that the value of the same when manufac- | necessary to be mentioned, “every alternate tured was $7.00 per thousand, board meas- section of land designated by odd numbers;

for six sections in width on each side of each Fifth. That the lands above described of said roads;

which lands were a part of the grant of lands made to the shall be held by the state of Michigan for state of Michigan by an act of the Congress the use and purpose aforesaid: Provided, of the United States approved June 3, 1856, That the lands to be so located shall in no being chapter 44 of volume 11 of the United case be further than fifteen miles from the States Statutes at Large, and that said lands lines of said roads, and selected for, and on were accepted by the state of Michigan by an account of each of said roads: Provided, fur. act of its legislature approved February 14, ther, That the lands hereby granted shall be 1857, being public act No. 126 of the laws of exclusively applied in the construction of Michigan for that year, and were a part of that road for and on account of which said the lands of said grant within the six-mile lands are hereby granted, and shall be dislimit, so called, outside of the common limposed of only as the work progresses, and the its, so called, certified, and approved to said same shall be applied to no other purpose state by the Secretary of the Interior, to aid whatsoever.” By the third section it was

in the construction of the railroad mentioned enacted that the "said lands hereby granted [208]*in said act No. 126 of the laws of Michigan to the said state shall be subject to the dis

of 1857, to run from Ontonagon to the Wis- posal of the legislature thereof, for the pure consin state line, therein denominated "The poses aforesaid, and no other.” Provision Ontonagon & State Line Railroad Company.” was made in the fourth section for a sale of

The finding of facts by the court was in ac- the lands for the benefit of the railroads as cordance with the foregoing stipulation, they were constructed. The last clause prowith the additional finding that said rail. vided that “if any of said roads is not com. road was never built, and said grant of lands pleted within ten years no further sales shall was never earned by the construction of any be made, and the lands unsold shall revert to railroad.

the United States." And as conclusions of law the court found: 1. Under this act the state of Michigan

First. That the cause of action sued on took the fee of the lands to be thereafter in this case did not, at the time of the com- identified, subject to a condition subsequent mencement of this action, and does not now, that if the roads were not completed within belong to the United States of America. ten years the lands unsold should revert to

Second. That the defendants are entitled the United States. With respect to this to judgment herein for the dismissal of the class of estates Professor Washburne says complaint upon its merits.

that, “so long as the estate in fee remains, No exceptions were taken to the findings the owner in possession has all the rights of fact, and no further requests to find were in respect to it which he would have if tenmade. Exceptions were only taken to the ant in fee simple, unless it be so limited that conclusions of law found by the court, and there is properly a reversionary right in an. for its failure to find other and contrary con other,—something more than a possibility of clusions.

a reverter belonging to a third person, when, Upon writ of error sued out from the cir- perhaps, chancery might interpose to precuit court of appeals, the judgment of the vent waste of the premises."., *1 Wash. Real(210) circuit court dismissing this complaint was Prop. 5th ed. 95. As was said in De Peyster affirmed. 34 U. $. App. 575.

v. Michael, 6 N. Y. 467, 506 [57 Am. Dec. Whereupon the United States sued out a 470), a right of re-entry "is not a reversion, writ of error from this court.

nor is it the possibility of reversion, nor is

it any estate in the land. It is a mere right Vessrs. George Hines Gorman and or chose in action, and, if enforced, the John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for grantor would be in by a forfeiture of a plaintiff in error.

condition, and not by a reverter. . . It Mr. W. H. Webster for defendants in is only by statute that the assignee of the les

sor can re-enter for condition broken. But

the statute only authorized the transfer of [208] "Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion the right, and did not convert it into a reof the court:

versionary interest, nor into any other esTo entitle the plaintiff to recover in this


When property is held on conaction, which is substantially in trover, it is dition, all the attributes and incidents of abnecessary to show a general or special prop- solute property belong to it until the condierty in the timber cut, and a right to the tron be broken." Had the state through its possession of the same at the commencement nf the suit.

