at the ends of its line or at favored points, | landings both within and without Louis. and by that means destroy or retard the iana as occasion required. He insisted that growth and prosperity of those at interven- it was void as to him because it directly ing points. It would mean also that, beyond regulated or burdened interstate business. the power of the state to prevent it, the de- The court distinctly recognized the princifendant railway company could run all its ple upon which we proceed in the present [303]trains through the state without stopping at case, that state legislation relating to comany city within its limits, however numerous merce is not to be deemed a regulation of inits population, and could prevent the people terstate commerce simply because it may to along its road within the state who desired some extent or under some circumstances afto go beyond its limits from using its inter- fect such commerce. But, speaking by state trains at all, or only at such points as Chief Justice Waite, it said: "We think it the company chose to designate. A principle may be safely said that state legislation that in its application admits of such results which seeks to impose a direct burden upon cannot be sanctioned. interstate commerce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon the business through the local instruments to be employed after coming within the state, but directly upon the business as it comes into the state from without or goes out from within. While it purports only to control the carrier when engaged within the state, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some extent in the management of his business throughout his entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and put down within the state, or taken up within to be carried without, cannot put affect in a greater or less degree those taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those taken up and put down without. A passenger in the cabin set apart for the use of whites without the state must, when the boat comes within, share the accommodations of that cabin with such colored persons as may come on board afterwards, if the law is enforced. It was to meet just such a case that the commercial clause in the Constitution was adopted. The river Mississippi[305] passes through or along the borders of ten different states, and its tributaries reach many more. No carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be. If this statute can be We perceive in the legislation of Ohio no basis for the contention that the state has invaded the domain of national authority or impaired any right secured by the national Constitution. In the recent case of Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 182 [41: 677, 678], it was adjudged that embraced within the police powers of a state was the establishment, maintenance, and control of public highways, and that under such powers reasonable regulations incident to the right to establish and maintain such highways could be established by the state. And the state of Ohio by the statute in question has done nothing more than to so regulate the use of a public highway established and maintained under its authority as will reasonably promote the public convenience. It has not unreasonably obstructed the freedom of commerce among the states. Its regulations apply equally to domestic and interstate railroads. Its statute is not directed against interstate commerce, but only incidentally affects it. It has only forbidden one of its own corporations from discriminating unjustly against a large part of the public, for whose convenience that corporation was created and invested with authority to maintain a public highway within the limits of the state. It has been suggested that the conclusion reached by us is not in accord with Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 488 [24: 547, 548], Wabash, St. L. & P. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 [30:244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31], and Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 153, 154 [41: 107, 111], in each of which cases certain state enactments were adjudged to be inconsistent with the grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce among the states. In Hall v. De Cuir a statute of Louisiana relating to carriers of passengers within that state, and which prohibited any dis-enforced against those engaged in interstate crimination against passengers on account commerce, it may be as well against those [304]of race or color, was held, looking at its nec- engaged in foreign; and the master of a ship essary operation, to be a regulation of and clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, a direct burden on commerce among the having passengers on board, would be comstates, and therefore unconstitutional. The pelled to carry all, white and colored, in the defendant who was sued for damages on ac- same cabin during his passage down the count of an alleged violation of that statute, river, or be subject to an action for damages, was the master and owner of a steamboat 'exemplary as well as actual,' by anyone enrolled and licensed under the laws of the who felt himself aggrieved because he had United States for the coasting trade, and been excluded on account of his color." The plying as a regular packet for the transpor- import of that decision is that, in the abtation of freight and passengers between sence of legislation by Congress, a state New Orleans, Louisiana, and Vicksburg, enactment may so directly and materially Mississippi, touching at the intermediate burden interstate commerce as to be in itself a regulation of such commerce. We cannot perceive that there is any conflict between the decision in that case and that now made. The Louisiana statute as interpreted by the court, embraced every passenger carrier coming into the state. The Ohio statute does not interfere at all with the management of the defendant's