public policy to allow an officer to receive a ered at common law to be a species of quasi reward for the performance of a duty which extortion, and partaking of the character of he was required by law to perform, therefore a bribe. Bridge v. Cage, Cro. Jac. 103; Bathe statute conferring power on the Attorney dow v. Salter, Wm. Jones, 65; Stotesbury v. General and the offer made by him in virtue Smith, 2 Burr. 924; Hatch v. Mann, 15 of the discretion in him vested, should be so Wend. 44; Gillmore v. Lewis, 12 Ohio, 281; construed as to exclude the right of the dep- Stacy v. State Bank of Illinois, 5 Ill. 91; uties in question to recover, since as deputy Davies v. Burns, 5 Allen, 349; Brown v. Godmarshals an obligation was upon them to frey, 33 Vt. 120; Morrell v. Quarles, 35 Ala. make the arrest without regard to the reward 544; Day v. Punam Ins. Co. 16 *Minn. 408,[385] offered. Second. That even although it be con- 414; Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42 [26 Am. ceded that the officers in question were other- Rep. 1]; Matter of Russell's Application, 51 wise entitled to recover the reward, they were Conn. 577 [50 Am. Rep. 55]; Ring v. Devwithout capacity to do so because of the gen- lin, 68 Wis. 384; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. eral statutory provision forbidding "officers v. Grafton, 51 Ark. 504. The broad differin any branch of the public service or any ence between the right of an officer to take other person whose salary, pay, or emolu- from a private individual a reward or comments are fixed by law or regulations," from pensation for the performance of his official receiving "any additional pay, extra allow-duty, and the capacity of such officer to reance or compensation in any form whatever" (Rev. Stat. 1765), and because of the further provision "that no civil officer of the government shall hereafter receive any compensation or perquisites, directly or indirectly, from the Treasury or property of the United States beyond his salary or compensation allowed by law (18 Stat. at L. 109, chap. 328, § 3). The first of these contentions amounts simply to saying that though the act of Congress vested the amplest discre[384]tion on the subject in the Attorney General, and although that discretion was by him exercised without qualification or restriction, it becomes a matter of judicial duty in construing the statute and in interpreting the authority exercised under it to disregard both the obvious meaning of the statute and the general language of the authority exercised under it by reading into the statute a qualification which it does not contain and by inserting in the offer of reward a restric ceive a reward expressly authorized by competent legislative authority and sanctioned by the executive officer to whom the legisla tive power has delegated ample discretion to offer the reward, is too obvious to require anything but statement. Nor is there anything in the case of Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219, tending to obscure the difference which exists between the offer of a reward by competent legislative and executive authority and an offer by one not having the legal capacity to do so. In that case, the plaintiff, a watchman in the employ of the city of Boston, while patrolling the streets, in the ordinary performance of his duty, discovered and apprehended an incendiary, who was subsequently convicted. The action was brought to recover the amount of a reward which the city government had offered "for the detection and conviction of any incendiaries" who had set fire to any tion not mentioned in it, the argument being building in the city, or might do so, within that this should be done under the assump of decisions denying the right of a public a given period. Solely upon the authority tion that it is within the province of a court officer to recover from a private individual to disregard a statute upon the theory that a reward or extra compensation for the perthe power which it confers is contrary to formance of a duty owing to the party sought public policy. It cannot be doubted that in exercising the powers conferred on him by the to be charged, it was held that there could statute, the Attorney General could at his be no recovery. The city government of Bosdiscretion have confined the reward offered ton, acting in its official capacity, and in by him to particular classes of persons. To invoke, however, judicial authority to insert such restriction in the offer of reward when it is not there found, is to ask the judicial power to exert a discretion not vested in it, but which has been lodged by the lawmaking power in a different branch of the government. Aside from these considerations the contention as to the existence of a supposed public policy, as applied to the question in hand, is without foundation in reason and wanting in support of authority. the exercise of the general powers vested in It is undoubted that both in England and Mr. Justice Brown concurring in the result only: Looking at the question of public policy | ney General to offer and pay rewards, did by the light of the legislation of Congress, not include or authorize the cffer or payon other subjects, it becomes clear that the ment of any reward to a public officer under expediency of offering to public officers a re- such circumstances. ward as