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short, that the company, if it saw fit to do so, could, beyond the power of Ohio to prevent it, refuse to stop within that state trains that started from points beyond its limits, or even trains starting in Ohio destined to places in other states.

the subject, state legislation interrupting in-
terstate commerce even for a limited time
only, whatever might be its object and how-
ever essential such legislation might be for
the comfort, peace, or safety of the people
of the state, was a regulation of interstate
commerce forbidden by the Constitution of
the United States.

After observing that the argument in be

In the argument at the bar, as well as in the printed brief of counsel, reference was made to the numerous cases in this court adjudging that what are called the police pow-half of the defendant rested upon the erroers of the states were not surrendered to the general government when the Constitution was ordained, but remained with the several states of the Union. And it was asserted with much confidence that while regulations adopted by competent local authority in order to protect or promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety have been sustained where such regulations only incidentally affected commerce among the states, the principles announced in former adjudications condemn as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States all local regulations that affect interstate commerce in any degree, if established merely to subserve the public convenience.

neous assumption that the statute of Georgia was such a regulation of interstate commerce as was *forbidden by the Constitution[291] without reference to affirmative action by Congress, and not merely a statute enacted by the state under its police power, and which, although in some degree affecting interstate commerce, did not go beyond the necessities of the case, and therefore was valid, at least until Congress intervened, this court, upon review of the adjudged cases, said: "These authorities make it clear that the legislative enactments of the states, passed under their admitted police powers, and having a real relation to the domestic peace, order, health, and safety of One of the cases cited in support of this their people, but which by their necessary position is Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. operation, affect to some extent or for 299, 303, 308, 317, [41: 166, 169, 171, 174], a limited time the conduct of commerce which involved the validity of a statute of among the states, are yet not invalid_by Georgia providing that "if any freight train force alone of the grant of power to Con[290]shall be run on any railroad in this *state on gress to regulate such commerce; and, if not the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday) the obnoxious to some other constitutional prosuperintendent of such railroad company, or vision or destructive of some right secured the officer having charge of the business of by the fundamental law, are to be respected that department of the railroad, shall be in the courts of the Union until they are liable for indictment for a misdemeanor in superseded and displaced by some act of Coneach county through which such trains shall gress passed in execution of the power grantpass, and on conviction shall be punished. ed to it by the Constitution. Local laws of Provided, always, That whenever the character mentioned have their source any train on any railroad in this state, hav- in the powers which the states reserved and ing in such train one or more cars loaded never surrendered to Congress, of providing with live stock, which train shall be delayed for the public health, the public morals, and beyond schedule time, shall not be required the public safety, and are not, within the to lay over on the line of road or route meaning of the Constitution, and considered during Sunday, but may run on to the point in their own nature, regulations of interwhere, by due course of shipment or consign-state commerce simply because, for a limited ment, the next stock pen on the route may time or to a limited extent, they cover the be, where said animals may be fed and field occupied by those engaged in such comwatered, according to the facilities usually merce. The statute of Georgia is not diafforded for such transportation. And it rected against interstate commerce. It esshall be lawful for the freight trains on the tablishes a rule of civil conduct applicable different railroads in this state, running alike to all freight trains, domestic as well over said roads on Saturday night, to run as interstate. It applies to the transportathrough to destination: Provided, The time tion of interstate freight the same rule preof arrival, according to the schedule by which cisely that it applies to the transportation the train or trains started on the trip, shall of domestic freight." Again: "We are of not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday opinion that such a law, although in a limmorning." This court said: "The well-set-ited degree affecting interstate commerce, is tled rule is that if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."

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The contention in that case was that the running of railroad cars laden with interstate freight was committed exclusively to the control and supervision of the national government; and that, although Congress had not taken any affirmative action upon

not for that reason a needless intrusion up-
on the domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor
strictly a regulation of interstate commerce,
but, considered in its own nature, is an or-
dinary police regulation designed to secure
the well-being and to promote the general
welfare of the people within the state by[292)
which it was established, and therefore not
invalid by force alone of the Constitution of
the United States."

