commerce.

linson, 160 U. S. 231 (40: 406), and Baker v. appropriate legislation to protect the publle
Grice, 169 U. S. 284 [42: 748], consists in health, the public morals, or the public safety.
the fact that the Federal officer proceeded 4. The Ohio statute (Ohio Laws 1889, p. 291,
against in the courts of the state may, upon

Rev. Stat. 1890, § 3220) requiring each
conviction, be imprisoned as a means of en-

railroad company whose road is operated

within the state to cause three, each way, of forcing the sentence of a fine, and thus the

its regular trains carrying passengers, if so operations of the Federal government might

many are run daily, Sundays excepted. to (285]in the meantime be *obstructed. This is

stop at a station, city, or village containing such a case. In Ex parte Royall it was over 3,000 inhabitants, long enough to receive stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, in naming and let off passengers, is for the public consome of the exceptions to the general rule venience, and is not a regulation of interthere laid down, that “when the petitioner

state commerce and unconstitutional when ap is in custody by state authority for an act

plied to the trains of a corporation of the done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a

state engaged in such commerce. law of the United States, or of an order, proc

5. Such railroad accepted its charter subject

to the condition that it would conform to sueb ess, or decree of a court or judge thereof;

reasonable state regulations as were for the or where, being a subject or citizen of a for

public interest and not in violation of the sueign state, and domiciled therein, he is in

preme law of the land. custody, under like authority, for an act

6. State legislation relating to commerce is done or omitted under any alleged right, title, not to be deemed a regulation of interstate authority, privilege, protection, or exemp- commerce simply because it may, to some er. tion claimed under the commission or order tent or under some circumstances, affect such or sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof 7. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5258, authorizing railroad depend upon the law of nations,-in such companies to carry government supplies. and like cases of urgency, involving the au

mails, etc.. from one state to another, does thority and operations of the general govern

not prevent the state from enacting such reg.

ulations, with respect, at least, to a railroad ment, or the obligations of this country to or

corporation of its own creation, as are not du
its relations with foreign nations, the courts

rected against interstate commerce, and ae
of the United States have frequently inter- not regulations thereof, but only incidentals
posed by writs of habeas corpus and dis- or remotely affect it, and are designed to pro
charged prisoners who were held in custody mote the public convenience.
under state authority.”
For the reasons herein given we think the

[No. 95.]
order of the Circuit Court of Appeals, af: Argued December 13, 1898. Decided Febre
firming the Circuit Court, was right, and it

ary 20, 1899. must be affirmed.

'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the
The Chief Justice took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of this case.

that court affirming the judgment of the Cir.
cuit Court of Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
affirming the judgment of the court of

pleas of said county against LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern RAILWAY COMPANY, Piff. in Err., Railway Company for the amount of the

penalty prescribed by Ohio Rev. Stat. $ STATE OF OHIO, eo rel. GEORGE L. 3320, requiring railroad companies to stop LAWRENCE.

three, each way, of its regular passenger

trains, if so many are run daily, Sundays (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 285-338.) excepted, at a station, city, or village, of over

3,000 inhabitants, to receive and let off passPower of state to provide for the public con- engers,-in an action brought by the State

venience and public good-power of Con- of Ohio ex rel. George L. Lawrence for the
gress-grounds of power of a state to pro- recovery of such penalty. Affirmed.
vide for the public convenience-Ohio stat- For decision of the Circuit Court of Cuya.
ute requiring railroad trains to stop at hoga County, see 8 Ohio C. C. 220.
stations of over 3,000 inhabitants-condi- The facts are stated in the opinion.
tion of its charter-regulation of inter: Mr. George C. Greene for plaintiff in er-
state commerce-U. 8. Rev. stat. § 5258. ror.

Mr. W. H. Polbamus for defendant in 1. The power exists in each state by appro- error.

priate enactments not forbidden by its own
or the Federal Constitution, to regulate the *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opin-(286)
relative rights and duties of all persons and ion of the court:
corporations within its jurisdiction so as to This action was commenced hefore a jus.
provide for the public convenience and the tice of the peace of the county of Cuyaloga,
public good.

Ohio, to recover the penalty prescribed by 2. When Congress acts with reference to a section 3320 of the Revised Statutes of that matter confided to it by the Federal Consti

common

v.

