1

limits of the government plan of reclama | The estate was represented in the appeal to
tion, and for such portions the court below
awarded compensation. All of these claim-
ants, save two, have accepted and received
the compensation.

"That the commissioners aforesaid, for the time being, or any two of them, shall, from time to time, until Congress shall exercise the jurisdiction and government within said territory, have power to license the building of wharves in the waters of the Potomac and the Eastern Branch, adjoining the said city, of the materials, in the manner and extent, they may judge durable, convenient, and agreeing with general order; but no license shall be granted to one to build a wharf before the land of another, nor shall any wharf be built in said waters without license as aforesaid; and if any wharf shall be built without such license or different therefrom, the same is hereby declared a common nuisance."

Here we may pause to observe that the only power given to the commissioners was to grant licenses, from time to time, and until Congress should assume and exercise its jurisdiction within the territory, and it was declared that any wharf built in the waters of the Potomac without such license or in disregard of its provisions was declared to be a common nuisance.

city requires it, of equal breadth with those streets, which if made by an individual holding the adjacent property shall be subject to his separate occupation and use, until the public shall reimburse the expense of making such street; and when no street or streets intersect said wharf, to leave a space of sixty feet for a street at the termination of every three hundred feet of ground. The buildings on said wharves to be subject to the general regulations for buildings in the city of Washington as declared by the President. Wharves to be built of such materials as the proprietors may elect."

It will be seen that, in publishing these regulations, the commissioners claimed no authority in themselves, but professed only to act in virtue of the act of Maryland, and must therefore be understood as having intended to grant temporary licenses, subject to the will of Congress when it should take jurisdiction.

It appears in the record that Notley Young himself procured from the commissioners a license to build a wharf on the Potomac river, and that the wharf appears as an existing structure upon the map of 1797. The board of commissioners was abolished by an act of Congress approved May 1, 1802 (2 Stat. at L. 175, chap. 41) by the second section whereof it was enacted:

"That the affairs of the city of Washington, which have heretofore been under the care and superintendence of the said commissioners, shall hereafter be under the direction of a superintendent to be appointed[284 by and under the control of the President of the United States; and the said superintendent is hereby invested with all the powers, and shall hereafter perform all the duties, which the said commissioners are now vested with, or are required to perform by or in virtue of any act of Congress, or any act of the general assembly of Maryland, or any deed or deeds of trust from the original proprietors of the lots of said city, or in other manner whatsoever."

【283] *On July 20, 1795, the commissioners published the following regulations respecting wharves:

The licenses contemplated therefore were temporary, and liable to be withdrawn by Congress on assuming jurisdiction. Such legislation certainly cannot be relied on as either conferring or recognizing rights to erect and maintain permanent wharves within the waters of the Potomac and the East-ulate the stationing, anchorage, and moorern Branch. ing of vessels," but no authority to license or regulate the building of wharves is given. Then came the act of February 24, 1804 (2 Stat. at L. 254, chap. 14), wherein was given to the city councils power "to preserve the navigation of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers, adjoining the city; to erect, repair, and regulate public wharves, and to deepen docks and basins."

"The board of commissioners, in virtue of the powers vested in them by the act of the Maryland legislature to license the building of wharves in the city of Washington, and to regulate the materials, the manner and extent thereof, hereby make known the following regulations:

This was followed by the act of May 3, 1802, entitled "An Act to Incorporate the Inhabitants of the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia." (2 Stat. at L. 195, chap. 53). In it was given to the corporation "full power and authority to reg

By the act of May 15, 1820 (3 Stat. at L. 583, chap. 104), entitled "An Act to Incorporate the Inhabitants of the City of Washington, and to Repeal All Acts Heretofore Passed for That Purpose," the corporation was empowered "to preserve the navigation of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers adjoining the city; to erect, repair, and regulate public wharves; to regulate the manner 977

"That the proprietors of water lots are permitted to wharf and build as far out into the river Potomac and the Eastern Branch as they think convenient and proper, not injuring or interrupting the channels or navigation of the said waters, leaving a space, wherever the general plan of streets in the U. S., Book 43.

174 U. S.

62

of erecting and the rates of wharfage at pri- | south of Water street were erected by indi-
vate wharves; to regulate the stationing, viduals in the exercise of private rights of
anchorage, and mooring of vessels."
property in defined parcels of land to them
belonging. The legislation clearly signifies
that during the entire history of the city
Congress and the city authorities have
claimed and exercised jurisdiction for public
purposes over the territory occupied by these
wharves; and that jurisdiction seems to have
been recognized and submitted to by the ap
pellants and their predecessors in many in-
stances in which the evidence discloses the
nature of the transactions.