It is insisted by counsel that these and
observations to the same effect in different
cases show that the police powers of the
states, when exerted with reference to mat-

This is an erroneous view of the adjudications of this court. While cases to which counsel refer involved the validity of state laws having reference directly to the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, in no one of them was there any occasion to determine whether the police powers of the states extended to regulations incidentally affecting interstate commerce, but which were designed only to promote the public convenience or the general welfare. There are, however, numerous decisions by this court to the effect that the states may legislate with reference simply to the public convenience, subject, of course, to the condition that such legislation be not inconsistent with the national Constitution, nor with any act of Congress passed in pursuance of that instrument, nor in derogation of any right granted or secured by it. As the question now presented is one of great importance, it will be well to refer to some cases of the latter class.

ters more or less connected with interstate | tures as dams, booms, piers, etc., should be commerce, are restricted in their exercise, used which are substantial obstructions to so far as the national Constitution is con- general navigation, and more or less so to cerned, to regulations pertaining to the rafts and barges. But to the legislature of health, morals, or safety of the public, and the state may be most appropriately confiddo not embrace regulations designed merely ed the authority to authorize these struc to promote the public convenience. tures where their use will do more good than harm, and to impose such regulations and limitations in their construction and use as will best reconcile and accommodate the interest of all concerned in the matter. And since the doctrine we have deduced from the cases recognizes the right of Congress to interfere and control the matter whenever it may deem it necessary to do so, the exercise of this limited power may all the more safely be confided to the local legislatures." The same principles were announced in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, 683 [27: 442, 445]. That case involved the validity of a certain local ordinance regulating the opening and closing of bridges over the Chicago river within the limits of the city of Chicago. That ordinance required the bridges to be closed at certain hours of the day, so as not to obstruct the passage over them of vast numbers of operatives and other *people going to and from their respec-[294] tive places of business. It was conceded that by the closing of the bridges at those In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.713,729 hours vessels were obstructed, in their use [18: 96, 101], which involved the validity of of the river. This court in that case said: a state enactment authorizing the construc- "The Chicago river and its branches must tion of a permanent bridge over the Schuyl- therefore be deemed navigable waters of the kill river within the limits of Philadelphia, United States, over which Congress under . and which bridge in fact interfered with the its commercial power may exercise control use of the river by vessels of a certain size to the extent necessary to protect, preserve, which had been long accustomed to navigate and improve their free navigation. But the it, the court said: "It must not be forgot-states have full power to regulate within ten that bridges, which are connecting parts their limits matters of internal police, inof turnpikes, streets, and railroads, are cluding in that general designation whatever means of commercial transportation as well will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, as navigable waters, and that the commerce and prosperity of their people. This power which passes over a bridge may be much embraces the construction of roads, canals, greater than would ever be transported on and bridges, and the establishment of ferries, [293]the water it obstructs. *It is for the munici- and it can generally be exercised more wisepal power to weigh the considerations which ly by the states than by a distant authority. belong to the subject, and to decide which They are the first to see the importance of shall be preferred, and how far either shall such means of internal communication, and be made subservient to the other. The are more deeply concerned than others in states have always exercised this power, and their wise management. Illinois is more from the nature and objects of the two sys-immediately affected by the bridges over the tems of government they must always continue to exercise it, subject, however, in all cases, to the paramount authority of Congress whenever the power of the states shall be exerted within the sphere of the commercial power which belongs to the nation."

So, in Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459, 464
[24: 525, 527], which was a case where ob-
structions-piers and booms-had been
placed under the authority of the state of
Wisconsin in the Chippewa river, one of the
navigable waters of the United States, it was
said: "There are within the state of Wis-
consin, and perhaps other states, many
small streams navigable for a short distance
from their mouths in one of the great rivers
of the country, by steamboats, but whose
greatest value in water carriage is as outlets
to sawlogs, sawed lumber, coal, salt, etc. In
order to develop their greatest utility in that
regard. it is often essential that such struc-
173 U. S.
U. S.. Book 43.

Chicago river and its branches than any other state, and is more directly concerned for the prosperity of the city of Chicago, for the convenience and comfort of its inhabitants, and the growth of its commerce. And nowhere could the power to control the bridges in that city, their construction, form and strength, and the size of their draws, and the manner and times of using them, be better vested than with the state or the au thorities of the city upon whom it has devolved that duty. When its power is exercised so as to obstruct unnecessarily the navigation of the river or its branches. Congress may interfere and remove the obstruction. If the power of the state and that of the Federal government come in conflict. the latter must control and the former yield. This necessarily follows from the position given by the Constitution to legislation in pursuance of it, as the supreme law of the

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land. But until Congress acts on the sub-
ject the power of the state over bridges
across its navigable streams is plenary." It
was consequently adjudged that the city or-
dinance was not to be deemed such a regu-
lation of interstate commerce as, in the ab-
sence of national legislation, should be
deemed invalid.

