eral inclosed a copy of the Secretary's re- hundred dollars has not been allowed or Proceeding under the above employment in the name of the government of the United States, Johnson took steps to acquire such lands by proceedings for their condemnation, and obtained decrees against the persons interested in them. In order to carry on such proceedings it was necessary that he should search and ascertain, and he did search and ascertain, the titles to the lands sought to be condemned. After rendering these services, he presented two bills against the government, which were approved and allowed [370]by the Attorney General, one being for $4,000, and the other for $2,500. These services were rendered by him in 1892, and were worth those sums respectively. In the statement that accompanies the questions certified it is said that for many years before 1892, and for many years prior to Johnson's employment, it was the custom and usage of the government to pay to district attorneys, under like employment and for like services, compensation outside of their annual salaries as fixed by statute at the sum of two hundred dollars. Johnson had received from the United States for services (other thar. those above mentioned) rendered for the government in the year 1892, either as district atttorney or under employment or directions of the Attorney General, the sum of $2,250. In 1891 he rendered services to the government in and about the acquisition of other lands in his district by condemnation proceedings. These services were rendered under employment similar to that above stated, in acquiring lands for like purposes. For the services thus rendered in 1891 he was paid by the government a sum exceeding six thousand dollars. He had also been paid for other services rendered to the government in 1891 further and additional sums. The aggregate so paid for services in 1891 exceeded six thousand dollars by a sum which, together with the amounts paid to him as above stated for services rendered in 1892, equaled the sum of six thousand dollars. Such excess over six thousand dollars existed and appeared after crediting and allowing on the sums so received by him the necessary expenses of his office, including the necessary clerk hire, as audited and allowed to him in the years 1891 and 1892. After the above services were rendered in 1892 Johnson requested that the amounts so allowed be paid by the officers of the Treasury, but those officers refused to audit or allow his bills or any part of the same, except as above stated, and refused to allow or pay to him any part of the same. Upon the trial in the circuit court it was admitted that the expense account of Johnson was $1,018.23, which was allowed by the Attorney General; that if the amounts he received for services in obtaining lands in said district (which services were similar in nature, employment, etc., to those here claimed for) are to be computed as part of the amount limited by section 835 of the Revised Statutes, then he had received in excess of the amount so limited for the year 1891 a sum, which, added to the amounts received by him for the year 1892 (and which are fees and emoluments referred to by section 835 of the Revised Statutes), equaled the sum of six thousand dollars and the legitimate office expenses of his office; and that if the services involved in this action and the other similar services stated above are to be accounted as a part of the maximum fixed by section 835 of the Revised Statutes,and if the government, having paid him for one year in excess of such maximum, has the right to recoup, set off, or counterclaim such overpayment against an amount otherwise due, then Johnson had no cause of action as set forth in his present suit. The circuit court of appeals desires information upon the following questions of law arising out of the above facts: 1. Whether Johnson is entitled to be paid the said sum of six thousand five hundred dollars for the services rendered by him in the year 1892. This question is submitted without reference to the provisions of section 835 of the Revised Statutes. *2. Whether, if the first question be an-[372] swered in the affirmative, such compensation should be included in the fees and emoluments of claimant's office within the meaning of sections 834, 835, and 844 of the Revised Statutes. 3. Whether, if both of the above questions are answered in the affirmative, the government of the United States can, under the circumstances stated, apply the six thousand five hundred dollars as such sum was ap plied, on account of the payments made by the United States for services rendered by The government contends that the services in question were such as the law required the district attorney to render, and consequently that he could receive no special compensation therefor. After the services rendered in 1892, and after the above sum of six thousand five hundred dollars had been allowed by the Attor-Johnson in the year 1891. ney General as stated, the accounting officers of the United States caused a warrant on funds appropriated for the War Department to be drawn for the sum of six thousand five hundred dollars, and "conveyed into the Treasury of the United States." That warrant In support of this proposition the Assist[371]"was drawn and conveyed" *against and ant Attorney General refers to Gibson v. in payment of the amount which Johnson, Peters, 150 U. S. 342, 347 [37: 1104, 1106]. for services rendered in 1891, had been paid That was an action against the receiver of in excess of the maximum fixed by section a national bank to recover the value of legal 335 of the Revised Statutes. Such convey-services alleged to have been rendered or ofance and application were made by the government without his