ordinary prudence would use under the same circumstances." The cases necessarily vary with the_circumstances. In The Stroma, 42 Fed. Rep. 922, the libellant sought to recover damages received by its steamer, while moored alongside respondent's pier, by settling, with the fall of the tide, on the point of a spindle, part of a derrick attached to a sunken dredge. Work was proceeding for the removal of the dredge, and several buoys had been set to indicate the place of its several parts. The agent of the steamer knew of the location of [435]the wreck; *sought permission to moor outside of it; and undertook to put the ship in position. The liability to danger was as well known to the steamer as to the wharfinger, who made no representation and was free from negligence. The libel was dismissed, and the decree was affirmed by this court. Panama Railroad Company v. Napier Shipping Company, 166 U. S. 280 [41: 1004]. In The Moorcock, L. R. 13 Prob. Div. 157, defendants, who were wharfingers, agreed with plaintiff for a consideration to allow him to discharge his vessel at their jetty which extended into the river Thames, where the vessel would necessarily ground at the ebb of the tide. The vessel sustained injury from the uneven condition of the bed of the river adjoining the jetty. Defendants had no control over the bed, and had taken no steps to ascertain whether it was or was not a safe place for the vessel to lie upon. It was held that, though there was no warranty, and no express representation, there was an implied undertaking by defendants that they had taken reasonable care to ascertain that the bottom of the river at the jetty was not in a condition to cause danger to a vessel, and that they were liable. The judgment was sustained in the court of appeal (L. R. 14 Prob. Div. 64), and was approved by the house of lords in The Calliope [1891] A. C. 11, though in the latter case it was ruled, on the facts, that there was no sufficient evidence of any breach of duty on the part of the wharfingers, and that the injury to the vessel was caused by the captain and pilot attempting to berth her at a time of the tide when it was not safe. The berth was in itself safe, but it was held that, under the particular circumstances disclosed by the proofs, the ship owner had assumed as to the approaches the risk of reaching the berth; while the general rule in respect of the duty of wharfingers was not questioned. The Lord Chancellor remarked: "In this case the wharfinger, who happens to be the consignee, invites the vessel to a particular place to unload. If, as it is said, to his knowledge the place for unloading was improper and likely to injure the vessel, he certainly ought to have adopted one of these alternatives: either he ought not to have in[436]vited the vessel or he ought to have informed the vessel what the condition of things was when she was invited, so that the injury might have been avoided." Lord Watson: "I do not doubt that there is a duty incumbent upon wharfingers in the position of the appellants towards vessels which they in vite to use their berthage for the purpose of loading from or unloading upon their wharf; they are in a position to see, and are in my opinion bound to use reasonable diligence in ascertaining whether the berths themselves and the approaches to them are in an ordinary condition of safety for vessels coming to and lying at the wharf. If the approach to the berth is impeded by an unusual obstruction they must either remove it, or, if that cannot be done, they must give due notice of it to ships coming there to use their quay." And Lord Herschell: "I do not for a moment deny that there is a duty on the part of the owner of the wharf to those whom he invites to come alongside that wharf, and a duty in which the condition of the bed of the river adjoining that wharf may be involved. But in the present case we are not dealing, as were the learned judges in the cases which have been cited to us, with the condition of the bed of the river in itself dangerous-that is to say, which is such as necessarily to involve danger to a vessel coming to use a wharf in the ordinary way; and we are not dealing with a case of what I may call an abnormal obstruction in the river--the existence of some foreign substance or some condition not arising from the ordinary course of navigation." We are remitted, then, to the consideration of the facts, and as to them the rule is firmly established that successive decisions of two courts in the same case, on questions of fact, are not to be reversed, unless clearly shown to be erroneous. Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17 [ante, 597]; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 382 [19: 464]; The S. B. Wheeler, 20 Wall. 386 [22: 385]; The Richmond, 103 U. S. 540 [26: 313]. And when the evidence is conflicting, there being evidence to sustain the decree, this court will not ordinarily interfere. Tested by this rule we must assume on the record that the vessel in question was chartered by appellants, through a ship broker duly authorized, for the purpose of[437] being loaded with a cargo of crushed stone, which would be about six hundred tons, by appellants at their wharf, to be discharged at Fortress Monroe; that the contract, which was oral, did not expressly name the number of tons to be loaded, nor guarantee the depth of water, nor the position of the vessel at the wharf, nor embody as part thereof the representations alleged to have been made in respect of the depth of the water; that there was a ridge of rock in the berth assigned to the vessel by appellants, projecting above the bottom of the river and endangering her safety, even when only partially loaded; and that the vessel though staunch, strong, and seaworthy, was