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U. S. 540, 550 [32: 223, 226]; Thompson v. Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343 [42: 1061]. The decision of this case mainly turns upon the scope and effect of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It may therefore be convenient, before particularly examining the acts [6] cf Congress now in question, to refer to the circumstances preceding and attending the adoption of this Amendment, to the contemporaneous understanding of its terms, and to the subsequent judicial interpretation thereof, as aids in ascertaining its true meaning, and its application to the case at

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II. The first Continental Congress, in the Declaration of Rights adopted October 14, 1774, unanimously resolved that "the respective Colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law." 1 Journals of Congress, 28.

The Ordinance of 1787 declared that the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory should "always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury," "and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." 1 Charters and Constitutions, 431.

The Constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, merely provided in article 3, section 3, that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury." In the Convention which framed the Constitution, a motion to add this clause, "and a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases,' was opposed by Mr. Gorham of Massachusetts, on the ground that "the constitution of juries is different in different states, and the trial itself is usual in different cases, in different states;" and was unanimously rejected. 5 Elliott's Debates, 550.

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preme court there should be no re-examination of facts where they had been tried in the original causes by juries;" but if this "should be thought too extensive, it might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are determinable at common law in that mode of trial." 2 Federalist (ed. 1788) pp. 319-321, 335, 336.

At the first session of the first Congress under the Constitution, Mr. Madison, in the House of Representatives, on June 8, 1789, submitted propositions to amend the Constitution by adding, to the clause concerning the appellate jurisdiction of this court, the words, "nor shall any fact, triable by a jury, according to the course of the common law, be otherwise re-examinable than according to the principles of the common law;" and, to the clause concerning trial by jury, these words: "In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate." 1 Annals of Congress, 424, 435. And those propositions, somewhat altered in form, were embodied in a single article, which was proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, to the legislatures of the several states, and upon being duly ratified by them, became the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, in these words: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."

A comparison of the language of the Seventh Amendment, as finally made part of the Constitution of the United States, with the Declaration of Rights of 1774, with the Ordinance of 1787, with the essays of Mr.[8] Hamilton in 1788, and with the amendments introduced by Mr. Madison in Congress in 1789, strongly tends to the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment, in declaring that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law," had in view the rules of the common law of England, and not the rules of that law as modified by local statute or usage in any of the states.

This conclusion has been established, and "the rules of the common law" in this respect clearly stated and defined, by judicial decisions.

Mr. Hamilton, in number 81 of the Federalist, when discussing the clause of the Constitution which confers upon this court "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make," and again, in more detail, in number 83, when answering the objection to the want of any provision securing trial by jury in civil actions, stated the diversity then existing in the laws of the different states regarding appeals and jury trials; and especially pointed out that in the New England states, and in those alone, appeals were allowed, as of course, from one jury to another until there had been two verdicts on one side, and in no [7] other state but Georgia was there any appeal from one to another jury. The diverkity in the laws of the several states, he insisted, "shows the impropriety of a technical definition derived from the jurisprudence of any particular state," and "that no general rule could have been fixed upon by the Con-in vain," said Mr. Justice Story, "in the vention which would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the states." And he suggested that "the legislature of the United States would certainly have full power to provide that in appeals to the su

In United States v. Wonson (1812) 1 Gall. 5, a verdict and judgment for the defendant having been rendered in the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts in an action of debt for a penalty, the United States appealed to the circuit court, and were held not to be entitled to try by a new jury in that court facts which had been tried and determined by the jury in the court below. "We should search

common law, for an instance of an appellate court retrying the cause by a jury, while the former verdict and judgment remained in full force. The practice indeed seems to be a peculiarity of New England, and, if I am

not misinformed, does not exist in more than | ton & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago (1897) one (if any) other state in the Union." 166 U. S. 226, 246 [41: 979, 988]. And, after quoting the words of the Seventh Amendment, he observed: "Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the common law of any individual state (for it probably differs in all), but it is the com-ernment under the Constitution, and on the mon law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence." "Now, according to the rules of the common law, the facts once tried by a jury are never re-examined, unless a new trial is granted in the discretion of the court, before which the suit is depending, for good cause shown; or unless the judgment of such court is reversed by a superior tribunal, on a writ of error, and a venire facias de novo is awarded. This is the invariable usage, settled by the decisions of ages." 1 Gall. 14, 20.