.

way, of its regular trains carrying passen- | engers who had paid through fare, and
gers, if so many are run daily, Sundays ex- were entitled to ride in said trains going in
cepted, to stop at a station, city, or village the one direction from the city of Chicago to
containing over three thousand inhabitants, the city of Buffalo, through the states of In-
for a time sufficient to receive and let off diana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and those go-
passengers; if a company, or any agent or ing the other direction from the city of Buf-
employee thereof, violate, or cause or per- falo

through said states to the city
mit to be violated, this provision, such com- of Chicago."
pany, agent, or employee, shall be liable to a On or about the day named the company
forfeiture of not more than one hundred nor operated but one regular train carrying pass-
less than twenty-five dollars, to be recovered engers each way, that was not engaged in
in an action in the name of the state, upon carrying such through passengers, and that
the complaint of any person, before a jus- train did stop at West Cleveland on that day
tice of the peace of the county in which the for a time sufficient to receive and let off
violation occurs, for the benefit of the gen passengers.
eral fund of the county; and in all cases in The through trains that passed westward.

which a forfeiture occurs under the provi. ly through West Cleveland on the 9th day of [287]sions of this section the company whose October, 1890, were a limited express train

agent or employee caused or permitted such having two baggage and express cars, one
violation shall be liable for the amount of passenger coach, and three sleepers, from
the forfeiture, and the conductor in charge of New York to Chicago; a fast mail train have
such train shall be held prima facie to have ing five mail cars, one passenger coach, and
caused the violation.” Laws of Ohio 1889, one sleeper, from New York to Chicago; and
vol. 86, p. 291; R. S. Ohio 1890, $ 3320. a train having one mail car, two baggage and

The case was removed for trial into the express cars, four passenger coaches, and one
court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, sleeper, from Cleveland to Chicago. The
in which a judgment was rendered against trains running eastwardly on the same day
the railroad company for the sum of one hun. through West Cleveland were a limited ex.
dred dollars. Upon writ of error to the cir-press train having one baggage and express
cuit court of that county the judgment was car and three sleepers, from Chicago to New
affirmed, and the judgment of the latter York; a train having one baggage and ex-
court was affirmed by the supreme court of press car, three passenger coaches, and two
Ohio.

sleepers, from Chicago to New York; a train
The facts upon which the case was deter having one mail car, two baggage and ex-
mined in the state court were as follows: press cars, and seven passenger coaches, from

The plaintiff Lawrence is a resident of Chicago to Buffalo; and a train having three
West Cleveland, a muncipal corporation of mail cars and one sleeper, from Chicago to
Ohio having more than three thousand in New York.
habitants.

The average time required to stop a train
The defendant railway company is a cor- of cars and receive and let off passengers is
poration organized under the respective laws three minutes.
of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, The number of villages in Ohio containing
Michigan, and Illinois, and owns and ope- three thousand inhabitants through which
rates a railroad located partly within the the above trains passed on the day named
village of West Cleveland. Its line extends were thirteen.
from Chicago through those states to Buf- The trial court found, as a conclusion of
falo.

law, that within the meaning of the Consti.
On the 9th day of October, 1890, as well | tution of the United States the statute of
as for some time prior thereto and thereafter, Ohio was not a regulation of commerce
the company caused to run daily both ways an:ong the states, and was valid until Con.
over its road within the limits of West Cleve-gress acted upon the subject. This general
land three or more regular trains carrying *view was affirmed by the circuit court of[289!
passengers. And on that day (which was Cuyahoga county and by the supreme court
not Sunday) it did not stop or cause to be of Ohio.
stopped within that village more than one The plaintiff in error contends that, as
of such trains each way, long enough to re- the power to regulate interstate commerce is
ceive or let off passengers.

vested in Congress, the statute of Ohio in its
On the day above named and after that application to trains engaged in such com-
date the company was engaged in carrying merce is directly repugnant to the Constitu-
both passengers and freight over its railroad, tion of the United States.
from Chicago and other stations in Indiana In support of this contention it insists
and Michigan, through each of said several that an interstate railroad carrier has the
states, to and into New York, Pennsylvania, right to start its train at any point in one
and Ohio and to Buffalo, and from Buffalo state, and pass into and through another
through said states to Chicago. It did not state without taking up or setting down
on that day, nor shortly prior thereto, nor up passengers within the limits of the latter
to the commencement of the present suit, run state. As applied to the present case, that
daily both ways, or either way, over said contention means that the defendant com-
road through the village of West Cleveland, pany, although an Ohio corporation deriving
three regular trains, nor more than one reg. all its franchises and privileges from that

