not in accordance with the terms of said stream within the entire control and jurisordinance). The rights and privileges diction of Congress and the courts of the granted by the plaintiff to the defendant United States, and that assumption of conwere of great value, and the plaintiff was trol by the city of that part of the bridge influenced and induced to so grant them by for purposes of taxation or for any purpose the belief in the right on the part of the except for executing writs from its police plaintiff to tax said bridge as other prop-authorities, would be in violation of the Conerty is taxed within the city limits. By the building of said bridge through the rights and privileges so granted by the plaintiff the system of roads north of the Ohio River [597]has been connected with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad south of the river, and the said bridge company's property has become so valuable that its bonds to the amount of about $2,000,000 are worth a premium of 82 per cent." The assessment against the bridge company on account of the bridge and its approaches was upon a valuation of $600,000 in 1885 and $1,000,000 in each of the years 1886 and 1887. In its petition the city claimed a lien upon the bridge from the beginning of its approach at Main street in the city of Henderson to low-water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio river for said taxes and the penalties thereon. The bridge company in its answer denied the material allegations of the petition and alleged That the city had no authority to levy taxes for the purposes indicated in the ordinances referred to; That the declaration in the ordinance granting the right to construct the bridge within the city's limits meant and was intended to mean nothing more than that the city did not waive any right to tax then possessed by it; stitution of the United States, the laws of Congress and the rights of the defendants; and, That, as the bridge derived no profit, protection, or advantage from the government of the city, to subject it to city taxation would be to take private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Constitution of the United States as well as of the Constitution and laws of Kentucky and of the defendant's rights in the premises. The answer of the bridge company further alleged That the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company was a necessary party to that suit; That when it constructed its bridge it was the settled law of Kentucky, as shown by the judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky in Louisville Bridge Company v. City of Louisville, 81 Ky. 189, that the part of the bridge erected over and across the Ohio river was not liable to municipal taxation; That relying upon such being the law of Kentucky the defendant and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company entered into the above agreement of February 27, 1884; and, That to grant to the plaintiff the relief prayed for or any part thereof would be a direct impairment of the contract between the bridge company and the railroad com The railroad company having been made a party, adopted the answer of the bridge company. That the bridge was built only for the pur-pany. That the bridge was located and construct That the Ohio river was a navigable The state circuit court adjudged that, the bridge being in an incomplete condition on the 10th day of January, 1885, the city was not entitled to tax it for that year. But as to the years 1886 and 1887, it was adjudged that the bridge and the approach thereto were subject to taxation for all the purposes *and for the amounts claimed in the city's[599] petition; and that the city had a lien upon the bridge structure, masonry piers, and the approach thereto situated within its boundary extending to low-water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio river, for the taxes assessed for the years 1886 and 1887 with interest and costs expended. The bridge company was directed to pay said sums, with interest and costs, to the plaintiff on or be fore a named day. In a brief opinion of the state circuit court it was said that the taxable boundary of the city was coextensive with its statutory boundary. Referring to the case of the Louisville Bridge Company v. City of Louisville, 81 Ky. 189, the court held that that case decided nothing more than that the legislature did not intend that the bridge there in question should be subject to taxation. It was further said: "Several cases are relied on where the courts of appeals have relieved parties from the payment of fixing it, intended to define the taxable | tiff on the Ohio river is the low-water mark [605]boundary of the city, but only to confer upon on the Kentucky shore. the city jurisdiction for police purposes upon the waters of the river to the Indiana shore, and that it was further settled by the court in the case of Louisville Bridge Company v. City of Louisville, 81 Ky. 189, that such an act, if intended to confer a taxing power over property erected in said stream beyond the low-water mark on the Kentucky side, was in violation of that provision of the Constitution of this state which prohibits the taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation, and of the like provision of the Constitution of the United States, and would, to the extent it conferred on the city such power, be absolutely null and void, and that the city could not tax said property for waterworks, school or railroad purposes, nor for any