It is earnestly urged by the learned counsel of the appellants that possession and enjoyment by successive occupants for so long a period warrant the presumption of a grant, and authorities are cited to show that such presumptive grant may arise as well from the Crown or the state as from an individual. As between individuals, this doctrine is wellsettled and valuable; and it may be that, in respect to the ordinary public lands held by the government for the purposes of sale, occupation, and settlement, there might exist a possession so long, adverse, and exclusive as to justify a court of equity or a jury in presuming a grant. But where, as in the present case, the lands and waters concerned are owned by the government in trust for public purposes, and are withheld from sale by the Land Department, it seems more than doubtful whether an adverse possession, however long continued, would create a title. However, under the facts disclosed in this record, it is unnecessary to determine such questions; for, as we have seen, at no time have Congress and the city authorities renounced or failed to exercise jurisdiction and control over the territory occupied by these wharves and docks.

On July 29, 1819 (Burch's Dig. 126), the city council enacted:

"Sec. 1. That the owners of private wharves or canals and canal wharves be obliged to keep them so in repair as to pre vent injury to the navigation.

"Sec. 2. That no wharf shall hereafter be built, within this corporation, without the plan being first submitted to the mayor, who, with a joint committee from the two boards of the city council, shall examine the same, and (285]if it shall appear to their satisfaction that no injury could result to the navigation from the erection of such wharf, then, and in that case, it shall be the duty of the mayor to issue a written permission for the accomplishment of the object, which permit shall express how near such wharf shall approach the channel."

By acts of councils approved January 8, 1831, it was enacted:

"Sec. 1. That it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to build or erect any wharf or wharves within the limits of this corporation who shall not first submit the plan of such wharf or wharves to the mayor, who, with a joint committee from the two boards of the city council, shall examine the same; and if it shall appear to their satisfaction that no injury could result to the navigation from the erection of such wharf or wharves, then, in that case, it shall be the duty of the mayor to issue a written permission for the accomplishment of the object, which permit shall express how near such wharf or wharves shall approach the channel and at what angle they shall extend from the street on which they are erected."

The record discloses a continuous series of acts and joint resolutions of the city councils, on the subject of improving the navigation of the Potomac river, the erection and repair of sea walls on the river, granting special permission to named persons to build wharves in front of such walls. The last we shall notice is the act of March 23, 1863, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Mayor to Lease Wharf Sites on the Potomac River," etc. By this act the mayor was authorized to lease for any term of years, not exceeding ten, wharf sites in front of any sea wall theretofore built by the corporation, or in front of any sea wall that might thereafter be built in pursuance of any enactment for that purpose; and it was provided that at the expiration of ten years, or sooner, the said sites and all wharf improvements thereon should revert to the corporation, and that if the occupants should fail to keep said wharves in good repair and to comply with all the provisions of the act, the contract should cease, and the mayor should notify them to vacate the premises within ten days. And this was followed by similar acts in [286]1865, 1867, 1870, and 1871, all *asserting power by the corporation over the wharves on Water street.

We think it impossible to reconcile the succession of acts of Congress and of the city councils with the theory that the wharves

An effort is made to distinguish the claim of Edward M. Willis, as alienee of A. I. Harvey, defendant, to land lying between Thirteen-and-a-half street and Maryland avenue, and fronting on the Potomac, by the circumstance that Water *street has never[287] been actually constructed and opened as a thoroughfare in front of this land. But it is not perceived that the failure of the city heretofore to open Water street could create any title in Willis to the land and water ly ing south of the territory appropriated for that street. His occupancy, or that of his predecessors, of such land for wharfing or other purposes may be presumed to have been with the consent of the city authorities, but could not, under the facts shown in this record, avail to raise the presumption of a grant.

