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U. S. 484 [23: 579]; Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 [23: 583]; Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 92 U. S. 637 [23: 748]; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 [25: 830]; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278 [26: 138]; Northern Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608 [28: 258]." After referring to what was said in Town of Coloma v. Eaves and Buchanan v. Litchfield, the court thus concludes its opinion: "We think this case comes fairly within the principles of those just cited; and that it is not governed by Dixon County v. Field and Lake County v. Graham, but is distinguishable from them in the essential particulars above noted."

It is contended that the present case is controlled by Sutliff v. Lake County Commissioners, 147 U. S. 230, 235, 237-8 [37: 145, 149], rather than by Chaffee County v. Potter. The action in the Sutliff Case was upon coupons of bonds issued by a county of Colorado, each bond reciting that it was issued under and by virtue of and in compliance with the act of Assembly entitled "An Act Concerning Counties, County Officers, and County Government, and Repealing Laws on These Subjects," approved March 24th, 1877, and it was certified in each bond that "all the provisions of said act have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond." It was a vital fact in that case that there was no recital in the bonds that the indebtedness thus created was not in excess of the constitutional limit. Still, the defense was that the bonds in fact increased the indebtedness of the county to an amount in excess of the limit prescribed by the State Constitution, and therefore were illegal and void. The court, upon the facts certified and in the light of previous decisions, held it to be clear that "the plaintiff, although a purchaser for value and before maturity of the bonds, was charged with the [272]duty *of examining the records of indebtedness provided for in the statute of Colorado, in order to ascertain whether the bonds increased the indebtedness of the county beyond the constitutional limit; and that the recitals in the bonds did not estop the county to prove by the records of the assessment and the indebtedness that the bonds were issued in violation of the Constitution. "In those cases," it continued, "in which this court has held a municipal corporation to be estopped by recitals in its bonds to assert that they were issued in excess of the limit imposed by the Constitution or statutes of the state, the statutes, as construed by the court, left it to the officers issuing the bonds to determine whether the facts existed which constituted the statutory or constitutional condition precedent, and did not require those facts to be made a matter of public record. Marcy v. Oswego Twp. 92 U. S. 637 [23: 748]; Humboldt Twp. v. Long, 92 U. S. 642 [23: 752]; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 [28: 360]; Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 682 [32: 1065, 1068]; Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355, 363 [35: 1040, 1043]. But if the statute expressly requires those facts to be made a matter of public record, open to the inspection of everyone, there can be no implication that

it was intended to leave that matter to be determined and concluded, contrary to the facts so recorded, by the officers charged with the duty of issuing the bonds." After referring to Dixon County v. Field, above cited, the court proceeded to show the precise grounds upon which the decisions in Lake County v. Graham and Chaffee County v. Potter were rested: "That decision [Dixon County v. Field] and the ground upon which it rests were approved and affirmed in Lake County v. Graham and Chaffee County v. Potter, above cited, each of which arose under the article of the Constitution of Colorado now in question, but under a different statute, which did not require the amount of indebtedness of the county to be stated on its records. In Lake County v. Graham each bond showed on its face the whole amount of bonds issued, and the recorded valuation of property showed that amount to be in excess of the constitutional limit; and for this reason, as well as because the bonds contained no recital upon that point, the county was held not to be estopped to[278] plead that limit. 130 U. S. 682, 683 [32: 1068]. In Chaffee County v. Potter, on the other hand, the bonds contained an express recital that the total amount of the issue did not exceed the constitutional limit, and did not show on their face the amount of the issue, and the county records showed only the valuation of property, so that, as observed by Mr. Justice Lamar in delivering judgment: "The purchaser might even know, indeed it may be admitted that he would be required to know, the assessed valuation of the taxable property of the county, and yet he could not ascertain by reference to one of the bonds and the assessment roll whether the county had exceeded its power, under the Constitution, in the premises.' 142 U. S. 363 [35: 1043]. The case at bar does not fall within Chaffee County v. Potter, and cannot be distinguished in principle from Dixon County v. Field or from Lake County v. Graham. The only difference worthy of notice is that in each of these cases the single fact required to be shown by the public record was the valuation of the property of the county, whereas here two facts are to be so shown, the valuation of the property, and the amount of the county debt. But, as both these facts are equally required by the statute to be entered on the public records of the county, they are both facts of which all the world is bound to take notice, and as to which, therefore, the county cannot be concluded by any recitals in the bonds."

It thus appears that in the Sutliff Case the court neither modified nor intended to modify, but distinctly recognized, the principle announced in Chaffee County v. Potter, namely, that the recital in the bonds that the debt thereby created did not exceed the limit prescribed by the Constitution estopped the county from asserting, as against a bona fide holder for value, that the contrary was the fact.