municipal purposes whatever; The answer of the bridge company further averred: "The territory on both sides of the Ohio river was, prior to the year 1784, a part of the state of Virginia, in which year she ceded to the United States the territory north and west of said river. On the 18th of December, 1789, the Congress of the United States passed the 'Compact with Virginia,' which authorized the establishment of the state of Kentucky, and which compact defined the rights of the said state in and to the Ohio river. By the eleventh section of that compact it is provided that the use and navigation of the river Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed state (Kentucky) or the territory which shall remain within the limits of this commonwealth (Virginia) lies thereon, shall be free and common to the citizens of the United States, That the defendant, relying upon the law and the respective jurisdiction of this comas thus established, went forward and built monwealth and the proposed state on the its bridge to low-water mark on the Indiana river aforesaid shall be concurrent only with shore of the Ohio river, and the legislative the states which may possess the opposite acts and city ordinances pleaded by plain- shores of said river;' that by said compact, tiff as authority for the collection of the tax formed and ratified between the United upon that part of the bridge beyond low- States and the states of Virginia and Kenwater mark of the Ohio river on the Kentucky, the bed of the Ohio river, so far as it tucky shore have all been passed since the law of Kentucky was settled as above stated, and are null and void as contrary to that provision of the Constitution of the United States forbidding any state to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and as contrary to those constitutional provisions, state and Federal, that prohibit the taking of private property for public uses without just compensation; That the above legislative acts and ordinances constitute the only authority the plaintiff has for the assessment of defendant's property or the levy and collection of the taxes thereon sued for herein, and the said act of April 9, 1888, which constituted the only authority the city of Henderson has to levy or collect taxes for any purposes or upon any property, and the alleged city ordinances of May, 1888, and of April 24, 1889, and of May 24, 1890, were each and all passed and ordained subsequent to the acceptance by the defendant of its charter of incorporation and its expenditure of the large sums of money aforesaid in the con[606]struction of its bridge, and to the extent that the said act or the said ordinances or either of them do or may authorize any portion of defendant's bridge structure situated north of low-water mark on the Kentucky shore to be taxed are null and void because repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; That the defendant has at all times been willing to pay taxes for the purposes set out in the petition on that portion of its bridge which is in fact and in the sense of the legislative acts referred to within the boundary of the city of Henderson, to wit, from the beginning of the approach on the west side of Main street to low-water mark of the Kentucky shore; and, That the taxable boundary of the plain is permanently under water, is the common The bridge company defended the action upon the further ground that the relief asked by the city could not be granted without directly impairing the obligation of the contract between it and the railroad company; which contract, it was insisted, was to be interpreted in the light of the law of Kentucky as it was when such contract was made and without reference to subsequent legislative acts and ordinances inconsistent | the final judgment of the state court for the with its provisions. The railroad company adopted the answer of the bridge company-averring, among other things, that to grant the plaintiff the relief prayed for or any part thereof would be a direct impairment of the obligation of the contract between the railroad company and the bridge company and a violation of the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States. The city filed a reply, in which the material allegations of the answers were controverted. It accompanied its reply with a transcript of the proceedings in the above suit between it and the bridge and railroad companies brought in 1887 to recover the taxes assessed for the years 1885, 1886, and {608]1887, *including the proceedings in this court on the appeal prosecuted by those companies. The reply concludes: "The plaintiff says that the right of plaintiff to assess and collect the taxes sued for against the defendant the Henderson Bridge Company, its jurisdiction thereon, and all questions raised by the pleadings in this case, except as to the passage of the ordinances alleged, are now res judicata, and plaintiff pleads and relies upon same as a bar to defendants' pleas herein, and prays as in its petition." Judgment was rendered in favor of the city for the taxes (with interest and penalties) for the years 1888 and 1889; and it was adjudged that for the amounts found due the city "has a lien upon the bridge structure, masonry, and piers (mentioned in the petition) and the approach thereto situated within the boundary of the state of Kentucky and extending to low-water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio river." That judgment having been affirmed by the court of appeals of Kentucky, the