ular train each way, carrying passengers state, may, if it so wills, deprive the people [288]ówhich were not engaged in interstate com- along its line in Ohio of the benefits of inter

merce, or that did not have upon them pagg. 'state communication by its railroad: in

short, that the company, if it saw fit to do the subject, state legislation interrupting in80, could, beyond the power of Ohio to pre terstate commerce even for a limited time vent it, refuse to stop within that state only, whatever might be its object and howtrains that started from points beyond its ever essential such legislation might be for linnits, or even trains starting in Ohio des- the comfort, peace, or safety of the people tined to places in other states.

of the state, was a regulation of interstate In the argument at the bar, as well as in commerce forbidden by the Constitution of the printed brief of counsel, reference was the United States. made to the numerous cases in this court ad. After observing that the argument in be judging that what are called the police pow- half of the defendant rested upon the erroers of the states were not surrendered to the neous assumption that the statute of Geor. general government when the Constitution gia was such a regulation of interstate comwas ordained, but remained with the several merce as was * forbidden by the Constitution[291) states of the t'nion. And it was asserted without reference to affirmative action by with much confidence that while regulations Congress, and not merely a statute enacted adopted by competent local authority in or- by the state under its police power, and der to protect or promote the public health, which, although in some degree affecting the public morals, or the public safety have interstate commerce, did not go beyond the been sustained where such regulations only necessities of the case, and therefore was incidentally affected commerce among the valid, at least until Congress intervened, states, the principles announced in former this court, upon review of the adjudged cases, adjudications condemn as repugnant to the said: “These authorities make it clear Constitution of the United States all local that the legislative enactments of the states, regulations that affect interstate commerce passed under their admitted police powers, in any degree, if established merely to sub- and having a real relation to the domes. serve the public convenience.

tic, peace, order, health, and safety of One of the cases cited in support of this their people, but which by their necessary position is Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. operation, affect to some extent or for 299, 303, 308, 317, [41: 166, 169, 171, 174], a limited time the conduct of commerce which involved the validity of a statute of among the states, are yet noti invalid by

Georgia providing that "if any freight train force alone of the grant of power to Con. [290]shall be run on any railroad in this state on gress to regulate such commerce; and, if not

the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday) the obnoxious to some other constitutional prosuperintendent of such railroad company, or vision or destructive of some right secured the officer having charge of the business of by the fundamental law, are to be respected that department of the railroad, shall be in the courts of the Union until they are liable for indictment for a misdemeanor in superseded and displaced by some act of Con. each county through which such trains shall gress passed in execution of the power grantpass, and on conviction shall be punished. ed to it by the Constitution. Local laws of

Provided, always, That whenever the character mentioned have their source any train on any railroad in this state, hav- in the powers which the states reserved and ing in such train one or more cars loaded never surrendered to Congress, of providing with live stock, which train shall be delayed for the public health, the public morals, and beyond schedule time, shall not be required the public safety, and are not, within the to lay over on the line of road or route meaning of the Constitution, and considered during Sunday, but may run on to the point in their own nature, regulations of interwhere, by due course of shipment or consign- state commerce simply because, for a limited ment, the next stock pen on the route may time or to a limited extent, they cover the be, where said animals may be fed and field occupied by those engaged in such comwatered, according to the facilities usually merce. The statute of Georgia is not diafforded for such transportation. And it rected against interstate commerce. It esshall be lawful for the freight trains on the tablishes a rule of civil conduct applicable different railroads in this state, running alike to all freight trains, domestic as well over said roads on Saturday night, to run as interstate. It applies to the transportathrough to destination: Provided, The time tion of interstate freight the same rule pre of arrival, according to the schedule by which cisely that it applies to the transportation the train or trains started on the trip, shall of domestic freight.” Again: "We are of not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday opinion that such a law, although in a limmorning.". This court said: “The well-set- ited degree affecting interstate commerce, is tled rule is that if a statute purporting to not for that reason a needless intrusion uphave been enacted to protect the public on the domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor health, the public morals, or the public safe strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, ty, has no real or substantial relation to but, considered in its own nature, is an or. those objects, or is a palpable invasion of dinary police regulation designed to secure rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the well-being and to promote the general the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby welfare of the people within the state by(292) give effect to the Constitution."