an incentive or stimulus for the energetic performance of public duty has often been resorted to. As early as July 31, 1789, in chapter 5 of the statutes of that year, a portion of the penalties, fines, and forfeitures which might be recovered under the act, and which were not otherwise appropriated were directed to be paid to one or more of certain officers of the cus-ulations," as specified in Revised Statutes, toms. Like provisions were embodied in section 69 of chapter 35 of the act of August 4, 1790; section 2 of chapter 22 of the act of May 6,1796; and section 91 of chapter 22 of the act of March 2, 1799. Similar provisions are also contained in the one hundred and seventy-ninth section of chapter 173, act of June 30, 1864, and the amendatory section, No. 1, of chapter 78 of the act of March 3, 1865. So also by section 3 of the anti-moiety act, chapter 391, June 22, 1874, a discretion was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury to award to officers of the customs as well as other parties, not exceeding one half of the net proceeds of forfeitures incurred in violation of the laws against smuggling. As said by Mr. Justice Grier, delivering the opinion of the court in Dor sheimer v. United States, 7 Wall. 173 [19: 187]: "The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade the payment of duties and taxes." Did the opinion of the court rest solely upon the ground stated in the opinion of the court of claims, that a deputy marshal is not an "officer," or "other person whose salary, pay, or emoluments are fixed by law or regsection 1765; nor a civil officer receiving from the United States a salary or compensation allowed by law, and therefore not within the act of June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 109),-I should have been disposed, though with some doubt, to acquiesce in the opinion. While I think a deputy marshal is beyond all peradventure an officer of the United States, yet as his compensation is by fees not paid directly by the government, but by agreement with the marshal, subject only to the limitation that such fees "shall not exceed three fourths of the fees and emoluments received or payable" to the marshall "for services rendered by him" (such deputy), I think it a grave question whether he is within the spirit of either of the sections above quoted. I consider it a reasonable construction to hold that these sections are limited to those who receive a salary or other compensation directly from the government, or one of its departments, and doubt their application *to one who, although [388] holding a permanent appointment as an officer, receives no pay directly from the government, but only such compensation as his superior may choose to allow him. (Douglas v. Wallace, 161 U. S. 346 [40: 727]). The fact that the statute vested a discretion in the Attorney General to include or not to include, when he exercised the power to offer a reward, particular persons within the offer by him made, and that in But I cannot concur in so much of the the instant case the discretion was so availed opinion as intimates that, under an act of of as not to exclude deputy marshals from Congress making an appropriation for the [387]taking the offered reward, renders it unnec- prosecution of crime, under the direction of essary to determine whether a deputy mar- the Attorney General, the Attorney General shal is an officer of the United States within has a discretion to direct any portion of it the meaning of section 1765 of the Revised to be paid to one of a class of persons who are Statutes and section 3 of the Act of June 20, forbidden by a previous act from receiving 1874, to which reference has already been any additional pay or compensation beyond made. As the reward was sanctioned by such as is allowed to them by law. This the statute making the appropriation, and could only be done upon the theory stated in was embraced within the offer of the Attor the opinion that the appropriation act, being ney General, it clearly, under any view of a special and later enactment, operated necthe case, was removed from the provisions essarily to ingraft upon the prior and genof the statutes in question. The appropria-eral statute an exception to the extent of the tion act being a special and later enactment operated necessarily to engraft upon the prior and general statute an exception to the extent of the power conferred on the Attorney General and necessary for the exercise of the discretion lodged in him for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the later and special act. Judgment affirmed. power conferred upon the Attorney General. I do not think the two acts stand in the relation of a prior general statute and a subsequent special one, but rather the converse. The prior acts are general acts, applicable to all officers of government whose salaries or compensations are fixed by law; the latter act makes a particular appropriation for the detection of crime, and vests the Attorney General with power to direct to whom it shall Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice be paid. But there can be no inference from Peckham dissented, upon the ground that it that he has a discretion to pay it to anythe offering or payment of a reward to a one who is forbidden by law to receive it. I public officer, for the performance of what had assumed