wrecked by grounding on that rock. We also think that the conclusions of the court of appeals, set forth in its opinion, that no ordinary skill or effort on the part of the master or owners could have been exercised effectively to save the vessel from total loss, and that the injury was not increased, nor were the damages enhanced, by delay in attempting to raise and remove the vessel, cannot reasonably be questioned; and that we are not required to pass on the conflicting evi 1 dence in respect of the value of the vessel As to knowledge or notice of the obstruction by appellants, the evidence tended to show that they had been for some years in the use of the wharf and of this particular berth; that they had under lease perhaps two and a half miles of river front, containing stone quarries, some of which they were working; that their business was large, and that during the year 1893, before the accident, they had loaded from fifteen to twenty vessels at the same place; that the capacity of the crusher for loading vessels through the chute was from one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons a day; that they employed from one hundred and fifty to three hundred men, and at times many more, and had bins into which they ran crushed stone to be carried off in various ways. It further appeared that in December, 1892, the two[488]masted schooner *Baird, carrying five hundred tons, and when loaded drawing fourteen feet, grounded in the same berth, manifestly on a rock, and that that fact and the character of her injuries were known to appellants. There was much other evidence bearing on this point of knowledge or notice, which fully sustained the court of appeals in its conclusion that appellants knew of the existence of the rock, and its dangerous nature; or, if not, that absence of investigation amounted, under the circumstances, to such negligence as to impute notice. But the stress of the argument is that the master was guilty of negligence which contributed to the injury, and chiefly in not as that the foreman "said the vessel was laying At all events, we are unable to decide that WILLIAM YERKE, Appt., บ. certaining the condition of the bottom of the UNITED STATES and The Apache Indians. berth and taking precautions, as advised. 1. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 439-442.) allowable. Under the first clause of the act of March 3, 1891, providing for the adjudication and payment of claims for Indian depredations, one who was not a citizen at the time of the depredation cannot make a claim, although he had previously declared his intention to become a citizen and was afterwards admitted to citizenship. say that the finding of the court of appeals Claim for Indian depredations—what claims that there might have been something 2. Under the second clause of the said act, a claim for Indian depredations which has only been filed with the Commissioner of Indian affairs is not within the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as a claim which has been "examined and allowed by the Interior Department." [No. 664.] Submitted February 20, 1899. Decided APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of "The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. T. H. N. McPherson and C. M.] Messrs. John G. Thompson, Assistant *Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the (440]opinion of the court: name and address of the claimants, Is the demand of appellant within any of these clauses? 1. In Johnson v. United States, 160 U. S. 546 [40: 529], it was held that citizenship at the time of the depredation was an essential condition of the jurisdiction of the court of claims of demands under the first clause. 2. Speaking of the second clause, it was said: "By that, jurisdiction is extended to 'cases which have been examined and allowed by the Interior Department, and also to such cases as were authorized to be examined under the act of Congress' of March 3, 1885, and subsequent acts." The appellant (petitioner in the court below) claimed $3,400.00 under the act approved March 3, 1891, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Adjudication and Payment of Claims Arising from Indian Depredations." He alleged that he was a native of Prussia, and came to the United States in 1828, and declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States on the 8th of January, 1842, and was recognized as a voter The appellant's case was not of the former of Cochise county, Arizona, from 1884 to kind. His claim had not "been examined 1886; that he made application for and was and allowed by the Interior Department." It adjudged and declared a citizen of the United had only been filed with the Commissioner of States December 16, 1896; that in March, Indian Affairs. Was it hence a case of the 1872, he was the owner of certain property second kind? To have been that it must (which was described) of the value of $3,400.