which it was established, and therefore not The contention in that case was that the invalid by force alone of the Constitution of running of railroad cars laden with inter- the United States." state freight was committed exclusively to It is insisted by counsel that these and the control and supervision of the national observations to the same effect in different government; and that, although Congress cases show that the police powers of the had not taken any affirmative action upon states, when exerted with reference to mat

ters more or less connected with interstate stures as dams, booms, piers, etc., should be commerce, are restricted in their exercise, used which are substantial obstructions to Bo far as the national Constitution is con. general navigation, and more or less so to cerned, to regulations pertaining to the rafts and barges. But to the legislature of health, morals, or safety of the public, and the state may be most appropriately confid. do not embrace regulations designed merely ed the authority to authorize these structo promote the public convenience.

tures where their use will do more good than This is an erroneous view of the adjudi. harm, and to impose such regulations and cations of this court. While cases to which limitations in their construction and use as counsel refer involved the validity of state will best reconcile and accommodate the in. laws having reference directly to the pub- terest of all concerned in the matter. And lic health, the public morals, or the pub- since the doctrine we have deduced from the lic safety, in no one of them was there any cases recognizes the right of Congress to inoccasion to determine whether the police terfere and control the matter whenever it powers of the states extended to regulations may deem it necessary to do so, the exercise incidentally affecting interstate commerce, of this limited power may all the more safely but which were designed only to promote the be confided to the local legislatures." public convenience or the general welfare. The same principles were announced in There are, however, numerous decisions by Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683 this court to the effect that the states may [27: 442, 445). That case involved the va. legislate with reference simply to the public lidity of a certain local ordinance regulating convenience, subject, of course, to the condi- the opening and closing of bridges over the tion that such legislation be not inconsistent Chicago river within the limits of the city with the national Constitution, nor with any of Chicago. That ordinance required the act of Congress passed in pursuance of that bridges to be closed at certain huurs of the instrument, nor in derogation of any right day, so as not to obstruct the passage over granted or secured by it. As the question them of vast numbers of operatives and now presented is one of great importance, it other people going to and from their respec.[294] will be well to refer to some cases of the tive places of business. It was conceded latter class.

that by the closing of the bridges at those In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713,729 hours vessels were obstructed, in their use (18: 96, 101], which involved the validity of of the river. This court in that case said: à state enactment authorizing the construc- "The Chicago river and its branches must tion of a permanent bridge over the Schuyl- therefore be deemed navigable waters of the kill river within the limits of Philadelphia, United States, over which Congress under • and which bridge in fact interfered with the its commercial power may exercise control use of the river by vessels of a certain size to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, which had been long accustomed to navigate and improve their free navigation. But the it, the court said: "It must not be forgot- states have full power to regulate within ten that bridges, which are connecting parts their limits matters of internal police, inof turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are cluding in that general designation whatever means of commercial transportation as well will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, as navigable waters, and that the commerce and prosperity of their people. This power which passes over a bridge may be much embraces the construction of roads, canals,

greater than would ever be transported on and bridges, and the establishment of ferries, [293]the water it obstructs. "It is for the munici- and it can generally be exercised more wise

pal power to weigh the considerations which ly by the states than by a distant authority: belong to the subject, and to decide which They are the first to see the importance of shall be preferred, and how far either shall such means of internal communication, and be made subservient to the other. The are more deeply concerned thon others in states have always exercised this power, and their wise management. Illinois is more from the nature and objects of the two sys- immediately affected by the bridges over the tems of government they must always con: Chicago river and its branches than any tinue to exercise it, subject, however, in all other state, and is more directly concerned cases, to the paramount authority of Con for the prosperity of the city of Chicago, for gress whenever the power of the states shall the convenience and comfort of its inhabi. be exerted within the sphere of the commer-tants, and the growth of its commerce. And cial power which belongs to the nation." nowhere could the power to control the

So, in Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 464 bridges in that city, their construction, form [24: 525, 527], which was a case where ob- and strength, and the size of their draws, structions-piers and booms--had been and the manner and times of using them, be placed under the authority of the state of better vested than with the state or the ar. Wisconsin in the Chippewa river, one of the thorities of the city upon whom it has de navigable waters of the United States, it was volved that duty. When its power is exer. said: “There are within the state of Wis- cised so as to obstruct unnecessarily the nav. consin, and perhaps other states, many igation of the river or its branches. Con. small streams navigable for a short distance gress may interfere and remove the obstrucfrom their mouths in one of the great rivers tion. If the power of the state and that of of the country, by steamboats, but whose the Federal government come in conflict. the greatest value in water carriage is as outlets | latter must control and the former yield. to sawlogs, sawed lumber, coal, salt, etc. In This necessarily follows from the position order to develop their greatest utility in that given by the Constitution to legislation in regard, it is often essential that such struc. pursuance of it, as the supreme law of the 173 U. S. U. S., BOOR 43.