We have made this extended reference to adjudged cases because of the wide difference among learned counsel as to the effect

*

The remaining five bonds owned by the plaintiff corporation were also purchased from Stanley, who received them directly from the county in exchange for warrants that he owned and held. There is no reason why upon the surrender of county warrants for county bonds he was not entitled to the benefit of the rule above declared as to the conclusiveness of the recital in the bonds, or why he may not be regarded as much an innocent holder of the bonds exchanged for county warrants as of the other bonds purchased by him in open market. There is no proof that at the time of such exchange he had or was chargeable with knowledge or notice that the debt created by the bonds exceeded the constitutional limit; consequently, in taking the bonds in exchange he was entitled, for the reasons heretofore given, to rely upon the truth of the recitals contained in them. When the board of county com

of our former decisions. This course has also been pursued in order to bring out clearly the fact that the present case is controlled by the judgment in Chaffee County v. Potter. The views of the circuit court, as expressed [274]in its charge in this case and as enforced by its peremptory instruction to find for the defendant, cannot be approved without overruling that case. It was expressly decided in the Chaffee county case that the statute under which the bonds there in suit (the bonds here in suit being of the same class) authorized the county commissioners to determine whether the proposed issue of bonds would in fact exceed the limit prescribed by the Constitution and the statute; and that the recital in the bond to the effect that such determination had been made and that the constitutional limitation had not been exceeded, taken in connection with the fact that the bonds themselves did not show such recital to be untrue, estopped the county, un-missioners, proceeding under the act of 1881, der the law, from saying that the recital was not true. We decline to overrule Chaffee County v. Potter, and upon the authority of that case, and without re-examining or enlarging upon the grounds upon which the decision therein proceeded, we adjudge that as against the plaintiff the county of Gunnison is estopped to question the recital in the bonds in question, to the effect that they did not create a debt in excess of the constitutional limit, and were issued by virtue of and in conformity with the statute of 1881, and in full compliance with the requirements of law.

We have assumed thus far that the plaintiff corporation was a bona fide purchaser or holder of the bonds to which the coupons in suit were attached. Upon this question we concur in the views expressed by the circuit court of appeals. Speaking by Judge Thayer, that court said: "The testimony contained in the present record shows, we think, without contradiction, that the plaintiff was a bona fide holder when the suit was brought of at least five of the bonds which are involved in the present controversy, because it holds the title of Joseph Stanley, who was himself an innocent purchaser of said bonds before maturity, for the price of ninetyeight cents on the dollar. The rights which Stanley acquired by virtue of such purchase inure to the plaintiff, by virtue of its purchase of the bonds from Stanley in June, 1892, and this without reference to any knowledge which the plaintiff may have had at the latter date affecting the validity of [275]the securities. *A bona fide holder of commercial paper is entitled to transfer to a third party all the rights with which he is vested, and the title so acquired by his indorsee cannot be affected by proof that the indorsee was acquainted with the defenses existing against the paper. Commissioners of Marion County v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278, 286 [24: 59, 62]; Hill v. Scotland County, 34 Fed. Rep. 208; Dan. Neg. Inst. 4th ed.) § 803, and cases there cited." 49 U. S. App.

399, 413.

698

offered to exchange county bonds for the warrants held by him, he was entitled under the circumstances disclosed to assume it to be true, as recited in the bonds, that the constitutional limit was not being exceeded.

It is insisted with much earnestness that the principles we have announced render it impossible for a state by a constitutional provision to guard against excessive municipal indebtedness. By no means. If a state Constitution, in fixing a limit for indebtedness of that character, should prescribe a definite rule or test for determining whether that limit has already been exceeded, or is being exceeded by any particular issue of bonds, all who purchase such bends would do so subject to that rule or test, whatever might be the hardship in the case of those who purchased them in the open market *in[276] good faith. Indeed, it is entirely competent for a state to provide by statute that all obligations, in whatever form executed by a municipality existing under its laws, shall be subject to any defense that would be allowed in cases of non-negotiable instruments. But for reasons that everyone understands no such statutes have been passed. Municipal obligations executed under such a statute could not be readily disposed of to those who invest in such securities.

It follows that the circuit court erred in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.

What has been said renders it unnecessary to consider various questions arising upon exceptions to specific rulings in the circuit court as to the admission and exclusion of evidence, and as to those parts of the charge to which objections were made. Those rulings were inconsistent with the principles herein announced.