consent, and except as above stated his claim for six thousand five fered to be rendered by a district attorney In its opinion in that case this court referred to section 380 of the Revised Statutes, providing that "all suits and proceedings arising out of the provisions of law governing national banking associations, in which the United States or any of its officers or agents shall be parties, shall be conducted by the district attorneys of the several districts under the direction and supervision of the Solicitor of the Treasury," and observed that the suit against McDonald was one embraced by that section, and that the receiver was, within its meaning, an officer and agent of the United States. The full scope of the decision in Gibson v. Peters is shown by this extract from the opinion in that case. The point in judgment was that the services rendered by Gibson were in discharge of duties imposed upon lar kind, and as no statute made provision for additional or special compensation for such services, his claim against the United States for extra pay could not be allowed. to the United States, the words 'other than the government' were inserted. The introduction of those words in that clause emphasizes the purpose not to subject the United States to any system for compensating *district attorneys except that expressly[374] established by Congress, and therefore to withhold from them any compensation for extra or special services rendered in their official capacity, which is not expressly authorized by statute. Whatever legal serv ices were rendered or offered to be rendered by the plaintiff in the McDonald suit were rendered or offered to be rendered by him as After referring also to sections 770, 823 to United States district attorney, and in that 827 inclusive, 1764, and 1765, the court said: capacity alone. As such officer he is not en"It ought not to be difficult under any rea- titled to demand compensation for the servsonable construction of these statutory pro-ices so rendered or offered to be rendered." visions to ascertain the intention of Congress. A distinct provision is made for the salary of a district attorney, and he cannot receive, on that account, any more than the statute prescribes. But the statute is equally explicit in declaring, in respect to compen-him by law in relation to suits of a particusation that may be 'taxed and allowed,' that [373]he shall receive no other than that specified in sections 823 to 827 inclusive, except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law.' It also declares that no officer in any branch In United States v. Winston, 170 U. S. 522, of the public service shall receive any addi- 525 [42: 1130,1132], which involved the questional pay, extra allowance, or compensation, tion whether the district attorney of the in any form whatever, for any service or United States for the district of Washington duty, unless the same is expressly authorized could be allowed special compensation for by law, or unless the appropriation therefor services rendered by direction or at the inexplicitly states that it is for such addition- stance of the Attorney General in a case in al pay, extra allowance, or compensation. the circuit court of appeals for the ninth cirNo room is left here for construction. It is not cuit sitting at San Francisco, it was held expressly provided by law that a district at that the duties of the claimant as district torney shall receive compensation for serv-attorney of the United States were limited by ices performed by him in conducting suits arising out of the provisions of the national banking law in which the United States or any of its officers or agents are parties. Without such express provision, compensation for services of that character cannot be taxed, allowed, or paid. Nor can the expenses of the receivership be held to include compensation to the district attorney for conducting a suit in which the receiver is a party, for the obvious reason that the statute does not expressly provide compensation for such services. Congress evidently intended to require the performance by a district attorney of all the duties imposed upon him by law, without any other remuneration than that coming from his salary, from the compensation or fees authorized to be taxed and allowed, and from such other compensation as is expressly allowed by law specifically on account of services named. Nothing in the last clause of section 823 militates against this view. On the contrary, the roper interpretation of that clause supports the conclusion we have reached. Its principal object was to make it clear that Congress did not intend to prohibit attorneys, solicitors, and proctors, representing individuals in the courts of the United States, from charging and receiving, in addition to taxable fees and allowances, such compensation as was reasonable under local usage, or such as was agreed upon between them and their clients. But to prevent the application of that rule the boundaries of his district; and that, In Ruhm v. United States, 66 Fed. Rep. 531, 532, it was held that, as it is the duty of a district attorney to prosecute in his district all civil actions in which the United States are concerned, he is not entitled to extra compensation for conducting a suit to recover pension money fraudulently secured. The controlling question, therefore, in the present case is whether Johnson was under a duty imposed upon him as district attorney to perform the services for which he here claims special compensation. If such was his duty as defined by law. then he is for bidden by statute from receiving any special | attorney have declined to represent the United States in such proceedings upon the What relations did the district attorney