The judiciary act of September 24, 1789, chap. 20, drawn by Senator (afterwards Chief Justice) Ellsworth, and passed-within six months after the organization of the gov day before the first ten Amendments were [10] proposed to the legislatures of the statesby the First Congress, in which were many eminent men who had been members of the convention which formed the Constitution, has always been considered as a contemporaneous exposition of the highest authority. Cohens v. Virginia (1821) 6 Wheat. 264, 420 [5: 257, 295]; Parsons v. Bedford, above cited; Börs v. Preston (1884) 111 U. S. 252, 256 [28: 419, 420]; Ames v. Kansas (Johnston] (1884) 111 U. S. 449, 463, 464 In Parsons v. Bedford (1830) 3 Pet. 433 [28: 482, 488]; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. [7: 732], this court, on writ of error to a (1888) 127 U. S. 265, 297 [32: 239, 246]. lower court of the United States, held that That act provided, in §§ 9 and 12, that the [9]*it had no power to re-examine facts tried by trial of issues of fact, in a district or circuit a jury in the court below, although that court, in all suits, except those of equity or court was held in Louisiana, where Congress admiralty jurisdiction, should be by jury; had enacted that the mode of proceeding in § 13, that the trial of issues of fact in this should conform to the laws directing the court, in the exercise of its original jurisdic mode of practice in the district courts of the tion, in all actions at law against citizens of state, and a statute of the state authorized the United States, should be by jury; in § 17, its supreme court to try anew on appeal that "all the said courts of the United facts tried by a jury in a district court. States" should "have power to grant new Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the judg-trials, in cases where there has been a trial ment of this court, expounding the Seventh by jury, for reasons for which new trials Amendment to the Constitution, after show- have usually been granted in the courts of ing that in the first clause the words "suits law;" and in §§ 22 and 24, that final judgat common law" were used in contradistinc-ments of the district court might be reviewed tion to suits in equity and in admiralty, and by the circuit court, and final judgments of included "not merely suits which the com- the circuit court be reviewed by this court, mon law recognized among its old and set-upon writ of error, for errors in law, but not tled proceedings," but all suits in which legal rights, and not equitable rights, were ascertained and determined, proceeded as follows: "But the other clause of the Amendment is still more important; and we read it as a substantial and independent clause. No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined, in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common The only instances that have come to our law.' This is a prohibition to the courts of notice, in which Congress has undertaken to the United States to re-examine any facts, authorize a second trial by jury to be had in tried by a jury, in any other manner. The a court of the United States, while the veronly modes known to the common law to redict of a jury upon a former trial in a court examine such facts are the granting of a of record has not been set aside, are to be new trial by the court where the issue was tried, or to which the record was properly returnable; or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceed-wards, each of which provided that certain ings." 3 Pet. 446-448 [7: 736, 737].

This last statement has been often reaffirmed by this court. Barreda v. Silsbee (1858) 21 How. 146, 166 [16: 86, 93]; Justices v. Murray (1869) 9 Wall. 274, 277 [19: 658, 660]; Miller v. Brooklyn Life Insurance Co. (1870) 12 Wall. 285, 300 [20: 398, 401]; Knickerbocker Insurance Co. v. Comstock (1872) 16 Wall. 258, 269 [21: 493, 498]; Mercantile Mut. Insurance Co. v. Folsom (1873) 18 Wall. 237, 249 [21: 827, 833]; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff (1879) 100 U. S. 24, 31 [25: 531535]; Lincoln v. Power (1894) 151 U. S. 436, 438 [38: 224, 225]; Chicago, Burling

for any error in fact. 1 Stat. at L. 77, 80, 81, 83, 84. Those provisions, so far as regards actions at law, have since remained in force, almost uninterruptedly; and they have been re-enacted in the Revised Statutes, allowing the parties, however, to waive a jury and have their case tried by the court. Rev. Stat. §§ 566, 633, 648, 689, 691, 726, 1011.

found in two temporary acts passed during
the last war with Great Britain, and in an
act passed during the War of the Rebellion
and continued in force for a short time after-

actions brought in a state court against of-
ficers or persons acting under the authority
of the United States might, after final judg-
ment, be removed by appeal or writ of error
to the circuit court of the United States, [11]
and that court should "thereupon proceed to
try and determine the facts and the law in
such action in the same manner as if the
same had been there originally commenced,
the judgment in such case notwithstanding."
Acts of February 4, 1815, chap. 31, §§ 8, 13,
and March 3, 1815, chap. 94, §§ 6, 8; 3 Stat.
at L. 199, 200, 234, 235; Act of March 3,
1863, chap. 81, § 5; 12 Stat. at L. 757; Act
of May 11, 1866, chap. 80, § 3; 14 Stat. at

L. 46. But such a provision, so far as it
authorized the facts to be tried and de-
termined in the circuit court of the United
States in a case in which a verdict had been
returned in the state court, was held to be
inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States by the
supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, in
a case arising under the acts of 1815; and by
the supreme court of New York and by this
court, in cases arising under the acts of 1863
and 1866. Wetherbee v. Johnson (1817) 14
Mass. 412; Patrie v. Murray (1864) 43 Barb.hibition should not equally apply to a case
323; S. C. nom. Justices v. Murray (1869)
9 Wall. 274 [19: 658]; McKee v. Rains
(1869) 10 Wall. 22 [19: 860].