As neither the circuit court nor the circuit court of appeals proceeded in accordance with the principles herein announced, the judgment of each court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

173 U. S.

STATE OF OHIO, Appt.,

v.

J. B. THOMAS.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 276-285.)

Governor of soldiers' home not subject to state law as to use of oleomargarine.

A governor of a soldiers' home which is under the sole jurisdiction of Congress is not subject to the state law concerning the use of to the inmates of the home as part of the rations furnished for them under appropria

oleomargarine, when he furnishes that article

tions made by Congress therefor.

[No. 353.]

"3. Said eating house is used by said J.
B. Thomas for serving and furnishing to the
inmates of said Central Branch of the Na-
tional Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers
their daily *food or rations, and is the only[278]
place so provided at said National Home, and
is known as the mess room of the said Cen-
tral Branch of the National Home for Dis-
abled Volunteer Soldiers, situate on the
grounds purchased, held and used by the
United States therefor, and the acts com-
plained of herein consisted in causing oleo-
margarine to be served and furnished, on the
2d day of March, 1897, as food and as part of
the rations furnished to the inmates thereof,
under appropriations made by the Congress
of the United States for the support of said
inmates; and that no placard in size not less

Argued and Submitted January 10, 1899. than 10 x 14 inches, having printed thereon
Decided February 27, 1899.

A

PPEAL from an order of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirming the order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, discharging the appellee, J. B. Thomas, governor of the soldiers' home in the county of Montgomery, Ohio, from the custody of a constable under a mittimus from the justice of the peace before whom he was tried and by whom he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to be imprisoned until such fine was paid, for a violation of the Ohio act of 1895 (92 Ohio State Laws, 23) in relation to the use of oleomargarine. Affirmed.

See same case below, 82 Fed. Rep. 304, and 58 U. S. App. 431, 87 Fed. Rep. 453.

Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: 77] In this case complaint was made by affidavit by the dairy commissioner of Ohio against the appellee, alleging that on March 2, 1897, he violated the act of the legislature of the state of Ohio, passed in 1895 (92 Ohio State Laws, 23), in relation to the use of oleomargarine. Appellee was arrested and brought before a justice of the peace, and declined to plead to the charge on the ground that the act complained of in the affidavit of the complainant was performed by him as governor of the soldiers' home, located in the county of Montgomery and state of Ohio, and what he did was done by the authority of the board of managers of the home. He therefore moved to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction in the magistrate. This motion was denied. He then consented to be tried without a jury upon the following agreed statement of facts:

"1. That on the 2d day of March, 1897, Joseph E. Blackburn was and now is the food and dairy commissioner of the state of

Ohio.

"2. That on the 2d day of March, 1897, J. B. Thomas was and now is the duly chosen and acting governor of the Central Branch of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, located in the county of Montgomery, state of Ohio, and as said governor was in charge of the eating house at the said Central Branch of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.

in black letters not less in size than 1% inches square, the words 'oleomargarine sold and used here,' was displayed in said eating house.

"4. The affidavit in the cause is made in conformity with an act of the general assembly of the state of Ohio (Ohio Laws, vol. 92, page 23), passed in 1895, and entitled 'An Act to Amend Section 3 of an Act Entitled "An Act to Prevent Fraud and Deception in the Manufacture and Sale of Oleomargarine and Promote Public Health in the State of Ohio," passed May 16, 1894."

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Section 3 of the act, as so amended, reads as follows:

"Sec. 3. Every proprietor, keeper, manager, or person in charge of any hotel, boat, railroad car, boarding house, restaurant, eating house, lunch counter, or lunch room, who therein sells, uses, serves, furnishes, or disposes of or uses in cooking, any oleomargarine, shall display and keep a white placard in a conspicuous place, where the same may be easily seen and read, in the dining room, eating house, restaurant, lunch room, or place where such substance is furnished, served, sold, or disposed of, which placard shall be in size not less than ten by fourteen inches, upon which shall be printed in black letters, not less in size than one and a half inches square, the words 'oleomargarine sold and used here,' and said card shall not contain any other words than the ones above described; and such proprietor, keeper, manager, or person in charge shall not sell, serve, or dispose of such substance as or for but ter, when butter is asked for or purported to be furnished or served."