present writ of error was sued out. 1. If the state court had sustained the city's plea of res judicata upon some ground that did not necessarily involve the determination of a Federal right it might be that the present case would come within the rule, often acted upon, that this court in reviewing the final judgment of the highest court of a state will not pass upon a Federal question, however distinctly presented by the pleadings, if the judgment of the state court was based upon some ground of local or general law manifestly broad enough in itself to sustain the decision independently of any view that might be taken of such Federal question. But that rule cannot be applied to the judgment below. Upon examining the opinion of the court of appeals of Kentucky in this case we find that that court expressly waived any decision upon the plea of res judicata for the reason that some views were then pressed upon its attention that had not been presented in previous cases, and it reconsidered and discussed the main question suggested by the defense, namely, that the Constitution of the United States forbade the assessment of that part of [609]the *bridge property between low-water mark on the Kentucky shore and low-water mark on the Indiana shore of the Ohio river. This court therefore has jurisdiction to review purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived the defendant of any right, privilege, or immunity specially set up by them under that instrument. 2. Whether the city of Henderson had authority to tax so much of the property of the bridge company as was permanently between low-water mark on the Kentucky shore and low-water mark on the Indiana shore of the Ohio river depends primarily upon the question whether the boundary of Kentucky extended to low-water mark on the Indiana shore. That question has been settled by ju dicial decisions. But it may be well to restate here the grounds of those decisions. Pursuant to a resolution of Congress passed in 1780, recommending to the several states asserting title to waste and unappropriated lands "in the western country" that a liberal cession be made by them to the United States of a portion of their respective claims for the common benefit of the Union, the commonwealth of Virginia, by an act passed January 2d, 1781, surrendered to the United States all her right, title, and claim "to the lands northwest of the river Ohio," subject to certain conditions, one of which was that the ceded territory should be laid out into states. 10 Hening's Stat. 564. The United States having accepted that cession substantially according to the conditions named, Virginia by an act passed December 20, 1783, authorized her delegates in Congress to convey to the United States all her right, title, and claim, "as well of soil as jurisdiction," to the territory or tract of country within the limits of the Virginia charter situated "to the northwest of the river Ohio." 11 Hening's Stat. 326. Such a deed was executed in 1784 by Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Handy, Arthur Lee, and James Monroe, representing Virginia-the deed describing the territory conveyed as "situate, lying, and being to the northwest of the river Ohio." On the 13th day of July, 1787, *Con-[610] gress passed an ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States "northwest of the river Ohio." That ordinance provided, among other things, that "no tax shall be imposed on land the property of the United States," and that "the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States, and those of any other states that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor." 1 Stat. at L. 51, note, chap. 8. Virginia, by an act passed in 1788, and which referred to the above ordinance, declared that "the aforerecited article of compact between the original states and the people and states in the territory northwest of the Ohio river, be and the same is hereby ratified and confirmed, anything to the contrary in the deed of cession of the said territory by this commonwealth to the United States notwithstanding." 12 Hening's Stat. 780. On the 18th day of December, 1789, the general assembly of Virginia passed the act entitled "An Act Next in order of time and as determining the boundary line of Kentucky is the judg ment of this court in Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374, 379, 380 [5: 113, 114] (1820) which case involved the question of the western and northwestern boundaries of that commonwealth. This court adjudged, upon a review of the legislative acts and public documents bearing upon the questionChief Justice Marshall delivering its cpinion-that although a certain peninsula or island on the western or northwestern bank of the Ohio, separated from the mainland by only a narrow channel or bayou which was not filled with water except when the river rose above its banks, was not within Kentucky as originally established, the boundary of that commonwealth did extend to low-water mark on the western and northwestern banks of the Ohio. "When a great river," said the chief justice, "is the boundary between two nations or states, if the original property is in neither, and there be no convention respecting it, each holds to the middle of the stream. But when, as in this case, one state [Virginia] is the original proprietor, and grants the territory on one side only, it retains the river within its own doinain, and the newly created state extends to the river only. The river, however, is its boundary." "Whenever