- have been one then "pending but not yet ex00, in Arizona territory, "which was taken, amined;" and must have been on behalf of a used, and destroyed by the Apache Mohave citizen of the United States. It was on file,[442] Indians," who were in amity with the United and hence may be said to have been "pendStates "when the depredation was commit-ing," but it was not on behalf of a citizen of ted." He further alleged "that he presented the United States. Appellant was not then his claim to the honorable Commissioner of a citizen. He did not become such unti! DeIndian Affairs March 8, 1882, but that no ac- cember 16, 1896. tion was had thereon; that said claim has not been paid or any part thereof, nor has any of the property been returned either by the said Indians or the United States." The United States filed a general traverse. The court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction. This ruling is assigned as error. The act of March 3, 1891, gives jurisdiction to the court of claims to "inquire into and finally adjudicate, in the manner provided in this act, all claims of the following classes, namely:" First. "All claims for property of citizens [441]of the United States taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United States. . . .' Second. Su jurisdiction shall also ex tend to all cases which have been examined and allowed by the Interior Department, and also to such cases as were authorized to be examined under the act approved March 3, 1885, and under subsequent acts. (23 Stat. at L. 376.) The "subsequent acts" do not affect the question; and that part of the act of March 3, which it is necessary to quote, provides as follows: "For the investigation of certain Indian depredation claims, ten thousand dollars; and in expending said sum the Secretary of the Interior shall cause a complete list of all claims heretofore filed in the interior Department, and which have been approved in whole or in part and now remain unpaid, and also all such claims as are pending, but not yet examined on behalf of citizens of the United States on account of depredations committed, chargeable against any tribe of Indians by reason of any treaty between such tribe and the United States, including the But appellant urges that the act of 1891 applies to claimants who were inhabitants at the time of the depredations, and that their naturalization afterwards should be held to relate to that time. This view is attempted to be supported by analogy to sections 2289 and 2319 of the Revised Statutes, which respectively give to citizens and to those who have declared their intention to become such the right to enter agricultural or mineral lands, and the practice of the Land Department in such cases to give retroactive effect to a declaration of intention. The answer is ready, and may be brief. The act of 1891 is not ambiguous. Its clearness does not need and may not be construed by analogies from other statutes or from the practice under other statutes. The rule is elemental that language which is clear needs no construction. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662 [32: 1060]. Under both of the clauses of the act of 1891, the claims of which jurisdiction was given were strictly identified; under the first clause, by citizenalso under the act of 1885, which provides ship at the time of the depredations; maybe the cases of the second clause. But whether, as was said in Johnson v. United States, the different phraseology of the act of March 3, 1885, would include claims in favor of those not citizens at the time of the depredations by the Indians, it was decided that they must be claims then "pending"-that is, pending at the time of the act on behalf of citizens. And as it was such cases which "were authorized to be examined" under the act of 1885, it was to such cases that the jurisdiction of the court of claims was extended by the second clause of the act of 1891. Judgment affirmed. (443]REMINGTON PAPER COMPANY, Piff. in |ington Paper Company, through their attor Err., IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana to review a judgment Mr. Alexander Porter Morse for de- 1443] *Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the It is objected that the record presents no neys, Merrick & Merrick, show cause on Thursday, June 1, at 11 A. M. why the above motion should not be granted." To which motion the Remington Paper Company filed the following: "The plaintiff in this case, for the purpose only of objection to the regularity of the rule taken by John W. Watson, calling himself receiver, by way of exception, says: "That said mover as a pretended receiver cannot interfere in the progress of this suit in the informal and summary manner at tempted by him in his said rule, nor has he any right to be heard to demand by the judg ment of this court anything of this court without coming into court by regular process and proceedings and in the mode allowed by law, wherein the plaintiff will be entitled to a trial of questions of law and fact in the mode and manner guaranteed by the Consti tution and prescribed by law. "Wherefore this plaintiff says that this rule taken by said John W. Watson should and ought to be dismissed at the cost of said Merrick & Merrick, Att'ys. mover. "And in the event the foregoing exception to said rule is overruled and this plaintiff is required by your honorable court to answer the same, and not otherwise, this plaintiff denies the allegations contained in said rule and denies that said John W. Watson, the pretended receiver, has any legal right or authority under the ex parte proceeding on which he relies to take possession of the property attached in this case nor to *hinder[445] or delay your petitioner from collecting its just debt against said defendant. "Merrick & Merrick, Att'ys." The plaintiff prayed the court to decide the exception to said rule before proceeding further or hearing any testimony on the rule taken. The court, however, decided to hear the testimony on the allegations of said rule, and after hearing the same, on the 6th day of June, 1893, made the following order: In an action brought in the civil district The plaintiff in error, a corporation created under the laws of New York, and having its residence in that state, brought an action in the United States circuit court for the district of Louisiana against the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company, to recover $3,863.55, for paper furnished the company, and sued out writs of sequestration and at[444]tachment, by* authority of which, on the 29th day of May, 1893, the United