This statute being in force, the Attorney General directed the defendant in error as district attorney to institute on behalf of the government the condemnation proceedings desired by the Secretary of War. It was of course not contemplated by Congress that the Attorney General should be away from the national capital in order to give his personal attention to the conduct of such proceedings. He therefore directed the district attorney of the district in which the lands were situated to institute and prosecute the required proceedings. Could the district Under the interpretation placed by us upon sections 771 and 824, it results that, according to the principle announced in Gibson v. Peters, the defendant in error having been under a duty to represent the United States in the condemnation proceedings referred to, and there being no statute explicitly allowing him extra compensation for the services rendered by him in and about those proceedings, his present claim must be disallowed. tien has been called by counsel certainly do chap. 202, 5 Stat. at L. 525, § 12) as to justify this court in departing in any degree from such an interpretation of those sections as is required by the obvious import of the words found in them. Such a practice may be resorted to in aid of interpretation, but it cannot be recognized as controlling when the statute to be interpreted is clear and explicit in its language and its meaning not doubtful. United States v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 221 [28: 126, 127]; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136, 141 [40: 369, 371]. for the performance of such a service must depend on that fact, not on the fact that he has been instructed by the head of department. A contrary construction would lay the foundation for extra compensation to district attorneys in almost every case in which they appear in civil actions in which the United States are concerned." 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 84, 86. At a later date, May 25th, 1858, Attorney General Black had before him an application for special allowance to a district attorney It may, however, be observed that some of for services rendered by him. The claim, he the opinions of Attorneys General rest upon said, involved three questions, the first of rules of construction that forbid the allow- which was, Can the district attorney, in any ance of the claim of the defendant in error. case, charge more for his services than the In 1855 special or extra compensation was fee-bill expressly allows? He said: "The claimed by a district attorney for services first question does not, for a moment, admit rendered under employment by the Navy De- of any other reply than a direct negative: partment, in a certain case in a circuit court the district attorney can receive such comof the United States in which the govern- pensation, and such only, as the fee-bill ment was a party. Attorney General Cush-gives. This is not only the general policy ing referred to the act of February 26th, of the government, but it is expressly de1853, regulating "the fees and costs to be al-clared to be the will of Congress by the act lowed clerks, marshals, and attorneys of the of 1853. When, therefore, a district atcircuit and district courts of the United torney makes a charge against the Treasury States, and for other purposes." 10 Stat. for services, he must support it by showing at L. 161, chap. 80. That act declared, some clause in the fee-bill which authorizes among other things, that in lieu of the com- him to recive what he claims. When a duty[380] pensation then allowed to the officers named is enjoined upon him by the law of his ofno other compensation should be taxed and fice, and not merely by the request of a deallowed. It also established for district at- partment, he is bound to perform it and take torneys a fee for each day "of his necessary as compensation what the law gives him. attendance in a court of the United States That is his contract; and if it be a bad one on the business of the United States." The for him he has no remedy but resignation. provisions of the act of 1853 have been pre- The subject is not open to a new bargain beserved in chapter sixteen of title 13 of the tween him and any other officer of the gov Revised Statutes. After referring to some ernment. All criminal prosecutions and all former opinions given by him, Mr. Cushing civil suits in which the United States are a said: "But in a matter like that now before party of record fall within this principle. me, which is of the direct official business of În them no charge for extra services can be a district attorney in the court of the United legally allowed, though it be true that some States for his district, which is of the very of them require an amount of labor and skill class of business for which the act of 1853 for which the compensation allowed by the expressly and in plain terms provides, and as fee-bill is altogether inadequate. I cannot to which any other compensation is emphati- make out, in any way satisfactory to my own cally excluded by the strong terms of that mind, the ingenious distinction which would [379]act, it does not appear to me that *any extra pay the officer as attorney what the fee-bill or special compensation can be lawfully paid gives, and then pay him besides a quantum to the district attorney. Nor, in my judg- meruit for managing the same case ment, is the case taken out of the general counsel." 