We think the statute in question is one of that class, and in the absence of any legislation by Congress the statute is a valid exercise of the power of the state over the subject."

So, in Richmond & A. Railroad Co. v. R. A. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 315 [42: 759, 761], it was adjudged that a stat (295) *In Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, ute of Virginia defining the obligations of 113 U. S. 205, 208 [28: 959, 960], it was held carriers who accepted for transportation that a statute of California authorizing a anything directed to points of destination bridge without a draw or opening for the beyond the termini of their own lines or passage of vessels to be constructed over a routes was not, in its application to internavigable water of the United States within state business, a regulation of interstate that state was not, in the absence of legisla- commerce within the meaning of the Constition by Congress, to be deemed repugnant to tution. This court said: "Of course, in a the commerce clause of the Constitution. latitudinarian sense any restriction as to The court referring to prior cases, said: "In the evidence of a contract relating to interthese cases the control of Congress over nav-state commerce may be said to be a limitaigable waters within the states so as to pre- tion on the contract itself. But this remote serve their free navigation under the com- effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by mercial clause of the Constitution, the power a state of its power to determine the form of the states within which they lie to au- in which contracts may be proved, does not thorize the construction of bridges over amount to a regulation of interstate comthem until Congress intervenes and super- merce." And the court cited in support of sedes their authority, and the right of pri- its conclusion the case of Chicago, M. & St. vate parties to interfere with their construc-P. Railway Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137 tion or continuance, have been fully considered, and we are entirely satisfied with the soundness of the conclusions reached. They recognize the full power of the states to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, which embraces, among other things, the construction, repair, and maintenance of roads and bridges and the establishment of ferries; that the states are more likely to appreciate the importance of these means of internal communication and to provide for their proper management than a government at a distance; and that, as to bridges over navigable streams, their power is subordinate to that of Congress, as an act of the latter body is, by the Constitution, made the supreme law of the land; but that until Congress acts on the subject their power is plenary. When Congress acts directly with reference to the bridges authorized by the state, its will must control so far as may be necessary to secure the free navigation of the streams." The doctrines of this case were reaffirmed in Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543 [30: 487].

[42: 688, 692], which involved the validity of state regulations as to the liability of carriers of passengers, and in which it was said: "They are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, although they control in some degree the conduct and liability of those engaged in such commerce. So long as Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject they are rather to be regarded as legislation in aid of such commerce, and as a rightful exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits.'

Now, it is evident that these cases had no reference to the health, morals, or safety of the people of the state, but only to the pub-[297] lic convenience. They recognized the fundamental principle that, outside of the field directly occupied by the general government under the powers granted to it by the Constitution, all questions arising within a state that relate to its internal order, or that involve the public convenience or the general good, are primarily for the determination In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, of the state, and that its legislative enact162 U. S. 650, 662 [40: 1105, 1109], the ments, relating to those subjects, and which question was presented whether a state en- are not inconsistent with the state Constituactment requiring telegraph companies with tion, are to be respected and enforced in the lines of wires wholly or partly within the courts of the Union if they do not by their state to receive telegrams, and on payment operation directly entrench upon the auof the charges thereon to deliver them with thority of the United States or violate some due diligence, was not a regulation of inter-right protected by the national Constitution. state commerce when applied to interstate telegrams. We held that such enactments [296]did not in any *just sense regulate interstate commerce. It was said in that case: "While it is vitally important that commerce between the states should be unembarrassed by vexatious state regulations regarding it, yet on the other hand there are many occasions where the police power of the state can be properly exercised to insure a faithful and prompt performance of duty within the limits of the state upon the part of those who are engaged in interstate commerce.