States marshal seized certain property of the company and took the same from the possession of Watson. On May 30, 1893, Watson as receiver filed a motion in said circuit court to quash the attachment and sequestration sued out, "and said rule on motion concluded with an order which the mover in the rule desired the court to adopt;" and thereupon the judge of the court made the following order: "Let this rule be filed, and let the Rem "This cause having been heard and sub son, appointed a receiver of the defendant by The opinion of the court referred to in the fendant corporation had resigned and that in fact it was a vacant corporation." It was | ing him was null and void because obtained further said: "I do not think this court can deal at all with the alleged irregularity in the appointment of the receiver, such as the alleged want of an execution, etc., preceding the appointment. It appearing to this court that a court of concurrent jurisdiction has appointed a receiver who was in actual possession, this court has no right to attempt to dispossess him. All the matter as to irregularity of the appointment must be dealt with by the court that appointed. I understand the doctrine of the comity of courts [446]to be this-that where a court has jurisdiction of a cause and property and through its proper officer is in possession, it is the auty of all other courts to refrain altogether from the attempt to take that property into possession except by permission of the court in possession. It is not a question of the validity of process, but a question of public order, and the rule of comity is based upon the duty of courts to abstain from anything that might lead to violence. There having been a receiver appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction and he being in possession of the property attempted to be seized by the marshal, and which was in fact seized, I think the duty of this court is to restore the property practically to the situation in which it was when the property was interfered with by the marshal." "upon the collusive petition of Frank H. Pope without citation to anyone, without oath or affidavit or any proof and without contest." It was further alleged that the socalled intervention of the attorney general did not cure the nullity of the proceedings of Pope and Watson, and that the state was without authority to intrude itself in that manner into the controversies of private persons. There was a prayer for citation and that the order appointing Watson receiver be declared as against petitioner null and void and of no effect, and the same be ineffectual as a bar to said attachment or se questration or other proceedings on the part of the petitioner in the circuit court of the United States, and that said Watson and Pope be condemned, as in solido or otherwise, to pay petitioner the sum of $3,863.55 damages caused it by the construction of its proceedings in the circuit court, and for general relief. The petition was subsequently amended, amplifying somewhat the charges of illegality in Watson's appointment, and alleging with more detail his action in the circuit court, and averring "that said ex parte order of this court, dated the 17tn day of May, 1893, purporting to appoint John W. Watson receiver of the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company, Limited, was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth The bill of exceptions signed by the circuit Amendments to the Constitution of the Unitjudge shows that Watson was in possession ed States, in this, that said decree was ob of the property, engaged in making an in-tained without due process of law, it being ventory of it when it was seized by the marshal, and had taken the oath of office but had filed no bond. On the 9th day of June, 1893, three days after the order of the circuit court, the Remington Company filed in the civil district court for the parish of Orleans a petition and action of nullity and for damages under the laws of the state against Watson, receiver, Pope, petitioning creditor, and the Louisiana Printing & Publishing Company. ex parte and without affidavits, bond, or The petition alleged the indebtedness of the latter company to petitioner, the action by the latter in the United States circuit court, the attachment of property, the motion of Watson as hereinbefore stated, and the ruling and order of the court thereon; that the effect thereof will be to prevent the execution of any judgment rendered, and that "Watson was without right to stand in the way of a just debt because he had given no bond at the date of the seizure of property under the attachment nor complied with the order of the court, nor had proceedings | been had to perfect his appointment or to give him the right to control the property To the petition Watson answered, denying or to prevent any suit from being brought all and singular its allegations except his or any court from subjecting the property of appointment as receiver, and "assuming the said defendant by due course of law to the attitude of plaintiff in reconvention," alleged payment of its debts, and the conduct of that the Remington Paper Company was a the said Watson, Frank H. Pope, and those nonresident corporation, and that by its "unconfederating with them in attempting to lawful and unwarranted seizure of the prop[447]*screen the property from payment of debts erty of said Louisiana Printing & Publishwas collusive and a constructive fraud upon ing Company, Limited, which seizure has been petitioner and a violation of its rights under released, said Remington Paper Company the laws and Constitution of the United has damaged the creditors of said Louisiana States of America," that the order appoint-Printing & Publishing Company, Limited, |