, or from the injuries resulting to me from it or from the effects of it, and agree that this is to be a full and satisfactory settlement of any and all claims which might have against said company. bama; and a motion to remand the case to the state court was made by the plaintiff (on what ground did not appear in the record) and was overruled. In the circuit court of the United States, on January 4, 1897, the following proceedings took place: The demurrer to the complaint was renewed by the defendant, and overruled by the court. The plaintiff then The complaint set out the contract, except amended his complaint by inserting, in the the clause above printed in brackets; and copy of the contract set forth therein, the alleged that by this contract the defendant words above printed in brackets; and a debecame liable to pay the plaintiff monthly murrer to the amended complaint was filed during his life the wages therein stipulated, and overruled. In answer to this complaint and to furnish him with coal and wood and the defendant filed two pleas: 1st. A denial allow him the privilege of the garden, as of each and every allegation of the comtherein agreed; that the plaintiff had always plaint; 2d. "The defendant, *for further an- [5] been ready and offered to do for the defend-swer to the complaint, says that the plainant such work given to him as he was able tiff, under and by the terms of the contract to do, and had labored at the same for such set out in the complaint, contracted to perreasonable time as he was able to work and form for the defendant during the term bound to work under this contract; that by thereof such service as he was able to perthe injuries received by him from the acci- form, in consideration for the promises made dent mentioned therein he was permanently by defendant therein; and the defendant disabled in the use of his legs and hands, avers that the plaintiff thereafter became and otherwise so injured as to be incapaci- able to perform service for the defendant, tated to do more work than he had done and and did in fact perform such service for some had offered to do; but that the defendant, time thereafter, and that, while engaged in without any reasonable ground for so doing, the performance of such service, the plainabandoned the contract and refused to carry tiff voluntarily and without excuse therefor it out, claiming that the defendant was un- refused to further perform such service as der no obligation to pay to the plaintiff the he was able to perform, and was in fact perwages therein stipulated longer than suited forming for the defendant, as required by its pleasure; and had wholly and purposely said contract, and the defendant thereupon disregarded and refused to abide by the ob- discharged the plaintiff from its service; and [4]ligations of the contract for the period of the defendant avers that the plaintiff failed six months next before the commencement of to comply with the conditions imposed upon the suit, and had entirely abandoned the him by said contract." The plaintiff joined contract and discharged the plaintiff from issue on the first plea; and demurred to the its service. The plaintiff claimed damages, second plea, upon the ground that it did not go to the whole consideration of the contract, and was no answer to the entire action; and the court sustained his demurrer. The defendant, for further answer, and by way of recoupment, pleaded that on May 3, 1891, the plaintiff, voluntarily and without excuse, refused to perform such labor as he was able to perform and was in fact performing for the defendant, as required by the contract; and since that time had continued to refuse to perform and had not in fact performed such service, or any part thereof; to the damage of the defendant in the sum of $50,000. A bill of exceptions, tendered by the plaintiff and allowed by the court, showed that at the trial before the jury the following proceedings were had: a writ of error from the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit. That court was of opinion that the contract sued on was for "an employment by the month, and, therefore, like every other such employment, subject to be discontinued, at the will of either party, at the expiration of any month, or at any time for adequate cause; and consequently that there was error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint; [7] and upon that ground, without passing upon any other question in the case, reversed the judgment of the circuit court of the United States, and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings, Judge Pardee dissenting. 52 U. S. App. 355, 365. The plaintiff thereupon applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari from this court. 168 U. S. 709. Mr. W. A. Gunter, for the petitioner: On the total renunciation of a contract by party thereto, the person against whom it is renounced, if in other respects entitled to damages, is entitled to recover full and final damages in one action. The plaintiff introduced and read in evidence the contract sued on, and introduced evidence tending to prove the allegations of the complaint. He also offered evidence that, at the time of his discharge by the de-a fendant from its employment in May, 1891, he was fifty-five years of age, and that he was then and had since been in good health, and addicted to no habits of drinking or otherwise, affecting his health and expectancy of life; and introduced the American [6] tables of mortality used by insurance companies, showing his expectancy of life at the time of his discharge, and at the time of the trial. But the court ruled that no recovery could be allowed on the contract, beyond the instalments of wages due and in default up to the date of the trial; and, upon the defendant's motion, excluded all evidence of the plaintiff's age, health, and expectancy of life, "on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant, and because damages for the expectancy of life was a matter too vague and uncertain to be allowed." The plaintiff duly excepted to the ruling and to the exclusion of evidence; and, to present the same point, asked the court to give, and duly excepted to its refusal to give, the following instruction to the jury: "If the defendant, after making the contract sued on and before the suit, refused further to pay the plaintiff and to furnish the articles stipulated to be furnished, and refused to employ the plaintiff, and discharged him, the plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit of his contract, which is the present value of the money agreed to be paid and the articles to be furnished under the contract for the period of his life, if his disability is permanent, less such sum as the jury may find the plaintiff may be able to earn in the future, and may have been able heretofore to earn, and less such loss as the defendant may have sustained from the loss of the plaintiff's service without the defendant's fault." The defendant also tendered and was al-1 lowed a bill of exceptions, presenting substantially, though in different form, the questions involved in the plaintiff's case, and the contents of which therefore need not be particularly stated. Schell v. Plumb, 55 N. Y. 592; Howard College v. Turner, 71 Ala. 434; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 30 L. ed. 257; Shover v. Myrick, 4 Ind. App. 7; Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109; Kentucky & I. Cement Co. v. Cleveland, 4 Ind. App. 171. The usual measure of damages upon a breach of a contract is "the amount that would have been received if the contract had been kept." Benjamin v. Hilliard, 23 How. 149, 16 L. ed. 518. The standard life and annuity tables, showing at any age the probable duration of life and the present value of a life annuity, are competent evidence. Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 30 L. ed. 257; The D. S. Gregory, 2 Ben. 226, Fed. Cas. No. 4.100; Foster v. Hilliard, 1 Story, 77, Fed. Cas. No. 4,972; Cooke v. Cook, 110 Ala. 567; Sauter v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 66 N. Y. 50, 23 Am. Rep. 18; Parker v. Russell, 133 Mass. 74; Amos v. Oakley, 131 Mass. 413; Remelee v. Hall, 31 Vt. 582, 76 Am. Dec. 140; Mullaly v. Austin, 97 Mass. 30; People v. Security L. Ins. & Annuity Co. 78 N. Y. 128, 34 Am. Rep. 522. Messrs. Walker Percy and William I. Grubb, for respondent: The contract sued on was for an indefinite time, and terminable at the will of either party thereto. Franklin Min. Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115; Parsons on Contracts, 519; Howard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 91 Ala. 270; Clark v. Ryan, 95 Ala. 409; De Briar v. Minturn, Cal. 450; Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co. 106 Mass. 56. The wrongful quitting of the work imposed upon plaintiff by the terms of the contract sued on would justify the defendant in refusing to proceed with the contract, and in deThe jury returned a verdict for the plain-clining further to pay the compensation protiff in the sum of $5,893, upon which judg-vided for in it. The facts as to plaintiff's ment was rendered. Each party sued out quitting work were such as to make it a ques 173 U. S. 38 U. S.. Book 43. 593 |