9 Ops. Atty. Gen. 146, 147. rule by the fact that the suit concerns immediately the business of the Navy Department, and has been the subject of instructions from the Secretary of the Navy. All the civil business of the government concerns some one of its departments, ard may require the attention of its head. It cannot be that a suit in the name of the United States, pending in the district or circuit court, is out of the scope of the regular duty of a district attorney because of its arising in the business of the Navy Department rather than the Treasury or any other department; nor that in such a case the service of the district attorney becomes that of counsel specially retained by the Department. This latter enactment must have been designed, it seems to me, for contingencies where a head of department needs professional services in a case not provided for by the particular terms of the law, and the special compensation to a district attorney U. S., Book 43. 173 U. S. 47 as In an opinion rendered March 13th, 1888, Attorney General Garland, upon an extended review of the adjudged cases, said: "From these authorities it may be derived that the elements necessary to justify the payment of compensation to an officer for additional services are, that they shall be performed by virtue of a separate and distinct appointment authorized by law; that such services shall not be services added to or connected with the regular duties of the place he holds; and that a compensation whose amount is fixed by law or regulation shall be provided for their payment." 19 Ops. Atty. Gen. 121, 125, 126. The same views were expressed by the Second Comptroller of the Treasury in an opinion delivered by him as late as 1893, in Earhart's Case. Cousar's Dig. 12. We are of opinion that Congress intended by sections 1764 and 1765 to uproot the prac tice under which, in the absence of any stat 737. ute expressly authorizing it, extra allow | United States for the recovery of the amount ances or special compensation were made to of a reward offered for the arrest of a crimpublic officers for services which they were inal. Affirmed. required to render in consideration only of the fixed salary and emoluments established for them by law. Our duty is to give effect to the legislation of Congress, and not to defeat it by an interpretation plainly inconsistent with the words used. [381] *The conclusion is that as the defendant in error was under a duty as district attorney to represent the United States in the condemnation proceedings referred to (§ 771); as his attendance in court on those proceed- The court below held that the plaintiffs ings was on the business of the United were entitled to recover the sum by them States (§ 824); as no statute provides for claimed (32 Ct. Cl. 123), and the United extra or special compensation for services of States prosecutes this appeal. The origin that character; and as the existing statutes of the controversy and the facts upon which declare that no officer in any branch of the the legal conclusion of the court was rested public service shall, directly or indirectly, are these: The two plaintiffs were, one a regor in any form whatever, receive from the ular and the other a specially appointed depTreasury of the United States any addition-uty marshal. They claimed five hundred al pay, extra allowance, or compensation, un- dollars, the sum of a reward offered by the less the same be authorized by law and the Attorney General for the arrest and convicappropriation therefor expressly states that tior of one Asa NcNeil, who was accused of it is for such additional pay, extra allow- having been concerned in the killing of one ance, or compensation (§§ 1764, 1765, Act or more revenue officers at a village in of June 20th, 1874, chap. 328), the claim Holmes county, Florida. McNeil was arof the defendant in error must be rejected, rested by the officers in question, tried, and and judgment rendered for the United convicted. This suit was brought in conseStates. quence of a refusal to pay the reward. The act of March 3, 1891, "making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the government for the fiscal year ending June the thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, and for other purposes," under the heading "Miscellaneous," contained the following ap See same case below, 32 Ct. Cl. 123. Messrs. Richard R. McMahon and *Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion[382] of the court: 1 For the reasons stated the first question is answered in the negative; and under the certificate the answer to the other questions becomes both unnecessary and immaterial. It will be so certified. Dissenting: Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. propriation: "Prosecution of crimes; for the Justice Peckham. UNITED STATES, Appt., บ. detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States, preliminary to indictunder the direction of the ment Attorney General, .. thirty-five thous- ANDREW J. MATTHEWS and Thomas 1891, addressed a letter to the marshal of Gunn. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 381-389.) 1. A reward expressly offered by competent leg- 2. When the statute gives the attorney gen eral discretion to whom to offer the reward, When the reward is sanctioned by an appro- [No. 79.] the northern district of Florida, saying: dred dollars (500) for the arrest and deliv- Beyond doubt the appropriation empowered the Attorney General to make the offer of reward, and hence in doing so he exercised a lawful discretion vested in him by Congress. It is also clear that the offer of the reward made by the Attorney General was broad enough to embrace an arrest made by the deputies in question. If, then, the right to recover is to be tested by the provisions of Argued December 8, 1898. Decided March the statute and by the language of the offer A 6, 1899. PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of Andrew J. Matthews and Thomas Gunn, plaintiffs, against the of reward, the judgment below was correctly |