45

705

We think the statute in question is one of that class, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress the statute is a valid exercise of the power of the state over the subject."

land. But until Congress acts on the sub-
ject the power of the state over bridges
across its navigable streams is plenary." It
was consequently adjudged that the city or-
dinance was not to be deemed such a regu-
lation of interstate commerce as, in the ab-
sence of national legislation, should be
deemed invalid.

So, in Richmond & A. Railroad Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 315 [42: 759, 761], it was adjudged that a stat (295) *In Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, ute of Virginia defining the obligations of 113 U. S. 205, 208 [28: 959, 960], it was held carriers who accepted for transportation that a statute of California authorizing a anything directed to points of destination bridge without a draw or opening for the beyond the termini of their own lines or passage of vessels to be constructed over a routes was not, in its application to internavigable water of the United States within state business, a regulation of interstate that state was not, in the absence of legisla-commerce within the meaning of the Constition by Congress, to be deemed repugnant to tution. This court said: "Of course, in a the commerce clause of the Constitution. latitudinarian sense any restriction as to The court referring to prior cases, said: "In the evidence of a contract relating to interthese cases the control of Congress over nav-state commerce may be said to be a limitaigable waters within the states so as to pre- tion on the contract itself. But this remote serve their free navigation under the com- effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by mercial clause of the Constitution, the power a state of its power to determine the form of the states within which they lie to au- in which contracts may be proved, does not thorize the construction of bridges over amount to a regulation of interstate comthem until Congress intervenes and super-merce." And the court cited in support of sedes their authority, and the right of pri- its conclusion the case of Chicago, M. & St. vate parties to interfere with their construc- P. Railway Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137 tion or continuance, have been fully consid- [42: 688, 692], which involved the validity ered, and we are entirely satisfied with the of state regulations as to the liability of soundness of the conclusions reached. They carriers of passengers, and in which it was recognize the full power of the states to regu- said: "They are not in themselves regulalate within their limits matters of inter- tions of interstate commerce, although they nal police, which embraces, among other control in some degree the conduct and liathings, the construction, repair, and main- bility of those engaged in such commerce. tenance of roads and bridges and the estab- So long as Congress has not legislated upon lishment of ferries; that the states are more the particular subject they are rather to be likely to appreciate the importance of these regarded as legislation in aid of such commeans of internal communication and to merce, and as a rightful exercise of the poprovide for their proper management than a lice power of the state to regulate the relagovernment at a distance; and that, as to tive rights and duties of all persons and corbridges over navigable streams, their power porations within its limits." is subordinate to that of Congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the Constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until Congress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams." The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543 [30: 487].

Now, it is evident that these cases had no reference to the health, morals, or safety of the people of the state, but only to the pub-[297] lic convenience. They recognized the fundamental principle that, outside of the field di rectly occupied by the general government under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, all questions arising within a state that relate to its internal order, or that involve the public convenience or the general good, are primarily for the determination of the state, and that its legislative enactments, relating to those subjects, and which are not inconsistent with the state Constitution, are to be respected and enforced in the courts of the Union if they do not by their operation directly entrench upon the authority of the United States or violate some right protected by the national Constitution. The power here referred to is, to use the words of Chief Justice Shaw, the power "to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth and of the subjects of the same." Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well said: "It cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the legislative department of the state to adopt all necessary legislation for the pur

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 662 [40: 1105, 1109], the question was presented whether a state enactment requiring telegraph companies with lines of wires wholly or partly within the state to receive telegrams, and on payment of the charges thereon to deliver them with due diligence, was not a regulation of interstate commerce when applied to interstate telegrams. We held that such enactments [296]did not in any *just sense regulate interstate commerce. It was said in that case: "While it is vitally important that commerce between the states should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding it, yet on the other hand there are many occasions where the police power of the state can be properly exercised to insure a faithful and prompt performance of duty within the limits of the state upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate commerce.