Referring to a similar claim this court said, in Potomac Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac S. B. Co. 109 U. S. 692 [27: 1077]:

"Disputes undoubtedly arose, some quite early, not so much as to what rights belonged to 'water lots,' nor as to what property constituted a 'water lot,' but, in regard to particular localities, whether that character attached to individual squares and lots. In part, at least, the uncertainty arose from the fact that the plan of the city, as exhibited on paper, did not accurately correspond at all points with the lines as surveyed and

marked on the land. Complaints of that de- | tion, and in directing the institution of these scription, and of designed departures from proceedings, to take for public use, without the plan, seem to have been made. It is also compensation, the private property of inditrue, we think, that mistakes arose, as per-viduals situated within the lines of the govhaps in the very case of the lots on the north ernment *improvement, even where such[289] side of Water street, owing to the fact that property may lie south of Water street. the street existed only on paper, and for a Those who, relying, some of them, on express long time remained an unexecuted project; and others on implied licenses from the city property appearing to be riparian, because authorities, have erected and maintained exlying on the water's edge, which, when the pensive wharves and warehouses for the acstreet was actually made, had lost its river commodation of the public, are not to be front, they were thought to be 'water lots,' treated, as we read the will of Congress, as because appearing to be so in fact but were mere trespassers. not so in law, because they were bounded by the street, and not by the river." Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 505 [8: 480]; City of Boston v. Lecraw, 17 How. 426 [15: 118]. There are also defendants who claim the right to hold certain wharf properties on the Potomac between the Long Bridge and the Arsenal, under licenses in writing issued by the Chief of Engineers for the time being, authorizing the erection of wharves. The power to grant such licenses is attributed to the Chief of Engineers as the successor of the office of Commissioner of Public Buildings [288]under the act of *March, 1867. It was the opinion of the court below that, under the legislation that preceded the act of 1867, jurisdiction with respect to private wharves had been conferred upon the authorities of the city, and that hence the Chief Engineer was without any lawful authority to issue such licenses. In so holding the court below followed the decision of the supreme court of the district in the case of The District of Columbia v. Johnson, 3 Mackey, 120.

We see no reason to doubt the soundness of this conclusion, though, for the reasons already given, even if the power to grant such licenses had belonged to the Chief of Engineers, they would not have vested any rights in fee in the land and water south of Water street in these appellants.

The contention, on behalf of the Washing ton Steaboat Company, as successor to the title of the Potomac Ferry Company by a purchase on June 1, 1881, that the act of Congress of July 1, 1864, creating the latter company, operated as a release of the title of the government to such land as that company might acquire for its proper purposes, we cannot accept. The legal purport of that enactment was, as we interpret it, to authorize the ferry company to purchase and hold such real estate as should be necessary to carry its chartered powers into effect, but was not intended as a grant of land on the part of Congress, or as a legislative admis

The fourth section provides that if, on the "shall be of opinion that there exists any final hearing of said cause, the said court right, title, or interest in the land or water in this act mentioned in any person or corporation adverse to the complete and para-[290] sion of the title of private parties. The pow-mount right of the United States, the said er to purchase land thereby conferred had court shall forthwith and in a summary way room to operate on land north of Water proceed to ascertain the value of any such street and on land situated in the state of right, title, interest, or claim, exclusive of Virginia. the value of any improvement to the property covered by such right, title. or interest made by or under the authority of the United States, and report thereof shall be made to Congress."

It may be well here to mention that it is disclosed in the record that the wharves owned by the Potomac Steamboat Company opposite square 472, and other wharves on the Potomac, were rented by the government

While, however, our conclusion is that no riparian rights in the waters of the Potomac river belong to the owners of lots lying north of Water street, and that no presumption of grants in fee can arise, in these cases, from actual occupation of lands and water south of that street, we do not understand that it is the intention of Congress, in exercising its jurisdiction over the territory in ques

That such is not the intention of Congress we infer, not merely from the fact that, by the act of 1886, the inquiry was submitted to a court of equity and not to a court of law, but from the express language of the act. Thus, by the first section, it is made "the duty of the Attorney General of the United States to institute, as soon as may be, in the supreme court of the District of Columbia, a suit against all persons and corporations who may have or pretend to have any right, title, claim, or interest in any part of the land or water in the District of Columbia within the limits of the city of Washington, or exterior to said limits and in front thereof toward the channel of the Potomac river, and composing any part of the land or water affected by the improvements of the Potomac river or its flats in charge of the Secretary of War, for the purpose of establishing and making clear the right of the United States thereto." The second section provides "that the suit mentioned in the preceding section shall be in the nature of a bill in equity, and there shall be made parties defendant thereto all persons and corporations who may claim to have any such right, title, or interest."

"shall proceed with all practicable expediThe third section provides that the cause court of all rights drawn in question theretion to a final determination by the said in; and that the said court shall have full power and jurisdiction by its decree to deest, or claim arising in the premises, and to termine every question of right, title, intervacate, annul, set aside, or confirm any claim of any character arising or set forth in the premises."