trains outside of the state, nor does it apply to all its trains coming into the state. It relates only to the stopping of a given number of its trains within the state at certain points, and then only long enough to receive and let off passengers. It so manifestly subserves the public convenience, and is in itself so just and reasonable, as wholly to preclude the idea that it was, as the Louisiana statute was declared to be, a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or a direct interference with its freedom. The judgment in Wabash, St. L. & P. Railway Co. v. Illinois is entirely consistent with [806]the views herein expressed. A statute of Illinois was construed by the supreme court of that state as prescribing rates, not simply for railroad transportation beginning and ending within Illinois, but for transportation between points in Illinois and points in other states under contracts for continuous service covering the entire route through several states. Referring to the principle contained in the statute, this court held that if restricted to transportation beginning and ending within the limits of the state it might be very just and equitable, but that it could not be applied to transportation through an entire series of states without imposing a direct burden upon interstate commerce, forbidden by the Constitution. In the case before us there is no attempt upon the part of Ohio to regulate the movement of the defendant company's interstate trains throughout the whole route traversed by them. It applies only to the movement of trains while within the state, and to the extent simply of requiring a given number, if so many are daily run, to stop at certain places long enough to receive and let off passengers. Nor is Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois inconsistent with the views we have expressed. In that case a statute of Illinois was held, in certain particulars, to be unconstitutional (although the legislation of Congress did not cover the subject) as directly and unnecessarily burdening interstate commerce. The court said: "The effect of the statute of Illinois, as construed and applied by the supreme court of the state, is to require a fast mail train carrying interstate passengers and the United States mail from Chicago, in the state of Illinois, to places south of the Ohio river, over an interstate highway established by authority of Congress, to delay the transportation of such passengers and mails by turning aside from the direct interstate route, and running to a station three miles and a half away from a point on that route, and back again to the same point, and thus traveling| seven miles which form no part of its course, before proceeding on its way; and to do this for the purpose of discharging and receiving passengers at that station, for the interstate travel to and from which, as is admitted in this case, the railway company furnishes other and ample accommodation.[307] This court is unanimously of opinion that this requirement is an unconstitutional hindrance and obstruction of interstate commerce, and of the passage of the mails of the United States." Again: "It may well be, as held by the courts of Illinois, that the arrangement_made by the company with the postoffice department of the United States cannot have the effect of abrogating a reasonable police regulation of the state But a statute of the state, which unnecessarily interferes with the speedy and uninterrupted carriage of the mails of the United States, cannot be considered as a reasonable police regulation." The statute before us does not require the defendant company to turn any of its trains from their direct interstate route. Besides, it is clear that the particular question now presented was not involved in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, for it is stated in the court's opinion that "the question whether a statute which merely required interstate railroad trains, without going out of their course, to stop at county seats, would be within the constitutional power of the state, is not presented, and cannot be decided, upon this record." The above extracts show the full scope of that decision. Any doubt upon the point is removed by the reference made to that case in Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 431 [41: 1064,1066]. It has been suggested also that the statute of Ohio is inconsistent with section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States authorizing every railroad company in the United States operated by steam, its successors and assigns," to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination." In Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 638 [42: 878,887], above cited, it was held that the authority given by that statute to railroad companies to carry "freight and property" over their respective roads from one state to another state did not authorize a railroad company to carry into a state *cattle known, or which by due dili-[308] gence might be known, to be in such condition as to impart or communicate disease to the domestic cattle of such state; and that a statute of Kansas prescribing as a rule of civil conduct that a person or corporation should not bring into that state cattle known, or which by proper diligence could be known, to be capable of communicating disease to domestic cattle, could not be regarded as beyond the necessities of the case, nor as interfering with any right intended to be given or recognized by section 5258 of the Revised Statutes. And we adjudge that the above statutory provision was not intended to interfere with the authority of the states to enact such regulations, with respect at least to a railroad corporation of its own creation, as were not directed against interstate commerce, but which only incidentally or remotely affected such commerce, and were not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce, but were designed reasonably to subserve the convenience