agents cut timber upon these lands, an acThere is no question that the lands be- tion would have lain by the United States (209]longed to the United States prior to June 3, upon the covenant of the state that the lands

1856. By an act of Congress passed upon should be held for railway purposes only and
that date (11 Stat. at L. 21, chap. 44), it devoted to no other use or purpose; but the
was enacted that “there be, and hereby is state was not responsible for the unauthor-
granted to the state of Michigan, to aid in ized acts of a mere trespasser, and it was no
the construction of railroads from Little Bay violation of its covenant that another person
de Noquet to Marquette, and thence to Onto. had stripped the lands of its timber.
nagon, and from the last two named places In the case of Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21
to the Wisconsin state line,” with others not Wall. 44 (22: 551], an act immediately pre-


oeding this, granting public lands to the no title to the lands at the time of the tresstate of Wisconsin to aid in the construction pass, and no right to the possession of the of railroads in that state, and precisely simi- timber, are in no position to maintain this lar to this act in its terms, was construed by suit. Neither a deed of land nor an assignthis court as a grant in presenti of title to ment of a patent for an "invention carries(218) the odd sections designated, to be afterwards with it a right of action for prior trespasses located; that when the route was fixed their or infringements. Such rights of action are, location became certain, and the title, which it is true, now assignable by the statutes of was previously imperfect, acquired precision most of the states, but they only pass with and became attached to the lands. “As it is a conveyance of the property itself where the stipulated in this case that the lands from language is clear and explicit to that effect. which the timber was cut were a part of the 1 Chitty, Pl. 68; Gardner v. Adams, 12 Wend. grant of June 3, 1856, to the state of Michi. 297, 299; Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass. 219, gan, and were a part of the lands within the 223 [4 Am. Rep. 532); Moore v. Marsh, 1 six-mile limit, certified and approved to the Wall. 515 [19: 37); Dibble v. Augur, 7 state by the Secretary of the Interior, no Blatchf. 86; Merriam V. Smith, 11 Fed. question arises with respect to the identity Rep. 588; May v. Juneau County, 30 Fed. of the lands.

Rep. 241; Kaolatype Engraving Company v. The case of Schulenberg v. Harriman was Hoke, 30 Fed. Rep. 444. also an action for timber cut upon lands So, where a landowner, intrusts another granted to the state, against an agent of the with the possession of his lands, either by state who had seized the logs, which had been lease, by contract to sell, or otherwise, the cut after the ten years had expired for the right of action for trespasses committed dur;

construction of the railroad, but before any ing such tenancy belongs to the latter, and (811)action had been taken by Congress *to forfeit except under special circumstances an action