In Justices v. Murray, an action was brought by Patrie against Murray, a United States marshal, and his deputy, in the supreme court of the state of New York, and a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were rendered in that court. The defendant sued out a writ of error from the circuit court of the United States, under the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, chap. 81, § 5; and moved the state court to stay proceedings. The state court denied the motion, and refused to make a return to the writ of error, upon the ground that the act of Congress, so far as it provided that a case, after verdict and judgment in a state court, might be removed to the circuit court of the United States for trial and de termination upon both the facts and the law, in the same manner as if the case had been originally commenced in that court, was in violation of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and for that reason null and void. Patrie v. Murray, 43 Barb. 323. Thereupon the circuit court of the United States, without expressing any opinion upon this point, granted a writ of mandamus to the clerk of the state [12] court. Murray v. Patrie, 5 Blatchf. 343, 9 Wall. 276, note [19: 658]. The judgment of the circuit court ordering a mandamus was then brought to this court by writ of error, and reversed. Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering judgment, after remarking that the case (which had been twice argued by very able counsel) had received the most deliberate consideration of the court, quoting the statements of Mr. Justice Story in Parsons v. Bedford, above cited, and recognizing that the second clause of the Seventh Amendment could not be invoked in a state court to prohibit it from re-examining, on a writ of error, facts that had been tried by a jury in a lower court, went on to say: "It is admitted that the clause applies to the appellate powers of the Supreme Court of the United States in all common-law cases coming up from an inferior Federal court, and also to the circuit court, in like cases, in the exercise of its appellate powers. And why not, as it respects the exercise of these powers, in cases of Federal cognizance coming up from a state court? The terms of the Amendment are general, and contain no qualification in respect to the restriction upon the appellate jurisdiction of the courts, except as to the class of cases, namely, suits at common law, where the trial has been by jury. The natural inference is that no other was in

tended. Its language, upon any reasonable, if not necessary, interpretation, we think, applies to this entire class, no matter from what court the case comes, of which cognizance can be taken by the appellate court." The ratio decidendi, the line of thought pervading and controlling the whole opinion, was that the Seventh Amendment undoubt edly prohibited any court of the United States from re-examining facts once tried by a jury in a lower court of the United States, and that there was no reason why the probrought into a court of the United States from a state court. "In both instances," it was said, "the cases are to be disposed of by the same system of laws, and by the same judicial tribunal." 9 Wall. 277-279 [19: 660, 661].

In Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 242-244 [41: 979, 987] the same course of reasoning was followed, and was applied to a case brought [13] by writ of error from the highest court of a state to this court.

It must therefore be taken as established, by virtue of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, that either party to an action at law (as distinguished from suits in equity or in admiralty) in a court of the United States, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, has the right to a trial by jury; that, when a trial by jury has been had in an action at law, in a court either of the United States or of a state, the facts there tried and decided cannot be re-examined in any court of the United States, otherwise than according to the rules of the common law of England; that by the rules of that law, no other mode of re-examination is allowed than upon a new trial, either granted by the court in which the first trial was had or to which the record was returnable, or ordered by an appellate court for error in law; and therefore that, unless a new trial has been granted in one of those two ways, facts once tried by a jury cannot be tried anew, by a jury or otherwise, in any court of the United States.

The case of enforcing, in a court of the United States, a statute of a state giving one new trial, as of right, in an action of ejectment, is quite exceptional; and such a statute does not enlarge, but restricts, the rules of the common law as to re-examining facts once tried by a jury, for by the common law a party was not concluded by a single verdict and judgment in ejectment, but might bring as many successive ejectments as he pleased, unless restrained by a court of equity after repeated verdicts against him. Bacon, Abe. Ejectment, L. Equator Min. & Smelting Co. v. Hall (1882) 106 U. S. 86 [27: 114]; Smale v. Mitchell (1892) 143 U. S. 99 [36: 90].