In addition to the above statement, reference was made to *the following acts of Con [279] gress providing for the creation and government of the National Homes for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, viz.: Act of March 3, 1865, chap. 91 (13 Stat. at L. 509); act of March 21, 1866, chap. 21 (14 Stat. at L. 10); act of March 3, 1875, chap. 129 (18 Stat. at L. 343, at 359). By the last-cited statute, on page 359, it is made the duty of the managers of the home, on or before the first day of August in each year, "to furnish to the Secretary of War estimates, in detail, for the support of said home for the fiscal year commencing on the first day of July there after; and the Secretary of War shall an

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nually include such estimates in his esti- | diers, incorporated under said act, in and
mates for his department. And no moneys over said territory."
shall, after the first day of April, 1875, be
drawn from the Treasury for the use of said
home, except in pursuance of quarterly es-
timates, and upon quarterly requisitions by
the managers thereof upon the Secretary of
War, based upon such quarterly estimates,
for the support of said home, for not more
than three months next succeeding such
requisition.
And the managers of
said home shall, at the commencement of
each quarter of the year, render the Secre-
tary of War an account of all their receipts
and expenditures for the quarter immediate-
ly preceding, with vouchers for such expen-
ditures; and all such accounts and vouchers
shall be authenticated by the officers of said
home thereunto duly appointed by said man-
agers, and audited and allowed as required
by law for the general appropriations and
expenditures of the War Department."

By the act (chapter 902) approved August 4, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 222, at 251), it was also provided that "hereafter the estimates for the support of the Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers shall be submitted by items." Also by the act (chapter 1069) approved October 2, 1888 (25 Stat. at L. 505, at 543), it was "Provided further, That it shall be the duty of the managers of said home, on or before the first day of October in each year to furnish to the Secretary of War estimates, in detail, for the support of said home for the fiscal year commencing on the first day of July thereafter, and the Secretary of War shall annually include such estimates in his estimates for his department." Also by the act (chapter 420) approved June 11, 1896 [280] (29 Stat. at L. 413, at 445), an appropriation was made for the support of the home at Dayton, Ohio, and for "the cost of all articles purchased for the regular ration, their freight, preparation, and serving."

The material portions of the acts of March 3, 1865, and March 21, 1866, have been enacted in the Revised Statutes of the United States, being sections 4825 to 4837, both inclusive.

On the third of April, 1867, the legislature of the state of Ohio passed an act ceding jurisdiction to the United States over the lands and their appurtenances within the state of Ohio, which might be acquired by donation or purchase by the managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers within the state of Ohio, for the uses and purposes of the asylum.

By the act, chapter 24, approved January 21, 1871 (16 Stat. at L. 399), Congress ceded back to the state of Ohio jurisdiction over the place named, and relinquished such jurisdiction on the part of the United States, and the act contained the following: "And the United States shall claim or exercise no jurisdiction over said place after the passage of this act: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to impair the powers and rights heretofore conferred upon the board of managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Sol

Upon these facts the appellee was convicted by the magistrate before whom he was tried, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and to be imprisoned until such fine was paid. He refused to pay the fine, and applied to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, western division, for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the state tribunal before which he was tried had no jurisdiction to try him. The writ was granted and the constable made return thereto, setting up that he held appellee under the mittimus from the justice of the peace before whom he was tried. Upon the hearing the court made an order discharging appellee. 82 Fed. Rep. 304. The state appealed from that order to the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit, where it was af-[281) firmed (58 U. S. App. 431, 87 Fed. Rep. 453), and the state then appealed to this court.

Messrs. Charles H. Bosler and Otto J. Renner for appellant.

Messrs. Judson Harmon and D. W. Bowman for appellee.

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the[281] facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The act of the legislature of the state of Ohio, passed May 16, 1868, ceaing jurisdic tion to the United States, if it had remained in force would have prevented the state of ficials from taking jurisdiction in this case. Congress, however, by the act of January 21, 1871, ceded back and relinquished the jurisdiction that had been granted, and provided that it would claim or exercise no jurisdicti n thereafter, except as therein mentioned.

If we assume, what the state court decided, that the provisions of the state statute relating to the sale of oleomargarine were intended to apply to and cover the soldiers' home, the question then arises whether the state had the power to legislate so as to control the governor of the home, acting under the direction of the board of managers and by the authority of Congress, in regard to the internal administration of the affairs of the home, and in respect to the conditions upon which an article of food might be provided by the governor under such directions and authority.

The home is a Federal creation, and is under the direct and sole jurisdiction of Congress. The board of managers have certain powers granted them (Rev. Stat. § 4825), and among other things to make by-laws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with law for carrying on the business and government of the home.

home are "officers and soldiers who served
The persons entitled to the benefits of the
in the late war for the suppression of the
rebellion," and also other soldiers and sail-
ors. The inmates are subject to the rules[282]
and articles of war, the same as if they were
in the army. Rev. Stat. §§ 4832, 4835.

