ment is immaterial, when the defendant could
give evidence of all matters of defense set up
In the equitable pleas under the plea of not
guilty filed by him.

2. A party cannot defend against a patent for
land, duly issued by the United States upon
an entry made at a local land office, on the
ground that he was in actual possession of
the land at the time of the issue of the patent.
[No. 239.]

Submitted April 28, 1898. Decided May 31, 1898.

for in the United States land laws." The patent to the plaintiff was issued September 30, 1882, and recited that it was upon a location of Valentine scrip, and in his equitable plea defendant averred that the patent was predicated upon an entry at the local land office of the United States at Gainesville, Florida. On August 18, 1856, Congress passed an act (11 Stat. at L. 87, chap. 129) containing this provision:

"That all public lands heretofore reserved for military purposes in the state of Florida, which said lands in the opinion of the Secretary of War, are no longer useful or desired for such purposes, or so much thereof as said Secretary may designate, shall be, and are hereby, placed under the control of the General Land Office, to be disposed of and sold in the same manner and under the same

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida to review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of that state in an action of ejectment brought by George F. Drew, plaintiff, against James Johnson, to recover possession of a tract of land, the judgment being for plain-regulations as other public lands of the tiff. Affirmed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:

In September, 1866, defendant in error commenced an action of ejectment in the circuit court of the state of Florida, for the county of Hillsborough to recover possession of a tract of land described as follows:

United States: Provided, That said lands shall not be so placed under the control of said General Land Office until said opinion of the Secretary of War, giving his consent, communicated to the Secretary of the Interior in writing, shall be filed and recorded."

At that time there was in existence what was known as the Fort Brooke military res"Lot eight (8) of section nineteen (19), ervation, near the town of Tampa, Florida. township twenty-nine (29) south, of range As appears from the testimony offered by the nineteen (19) east, and lot seven (7) of sec-defendant, on July 24, 1860, the Secretary of tion twenty-four (24), in township twenty- War wrote to the Secretary of the Interior as nine (29) south, of range eighteen (18) east, follows: containing about forty and nineteen onehundredths (40.19) acres.❞

The defendant, now plaintiff in error, filed a plea of not guilty and also a plea based on equitable grounds. A demurrer to this latter plea was sustained, and thereupon the defendant asked leave to file an amended equitable plea. This application was denied, the court holding that the grounds of defense set up therein were not sufficient. That plea alleged in substance that the plaintiff's title rested on a patent from the United States, issued on a location of Valentine scrip; that such scrip was, by the terms of the statute under which it was issued, to be located only upon unoccupied and unappropriated lands of the United States; that the land in controversy was, at the time of the location of the scrip, a part of Fort Brooke military reservation, and was also in the actual occupancy of the defendant. The case came on for trial in September, 1889, and the defendant offered evidence in support of all of his defenses, including therein the matters set up in the equitable plea which he had been refused leave to file. This testimony was held insufficient by the court, and the trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which judgment was thereafter, and in June, 1894, aflirmed by the supreme court of the state; whereupon the defendant sued out this writ of error.

The Valentine scrip act was passed April [95]5, 1872 (17 Stat. at L.649), chap. 89, and authorized the location of such scrip on "the unoccupied and unappropriated public lands of the United States, not mineral, and in tracts not less than the subdivisions provided

War Department, July 24, 1860. Sir: Referring to the correspondence be tween the two departments on the subject, I have the honor to inclose to you a report of the quarter-master general showing that Fort Brooke is now in readiness to be turned over to the Department of the Interior, in pursuance of the arrangements made to that effect.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, John B. Floyd, Secretary of War. Hon. J. Thompson, Secretary of the Interior.

*The inclosed report from the quartermaster [96] general stated that all the movable property of the government had been sold, and that there was no reason why the military reservation should not be turned over to the Interior Department. Probably the exigencies of the war, which soon thereafter commenced, prevented any further action by either department, for on April 6, 1870, the following communication was sent by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Interior:

War Department, Washington City,
April 6, 1870.

The Honorable Secretary of the Interior.
Sir: I have the honor to reply to a letter
addressed to this department by the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office on the 26th
ultimo relative to the public lands occupied
by this department for military purposes at
Fort Brooke, Florida, and to inform you
that there is no longer any objection to their

disposition by the General Land Office under
the laws governing the subject.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Wm. W. Belknap, Secretary of War.

