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or merchandise, and not those who sell bonds, | order made by the circuit court of the Unit stocks, etc. ed States for the northern district of Illinois, discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the marshal. The petition to the circuit court for the writ alleged that the petitioner Nicol had been convicted in the United States court for the northern district of Illi

Congress has power to require the written memorandum to be made as a means for identifying the sale and for collecting the tax by means of the required stamp, and for that purpose to secure by proper penalties the making of the memorandum.

9. The statute covers sales made at union change or board of trade within the meaning

stock yards; it is a "similar place" to an ex

of the statute.

[Nos. 435, 4 Original, 625, and 636.]

Argued and Submitted December 13, 14, 1898.
Decided April 3, 1899.

The first of the above-named cases is an ap peal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner, James Nicol, to the custody of the marshal under a conviction for violation of the war revenue act for selling, at the Chicago Board of Trade, certain merchandise without making a memorandum or bill of such sale, as required by said act. Affirmed.

The second of said cases, No. 4 Original, is an application for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to bring before the court the petitioner, George R. Nichols, who was convicted under said act of Congress for selling merchandise at said Board of Trade, and making and delivering a bill and memorandum of the sale without affixing the proper internal revenue stamps thereon. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.

The third of said cases, No. 625, is an ap; peal to this court from an order of the said circuit court of the United States discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding to custody the petitioner, Skillen, who was convicted for selling merchandise at said Board of Trade, and unlawfully failing and refusing to make and deliver to the buyer any bill or memorandum as required by said revenue act. Affirmed.

The last of said above cases, No. 636, is a writ of error to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to review a conviction of said Charles H. Ing

wersen for making a sale of certain cattle at said stock yards and delivering the same without making any written memorandum, etc., as required by said revenue act. Af firmed.

The above cases were all considered together.

Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: 10] These cases involve the validity and construction of some of the provisions of section 6, and a portion of schedule "A," therein referred to, of the act of Congress approved June 13, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. 448), entitled "An Act to Provide Ways and Means to Meet War Expenditures, and for Other Purposes," commonly spoken of as the War Revenue Act. The cases come before the court in this way:

No. 435 is an appeal to this court from an

nois, upon an information duly filed charg ing him with selling, at the Chicago Board of Trade and at its rooms, two carloads of oats, "without then and there making and delivering to the buyer any bill, memorandum, agreement, or other evidence of said sale, showing the date thereof, the name of the seller, the amount of the same, and the matter or thing to which it referred, as required by the act of Congress," above mento be imprisoned until paid. He refused to tioned. He was sentenced to pay a fine and pay, and was taken into custody by the marshai. That part of the act referring to the making and delivering of a bill or memorandum, etc., the petitioner claimed was unconstitutional. The circuit court, after argu ment, held the law valid and the conviction legal.

No. 4 Original is an application to this court for leave to file a petition for a writ the petitioner George R. Nichols, and for a of habeas corpus to bring before the court rule requiring the marshal for the northern district of Illinois, in whose custody the petitioner is, to show cause why the writ should not issue. The petition states that Nichols was convicted and sentenced, under the act of Congress above mentioned, upon

an information filed in the district court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois, for selling at the Chicago Board of Trade, of which he was then a member, for immediate delivery, to one Roloson, also thousand pounds of hams, then in Chicago, a member of such board, *ten tierces, or three[511] at a price named, amounting to $195, and on the sale unlawfully making and delivering to Roloson a bill and memorandum of the sale showing the date thereof, the name of the seller, the amount of the same, and without having the proper stamps affixed to the matters and things to which it referred, said bill or memorandum denoting the internal revenue accruing upon said sale, bill, the contrary unlawfully refusing and neg. or memorandum, as required by law, but on lecting to affix any such stamps to said bill or memorandum. Upon the trial the jury rendered a verdict finding the petitioner the court sentenced him to pay a fine of guilty as charged in the information, and $500 and to be committed to the county jail until such fine and costs should be paid. The petitioner refused to pay the fine and an order of commitment was made out and placed in the hands of the marshal, who arrested the petitioner and he is now in the custody of the marshal. The petitioner upon the trial claimed that the act in regard to the matters named in the information was unconstitutional, and therefore no offense was charged in the information; that the court had no jurisdiction to try him, and that his conviction and subsequent arrest

