and a railroad. charge. The power to compel the company | ing the sale of tickets at less than the gento carry persons under the circumstances as erally established rate, it can compel the provided for in this act, for less than the company to carry certain persons or classes usual rates, does not seem to be based upon free. If the maximum rates are too high in any reason which has hitherto been regarded the judgment of the legislature, it may lower as sufficient to authorize an interference with them, provided they do not make them unthe corporation, although a common carrier reasonably low as that term is understood in the law; but it cannot enact a law making[695] maximum rates, and then proceed to make exceptions to it in favor of such persons or classes as in the legislative judgment or caprice may seem proper. What right has the legislature to take from the company the compensation it would otherwise receive for the use of its property in transporting an individual or classes of persons over its road, and compel it to transport them free or for a less sum than is provided for by the general law? Does not such an act, if enforced, take the property of the company without due process of law? We are convinced that the legislature cannot thus interfere with the conduct of the affairs of corporations. The act also compels the company to carry, not only those who choose to purchase these tickets, but their wives and children, and it makes the tickets good for two years from the time of the purchase. If the legislature can, under the guise of regulation, provide that these tickets shall be good for two years why can it not provide that they shall be good for five or ten or even a longer term of years? It may be said that the regulation must provide for a reasonable term. But what is reasonable under these circumstances? Upon what basis is the reasonable character of the period to be judged? If two years would and five years would not be reasonable, why not? And if five years would be reasonable, why would not ten? If ]the power exist at all, what are the *factors which make it unreasonable to say that the tickets shall be valid for five or for ten years? It may be said that circumstances can change within that time. That is true, but circumstances may change within two just as well as within five or ten years. There is no particular time in regard to which it may be said in advance and as a legal conclusion that circumstances will not change. Ang can the validity of the regulation be made to depend upon what may happen in the future, during the running of the time in which the legislature has decreed the company shall carry the purchaser of the ticket? Regulations for maximum rates for present transportation of persons or property bear no resemblance to those which assume to provide for the purchase of tickets in quantities at a lower than the general rate, and to provide that they shall be good for years This is not fixing maximum rates, nor is it proper regulation. It is an illegal and unjustifiable interference with the rights of the company. to come. But it may be said that as the legislature would have the power to reduce the maximum charges for all, to the same rate at which it provides for the purchase of the thousand-mile ticket, the company cannot be harmed or its property taken without due process of law when the legislature only reduces the rates in favor of a few instead of in favor of all. It does not appear that the legislature would have any right to make such an alteration. To do so might involve a reduction of rates to a point insufficient for the earning of the amount of remuneration to which a company is legally entitled under the decisions of this court. In that case reduction would be illegal. For the purpose of upholding this discriminatory legislation we are not to assume that the exercise of the power of the legislature to make in this instance a reduction of rates as to all would be legal, and therefore a partial reduction must be also legal. Prima facie, the maximum rates as fixed by the legislature are reasonable. This of course applies to rates actually fixed by that body. There is no presumption, however, that certain named rates which it is said the legIf this power exist it must include the islature might fix but which it has not, right of the legislature, after establishing would, in case it did so fix them, be rea maximum freight rates, to also direct the sonable and valid. That it has not so fixed company to charge less for carrying freight them affords a presumption that they would where the party offering it sends a certain be invalid, and that presumption would reamount, and to carry it at that rate for the main until the legislature actually enacted next two or five or ten years. Is that an ex- the reduction. At any rate, there is no ercise of the power to establish maximum foundation for a presumption of validity freight rates? Is it a valid exercise of the in case it did so enact. in order to base power to regulate the affairs of a corpora- the argument that a partial *reduction, by[696] tion? The legislature would thus permit means of this discrimination, is therefore not only discrimination in favor of the larger also valid. And this argument also loses freighter as against the smaller one, but it sight of the distinction we made above would compel it. If the general power ex-between the two cases of a general estabist, then the legislature can direct the com- lishment of maximum rates and the enactpany to charge smaller rates for clergymen ment of discriminatory, exceptional, and paror doctors, for lawyers or farmers or school tial legislation upon the subject of the teachers, for excursions, for church conven- sale of tickets to individuals willing and tions, political conventions, or for all or any able to purchase a quantity at any one time. of the various bodies that might desire to The latter is not an exercise of the power to ride at any particular time or to any par- establish maximum rates. ticular place. If the legislature can interfere by direct True it is that the railroad company exercises a public franchise and that its occupa The contention that the act in question is valid because it is within the scope of the police power of the state cannot be sustained. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska, Omaha, 170 U. S. 57, 42 L. ed. 948. Messrs. Fred A. Maynard, and Henry C. Smith, in proper person, for defendant in error: The legislature of a state has the power to fix said rates, and the extent of judicial interference is protection against unreason able rates. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 344, 36 L. ed. 179; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Kep. 209; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 567, 38 L. ed. 273. Railroad corporations are subject to the legislative control in all respects necessary to protect the public against danger, injustice, and oppression. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 32 L. ed. 352, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 238; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174, 32 L. ed. 377; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32 L. ed. 585; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623; Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386, 35 L. ed. 1051; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364, 37 L. ed. 769; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 586, 30 L. ed. 254, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31. The right to regulate, to some extent, the business of railroads has always been conceded. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, Koerner, 67 111. 11, 16 Am. Rep. 599; Com. v. Eastern R. Co. 103 Mass. 254, 4 Am. Rep. 555; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560, 21 L. ed. 710; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 125, 24 L. ed. 84; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 215, 38 L. ed. 967, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649. The police power is paramount to contracts in charters. Kansas P. R. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Nelson v. Vermont & C. R. Co. 26 Vt. 717, 62 Am. Dec. 614; Lyman v. Boston & W. R. Corp. 4 Cush. 288; Pratt v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co. 42 Me. 579; Norris v. Androscoggin R. Co. 39 Me. 273, 63 Am. Dec. 621; Bulkley v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 27 Conn. 479; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 700, 40 L. ed. 859; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 511, 13 L. ed. 518. a In Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, it is decided that the right of state to reasonably limit the amount of charges by a railroad company for the transportation of passengers and property within its jurisdiction cannot be granted away by its legislature, unless by word of positive grant or words equivalent in law. The several states have a right to fix, either directly through an act of the legislature or indirectly through a commission, reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates upon traffic wholly within their borders. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94; Peik v. Chicago & N. R. Co. 94 U. S. 164, 24 L. ed. 97; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179, 24 L. ed. 99; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541, 27 L. ed. 818; Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 56. *Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the [686] facts, delivered the opinion of the court: *The only subject of inquiry for us in this [687] case is whether the act of the legislature of the state of Michigan violates any provision of the Federal Constitution. It is not within cur province to review the decision of the supreme court upon the question whether the act violates the Constitution of the state. The two questions of a Federal nature that are raised in the record are, (1) whether the act violates the Constitution of the United States by impairing the obligation of any contract between the state and the railroad company; and (2) if not, does it nevertheless violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution by depriving the company of its property or libert liberty without due process of law or by depriving it of the equal protection of the laws; if we should decide that this act violates any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment it would be unnecessary to examine the question whether there was any contract between the state and the company as claimed by it. We will therefore first come to an investigation of the legislative authority with reference to that amendment. If unhampered by contract there is no doubt of the power of the state to provide by legislation for maximum rates of charges for railroad companies, subject to the condition that they must be such as will admit of the carrier earning a compensation that under all the circumstances shall be just to it and to the public, and whether they are or rot is a judicial question. If the rates are fixed at an insufficient amount within the meaning of that term as given by the courts, the law would be invalid, as amounting to the taking of the property of the company without due process of law. Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Company v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 344 [36:176, 179]; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 154 U. S. 362, 399 [38:1014, 1024, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560]; St. Louis & S. F. R. Company v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649 [39:567]; Smyth Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 523 [42:819, 841]. L. & The extent of the power of the state to legislate regarding the affairs of railroad companies has within the past few years been several times before this court. Wabash, St. P. R. Company v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 [30: 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31]; Illinois Central R. *Company v. Illinois, 163 U. S.