The power here referred to is, to use the words of Chief Justice Shaw, the power "to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth and of the subjects of the same." Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well said: "It cannot be doubted that there is ample power in the legislative department of the state to adopt all necessary legislation for the pur

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pose of enforcing the obligations of railway | Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 104 [23: 819]; Morgan's companies as carriers of persons and goods L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of to accommodate the public impartially, and Health, 118 U. S. 455, 463 [30: 237, 241; to make every reasonable provision for car- Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 [31; 508]; rying with safety and expedition." Cooley's Nashville, C. & St. L. Railway Co. v. AlaConst. Lim, 6th ed. p. 715. It may be that bama, 128 U. S. 96, 100 [32: 352, 354, 2 such legislation is not within the "police Inters. Com. Rep. 238]; Hennington v. Georpower" of a state, as those words have been gia, above cited; Missouri, Kansas, and sometimes, although inaccurately, used. Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, above cited; and But in our opinion the power, whether New York, *N. H. & H. Railroad Co. v. New[299] called police, governmental, or legislative, York, 165 U. S. 628, 631, 632 [41: 853, 854], exists in each state, by appropriate enact- were all cases involving state regulations ments not forbidden by its own Constitution more or less affecting interstate or foreign or by the Constitution of the United States, to commerce, but which were sustained upon the regulate the relative rights and duties of all ground that they were not directed against persons and corporations within its jurisdic- nor were direct burdens upon interstate or tion, and therefore to provide for the public foreign commerce; and having been enacted convenience and the public good. This only to protect the public safety, the public power in the states is entirely distinct from health, or the public morals, and having a any power granted to the general govern- real, substantial relation to the public ends ment, although when exercised it may some- intended to be accomplished thereby, were times reach subjects over which national not to be deemed absolutely forbidden belegislation can be constitutionally extended. cause of the mere grant of power to Congress [298]When Congress acts with reference to a mat- to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, ter confided to it by the Constitution, then but to be regarded as only incidentally af its statutes displace all conflicting local reg-fecting such commerce, and valid until ulations touching that matter, although such superseded by legislation of Congress on the regulations may have been established in same subject. pursuance of a power not surrendered by the states to the general government. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210 [6: 23, 73]; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243 [16: 243, 247]; Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626 [42: 878, 883].

It is not contended that the statute in question is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States when applied to railroad trains carrying passengers between points within the state of Ohio. But the contention is that to require railroad companies, even those organized under the laws of Ohio, to stop their trains, or any of them carrying interstate passengers at a particular place or places in the state for a reasonable time, so directly affects commerce among the states as to bring the statute, whether Congress has acted or not on the same subject, into conflict with the grant in the Constitution of power to regulate such commerce. That such a regulation may be in itself reasonable and may promote the public convenience or subserve the general welfare is, according to the argument made before us, of no consequence whatever; for, it is said, a state regulation which to any extent or for a limited time only interrupts the absolute, continuous freedom of interstate commerce is forbidden by the Constitution, although Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject covered by the state enactment. If these broad propositions are approved, it will be difficult to sustain the numerous judgments of this court upholding local regulations which in some degree or only incidentally affected commerce among the states, but which were adjudged not to be in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but within the police powers of the states and to be respected so long as Congress did not itself cover the subject by legislation. Cooley v. Philadelphia Port Wardens, 12 How. 299. 320 [13: 996, 1005]; Sherlock v.

In the case last cited-New York, N. H. & H. Railroad Co. v. New York-the question was as to the validity, when applied to interstate railroad trains, of a statute of New York forbidding the heating of passenger cars in a particular mode. This court said: "According to numerous decisions of this court sustaining the validity of state regulations enacted under the police powers of the state, and which incidentally affected commerce among the states and with foreign nations, it was clearly competent for the state of New York, in the absence of national legislation covering the subject, to forbid under penalties the heating of passenger cars in that state by stoves or furnaces kept inside the cars or suspended therefrom, although such cars may be employed in interstate commerce. While the laws of the states must yield to acts of Congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211 [6: 23, 73]), the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states did not, of itself and without legislation by Congress, impair the authority of the states to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people. The statute in question had for its object to protect all persons traveling in the state of New York on passenger cars moved by the agency of steam, against the perils attending a particular mode of heating such cars.