The circuit court having in both cases upheld the constitutionality of the present law, and having, in the case of James Nicol, denied a writ of habeas corpus, an application by George R. Nichols to that court would have been useless; hence, an application by him directly to this court is in accordance with its practice.

and detention were wholly without jurisdic- | 717; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 248, 29 L.
tion. The petitioner gives as a reason for ed. 870; Re Coy, 127 U. S. 758, 32 L. ed.
his application to this court for the writ of 281; Neilsen, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 182, 33 L
habeas corpus that one James Nicol (the ap- ed. 120.
pellant in No. 435) had been convicted of
substantially the same offense in the district
court for the northern district of Illinois,
and that he had made application for a writ
of habeas corpus to the circuit court held
in that district, which court, after a hearing
upon the writ, decided against Nicol, and
in favor of the constitutionality of the act
of Congress herein questioned, and the peti-
tioner herein alleges that it would be a vain
act to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to
the same circuit court which had already,
after a hearing, decided the question in a
way unfavorable to the claims of the peti-
tioner herein.

No. 625 is also an appeal to this court
from an order of the circuit court of the
United States for the northern district of
Illinois, discharging a writ of habeas cor-
[512]pus and remanding the petitioner Skillen to
the custody of the marshal. The petitioner
was convicted upon an information of the
same nature as is above set forth in No.
435, excepting that the information in this
case alleged that the contract was for fu-
ture delivery of 5,000 bushels of corn, and
that Skillen unlawfully failed and refused
to make and deliver to the buyer any bill
or memorandum as required by the act.
The petitioner was convicted upon a trial
had upon such information, and the court
imposed upon him a fine in the sum of $500
besides costs, and directed that he should be
committed to the county jail until such fine
and costs were paid. The same proceedings
were then taken as are set forth in No. 435.
No. 636 is a writ of error to the district
court of the United States for the northern
district of Illinois, to review a conviction of
the plaintiff in error upon an information
charging him with making a sale of certain
cattle at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago,
an delivering the same without making any
written memorandum, etc., as required by
the act of Congress. The information also
charged in a second count a sale, at the same
place, of certain live stock and a delivery of

a memorandum of the kind mentioned in the
act of Congress and a failure and refusal to
affix the stamps as provided for in such act.
Upon the trial a nolle prosequi was duly en-
tered upon the first count. The plaintiff in
error claims that the act of Congress is un-
constitutional on the same grounds men-
tioned in the other cases, and sets up as a
special and separate defense that a sale at
the stock yards is not included in the act of
Congress, as it is not an "exchange or board
of trade or other similar place," within the
meaning of that act.

Messrs. Henry S. Robbins and John G. Carlisle, for appellant in No. 435 and No. 625, and for petitioner in No. 4 Original:

Habeas corpus is the proper remedy where the prisoner is in custody upon conviction for an offense created by an unconstitutional law.

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed.

Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 32 L. ed. 405; Sawyer's Case, 124 U. S. 200, 31 L. ed. 402; Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 30 L. ed. 849; Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689; Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216.

The tax in question, if an indirect tax, is a stamp tax upon documents. It is not a privilege tax. A commercial exchange is a voluntary association (the Chicago Board of Trade, although incorporated, has been decided to be such-Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Nelson, 162 Ill. 431), and neither the privilege of being a member of the exchange nor of having one's property sold there, nor of being a seller there, is a privilege in the legal sense that is a taxable privilege.

Columbia v. Guest, 3 Head, 414; Cooley, Taxation, 2d ed. 571; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47.

Nor is this an occupation tax-such tax being imposed elsewhere in this act upon brokers, and the law not presuming double taxation.

Cooley, Taxation, 227; Montgomery Coun ty Bd. of Revenue v. Montgomery Gaslight Co. 64 Ala. 273.

Nor is it a tax on sales, which would in reality be a tax on the commodity sold.

Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L ed. 1015; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678.

For agreements to sell for future delivery are taxed, and in these there is usually no commodity to tax, such contracts, although generally settled by the payment of differ ences, being legal (Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 499, 37 L. ed. 827; Miles v. Andrews, 40 Ill. App. 155), and, whether legal or not, would be taxable.

License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 463, 18 L. ed. 497. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644, as construed by Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382, is not in conflict with the proposition that this is a stamp tax only.