it to be the law that a later act was at all events nothing more than his of- would not be held to qualify or repeal a prior ficial duty, was against public policy, and one, unless there were a positive repugnancy the act of Congress authorizing the Attor-between the provisions of the new law and ERROR to the Supreme Court of the the old, and even then the prior law is only I State of Louisiana to review a decree of In this case I see no intent whatever on For these reasons, I cannot concur in the opinion, though I do not dissent from the result. that Court varying and affirming the decree of the District Court of that State, and decreeing that the government bounty upon sugar earned upon the estate left by Richard H. Allen, deceased, be divided equally, and one half be distributed among his heirs as an unwilled portion, and that the other half be delivered to his widow and legatee, Mrs. Bettie Allen. Reversed and case remanded for further proceeding. See same case below, 48 La. Aun. 1036, 49 La. Ann. 1096, 1112. Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: *This was a controversy arising over the[390] distribution of the estate of Richard H. Allen, a large sugar planter of La Fourche parish, Louisiana, who died September 14, 1894, leaving a will of which the following clauses only are material to the disposition of this case: "I give to my wife, Bettie Allen, one half on my Rienzi plantation and one half of all tools, mules, etc. The names of my executors, etc., will be named hereafter. My executors shall have from one to five years to sell and close up the estate, as I fear property will be very low and dull. They can sell part cash, part on time, eight per cent interest with vendor's lien. I will that my wife do have one half of everything belonging to Rienzi, except the claim due me by the United States; that and other property I will speak of further on. I appoint as my executors, Ogden Smith and W. F. Collins, residing on Rienzi plantation. I also appoint Mrs. Bettie Allen, executrix. I give them full power to sell Rienzi plantation whenever they find a good offer for all of the property there belonging. When it is sold MRS. BETTIE ALLEN et al., Plffs. in Err., half of all the proceeds, cash, notes, etc., is v. OGDEN SMITH. OGDEN SMITH, Plff. in Err., v. MRS. BETTIE ALLEN et al. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 389-404.) to belong to my dear wife, Bettie Allen. The other half will be spoken of hereafter. As I fear property will be very low, I give my executors five years to work for a good price. In the meantime that they are waiting to sell, the place can be rented or worked so as to pay all taxes and other charges: any over that to go to Mrs. Bettie Allen's credit." Letters testamentary were issued to William F. Collins, Ogden Smith, and M. Eliza Government bounties-bounty on sugar goes beth Greene, the widow, better known as 1. 2. to the manufacturer. Bounties granted by a government are never pure donations, but are allowed either in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered, objects of public interest to be obtained, production or manufacture to be stimulated, or moral obligations to be recognized. The manufacturer of the sugar, although not the producer of the cane, is entitled to the bounty given by the act of Congress of August 28, 1894, to producers and manufacturers who had complied with the provisions of the bounty law of 1890, which had been repealed. Bettie Allen, who were authorized by special order to carry on and work the plantation, etc. The executors did not agree as to the disposition of the estate; Mrs. Allen and Collins filing a provisional account of their administration and praying for its approval, while Smith filed a separate account, prayed for its approval, and stated that he disagreed with his coexecutors in several particulars, and therefore filed an account in which his coexecutors did not concur. The principal dispute seems to have been over the cash left by the deceased, which Mrs. Allen claimed under the will, and Smith insisted belonged to the legal heirs who were[391] not cut off by the will. Mrs. Allen also Argued January 19, 1899. Decided March claimed the crop of the Rienzi planta6, 1899. tion, while Smith insisted it belonged [Nos. 168 & 176.] (49 to the legatees named in the will, to ty from the government, though based upon whom the realty was bequeathed. Opposi- an estimate of the crop as a means of caltions to the approval of both accounts were culation; that its allowance was conditioned also filed by various parties interested in the on the fulfilment by the deceased of certain estate, and for various reasons not necessary prerequisites; that the equitable claim of to be here enumerated. Judgment was de- the deceased to the bounty had been created livered by the district court, June 10, 1895, during his lifetime, the license obtained and settling the questions in dispute between the all conditions precedent complied with; that parties interested, and an appeal was taken it formed no part of the crops of 1894 or to the supreme court of Louisiana, which 1895, nor of their proceeds; that the execurendered an opinion March 9, 1896, varying tors did nothing but make the necessary the decree of the court below to the extent of proofs preparatory to its collection and reholding Mrs. Allen entitled to