[688] 142 [41:107]; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Company v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 [ante 702], and cases cited. These cases arose under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, the inquiry being whether the legislation in question violated that provision. In the cases in which the legislation was upheld it was on the ground that the state was but exercising its proper authority under its general power to legislate regarding persons and things within its jurisdiction, sometimes described as its police power, and that in exercising that power in the particular cases it did not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution by improperly regulating or interfering with interstate commerce. The extent of the right of the state to legislate was examined in these various cases-so far, at least, as it was affected by the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States. In Illinois Central R. Company v. Illinois, supra, the state statute imposed the duty upon the company of stopping its fast mail train at the station of Cairo, to do which the train had to leave the through route at a point three miles from that station and then return to the same point in order to resume its journey. This statute was held to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce and therefore void. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Company v. Ohio, supra, a statute of the state of Ohio required the company to stop certain of its trains at stations containing 3,000 inhabitants for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, and the statute was held to be a valid exercise of legislative power and not an improper interference with interstate commerce. In the course of the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan, it was said that "the power, whether called police, governmental, or legislative, exists in each state, by appropriate enactments not forbidden by its own Constitution or by the Constitution of the United States, to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its jurisdiction, and therefore to provide for the public convenience and the public good. This power in the states is entirely distinct from any power granted to the general government, although when exercised it may [689]sometimes *reach subjects over which national legislation can be constitutionally extended." And again, speaking of cases involving state regulations more or less affecting interstate or foreign commerce, it was said that these cases "were sustained upon the ground that they were not directed against nor were direct burdens upon interstate or foreign commerce; and having been enacted only to protect the public safety, the public health, or the public morals, and having a real, substantial relation to the public ends intended to be accomplished thereby, were not to be deemed absolutely forbidden because of the mere grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, but to be regarded as only incidentally affecting such commerce, and valid until superseded by legislation of Congress on the same subject." The police power is a general term used to express the particular right of a government which is inherent in every sovereignty. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in the course of his opinion in the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 [12:256, 291], in describing the powers of a state: "They are nothing more nor less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a state passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its dominion." This power must, however, be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. If, in the assumed exercise of its police power, the legislature of a state directly and plainly violates a provision of the Constitution of the United States, such legislation would be void. The validity of this act is rested by the counsel for the defendant in error upon the proposition that the state legislature has the power of regulation over the corporation created by it, and in cases of railroad corporations, the same power of regulation and also full control over the subject of rates to be charged by them as carriers for the transportation of persons and property. Assum-[690] ing that the state is not controlled by contract between itself and the railroad company, the question is, How far does the authority of the legislature extend in a case where it has the power of regulation, and also the right to amend, alter, or repeal the charter of a company, together with a general power to legislate upon the subject of rates and charges of all carriers? It has no right even under such circumstances to take away or destroy the property or annul the contracts of a railroad company with third persons. (Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Company, 105 U. S. 13, 17 [26:961, 964]; Commonwealth v. Essex Co. 13 Gray, 239; People v. O'Brien, 11 N. Y. 1, 52 [2 L. R. A. 255); Detroit v. Detroit & H. Plank Road Company, 43 Mich. 140.) A railroad company, although a quasi public corporation, and although it operates a public highway (Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company, 135 U. S. 641 [34:295]; Lake Shore & M. S. Railway Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 301 [ante, 702], has nevertheless rights which the legislature cannot take away without a violation of the Federal Constitution, as stated in Smyth v. Ames (169 U. S. 466, 544 [42:819, 848].) A corporation is a person within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 [32:585]; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 522, 526 [42: 840, 842]. Although it is under governmental control, that control must be exercised with due regard to constitutional guarantees for the protection of its property. The question is presented in this case whether the legislature of a state, having power to fix maximum rates and charges for the transportation of persons and property by railroad companies, with the limita |