of the public. Imaginary cases are put for the purpose of showing what might be done by the state that would seriously interfere with or discriminate against interstate commerce, if the statute in question be upheld as consistent with the Constitution of the United States. Without stopping to consider whether the illustrations referred to are apposite to the present inquiry, it is sufficient to say that it is always easy to suggest extreme cases for the application of any principle embodied in a judicial opinion. Our present judgment has reference only to the case before us, and when other cases arise in which local statutes are alleged not to be legitimate exertions of the police powers of the state, but to infringe upon national authority, it can then be determined whether they are to be controlled by the decision now rendered. It would be impracticable, as well as unwise, to attempt to lay down any rule that would govern every conceivable case that might be suggested by ingenious minds. For the reason stated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is affirmed. [309] *Mr. Justice Shiras filed the following dissenting opinion: The Constitution of the United States, in its eighth section, confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes, and to establish postoffices and post roads. In pursuance of this power, Congress, on June 15, 1866, enacted that "every railroad company in the United States, whose road is operated by steam, its successors and assigns, is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries, all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor, and to connect with roads of other states so as to form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to the place of destination." Rev. Stat. § 5258. to prevent, by change of time schedules, carriage in different cars, or by other means or devices, the carriage of freight from being continuous from the place of shipment to the place of destination. It was said by this court in California v. California Pacific R. R. Company, 127 U. 8. 39 [32: 157, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153], that— "It cannot at the present day be doubted that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce among the several states, as well as to provide for postal accommodations and[310] military exigencies, had authority to pass such laws. The power to construct, or to authorize individuals or corporations to construct, national highways and bridges from state to state, is essential to the complete control and regulation of interstate commerce. Without authority in Congress to establish and maintain such highways and bridges, it would be without authority to regulate one of the most important adjuncts of commerce. This power in former times was exerted to a very limited extent-the Cumberland or National road being the most notable instance. Its exertion was but little called for, as commerce was then mostly conducted by water, and many of our statesmen entertained doubts as to the existence of the power to establish ways of communication by land. But since, in consequence of the expansion of the country, the multiplication of its products, and the invention of railroads and locomotion by steam, land transportation has so vastly increased, a sounder consideration of the subject has prevailed, and led to the conclusion that Congress has plenary power over the whole subject. Of course, the authority of Congress over the territories of the United States, and its power to grant franchises exercisable therein, are, and ever have been, undoubted. But the wider power was very freely exercised, and much to the general satisfaction, in the creation of the vast system of railroads connecting the East with the Pacific, traversing states as well as territories, and employing the agency of state as well as Federal corporations." In the case of Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184 [40: 935, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 391], the validity of the act of February 4, 1887, was sustained, and its provisions were held applicable even to a railroad company whose entire road was within the limits of the state of its creation, when, by agreeing to receive goods by virtue of foreign through bills of lading and to participate in through rates and charges, it became part of a continuous line of transportation. By the act of February 4, 1887, entitled "An Act to Regulate Commerce" (24 Stat. at L. 379), Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission, and enacted that the provisions of that act should "apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and By an act approved February 23, 1869, the partly by water when both are used, under a state of Louisiana forbade common carriers common control, management, or arrange- of passengers to make discrimination on ac-[311] ment, for a continuous carriage or shipment count of race or color. A person of color from one state or territory of the United took passage upon a steamboat plying beStates, or the District of Columbia, to any tween New Orleans and Vicksburg. in the other state or territory of the United States state of Mississippi, and was carried from ;"and that it should be unlawful for New Orleans to her place of destination any common carrier subject to the provisions within Louisiana, and being refused accomof the act, to enter into any combination, modations, on account of her color, in the rontract, or agreement, expressed or implied,' cabin specially set apart for white persons, | governed from one end to the other of his route is a necessity in his business, and to secure it Congress, which is untrammeled by state lines, has been invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what such regulations shall be. If this statute can be enforced against those engaged in interstate commerce, it may as well be against those engaged in foreign; and the master of a ship clearing from New Orleans for