the net pro- ceive payment of the money. "It must conceeds of the crop for the year 1894, but af- sequently be classed as an unwilled asset of firming it in other respects. (48 La. Ann. the deceased, and not as part of the net pro1036.) No reference, however, was made in ceeds of the crop of 1894, passing, under the the proceedings up to this time to the gov- will, to Mrs. Betty Allen;" and that it must ernment bounty upon sugar, amounting to pass to the account of the legal heirs. $11,569.35, which was collected by Mrs Al-La. Ann. 1096.) Upon a rehearing, applied len, and which forms the subject of the pres- for by both parties, that court modified its ent litigation. views, and adjudged that the bounty money This suit was initiated by a petition filed in controversy be divided equally; that one August 18, 1896, by Collins and Mrs. Allen half be distributed among the heirs as an unfor the approval of their final account, and willed portion, and that the other half be deof the proposed distribution of the undis-livered to Mrs. Allen as legatee. From this tributed assets, among which was the bounty granted by Congress for sugar produced on the Rienzi plantation for the year 1894, the portion received, $11,569.35, being all that the estate was entitled to out of the appropriation made by Congress for this purpose. "This amount the accountants proposed to turn over to Mrs. Bettie Allen as the owner of the net proceeds of the crop of 1894 on the Rienzi plantation, under the will of the testator and the decree of the supreme court." Smith also filed a final account and an opposition to that of Mrs. Allen and Collins. particularly opposing giving any part of the bounty to Mrs. Allen, stating that "this money formed no part of the crop of 1894, is an unwilled asset, and must be distributed among the legal heirs who have not been cut off by the will, in accordance with the petitioner's final account filed herewith." These heirs, as stated by him in his account, were (1) the estate of Thomas H. Allen, Sen., a deceased brother of the testator, represented by J. Louis Aucoin, administrator; (2) two children of Mrs. Myra Turner, a de[392]ceased *sister; (3) five children of Mrs. Cynthia Smith, a deceased sister. Opposition was also filed by these several classes of heirs to the accounts of Mrs. Allen and Collins, and by certain other heirs who were not recognized by the executors, to that of Smith. Upon consideration of these various plead ings and the testimony introduced in connection therewith, the district court was of opinion that the bounty formed no part of the crop proper or the proceeds thereof. "Though based on the crop as a means of calculation, and conditioned on the production of the crop by the owner of the plantation under certain rules, it was a pure gratuity from the government;" that it did not therefore go to Mrs. Allen under the will, but to the heirs as an unwilled portion. An appeal was taken to the supreme court by the Smith heirs, by Ogden Smith, executor, and by Mrs. Allen and Collins. That court first held that the bounty was a gratui decree both parties sued out a writ of error from this court. 49 La. Ann. 1112. Messrs. James F. Pierson, Charlton R. Beattie, and Taylor Beattie for Mrs. Bettie Allen, as executrix and individually, and W. F. Collins, executor, plaintiffs in error in No. 168, and defendants in error in No. 176. Messrs. Charles Payne Fenner, Charles E. Fenner, and Samuel Henderson, Jr., for J. L. Aucoin, administrator, plaintiff in error in No. 176 and defendant in error in No. 168. Mr. Henry Chiapella and L. F. Suthon for Smith et al., defendants in error in No. 168, and plaintiffs in error in No. 176. *Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion[393] of the court: This case involves the question whether, under the act of Congress and the will of Richard H. Allen, the bounty of eight tenths of one per cent per pound, granted by Congress to the "producer" of sugar, was payable to his widow or to his heirs at law. In the course of the litigation in the state courts a large number of questions were raised and decided which are not pertinent to this issue. So far as these questions depend upon the construction of state laws or of the will of Mr. Allen, they are beyond our cognizance. So far as the question of bounty depends upon the construction of that law, the decision of the supreme court is equally binding upon us; but so far as it depends upon the construction of the act of Congress awarding such bounty, it is subject to reexamination here. The course of legislation upon the subject of the sugar bounty is set forth at length in the opinion of this court in United States v. Realty Co. 163 U. S. 427 [41: 215], and is briefly as follows: By the tariff act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 567), it was provided in paragraph 231 that on and after July 1, 1891, and until July 1, 1905, there should be paid "to the producer of sugar" a variable bounty, dependent upon polariscope tests, "under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall prescribe." Then follow three paragraphs requiring the producer to give notice to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the place of production, the methods employed, and an estimate of the amount to be produced, together with an application for a license and an accompanying