From the date of this last communication up to 1877 the record discloses no action by either department, but in January, 1877, the Secretary of War requested that a military reservation at Fort Brooke be declared and set apart by the executive. Subsequently, and on May 29, 1878, the Secretary of War addressed a communication to the President, as follows:

War Department, Washington City,
May 29, 1878.
To the President.

Sir: In accordance with recommendation

of commanding general department of the south, concurred in by division commanders, I have the honor to request that a military reservation at the post of Fort Brooke, Tampa, Florida, with boundaries as herein after described, may be duly declared and set apart by the executive in lieu of the lands at that post reserved by executive order dated January 22, 1887, to wit: Beginning at the intersection of the line which bounds the [97] town of Tampa on the south with the Hillsborough river, running thence along said line which bounds the town of Tampa on the south, and in prolongation thereof north 68 degrees 45 minutes east 2,976 feet; thence north 4 degrees 28 minutes west 2,342 feet; thence north 38 degrees east 1,052 feet; thence south 52 degrees east 459.2 feet; thence south 38 degrees west 1,052 feet; thence south 4 degrees 28 minutes east 1,931 feet; thence south 5 degrees 29 minutes east 2,007.2 feet to the Hillsborough bay; thence westerly along the shore of Hillsborough bay and the shore of Hillsborough river to the place of beginning, containing 155 and one half acres, more or less. A plat of the reservation and report and notes and survey by Lieutenant James C. Bush, 5th artillery, are inclosed herewith.

I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

Geo. W. McCrary,

Secretary of War.

tion last relinquished by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Interior." The diagram is not very definite, and it is difficult to determine therefrom the boundaries of either the earlier or later Fort Brooke military reservation. The defendant also offered evidence tending to show that he entered into occupation of the tract in controversy in 1871, and had continued in occupancy ever since.

*Mr. Samuel Y. Finley for plaintiff in [98] error.

Messrs. C. M. Cooper and J. C. Cooper for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The ruling of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the first equitable plea and refusing leave to permit the second to be filed presents no question for the consideration of this court, for it was held by the supreme court of the state that under the plea of not guilty all the matters of defense set up in these equitable pleas could be offered in evidence and made available; and, in fact, the defendant on the trial did offer his testimony to establish them. So, the substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced, and the ruling involved merely a question of state practice.

We pass, therefore, to a consideration of the merits of the case: Was the land within the limits of any military reservation at the time that it was patented? The supreme court of the state said in respect to this matter:

"There is doubt whether the documentary evidence offered by the defendant shows that the particular lots of land described in the declaration were embraced in the Fort Brooke reservation when the patent was issued."

It is clear to us that they were not. The description of the reservation asked for in the letter of May 29. 1878, from the Secretary of War to the President, is not of itself sufficient to show whether the land was within or without the limits of such reservation. The plat, notes and survey were not in evidence. But the record recites that the diagram, certified by the Commissioner of the Land Office, "shows the contiguity of the land in This request was approved and the reser- question." If contiguous it was not within, vation was made and declared accordingly. and while the diagram is unsatisfactory, yet The plat, notes, and survey referred to in this it tends to support this statement of the recletter were not introduced in evidence, so ord. Again, the testimony of the defendant that the exact boundaries of the reservation is that he entered into possession of this land then ordered were not distinctly shown, nor in 1871, which was before the reservation was can it be determined from the description in established, and continued in such possession [99] the letter alone whether it included the lands until after the restoration in 1883, and this in controversy. In March, 1883, this last is in accord with the averments in the equitreservation was abandoned, and the land able plea. This also indicates that the land again turned over to the Interior Depart- was not included in any government reserment. Defendant also offered a diagram, vation. Further and finally, the plat on file certified by the Commissioner of the Land in the General Land Office, and a part of the Office, of sections 18 and 19 of township 29, range 19, and section 24 of township 29, range 18, which, as the record recites, "shows the contiguity of the land in question to that portion of the Fort Brooke military reserva

public records, puts the question at rest and locates the land outside the reservation. Hence, as shown by the testimony and by the public records, this land ever since 1870 has been part of the public lands of the United

States. and subject to disposal in accordance | gard or defiance thereof. St. Louis Smelting with the general land laws. It was unappropriated land within the meaning of the act of


& Ref. Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 646 [26: 875, 879]; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 519 [30: 1039, 1048]; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618 [31: 844]; Davis's Admr. v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507, 529 [35: 238, 246]; Knight v. United States Land Asso. 142 U. S. 161 [35: 974].