*The statute in ques-[300] tion is not directed against interstate commerce. Nor is it within the necessary meaning of the Constitution a regulation of commerce, although it controls, in some degree, the conduct of those engaged in such commerce. So far as it may affect interstate commerce, it is to be regarded as legislation in aid of commerce and enacted under the power remaining with the state to regu

late the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits. Until displaced by such national legislation as Congress may rightfully establish under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, the validity of the statute, so far as the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States is concerned, cannot be questioned."

cities on the route, if in the contingency named in the statute the required number of trains stop at each place containing three thousand inhabitants long enough to receive and let off passengers. It seems from the evidence that the average time required to stop a train, and receive and let off passengers is only three minutes. Certainly, the state of Ohio did not endow the plaintiff in error with the rights of a corporation for the purpose simply of subserving the convenstate between points outside of its territory. "The question is no longer an open one," this court said in Cherokee Nation v Southern Kansas Railway Co. 135 U. S. 641, 657 [34: 295, 302], "as to whether a railroad is a pub

Consistently with these doctrines it cannot be adjudged that the Ohio statute is un-ience of passengers traveling through the constitutional. The power of the state by appropriate legislation to provide for the public convenience stands upon the same ground precisely as its power by appropriate legislation to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety. Wheth-lic highway, established primarily for the er legislation of either kind is inconsistent with any power granted to the general government is to be determined by the same rules.

convenience of the people, and to subserve public ends, and therefore subject to governmental control and regulation. It is because it is a public highway and subject to such In what has been said we have assumed control that the corporation by which it is that the statute is not in itself unreasona- constructed and by which it is to be maintained ble; that is, it has appropriate relation to may be permitted, under legislative sanction, the public convenience, does not go beyond the to appropriate property *for the purpose of a[302] necessities of the case, and is not directed right of way, upon making just compensaagainst interstate commerce. In Hannibal tion to the owner, in the mode prescribed by & St. J. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, law." In the construction and maintenance 473 [24: 527, 531], reference was made to of such a highway under public sanction the some decisions of state courts in relation to corporation really performs a function of statutes prohibiting the introduction into a the state. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 544 state of cattle having infectious diseases, and [42: 819, 848]. The plaintiff in error acin which it was contended that it was for the cepted its charter subject necessarily to the legislature, and not for the courts, to deter- condition that it would conform to such mine whether such legislation went beyond reasonable regulations as the state might the danger to be apprehended, and was there- from time to time establish, that were not fore something more than the exertion of the in violation of the supreme law of the land. police power. This court said that it could In the absence of legislation by Congress, it not concur in that view; that as the police would be going very far to hold that such an power of a state cannot obstruct either for- enactment as the one before us was in it eign or interstate commerce "beyond the ne- self a regulation of interstate commerce. It cessity for its exercise," it was the duty of was for the state to take into consideration the courts to guard vigilantly against "need- all the circumstances affecting passenger [801]less intrusion" upon the field *committed by travel within its limits, and, as far as prac the Constitution to Congress. As the cases ticable, make such regulations as were just to above cited show, and as appears from other all who might pass over the road in question. cases, the reasonableness or unreasonable It was entitled, of course, to provide for the ness of a state enactment is always an ele- convenience of persons desiring to travel ment in the general inquiry by the court from one point to another in the state on dowhether such legislation encroaches upon na-mestic trains. But it was not bound to ig tional authority, or is to be deemed a legitimate exertion of the power of the state to protect the public interests or promote the public convenience.

In our judgment the assumption that the statute of Ohio was not directed against interstate commerce, but is a reasonable provision for the public convenience, is not unwarranted. The requirement that a rail road company whose road is operated within the state shall cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at any station, city, or village of three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, so far from being unreasonable, will greatly subserve the public convenience. The statute does not stand in the way of the railroad company running as many trains as it may choose between Chicago and Buffalo without stopping at intermediate points, or only at very large

nore the convenience of those who desired to travel from places in the state to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those outside of the state who wished to come into it. Its statute is in aid of interstate commerce of that character. It was not compelled to look only to the convenience of those who desired to pass through the state without stopping. Any other view of the relations between the state and the corpora tion created by it would mean that the directors of the corporation could manage its affairs solely with reference to the interests of stockholders, and without taking into consideration the interests of the general public. It would mean, not only that such di rectors were the exclusive judges of the manner in which the corporation should discharge the duties imposed upon it in the interest of the public, but that the corporation could so regulate the running of its interstate trains as to build up cities and towns

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