bond. The Com[394]missioner was required to issue *this license, and to certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amount of the bounty for which the Secretary was authorized to draw warrants on the Treasury. This act was repealed August 28, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 509), while the crop of 1894 was in progress of growth, and about a fortnight before the death of Mr. Allen. But by a subsequent act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat. at L. 910, 933), it was enacted that there should be paid to those "producers and manufacturers of sugar" who had complied with the provisions of the previous law a similar bounty upon sugar manufactured and produced by them previous to August 28, 1894, upon which no bounty had been previously paid. As the sugar in question in this case was not manufactured and produced prior to August 28, 1894, this provision was not applicable; but there was a further clause (under which the bounty in this case was paid) to the effect that there should be paid to "those producers who complied with the provisions" of the previous bounty law of 1890, by filing an application for license and bond thereunder required, prior to July 1, 1894, and who would have been entitled to receive a license as provided for in said act, a bounty of eight tenths of a cent per pound on the sugars actually manufactured and produced during that part of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895, comprised in the period commencing August 20, 1894, and ending June 30, 1895, both days inclusive. The constitutionality of this act was affirmed by this court in United States v. Realty Co. 163 U. S. 430 [41: 216]. The material provisions of his will are as follows: 1. "I give to my wife, Bettie Alien, one half on my Rienzi plantation and one halı of all tools, mules, etc." 2. "My executors shall have from one to five years to sell and close up the estate." 3. "I will that my wife do have one half of everything belonging to Rienzi plantation, except the claim due me by the United States." (This was not the claim for bounty.) 4. "When it" (the plantation) "is sold, half of all the proceeds, cash, notes, etc., is to belong to my wife, Bettie Allen." "As I fear property will be very low, I give my executors five years to work for a good price." 5. "In the meantime, that they are wait ing to sell, the place can be rented or worked to pay all taxes and other charges, any over that to go to Mrs. Bettie Allen's credit." Under the last clause of the will the executors, while awaiting a favorable opportunity to sell the plantation, were authorized to work it so as to pay all taxes and other charges, and to place the net proceeds to Mrs. Allen's credit. In construing this clause the supreme court of Louisiana held, upon the first hearing (48 La. Ann. 1045), that Mistress Bettie was entitled to the net proceeds of the crop of the Rienzi plantation for the years 1894-1895. At the time of the filing of their first account by the executors, the crop of 1894 had not been sold by them, and the bounty granted by the act of March 2, 1895, had not been collected; consequently these two items were reserved to be afterwards accounted for by the executors. A further question, however, arose, and that was as to whether, in making up the net proceeds of the crop of 1894, the expenses incurred prior to the death of the testator should be[398] deducted, as well as those incurred by the executors after the death of the testator. Both the district court and the supreme At the time of Mr. Allen's death, Septem- court were of opinion that the will contember 19, 1894, and for many years prior there- plated and dealt with the renting or cultito, he was the owner of a valuable sugarvation of the plantation after the death of plantation, upon which he was engaged in the cultivation of cane and the manufacture of sugar. At this time there was standing in his fields a large crop of cane nearly ready for harvesting. In anticipation of this crop and of the manufacture of sugar therefrom, Mr. Allen had complied with all the provisions of the bounty law, and would, but for the repeal of the act of 1894, about one month prior to his death, have been entitled to collect the bounty. While, then, there was no bounty provision in force at [395]the time of his death,*Congress, in March of the following year, enacted the bounty law above specified in fulfilment of its moral obligation to recompense those who had planted their cane upon the supposition that the bounty granted by the act of 1890 would be continued. The crop of cane upon his plantation at his death was harvested by his executors at the expense of the funds in their hands, which expense was deducted from the gross proceeds of the sugar. the testator, and during such a period of The supreme court was further of the opinion that the bounty money which was collected from the government by the executors 1895, nor of their proceeds; that it was not formed no part of the crops of 1894 and in esse at the time those crops were grown and gathered; that the executors did nothing but make the necessary proofs preparatory to its collection and receive payment of the money, and that it should therefore be classed as an unwilled asset of the deceased, and not as part of the net proceeds of the crop of 1894, passing, under the will, |