Reference is made in the brief to the act of Congress of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat. at L. 103, chap. 214) concerning the disposal of abandoned and useless military reservations. But obviously that statute can have no significance in this case, for the patent had issued and the title passed from the government prior to its enactment. We see no reason to doubt that upon the facts in this case the judgment of the Supreme Court of Flori da was right, and it is therefore affirmed.

It being so a part of the public domain, subject to administration by the land department and to disposal in the ordinary way, the question arises whether a party can defend against a patent duly issued therefor upon an entry made in the local land office on the ground that he was in actual possession of the land at the time of the issue of the patent? We are of opinion that he cannot. It appears from the testimony that the defendant, although in occupation of this land, as he says, from 1871, never attempted to make any entry in the local land office, never took any steps to secure a title, and in fact did nothing until after the issue of a patent, when he began to make inquiry as to his supposed rights. But whether a party was or was not in possession of a particular tract at a given time is a question of fact, depending upon parol testimony; and if there is any one thing respecting the administration ARCHIE R. ANDERSON, Sheriff of Harris of the public lands which must be considered as settled by repeated adjudications of this court, it is that the decision of the land department upon mere questions of fact is, in the absence of fraud or deceit, conclusive, and such questions cannot thereafter be relitigated in the courts. The law in reference to this matter was summed up in the case of Burfenning v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & O. Railway Co. 163 U. S. 321, 323 [41: 175, 176], as follows:



County, Texas.


(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 101-108.)

Power of circuit courts—dismissal of habeas
corpus-equal protection of the laws-
..commitment for contempt-lien on prop-

It has undoubtedly been affirmed over
and over again that in the administration of..erty, when a defense-jury trial.
the public land system of the United States
questions of fact are for the consideration 1.
and judgment of the land department, and
that its judgment thereon is final. Whether.
100]for instance, a certain tract is swamp *land

or not, saline land or not, mineral land or not,
presents a question of fact not resting on rec-
ord, dependent on oral testimony; and it
cannot be doubted that the decision of the
land department, one way or the other, in
reference to those questions, is conclusive and
not open to relitigation in the courts, except
in those cases of fraud, etc., which permit
any determination to be re-examined. John-
son v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72 [20: 485]; St.
Louis Smelting & Ref. Company v. Kemp,
104 U. S. 636 [26: 875]; Steel v. St. Louis
Smelting & Ref. Company, 106 U. S. 417 [27:
226]; Wright v. Roscberry, 121 U. S. 488
[30: 1039]; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U. S. 573
[34: 1063]; McCormick v. Hayes, 159 U. S.
332 [40:171].

"But it is also equally true that when by act of Congress a tract of land has been reserved from homestead and pre-emption, or dedicated to any special purpose, proceedings in the land department in defiance of such reservation or dedication, although culminating in a patent, transfer no title and may be challenged in an action at law. In other words, the action of the land department cannot override the expressed will of Congress, or convey away public lands in disre

Circuit courts of the United States should not, except in urgent cases, relieve from custody, by habeas corpus, persons held under state authority in violation of a Federal right. but should leave them to their remedy by review.

2. The dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus by the highest court of the state having jurisdiction of the case is reviewable by this court on writ of error, if it denies the prisoner any right specially set up and claimed by him under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.


Equal protection of the laws is not denied

by a law or course of procedure which would
have been applied to any other person in the
state under similar circumstances and condi-

4. A commitment for contempt does not de-
prive a person of liberty without due process
of law, unless the commitment was void.


The claim of an equity or lien on property held by an officer of a corporation to secure a debt to himself does not defeat the jurisdiction of a court which has appointed a receiver

NOTE. When habeas corpus may issue, and
when not; and from what courts and by what
judges; what may be inquired into by writ of,
-see note to United States v. Hamilton, 1:

As to what questions may be considered on
habeas corpus,-see note to Re Carll, 27: 288.
As to suspension of writ of habeas corpus,
-see note to Luther v. Borden, 12:581.
As to what is due process of law,-see note to
Pearson v. Yewdall, 24: 436.


for the corporation in a suit to which the off-
cer is a party, after hearing on due notice and
appearance, to order him to turn over such
property to the receiver.