III. "Trial by jury," in the primary and usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American Constitutions, is not merely a trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution

on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury | of twelve men, in the presence and under the [14] superintendence of a judge empowered to *instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence. This proposition has been so generally admitted, and so seldom contested, that there has been little occasion for its distinct assertion. Yet there are unequivocal statements of it to be found in the books. Lord Hale, in his History of the Common Law, chap. 12, "touching trial by jury," says: "Another excellency of this trial is this, that the judge is always present at the time of the evidence, given in it. Herein he is able in matters of law, emerging upon the evidence, to direct them; and also, in matters of fact, to give them great light and assistance, by his weighing the evidence be fore them, and observing where the question and knot of the business lies; and by showing them his opinion even in matter of fact, which is a great advantage and light to laymen. And thus, as the jury assists the judge in determining the matter of fact, so the judge assists the jury in determining points of law, and also very much in investigating and enlightening the matter of fact, whereof the jury are the judges." And again, in summing up the advantages of trial by jury, he says: "It has the advantage of the judge's observation, attention, and assistance, in point of law by way of decision, and in point of fact by way of direction to the jury." 2 Hale, Hist. Com. Law, 5th ed. 147, 156. See also 1 Hale, P. C. 33. The supreme court of Ohio held that the provision of article 1, section 19, of the Constitution of that state, requiring compensation for private property taken for the public use to "be assessed by a jury," was not satisfied without an assessment by a jury of twelve men under the supervision of a court; and, speaking by Chief Justice Thurman, said: "That the term 'jury,' without addition or prefix, imports a body of twelve men in a court of justice, is as well settled as any legal proposition can be." "We agree with Grimke, J., in Willyard v. Hamilton, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, pp. 111, 118 [30 Am. Dec. 195], that a jury, properly speaking, is an appendage of a court, a tribunal auxiliary to the administration of justice in a court, that a presiding law tribunal is implied, and that the conjunction of the two is the peculiar and valuable feature of the jury trial; and, as a necessary inference, that a mere commission, though composed of twelve men, can never be properly regarded as a jury. Upon the whole, after a careful examination of the subject, we are clearly of the opinion that the word 'jury,' in section 19 of article 1, as well as in other places in the Constitution where it occurs, means a tribunal of twelve men, presided over by a court, and hearing the allegations, evidence, and arguments of the parties." Lamb v. Lane (1854) 4 Ohio St. 167, 177, 179.

The Justices of the supreme judicial court of New Hampshire, in an opinion given to the house of representatives of the state,

said: "The terms 'jury,' and 'trial by jury,' are, and for ages have been, well known in the language of the law. They were used at the adoption of the Constitution, and always, it is believed, before that time, and almost always since, in a single sense. A jury for the trial of a cause was a body of twelve men, described as upright, well qualified and lawful men, disinterested and impartial, not of kin nor personal dependents of either of the parties, having their homes within the jurisdictional limits of the court, drawn and selected by officers free from all bias in favor of or against either party, duly empaneled under the direction of a competent court, sworn to render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence given them; who, after hearing the parties and their evidence, and receiving the instructions of the court relative to the law involved in the trial, and deliberating, when necessary, apart from all extraneous influences, must return their unanimous verdict upon the issue submitted to them." Opinion of the Justices (1860) 41 N. H. 550, 551.

Judge Sprague, in the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, said: "The Constitution secures trial by jury, without defining what that trial is. We are left to the common law to learn what it is that is secured. Now the trial by jury was, when the Constitution was adopted, and for generations before that time had been, here and in England, a trial of an issue of fact by twelve men, under the direction and superintendence of the court. This direction and superintendence was an essen- [16] tial part of the trial." "At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, it was a part of the system of trial by jury in civil cases that the court might, in its discretion, set aside a verdict." "Each party, the losing as well as the winning, has a right to the legitimate trial by jury, with all its safeguards, as understood when the Constitution was adopted." United States v. 1363 Bags of Merchandise (1863) 2 Sprague, 85-88.

This court has expressed the same idea, saying: "In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts." Vicksburg & M. Railroad Co. v. Putnam (1886) 118 U. S. 545, 553 [30: 257, 258]. And again: "Trial by jury in the courts of the United States is a trial presided over by a judge, with authority, not only to rule upon objections to evidence and to instruct the jury upon the law, but also, when in his judgment the due administration of justice requires it, to aid the jury by explaining and commenting upon the testimony, and even giving them his opinion on questions of fact, provided only he submits those questions to their determination." United States v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. (1887) 123 U. S. 113, 114 [31: 138, 139]. And see Sarf v. Unitel States (1895) 156 Ú.

5. 51, 102, 106 [39: 343, 361, 363]; Thomp-| Speedy Recovery of Small Debts out of son v. Utah (1898) 170 U. S. 343, 350 [42: Court." And Congress has vested in them, 1061, 1066]; Miller on the Constitution, 511; "as individual magistrates," the powers and Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, duties which justices of the peace previously had under the laws in force in the District of Columbia. Act of February 27, 1801, chap. 15, § 11; 2 Stat. at L. 107; Rev. Stat. D. Č. § 995.