Liverpool, having passengers on board, would be compelled to carry all, white and colored, in the same cabin during his passage down the river, or be subject to an action for damages, exemplary as well as actual, by anyone who felt himself aggrieved because he had been excluded on account of his color. brought an action in the district court for the parish of New Orleans, under the provisions of the act above referred to. By way of defense it was insisted that the statute was void in respect to the matter complained of, because, as to the business of the steamboat, it was an attempt to regulate commerce between the states, and therefore in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. The state court held that the statute was valid, and the case was brought to this court, where the judgment of the state court was reversed. The reasoning of the court is so closely applicable to the case before us that we quote a considerable part of the opinion: "We think that it may be safely said that state legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce, or to "This power of regulation may be exerinterfere directly with its freedom, does en- cised without legislation as well as with it. croach upon the exclusive power of Congress. By refraining from action, Congress in efThe statute now under consideration, in our fect adopts as its own regulations those opinion, occupies that position. It does not which the common law, or the civil law act upon the business through the local in- where that prevails, has provided for the[318] struments to be employed after coming with government of such business, and those in the state, but directly upon the business which the states, in the regulation of their as it comes into the state from without, or domestic concerns, have established affecting goes out from within. While it purports only commerce, but not regulating it within the to control the carrier when engaged within meaning of the Constitution. In fact, con-. the state, it must necessarily influence his gressional legislation is only necessary to conduct to some extent in the management cure defects in existing laws, as they are disof his business throughout his entire voyage. covered, and to adapt such laws to new deHis disposition of passengers taken up and velopments of trade. As was said by Mr. put down within the state, or taken up with- Justice Field, speaking for the court in Wel in to be carried without, cannot but affect ton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282 [23:350]: 'Inin a greater or less degree those taken up action by Congress is equivalent to a declarawithout and brought within, and sometimes tion that interstate commerce shall remain those taken up and put down without. A free and untrammeled.' Applying that prinpassenger in the cabin set apart for the use ciple to the circumstances of this case, conof whites without the state must, when the gressional inaction left the captain of the boat comes within, share the accommoda-steamboat to adopt such reasonable rules and tions of that cabin with such colored per- regulations for the disposition of passengers sons as may come on board afterwards, if the upon his boat, while pursuing her voyage law is enforced. within Louisiana or without, as seemed to [312] *"It was to meet just such a case that the him most for the interest of all concerned. commercial clause in the Constitution was The statute under which this suit is brought, adopted. The river Mississippi passes as construed by the state court, seeks to take through or along the borders of ten different away from him that power so long as he is states, and its tributaries reach many more. within Louisiana; and while recognizing to The commerce upon these waters is immense, the fullest extent the principle which susand its regulation clearly a matter of nation- tains a statute unless its unconstitutionality al concern. If each state was at liberty to is clearly established, we think this statute, regulate the conduct of carriers while within to the extent that it requires those engaged in its jurisdiction, the confusion likely to fol- the transportation of passengers among the low could not but be productive of great in-states to carry colored passengers in Louisconvenience and unnecessary hardships. Each state could provide for its own passengers and regulate the transportation of its own freight regardless of the interests of others. Nay, more, it could prescribe rules by which the carrier must be governed within the state in respect to passengers and property brought from without. On one side of the river or its tributaries he might be required to observe one set of rules, and on the other another. Commerce cannot flourish in the midst of such embarrassments. carrier of passengers can conduct his business with satisfaction to himself or comfort to those employing him, if on one side of a state line his passengers, both white and colored, must be permitted to occupy the same cabin, and on the other be kept separate. Uniformity in the regulations by which he is to be No iana in the same cabin with whites is unconstitutional and void. If the public good requires such legislation, it must come from Congress, and not from the states." Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 [24: 547]. I am not able to think that this decision is satisfactorily disposed of, in the principal opinion, by citing it, and then dismissing it with the observation that it is not perceived that there is any conflict between it and that now made. The state of Illinois enacted that if any railroad corporation shall charge, collect, or receive for the transportation of any passenger or freight of any description upon its railroad, for any distance within the state, the same or a greater amount of toll or compensation than is at the same time charged, collected, or received for the transportation in the same direction of any passenger or | to central Illinois, or from the latter to New like quantity of freight, of the same class, York, is obvious, and it is not easy to see over a greater distance of the same road, all how any distinction can be made. Whatever [314]*such discriminating rates. charges, collec- may be the instrumentalities by which this tions, or receipts, whether made directly or transportation from the one point to the by the means of a rebate, drawback, or other other is effected, it is but one voyage, as shift or evasion, shall be deemed and taken much so as that of the steamboat on the Misagainst any such railroad company as prima sissippi river. It is not the railroads themfacie evidence of unjust discrimination pro- selves that are regulated by this act of the hibited by the provisions of the act. The Illinois legislature, so much as the charge act further provided a penalty of not over for transportation; and, in the language just $5,000, and also that the party aggrieved cited, if each one of the states through whose should have a right to recover three times territories these goods are transported can the amount of damages sustained, with costs fix its own rules for prices, for modes of and attorney's fees. Rev. Stat. Ill. chap. transit, for terms and modes of delivery, 114, § 126. and all the other incidents of transporta. tion to which the word 'regulation' can be applied, it is readily seen that the embarrassments upon interstate transportation, as an element of interstate commerce, might be too oppressive to be submitted to. 'It was,' in the language of the court cited above, 'to meet just such a case that the commerce clause of the Constitution was adopted.' An action to recover penalties under this statute was brought by Illinois against the Wabash, St. Louis, and Pacific Railway Company, an Illinois corporation in which the allegations were that the railroad company had charged Elder & McKinney for transporting goods from Peoria, in the state of Illinois, to New York City, at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred pounds for a carload; that on the same day the railroad company had charged one Bailey for transporting similar goods from Gilman to New York City at the rate of twenty-five cents per hundred pounds per car-load; that the carload for Elder & McKinney was carred eighty-six miles further in the state of Illinois than the other carload of the same weight; that this freight, being of the same class in both instances, and over the same road, except as to the difference in the distance, made a dis-subjects which prompted the formation of[316] crimination forbidden by the statute, whether the charge was regarded for the whole distance from the terminal point in Illinois to New York City, or the proportionate charge for the haul within the state of Illinois. Judgment went against the company in the courts of the state of Illinois, and the case was brought to this court. It was here strenuously contended that, in the absence of congressional legislation a state legislature has the power to regulate the charges made by the railroads of the state for transporting goods and passengers to and from places within the state, when such goods and passengers are brought from or carried to points without the state, and are therefore in the course of transportation from any state or to another state. And of that view were several justices of this court, who, in the opinion filed on their behalf, [315 cited the very cases that art cited and relied on in the majority opinion in the present case. But the court did not so hold, and its reasoning is so plainly applicable to the question now before us, it may well be quoted at some length. After having reviewed some of the previous cases, and having quoted those passages in the opinion of the court in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 [24: 547], which have hereinbefore been quoted, Mr. Justice Miller, giving the opinion of the court, proceeded as follows: "The applicability of this language to the case now under consideration, of a continuous transportation of goods from New York "It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the right of continuous transportation from one end of the country to the other is essential in modern times to that freedom of commerce from the restraints which the states might choose to impose upon it, that the commerce clause was intended to secure. This clause giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations, as this court has said before, was among the most important of the the Constitution." Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 574 [24:1018]; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 446 [6: 688]. And it would be a very feeble and almost useless provision, but poorly adapted to secure the entire freedem of commerce among the states which was deemed essential to a more perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if, at every stage of the transportation of goods and chattels through the country, the state within whose limits a part of this transportation must be done could impose regulations concerning the price, compensation, or taxation, or any other restrictive regulation interfering with and seriously embarrassing this commerce. "The argument on this subject can never be better stated than it is by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 195, 196 [6: 23, 69 70]. He there demonstrates that commerce among the states, like commerce with foreign nations, is necessarily a commerce which crosses state lines and extends into the states, and the power of Congress to regulate it exists wherever that commerce is found. Speaking of navigation as an element of commerce, which it is. only as a means of transportation now largely su perseded by railroads, he says: "The power of Congress, then, comprehends ravigation within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes. It may, of con sequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York and act upon the very waters, the Hud |