6. A jury trial is not necessary to due process
of law on an inquiry for contempt.
[Nos. 632, 633.]
Argued May 5, 6, 1898.


State, requiring him to deliver to the receiver of the Houston Cemetery Company certain books and property of that company. Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Judgments of the Circuit Court and of the

See same case below (Tex. Civ. App.) 36 S. W. Rep. 802, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep.

Decided May 31, S. W. 306.


The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. James L. Bishop for appellant and plaintiff in error:

The commitment and the order on which it was made were void.

Distinct and incompatible proceedings were blended in one judgment.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas dismissing a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of Thomas Tinsley for a contempt; and in error to the Court of Criminal Re Chiles, 22 Wall. 157 (22: 819); PeoAppeals of the State of Texas to review a ple, Munsell, v. New York County Ct. of Oyer judgment dismissing a writ of habeas corpus & Terminer, 101 N. Y. 245, 54 Am. Rep. C91. and remanding said Tinsley to the custody Regarding the order as made in the proof the sheriff for the same contempt of court, ceeding as a civil remedy directing the appelwhich was disobeying the order of the Dis-lant to deliver the property specified to the trict Court of the County of Harris in said receiver, or in default of delivery that he be As to powers of court to punish for contempt, | ceptional_nature. Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. -see note to Ex parte Robinson, 22: 205. 284 (42:748). tion of the petitioner under order of a state Habeas corpus will lie to prevent the execucourt, pending an appeal in previous habeas corpus proceedings instituted by him in a Federal court, the effect of which is to stay proceedings in the state court. Re Ebanks, 84 Fed. Rep. 311.

That there is no review of decree punishing for contempt; limits to rule, see note to New

Orleans v. New York Mail S. S. Co. 22: 354.

As to powers and duties of receivers,—see note to Davis v. Gray, 21:447.

As to presumption of innocence in habeas corpus proceedings, see note to State v. Jones (N. C.) 22 L. R. A. 678.

As to jurisdiction of United States courts, to issue writs of habeas corpus, see note to Re Reinitz (C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 4 L. R. A. 236. Habeas corpus; power of Federal courts to issue; in what cases; when discharge granted; review of decisions; contempt proceedings. The circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus in favor of a person unlawfully restrained of his liberty by state officers under a statute in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284 (42: 748).

Error in submitting to the jury only the question of murder in the first degree, while the evidence is sufficient at the most to convict of murder in the second degree, does not constitute such a jurisdictional defect in a conviction for murder in the first degree as to sustain a writ of habeas corpus. Crossley v. California, 168 U. S. 640 (42:610).

Federal officers arrested under a charge made in state courts will be discharged by a Federal court on habeas corpus where there is no ground for a criminal charge under the state laws. Re Lewis, 83 Fed. Rep. 159.

The finding of a commissioner holding a prisoner for removal to another Federal district, as to probable cause to believe that he has been guilty of a crime, will not be disturbed where the testimony, though not strong, tends Re Price, 83 Fed. Rep. 830. to show the commission of the offense charged.

A writ of habeas corpus will not be granted by a Federal court to investigate the detention of a person for selling cigarettes without license, under a plain statute making no discitizens, but simply requiring every person encriminations against foreign goods or foreign gaged in the business of selling cigarettes to pay a special license tax. Re May, 82 Fed. Rep. 422.

The court cannot upon habeas corpus review a judgment of deportation made by a United States commissioner in respect to a Chinese person upon the facts. Fed. Rep. 702. Re Tsu Tse Mee, 81

The action of the circuit court of the United States in refusing to grant appeals in habeas A complaint in habeas corpus alleging invalidcorpus cases in favor of a prisoner under judg-ity of process or proceedings under which the ment of a state court cannot be revised on ap- party is held in custody must set out copies of plication to the Supreme Court of the United such process or proceedings, or the essential States for such a writ. Re Boardman, 169 U. parts thereof; and mere averments of conclu8. 39 (42: 653). sions of law are inadequate. Craemer v. Wash

A determination by a state court that judgington, 168 U. S. 124 (42: 407). ment of conviction in a capital case shall not be stayed, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal which is alleged to present Federal questions, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of habeas corpus. Re Boardman, 169 U. S. 39 (42: 653).