239.

IV. By the common law, justices of the peace had some criminal jurisdiction, but no jurisdiction whatever of suits between man and man. There were in England, however, courts baron, county courts, courts of conscience, and other petty courts, which were not courts of record, and whose proceedings varied in many respects from the course of the common law, but which were empowered to hear and determine, in a summary way, without a jury, personal actions in which the debt or damages demanded did not ex[17] ceed forty *ahillings. 3 Bl. Com. 33, 35, 81. The twelve freeholders summoned to the county court of Middlesex, and authorized, when there assembled, together with the county clerk, and without any judge being present, to decide by a majority, and in a summary way, causes not exceeding forty shillings, under the statute of 23 Geo. II., chap. 33 (1750) commended by Blackstone, were clearly not a common-law jury. 3 Bl. Com, 83, and Coleridge's note.

In this country before the Declaration of Independence, the jurisdiction over small debts, which county courts and similar courts had in England, was generally vested | in single justices of the peace. Whenever a trial by jury of any kind was allowed at any stage of an action begun before a justice of the peace, it was done in one of two ways; either by providing for an appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace to a court of record, upon giving bond, with surety, "to prosecute the said appeal there with effect, and to abide the order of said court," and for a trial in that court by a common jury, as in Massachusetts; (6 Dane, Abr. 405, 442; Mass. Prov. Stats. 1697, chap. 8, § 1, and 1699, chap. 2, § 3 (1 Prov. Laws, State ed. pp. 283, 370), and Stat. 1783, chap. 42); or "by providing for a trial by a jury of six before the justice of the peace, as in New York and in New Jersey. 6 Dane, Abr. 417; N. Y. Stats. of December 16, 1737, 1 Smith & Livingston's Laws, p. 238, § 4, and of December 24, 1759, 2 Id. p. 170, 84; N. J. Stat. February 11, 1775, Allinson's Laws, p. 468; Wanser v. Atkinson (1881) 43 N. J. L. 571, 572.

A trial by a jury of twelve men before a justice of the peace, having been unknown in England or America before the Declaration of Independence, can hardly have been within the contemplation of Congress in proposing, or of the people in ratifying, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

V. Another question having an important bearing on the validity and the interpretation of the successive acts of Congress, concerning trial by jury in civil actions begun before justices of the peace in the District of Columbia, is whether the right of trial by jury, secured by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, is preserved by allowing a common-law trial by jury in a court of record, upon appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace, and upon giving bond with surety to prosecute the appeal and to abide the judgment of the appellate court.

The question considered and decided by this court in Callan v. Wilson (1888) 127 U. S. App. 540 [32: 223] though somewhat analogous, was essentially a different one. That case was a criminal case, not affected by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution, but depending upon the effect of those other provisions of the original Constitution and of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which declare that "the trial of all causes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury," that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," and that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury." The point there decided was that a person accused of a conspiracy to prevent another person from pursuing his lawful calling, and by intimidations and molestations to reduce him to beggary, had the right to a trial by jury in the first instance, and that it was [19] not enough to allow him a trial by jury after having been convicted by a justice of the peace without a jury. The decision proceeded upon the ground that such a conspiracy was an offense of a grave character, affecting the public at large, as well as one the punishment of which might involve the liberty of the citizen: it was conceded that there was a class of minor offenses to which the same rule could not apply; and the question of applying a like rule to civil cases did not arise in the case, and was not touched by the court.

Justices of the peace in the District of Columbia, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress to try and determine cases, criminal or civil, are doubtless, in some sense, judicial officers. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 330, 336 [2: 457, 458]. But they are not inferior courts of the United States, for the Constitution requires judges of all such courts to be appointed during good behavior. Nor are they, in any All the other cases cited at the bar, in sense, courts of record. They were never which the constitutional right of trial by jury considered in Maryland as "courts of law." was held not to be secured by allowing such Weikel v. Cate (1882) 58 Md. 105, 110. The a trial on appeal from a justice of the peace, statutes of Maryland of 1715, chap. 12, and or from an inferior court, were criminal of 1763, chap. 21 (in Bacon's Laws of Mary- cases. Greene v. Briggs (1852) 1 Curt. C. land), and of 1791, chap 68 (in 2 Kilty's C. 311, 325; Saco v. Wentworth (1853) 37 18] Laws) defining the civil jurisdiction of jus-Me. 165 [58 Am. Dec. 786]; Re Dana (1873) tices of the peace, were entitled acts "for the 7 Ben. 1.

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