Congress is without constitutional power to require written memoranda of intrastate contracts or transactions. This act, by imposing a penalty and creating a misdemeanor, prohibits oral sales or contracts of sales, and thereby interferes with intrastate commerce-this regardless of whether it makes the sale void or not.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 433, 6 L. ed. 683.

Congress cannot regulate intrastate commerce.

United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. 44, 19 L. ed. 594; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76, 19 L. ed. 74. 173 U. S.

Nor can it do this as a "necessary and proper" means of levying taxes.

"Necessary and proper", under sub-clause 18, § 8, of the Constitutiou, authorizes only such laws as are (1) "appropriate and plainly adapted" to the levying of the tax, and (2) "consist with the spirit of the Constitution."

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287.

But the only purpose of requiring written memoranda is to increase the number of such documents to be taxed, which is not a proper incident to the taxing power.

United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 42, 19 L. ed. 593; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 463, 18 L. ed. 497.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 635, 29 L. ed. 753; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 325, 37 L. ed. 468; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547.

This tax, if a stamp or other indirect tax, violates the rule of uniformity.

The Constitution requires, not merely "geographical uniformity," but practical uniformity between taxpayers, which means, not that all persons or all property must be taxed, if any are, but that all persons similarly situated, and all property of the same kind, be proportionately taxed, if any such person or property is taxed.

This construction is required by the state of history and political economy at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, as well as by the circumstances attending the insertion of this uniformity clause in the Constitution.

Congressional interference with state commerce, in whatever form or degree, is to be as much condemned as has been state interference, in whatever form or degree, with in-stroy. terstate or foreign commerce.

Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 271, 23 L. ed. 549; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 350, 26 L. ed. 567; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co. 117 U. S. 35, 29 L. ed. 786; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, 28 L. ed. 653; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 641, 32 L. ed. 312, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 25 L. ed. 743.

This interference with oral contracts within the state does not "consist with the spirit of the Constitution."

Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467, 7 Am. Rep. 466; Sammons v. Halloway, 21 Mich. 163, 4 Am. Rep. 465; Craig v. Dimock, 47 Ill. 310; Davis v. Richardson, 45 Miss. 500, 7 Am. Rep. 732; Forcheimer v. Holly, 14 Fla. 243; Sporrer v. Eifler, 1 Heisk. 633; Duffy v. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 617; Carpenter v. Snelling, 97 Mass. 452.

Such legislation, if independent of a tax law, would be class legislation, because depriving some, but not all, of the right to contract orally.

Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 298, 57 Am. Rep. 869; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 32 L. R. A. 445; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; Kuhn v. Detroit, 70 Mich. 537; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220.

If the right to thus discriminate respecting oral contracts be sustainable at all, it can only be when it is necessary to taxation, and not where, as here, it is neither necessary nor usual. In the latter case it is clearly contrary to the "spirit of the Constitution." It takes from a taxpayer, as a part of his tax, his constitutional right to contract or trade orally as others do.

A liberal construction is to be resorted to for the protection of constitutional rights.

The power to tax implies the power to de

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 431, 4 L. ed. 607; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. ed. 481; Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. ed. 455.

Uniformity has been defined as above by this court in

United States v. Singer, 15 Wall. 111, 21 L. ed. 49; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 28 L. ed. 798.

This rule of taxation requires an essential difference between the subjects taxed and those untaxed.

Pacific Exp. Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 339, 35 L. ed. 1035, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 810; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 661.

This does not arise from the mere difference of locality of a sale of the thing taxed, nor from greater convenience attending the making of such sale.

Messrs. John S. Miller and Merritt Starr, for plaintiff in error in No. 636:

The words "at any exchange or board of trade or other similar place," in Schedule A of the act in question, refer to the place of sale; and they mean the room or floor or place provided by associations of that kind for trading among their members, and to the privileges of which only members are admitted. And the tax levied is only upon sales at those places.

This is a fact of common knowledge, and appears in adjudged cases and works of standard authority; and it must be held to have been known to and in contemplation of Congress in passing the act in question. It appears in the following, among other, authorities:

Dos Passos, Stock Brokers, 88, 208; Melsheimer & Laurence Stock Exchange, 1, 2; Bisbee & Simons, Produce Exchange, 71; Speight v. Gaunt, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 727; Leech v. Harris, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 575; Metropolitan Grain & Stock Exchange v. Chicaga Bd. of Trade, 15 Fed. Rep. 849.