the river is a boundary between states, it is the main, the permanent river, which constitutes that boundary; and the mind will find itself embarrassed with insurmountable difficulty in attempting to draw any other line than the low-water mark." Concerning the Erection of the district of margin of the southeast side is the limit of Kentucky into an Independent State." That the counties; to explain which Be it enacted act provided for a convention in Kentucky to by the General Assembly, That each county consider and determine whether that district of this commonwealth, calling for the river[612) should be formed into an independent state. Ohio as the boundary line, shall be considIts eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and eigh- ered as bounded in that particular by the teenth sections were in these words: "§ 11. state line on the northwest side of said river, That the use and navigation of the river and the bed of the river and the islands Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed therefore shall be within the respective counstate, or the territory which shall remain ties holding the main land opposite thereto, within the limits of this commonwealth, lies within this state, and the several county trithereon, shall be free and common to the citi-bunals shall hold jurisdiction accordingly." zens of the United States; and the respective Ky. Sess. Laws 1810, p. 100. jurisdictions of this commonwealth and of the proposed state on the river as aforesaid, shall be concurrent only with the states which may possess the opposite shores of the said river." "§ 14. That if the said convention shall approve of the erection of the said district into an independent state on the foregoing terms and conditions, they shall and may proceed to fix a day posterior to the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, on which the [611]authority of this commonwealth, and of its laws, under the exceptions aforesaid, shall cease and determine forever over the pro posed state, and the said articles become solemn compact, mutually binding on the parties, and unalterable by either without the consent of the other. § 15. Provided, however, That, prior to the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, the general government of the United States shall assent to the erection of the said district into an independent state, shall release this commonwealth from all its Federal obligations arising from the said district as being part thereof, and shall agree that the proposed state shall immediately after the day to be fixed as aforesaid, posterior to the first day of November, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one or at some convenient time future thereto, be admitted into the Federal Union." " 18. This act shall be transmitted by the Executive to the representatives of this commonwealth in Congress, who are hereby instructed to use their endeavors to obtain from Congress a speedy act to the effect above specified." 13 Hening's Stat. 17. This was followed by an act of Congress approved February 4, 1791, which referred to the above Virginia act of December 18, 1789, and expressed the consent of Congress that the said district of Kentucky, "within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth of Virginia, and according to its actual boundaries on the 18th day of December, 1789;" should, on the 1st day of June, 1792, be formed into a new state, separate from and independent of the commonwealth of Virginia. 1 Stat. at L. 189, chap. 4. Early in the history of Kentucky some doubts were expressed as to the location of the western and northwestern boundaries of that commonwealth, and to quiet those doubts its legislature passed the following act, which was approved January 27, 1810: "Whereas doubts are suggested whether the counties calling for the river Ohio as the boundary line extend to the state line on the northwest side of said river, or whether the The question of boundary was again before this court in Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 505, 519 [34: 329, 331, 336]. That was a controversy between Kentucky and Indiana as to the boundary lines of the two states at a particular point on the Ohio river. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, after referring[613] to all the documentary evidence relating to the question and to the decision in Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, above cited, said: "As thus seen, the territory ceded by the state of Virginia to the United States, out of which the state of Indiana was formed, lay northwest of the Ohio river. The first inquiry therefore is as to what line on the river must be deemed the southern boundary of the territory ceded, or, in other words, how far did the jurisdiction of Kentucky extend on the other side of the river." Referring to the channel of the Ohio river as it was when Kentucky was admitted into the Union, this court stated its conclusion to be that "the jurisdiction of Kentucky at that time extend- | tion by the authorities of the city of Hendered, and ever since has extended, to what was then low-water mark on the north side of that channel." The same view of the question of boundary was taken by the court of appeals of Kentucky in Fleming v. Kenney, 4 J. J. Marsh. 155, 158, Church v. Chambers, 3 Dana, 274, 278, McFarland v. McKnight, 6 B. Mon. 500, 510, and McFall v. Commonwealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 394, 396, and by the general court of Virginia in Commonwealth v. Garner, 3 Gratt. 