A Federal court will not on habeas corpus discharge a prisoner charged with a violation of the criminal laws of one state and apprehended in another, where it appears by the recitals contained in the warrant under which he was arrested and the record of the extradition proceedings, that no right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States will be violated by remanding him to the custody of the agent of the demanding state. Dawson v. Rushin, 49 U. S. App. 674, 83 Fed. Rep. 306, 28 C. C. A. 354.

The regular course of justice in a state court will not be interfered with by habeas corpus In a Federal court, unless the case is of an ex

Writ of habeas corpus cannot perform the office of a writ of error to review proceedings in extradition before an officer authorized to entertain such proceedings. It is efficient only to reach error fatal to the jurisdiction of the officer over the person accused, or over the subject-matter of the accusation. Sternaman Peck, 51 U. S. App. 312, 80 Fed. Rep. 883, 26 C. C. A. 214.


Habeas corpus wil' te to review an imprisonment under sentence of a state court, where the question is whether such court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the charge. Re Walte. 81 Fed. Rep. 359.

Federal courts will not, except in extreme cases, if at all interfere by habeas corpus with confinement of insane person, because steps provided for by the state statute have not been followed, but the proper redress is by application to the state courts. Re Huse, 48 U. S. App. 318. 79 Fed. Rep. 305, 25 C. C. A. 1.

One held for extradition upon charge of for gery should not be released upon habeas corpus,

committed until he make delivery, it was void for the reason that the court had no authority in a proceeding to punish for contempt to determine the right of possession of property claimed adversely to the receiver or give judgment for the payment of a debt. Ex parte Hollis, 59 Cal. 405; Parker v. Browning, 8 Paige, 388, 35 Am. Dec. 717; Havemeyer v. San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. 84 Cal. 385, 10 L. R. A. 627; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 218 (21: 452); Baldwin v. Wayne County Circuit Judge, 101 Mich. 119; State, Boardman, v. Ball, 5 Wash. 387; Re Muehlfeld, 16 App. Div. 401; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa, 208, 79 Am. Dec. 534; State v. Start, 7 Iowa, 501, 74 Am. Dec. 278; Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 303.

The uniform rule is that where a receiver has been appointed he cannot compel the delivery of property in the possession of third persons, who claim title or right to possession adverse to the judgment debtor by proceedings for contempt.

Rodman v. Henry, 17 N. Y. 182; Barnard v. Kobbe, 54 N. Y. 516; West Side Bank v. Pugsley, 47 N. Y. 368; Krone v. Klotz, 3 App. Div. 587; Re Havlik, 45 Neb. 747; Edgarton v. Hanna, 11 Ohio St. 323.

Jurisdiction means something more than that a party has been brought before the court, or that the court has a general jurisdiction of the subject-matter-it requires that the particular subject-matter shall have been brought into issue in the particular action before the court.

Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U S. 254 (35: 464); Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 339 (19: 696) Seamster v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 232; Risley v. Phoenix Bank, 83 N. Y. 318, 38 Am. Rep. 421; Shaw v. Broadbent, 129 N. Y. 114; Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N. Y. 520; Allen v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 18 App. Div. 27.

The title of the receiver related only to the date of his appointment. He took the property as of that date subject to such

where there was legal, though circumstantial, which it is based is properly authenticated and evidence before the commissioner which he charges an offense committed within the fordeemed sufficient to sustain the charge of foreign state with reasonable fullness and accurgery under the provisions of the treaty. Reacy, and will not be pronounced void because of Bryant, 80 Fed. Rep. 282. some technical defect in the foreign indictment or affidavit, if the offense is substantially alleged or described. Webb v. York, 49 U. S. App. 163, 79 Fed. Rep. 616.

While the general rule is that parties under prosecution in state courts will not be released by a Federal court on habeas corpus, but will be left to reach the United States Supreme Court by writ of error, the Federal court has the power to do so if special circumstances require. Re Grice, 79 Fed. Rep. 627.