The words "or similar place" in Schedule A of the act do not bring within the tax but exclude therefrom, sales at any different place.

Harlow v. Tufts, 4 Cush. 453.

The Union Stock Yards in Chicago, or its pens, in one of which the sale in question

was made, or other similar stock yards in the United States where live stock is received and where it is sold by the owner or by his agent, are not exchanges or boards of trade, or other similar places, within the meaning of the act in question.

If it is competent for Congress, as contended by counsel for the government in board of trade cases, to put into a class, for the purposes of taxation, sales made on 'change, it is not possible to bring within that class sales of cattle in the pens of the Union Stock Yards, and still preserve the uniformity required by the Constitution.

Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 28 L. ed. 798; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892; Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666.

The phrase "or other similar places," in Schedule A of the war revenue act, if open to the interpretation given by the court below, is void for uncertainty and for indefiniteness.

Hughes's Case, 1 Bland, Ch. 46; Weale v. Proprietors of West Middlesex Waterworks Co. 1 Jac. & W. 371; Bank of Columbia v. Ross, 4 Harr. & M'H. 456; State v. Boon, 1 N. C. (Taylor & C.) 103, 246; Drake v. Drake, 15 N. C. (4 Dev. L.) 114; State v. Partlow, 91 N. C. 550; Com. v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 3 Watts & S. 173; Leavitt v. Lovering, 64 N. H. 607, 1 L. R. A. 58; Ward v. Ward, 37 Tex. 389; Green v. Wood, 7 Q. B. 178; Doe, Davenish, v. Moffatt, 15 Q. B. 257; McConvill v. Jersey City, 39 N. J. L. 38. If this tax applies to the sale of cattle here in question then the tax is a direct tax and violates the rule of apportionment.

A tax upon a sale of merchandise is a tax upon the merchandise itself.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Dobbins v. Erie County Comrs. 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 644; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 581, 39 L. ed. 819.

Mr. John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for appellee in No. 435 and No. 625, and for respondent in No. 4 Original, and for defendant in error in No. 636:

shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579.

The selection of the means rests with Congress. Unless these means are forbidden by the Constitution the courts will not interfere.

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447, 38 L. ed. 1047, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545.

With the exception and under the limitation of the Constitution, the taxing power reaches every subject of taxation.

License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 18 L. ed. 497; Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 433, 19 L. ed. 95; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. ed. 179.

In executing the taxing power Congress may, through classification, select the subjects of taxation, and thus use its discretion in distributing equitably the burdens of government.

Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037.

This is a tax upon the sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, not upon the memorandum thereof.

Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015.

Only those sales, agreements of sale, or agreements to sell, are taxed which are made on commercial exchange. Such sales are made under conditions which distinguish them from other sales, thus affording a ground for classification.

The court will take judicial notice of what a commercial exchange is.

Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, ante, 300; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, ante, 290; Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397, 40 L. ed. 746; Nelson v. Board of Trade, 58 Ill. App. 399.

The tax is uniform because every sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, made at an exchange, is taxed alike. All persons similarly situated are treated in the same way and subjected to an equal burden. tax operates with the same force and effect in every place in the United States where the subject of it is found.

The

Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 28 L. ed. 798; Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 22 L. ed. 189.

The tax is not on personal property or the income thereof. It is therefore not a direct Where the constitutionality of a law is tax. It is the duty on the disposition or involved, every possible presumption is in transfer of merchandise, which, payable in favor of its validity, and this continues unthe first instance by the seller who voluntar til the contrary is shown beyond a reasona-ly goes upon the exchange, may be shifted

ble doubt.

Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 25 L. ed. 496; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. 253; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. ed. 162; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. ed. 629; Livingston County v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407, 25 L. ed. 1015.

The Constitution expressly confers upon Congress the taxing power.

Congress may make all the laws which

in whole or in part to the buyer. It is therefore an indirect tax-an excise.