655, 667. Upon this question of boundary nothing can be added to what was said in the cases cited; and it must be assumed as indisputable that the boundary of Kentucky extends to low-water mark on the western and northwestern banks of the Ohio river. Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the jurisdiction of that commonwealth for all the purposes for which any state possesses jurisdiction within its territorial limits is coextensive with its established boundaries, subject, of course, to the fundamental condition that its jurisdiction must not be exerted so as to intrench upon the authority of the National government or to impair rights secured or protected by the National Constitution. 3. But the plaintiffs in error insist that although the jurisdiction of Kentucky may extend to low-water mark on the opposite shore of the Ohio river, the city of Henderson cannot assess for taxation any part of the roperty of the bridge company between [614] w-water mark on the Kentucky shore and ow-water mark on the Indiana shore with out violating the Constitution of the United States in particulars to be adverted to presently. In considering this objection so far as it rested on Federal grounds, we shall assume that the action of the city of Henderson was authorized by the terms of its charter and was in no respect forbidden by any principle of local law. Upon these points we accept the decision of the highest court of Kentucky as conclusive. We accept also as binding upon this court the declaration of the state court that Kentucky intended by its legislation to confer upon the city of Henderson a power of taxation for local purposes coextensive with its statutory boundary. But we may add, as pertinent in the consideration of the Federal questions presented, that if the commonwealth of Kentucky could tax for state purposes the bridge property so far as it was between low-water mark on the Kentucky shore and low-water mark on the Indiana shore, it could confer upon one of its municipal corporations the power to tax the same property for local purposes. So that a judgment declaring the taxation of such property by the city of Henderson for local purposes, under the authority of the state, to be forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, would in effect declare that like taxation by the state for state purposes would be forbidden by that instrument. It is said that the bridge property outside of low-water mark on the Kentucky shore is so far beyond the reach of municipal protec son that it cannot be said to receive any benefits whatever from the municipal government, and that to impose taxes for the benefit of the city upon such property is a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and therefore inconsistent with the due process of law ordained by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Chicago, Burlington & Q. R'd Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 241 [41: 979, 986]. It is conceivable that taxation may be of such a nature and so burdensome as properly to be characterized a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. But in order to bring taxation imposed by a state or under its authority within the[615] scope of the Fourteenth Amendment of the National Constitution the case should be so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation by its necessary operation is really spoliation under the guise of exerting the power to tax. As an act of Congress should not be declared unconstituticnal unless its repugnancy to the supreme law of the land is too clear to admit of dispute, so a local regulation under which taxes are imposed should not be held by the courts of the Union to be inconsistent with the National Constitution unless that conclusion be unavoidable. All doubt as to the validity of legislative enactments must be resolved, if possible, in favor of the binding force of such enactments. In the case before us the state court rejected the idea that the bridge property in question was entirely beyond municipal protection and could not receive any of the benefits derived from the municipal government of the city of Henderson. We cannot adjudge that view to be so clearly untenable as to entitle the defendants to invoke the principle that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation. On the contrary the property which it is contended was illegally taxed is all within the territorial limits of Kentucky, within the statutory boundary of the city of Henderson, and within reach of the police protection afforded by that city for the benefit and safety of all persons and property within its limits; not perhaps as much or as distinctly so as that part of the bridge on the Kentucky bank south of low-water mark on that shore; but this difference does not constitute a reason why the city may not regard the bridge and its appurtenances within its statutory boundaries as an entirety for purposes of taxation, nor afford any proper ground for holding that the constitutional right to compensation for private property taken for public use has been violated. The court of appeals of Kentucky in its opinion in this case said: “Applying the just and equitable rule of making burdens and benefits of government reciprocal, we think the whole bridge structure within the corporate limits of the city of Henderson is liable for municipal taxes, for neither the benefits to the bridge company are lessened nor its cor-(616) responding duty to bear its full share of the |