Courts of the United States may exercise a discretion in determining the question of the discharge of a person on habeas corpus who has been arrested as a fugitive in a state proceeding in aid of a prosecution for the violation of the laws of another state. Iasigi v. Van De Carr, 166 U. S. 391 (41: 1045).

A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made use of to perform the functions of a writ of error or an appeal. Re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548 (41: 1110) Re Rowe, 40 U. S. App. 516, 77 Fed. Rep. 161, 23 C. C. A. 103.

A conviction on a verdict which fails to specify the degree of the crime, when the law divides it into degrees. with punishment varying according to the degree, although it is erroneous, is not a jurisdictional defect for which the convict can be released on habeas corpus. Re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481 (41: 1085).


Habeas corpus in contempt proceedings: parte Smith, 177 Ill. 63; Ex parte Terry, 148 U. S. 289 (32: 405); Ex parte Ah Men, 77 Cal. 198; Re Morris, 39 Kan. 28; Ex parte Robertson, 27 Tex. App. 628; Er parte Wilson 73 Cal. 97: Re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586 (34: 500) Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 16 L. R. A. 108; Com. v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374 Ex parte Brown, 97 Cal. 83; Re Whetstone, 9 Utah, 156; Re Taylor, 8 Misc. 159; Re McMaster, 2 Okla. 435; Ex parte Wright, 32 N. B. 54; Re Pair man, 1 Ohio N. P. 127; Re Rosenberg, 90 Wis. 581: Er parte Lennon, 22 U. S. App. 561, 64 Fed. Rep. 320, 12 C. C. A. 134; Ex parte O'Brien, 127 Mo. 477.

The question of error in an order consolidating indictments cannot be re-examined by writ of habeas corpus, as error in that respect would not make the judgment and sentence void as without jurisdiction and authority. Howard v. United States, 43 U. S. App. 678. 75 Fed. Rep. 986, 21 C. C. A. 586, 34 L. R. A. 509.

After a decision of a state court of competent Jurisdiction when it is still contended that the Federal Constitution has been violated, a Federal court has the power, and it is its duty, to interfere by habeas corpus for the protection of the rights violated, but not unless there is a plain case requiring it. Re Krug, 79 Fed. Rep. 308.

An executive warrant for the arrest of a fugitive from justice will be upheld on habeas corpus when the foreign indictment or affidavit on

An excess or abuse in the mode of detention of an accused person does not, except in a very grave and unusual case, entitle him to a discharge, by a writ of habeas corpus, from all confinement, and the rule applies where the arrest is under military law. Closson v. United States, Armes. 7 App. D. C. 460.

A letter from the commissioner of internal revenue to a collector, stating that a state court has no right to compel the production of the records of the officers, and that the communications of taxpayers are privileged, is not a regulation having the force of a statute which will entitle a Federal court to review on habeas corpus the imprisonment of a collector for refusal to produce such records in compliance with the order of a state court. Re Hirsch, 74 Fed. Rep. 928.

One held under process legally issued by the courts of a state is not entitled to discharge upon habeas corpus because of illegal or fraudu lent extradition proceedings by which he was brought into the jurisdiction. Re Moore, 75 Fed. Rep. 821.

Habeas corpus cannot be extended so as to enable the Federal court to assume the func tiors of an appellate tribunal to review the deis poor and unable to bear the expense incident cisions of state courts, because the petitioner to a hearing in the appellate courts of the state. Re Nelson, 69 Fed. Rep. 712.

The decision of a state court denying a writ of error to a person convicted of crime or refusing to make it effectual cannot be revised by habeas corpus proceedings in a Federal court. Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293 (40: 432).

The insufficiency of an indictment in a state court will not be a ground for interposition by the courts of the United States by writ of haWhitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. beas corpus. 231 (40:406).

Habeas corpus will lie in a Federal court to review the commitment by a state court of a deputy collector of internal revenue for contempt in refusing to disclose communications made to him by an applicant for a retail liquor dealer's tax stamp. for the purpose of making Re Huttthe office records of the application. man, 70 Fed. Rep. 699.

A dispute in regard to the true boundary be tween the state of California and the territory of Arizona cannot be created or determined upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of one convicted and sentenced and imprisoned by the territorial government in

« ForrigeFortsett »