S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759, 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. ed. 1108; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 16 L. ed. 644; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566, 24 L. ed. 1015; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 41 L. ed. 683; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 39 L. ed. 311, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1; Brown v. Houston, 114

U. S. 623, 29 L. ed. 257; Pacific Ins. Co. v. | to adopt, and such a choice cannot be in any
Boule, 7 Wall. 433, 19 L. ed. 95.
fair use of the term a privilege which is sub-
ject to taxation.

[513] *Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the
facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

These cases may be considered together, because they involve substantially the same question, only the last one includes, in addition, a question of construction as distinguished from a question of the validity of the statute.

That portion of the act which is involved is set forth in the margin.† 30 Stat. at L. 448, 450, 458.

In the Nicol Case (No. 435), the sale was by a citizen to a citizen of the state of Illinois.

These questions are involved in each case, while in the last one it is further objected that the sales at the stock yards are not included in the terms of the act, and evidence was adduced upon the trial as to the nature of the business conducted at the stock yards, and the manner in which it was performed. It will be adverted to hereafter when we come to a discussion of the meaning and proper construction of the act.

It is always an exceedingly grave and deli[514] *It is seen that the cases embrace the facts cate duty to decide upon the constitutionality of a member of the Board of Trade of Chicago, of an act of the Congress of the United States. selling for immediate delivery, products or The presumption, as has frequently been merchandise: (a) without making a mem-said, is in favor of the validity of the act,[515] orandum; (b) making a memorandum but and it is only when the question is free from omitting to put stamps on it; (c) making a any reasonable doubt that the court should sale for future delivery and failing to put hold an act of the lawmaking power of the stamps on the memorandum. nation to be in violation of that fundamental instrument upon which all the powers of the government rest. This is particularly true of a revenue act of Congress. The provisions of such an act should not be lightly or inadvisedly set aside, although if they be plainly antagonistic to the Constitution it is the duty of the court to so declare. The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based. It is as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man. It is not only the power to destroy, but it is also the power to keep alive.

The case of sales at the Union Stock Yards at Chicago is also included, where a memorandum is delivered, but the vendor neglects and refuses to affix the stamps to the memorandum.

The objections to the validity of the act are, stated generally, that it is a direct tax, and is illegal because not apportioned as required by the Constitution. If an indirect tax, it is a stamp tax on documents not required to be made under state law in order to render the same valid, and Congress has no power to require a written memorandum to be made of transactions within the state for the purpose of placing a stamp thereon. It is not a priv ilege tax within the meaning of that term, because there is no privilege other than that which every man has to transact his own business in his own house or in his own office under such regulations as he may choose

†ADHESIVE STAMPS.

Sec. 6. That on and after the first day of July, 1898, there shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in Schedule A of this act, or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or any of them, shall be written or printed by any person or persons, or party who shall make, sign, or Issue the same, or for whose use or benefit the same shall be made, signed, or issued, the several taxes or sums of money set down in figures against the same, respectively, or otherwise specified or set forth in the said schedule. SCHEDULE A.-STAMP TAXES. (30 Stat. at L. 448-458.)

Upon each sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell any products or merchandise at any exchange or board of trade, or other similar place, either for present or future delivery, for each one hundred dollars in value of said sale or agreement of sale or agreement to sell, one cent, and for each additional one hundred dollars or fractional part thereof in excess of one hundred dollars, one cent; Provided, That on every sale or agreement of sale or

This necessary authority is given to Congress by the Constitution. It has power from that instrument to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, in order to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare, and the only constitutional restraint upon the power is that all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, and that no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, agreement to sell as aforesaid, there shall be made and delivered by the seller to the buyer a bill, memorandum, agreement, or other evidence of such sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, to which there shall be affixed a lawful stamp or stamps in value equal to the amount of the tax on such sale. And every such bill, memorandum, or other evidence of sale or agreement to sell shall show the date thereof, the name of the seller, the amount of the sale, and the matter or thing to which it refers; and any person or persons liable to pay the tax as herein provided, or anyone who acts in the matter as agent or broker for such person or persons, who shall make any such sale or agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, or wno shall, in pursuance of any such sale, agreement of sale, or agreement to sell, deliver any such products or merchandise without a bill, memorandum, ог other evidence thereof, as herein required, or who shall deliver such bill, memorandum, or other evidence of sale, or agreement to sell, without having the proper stamps affixed thereto, with intent to evade the foregoing provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall pay a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both, at the discretion of the court.

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