Under the statutes above cited, in which it is provided that the board of managers shall furnish to the Secretary of War, in each year,

1898.

OHIO V. THOMAS.

estimates, in detail, for the support of the home for the succeeding fiscal year, it would naturally be the duty of the governor of each home, in order to enable the board of managers to perform their own duty, to report to the board the same kind of detailed estimates that the board is by law directed to report to the Secretary of War, and which are to be included by the Secretary in the estimates for his department. At all events, the duty is laid upon the board of managers, by the very terms of the statute, to make these estimates in detail. It is admitted in the record that the oleomargarine complained about herein was served and furnished by the appellee as food and as part of the rations furnished the inmates under the appropriations made by Congress for the support of such inmates.

land, in opposition to the language of the act
of Congress ceding back the jurisdiction the
United States received from the state. The
government is but claiming that its own_of-
ficers, when discharging duties under Feder-
al authority pursuant to and by virtue of
valid Federal laws, are not subject to arrest
or other liability under the laws of the state
in which their duties are performed.

The claim is made that neither the board
of managers nor the governor of the home
can, through their officers or by himself, vio-
late the statute law of a state having ju-
risdiction, when the acts constituting the
infringement are not necessary for the gov-
ernment and management of the home for
the purposes for which it was incorporated,
or authorized by any act of the United
States.

Under the facts herein the state court had no jurisdiction to try the appellee for the offense charged in the written complaint made to the magistrate. See authorities cited in Re Waite, 81 Fed. Rep. 359.

This claim might be conceded and still the From these facts the inference is plain that oleomargarine had been included in the conviction of the appellee would be invalid, detailed estimates for rations to be furnished because we find in this record the authority the inmates, and that the appropriation for of the United States for the act of the govThe statutes above referred to, when rations included oleomargarine as part there- ernor. of. Otherwise we should have to infer a taken in connection with the admitted facts, dereliction of duty on the part of the board of show an appropriation by Congress for the [284| managers in not making out estimates in de- purchase of oleomargarine as part of the regular rations of the inmates of the home. The tail, and we should adopt an inference contrary to the admission, which states that the act of the governor in serving it was authoroleomargarine was furnished as food underized by Congress, and it was therefore legal, an appropriation of Congress. The appropria- any act of the state to the contrary notwithtion does not precede the detailed estimates, standing. but is made subsequently and is presumably enacted with reference thereto. Congress has therefore in effect provided oleomargarine as part of the rations for the inmates of the home. It is given them in the mess room of the institution and under the rules and regulations for feeding them there. In making provision for so feeding the inmates, the governor, under the direction of the board of managers and with the assent and approval of Congress, is engaged in the internal administration of a Federal institution, and we think a state legislature has no constitutional power to interfere with such management as is provided by Congress. [283] *Whatever jurisdiction the state may have over the place or ground where the institution is located, it can have none to interfere with the provision made by Congress for furnishing food to the inmates of the home, nor has it power to prohibit or regulate the furnishing of any article of food which is approved by the officers of the home, by the board of managers, and by Congress. Under such circumstances the police power of the state has no application.

We mean by this statement to say that Federal officers who are discharging their duties in a state and who are engaged, as this appellee was engaged, in superintending the internal government and management of a Federal institution, under the lawful direction of its board of managers and with the approval of Congress are not subject to the jurisdiction of the state in regard to those very matters of administration which are thus approved by Federal authority.

In asserting that this officer under such circumstances is exempt from the state law, the United States are not thereby claiming jurisdiction over this particular piece of

Assuming, in accordance with the decision of the state court, the act of the Ohio legislature applies in its terms to the soldiers' home at Dayton, in that state, we are of opinion that the governor was not subject to that law, and the court had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the criminal prosecution in question, because the act complained of was performed as part of the duty of the governor as a Federal officer, in and by virtue of valid Federal authority, and in the performance of that duty he was not subject to the direction or control of the legislature of Ohio.

The authorities cited in the case of Re Waite, supra, and those cited by the learned The cases of circuit judge in this case, fully support the view we have taken herein. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 [25: 648], Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 394, 395 [25: 717, 725], Re Loney, 134 U. S. 372 [33: 949], Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 [34: 55], all concur in upholding the paramount authority of the Federal government under circumstances similar, in effect, to those set forth in this record.

Some of the same authorities also show that this is one of the cases where it is proper to issue a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal court, instead of awaiting the slow process of a writ of error from this court to the highest court of the state where a decision could be had. One of the grounds for making such a case as this an exception to the general rule laid down in Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 [29: 868], Whitten v. Tom

701

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