THE DECISIONS OF THE Supreme Court of the United States AT OCTOBER TERM, 1898. Authenticated copy of opinion record strictly followed, except as to such reference words and gures as are inclosed in brackets.] APITAL TRACTION COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. CHARLES HOF. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 1-46.) urisdiction of this court-trial by jury— trial before justice of the peace and a jury, not a trial by jury within the constitutional provision when trial by jury in appellate court satisfies constitutional right of trial by jury-re-examination of the facts enlarging jurisdiction of justices of the peace. This court has jurisdiction of a writ of error to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, to review its decision as to the 6. in any court of the United States than according to the rules of common law is not violated by allowing an appeal, for trial by a common-law jury, from the judgment on the verdict of a jury of twelve men in a court of a justice of the peace, as that is not a common-law jury. The right of trial by jury is not unduly ob. structed by enlarging the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace to $300, and requiring every appellant to give security to pay and satisfy the judgment of the appellate court in order to obtain a trial by a common-law jury on appeal. [No. 108.] Argued January 5, 6, 1899. Decided April 11, 1899. validity and effect of the legislation of Con-N ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to review a judg gress conferring upon justices of the peace in that District jurisdiction in civil actions in ment of that court reversing an order of the which the matter in dispute exceeds $20 Supreme Court of the District and remandin value, and providing for a trial by jury being the case with directions to quash a writ fore the justice, an appeal to the supreme of certiorari to a justice of the peace to precourt of the District, and a trial by jury invent a civil action to recover damages in the the appellate court, at the request of either sum of $300 from being tried by a jury beparty. fore him. Affirmed. Trial by jury under the Constitution means a trial by a jury of twelve men in the pre ence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law, and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it is against the law or the evidence. A trial by a jury of twelve men before a Justice of the peace, having been unknown in England or America before the Declaration of Independence, is not a trial by jury within the meaning of U. S. Const. 7th Amend. A common-law trial by jury in a court of record upon appeal from a judgment of a Justice of the peace in a civil action, after giving bond with surety to prosecute the appeal and to abide the judgment of the appellate court, is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional right of trial by jury. The constitutional provision, that no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise re-examined and 10 App. D. C. 205. The facts are stated in the opinion. *Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of [2] the court: On September 8, 1896, the Capital Traction Company, a street-railway corporation in the District of Columbia, presented to the supreme court of the District a petition for a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace to prevent a civil action to recover damages [3] in the sum of $300 from being tried by a jury before him. The petition for a writ of certiorari alleged that Charles Hof, on August 17, 1896, caused a summons to be issued by Lewis I. joined. 24 Wash. L. Rep. 646. Hof appealed to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, which on February 17, 1897, reversed that order, and remanded the case with directions to quash the writ of certiorari. 10 App. D. C. 205. The Capital Traction Company thereupon sued out a writ of error from this court, under the act of February 9, 1893, chap. 74, § 8. 27 Stat. at L. 436. O'Neal, Esquire, one of the justices of the | before the justice of the peace after issue peace in and for the District of Columbia, summoning the Capital Traction Company to appear before him on August 20, 1896, "to answer unto the complaint of Charles Hof in a plea of damage of $300," and the matter was postponed until September 8, on which day, after the company had put in its plea, and issue had been joined thereon, the attorney for Hof demanded of the justice of the peace that the action should be tried by a jury, and thereupon the justice of the peace issued a venire to a constable, commanding him to summon twelve jurors to appear before said justice on September 10; that the petitioner was advised that such a demand for the so-called jury was founded upon sections 1009-1016 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, and was intended to subject the petitioner, without appeal, to a form of trial before a justice of the peace, unknown to the common law, and, as the petitioner was advised, illegal and unconstitutional; that the petitioner was informed and believed that Hof's claim was for damages sustained by him through its negligence, while he was a passenger on one of its cars; and that it had a good defense on the merits to his claim, and sought a fair opportunity to make such defense before an impartial tribunal, and was ready and willing to give any security that might be required for the prompt payment of any final judgment which might be pronounced against it in due course of law. The petition further averred that the only method in which Hof's claim against the petitioner could be tried by a jury according to the common law and the Constitution was by removing his suit from the justice of the peace into the supreme court of the District of Columbia; that if this was not done, the petitioner would be deprived of its constitutional right to a trial by jury, and would be in danger of being deprived of its property [4] without due process of law, and would be denied the equal protection of the laws; and that the amount claimed by Hof was within the jurisdiction of that court. Wherefore the petitioner prayed that a writ of certiorari might be issued to the justice of the peace to remove Hof's claim into that court for trial according to the course of the common law, upon such terms as to security for costs and damages as the court might think proper; and for such other and further relief as the petitioner might be entitled to. The supreme court of the District of Columbia granted a writ of certiorari to the justice of the peace, as prayed for; and the justice of the peace, in his return thereto, set forth the proceedings before him in the action of Hof against the Capital Traction Company, showing the issue and return of the summons to the defendant, its oral plea of not guilty, the plaintiff's joinder of issue and demand of a jury, and the stay of further proceedings by the writ of certiorari. On October 6, 1896, the supreme court of the District of Columbia overruled a motion of Hof to quash the writ of certiorari; and entered an order quashing all proceedings The petition for a writ of certiorari presents for determination a serious and important question of the validity, as well as the interpretation and effect, of the legislation of Congress conferring upon justices of the peace in the District of Columbia jurisdiction in civil actions in which the matter in dispute exceeds twenty dollars in value, and providing for a trial by a jury before the justice of the peace, an appeal from his judgment to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and a trial by jury, at the request of either party, in the appellate court. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction of the writ of error. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210, 224 [32: 908, 913]; Parsons v. District of Columbia, [5] 170 U. S. 45 [42: 943]. The court of appeals was unanimous in maintaining the validity of the proceedings locking to a trial by a jury before the justice of the peace. But there was a difference of opinion between the two associate justices and the chief justice upon the question whether such a trial before the justice of the peace would be a trial by jury according to the common law and the Constitution; as well as upon the question whether the trial by jury, allowed by Congress in the supreme court of the district, upon appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace, and upon the condition of giving bond to pay the final judgment of the appellate court, satisfied the requirements of the Constitution. I. The Congress of the United States, being empowered by the Constitution "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the seat of the national government, has the entire control over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government, national or local. It may exercise within the District all legislative powers that the legislature of a state might exercise within the state; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Kendall v. United States [Stokes] (1838) 12 Pet. 524, 619 [9: 1181, 1218]; Mattingly v. District of Columbia (1878) 97 U. S. 687, 690 [24: 1098, 1100]; Gibbons v. District of Columbia (1886) 116 U. S. 404, 407 [29: 680, 681]. It is beyond doubt, at the present day, that the provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing the right of trial by jury, whether in civil or in criminal cases, are applicable to the District of Columbia. Webster v. Reid (1850) 11 How. 437, 460 [13: 761, 770];Callan v. Wilson (1888) 127 |