the grant. The complaint in the case alleged for a trespass, such as the cutting of timber, property and right of possession in the plain will not lie in favor of the landlord. Greber tiffs. It was stipulated by the parties that v. Kleckner, 2 Pa. 289; Campbell v. Ar. the plaintiffs were in the quiet and peacea nold, 1 Johns. 511; Tobey v. Webster, 3 ble possession of the logs at the time of their Johns. 468; Cutts v. Spring, 15 Mass. 135; seizure by the defendants, and that such pos- Lienow v. Ritchie, 8 Pick. 235; Ward v. session should be conclusive evidence of title Macauley, 4 T. R. 489; Revett v. Brown, 5 in the plaintiffs against evidence of title in Bing. 7; Harper v. Charlesworth, 4 Barn. a stranger, unless the defendant should con- & c. 574; Graham v. Peat, 1 East, 244; Lunt nect himself with such title by agency, or au. v. Brown, 13 Me. 236; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 616. thority in himself. The title of the plain. Although, as was said by Lord Kenyon in tiffs was not otherwise stated. It was held Ward v. Macauley, 4 T. R. 489, "the distincthat the title to the lands did not revert to tion between the actions of trespass and trovthe United States after the expiration of the er is well settled; the former are founded on ten years, in the absence of judicial proceed. possession; the latter on property;"—yet ings in the nature of an inquest of office, or they are concurrent remedies to the extent a legislative forfeiture, and that until a for- that, wherever trespass will lie for the un: feiture had taken place the lands themselves lawful taking and conversion of personal and the timber cut from them were the prop property, trover may also be maintained. erty of the state. Said Mr. Justice Field, in The plaintiff is bound to prove a right of posdelivering the opinion of the court, p. 64: session in himself at the time of the conver"The title to the land remaining in the state, sion, and if the goods are shown to be in the the luinber cut upon the land belonged to the lawful possession of another by lease or simistate. While the timber was standing it lar contract he cannot maintain trover for constituted a part of the realty; being sev. them. Smith v. Plomer, 15 East, 607; ered from the soil its character was changed; Wheeler v. Train, 3 Pick. 255; Gordon v. it became personalty, but its title was not Harper, 7 T. R. 9, Ayer v. Bartlett, 9 Pick. affected; it continued, as previously, the 156; Fairbank v. Phelps, 22 Pick. 535. property of the owner of the land, and could It does not aid the plaintiffs' case to take be pursued wherever it was carried. All the the position (the soundness of which we by remedies were open to the owner which the no means concede) that the state held the law affords in other cases of the wrongful lands as trustee to deliver them over to the removal or conversion of personal property." railroads upon certain contingencies, and to[218] The same rule regarding the construction of return them to the United States in case the this identical land grant was applied by this conditions subsequent were not performed, court in Lake Superior Ship Canal, R. &1: since nothing is better settled than that a Co. v. Cunningham, 155 U. S. 354 [39: 183]. trustee has the legal title to the lands, and Indeed, the principle is too well settled to re that actions at law for trespasses must be quire the citation of authorities. The case of Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 brought by him, and by him alone. 1 Perry, (22: 551), differs from the one under consid- Trusts, $ 328, and cases cited; Fenn v. eration in the fact that no act forfeiting the Holme, 21 How. 481 [16: 198). grant was ever passed; but it is pertinent as Certain cases having a contrary bearing showing that under a statute precisely like will now be considered. Several of these are the present the title to the timber cut before to the effect that if a man leases an estate such forfeiture is in the state, and not in the for a term of years, and the tenant unlawfully general governinent.

cuts timber, the lessor may sue in trespass, It follows that the United States, having and perhaps in trover, upon the ground that

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the title to the land remains in the lessor dur-
ing the pendency of the lease.

certain mill machinery, together with the
mill, had been demised for a term to a ten-
ant, and he, without permission of his land-
lord, severed the machinery from the mill,
and it was afterwards seized under execu.
tion by the sheriff and sold by him. It was
held that no property passed to the vendee,
and the landlord was entitled to bring trover
for the machinery, even during the continu-
ance of the term, upon the ground that the
machinery attached to the mill was a part
of the inheritance which the tenant had a
right to use, but not to sever or remove.

In Richard Liford's Case, 11 Coke, 46,
which was an action of trespass by a tenant
against the agent of the owner of the inherit-
ance for certain trees cut, it was said "that
when a man demises his land for life or
years the lessee has but a particular interest
in the trees, but the general interest of the
trees remains in the lessor; for the lessee
shall have the mast and fruit of the trees,
and shadow for his cattle, etc., but the inter-
est of the body of the trees is in the lessor
as parcel of his inheritance; and this appears
in 29 Hen. VIII. [Malever v. Spinke] 1
Dyer, 36, where it is held in express words
that it cannot be denied that the property of
great trees, scil. the timber, is reserved by
the law to the lessor, but he cannot grant it
without the termor's license, for the termor
has an interest in it, scil. to have the mast
and fruit growing upon it, and the loppings
thereof for fuel, but the very property of the
tree is in the lessor as annexed to his inherit-
ance." Again, speaking of disseisin and the
respective rights of the disseisee and disseis-
or when the former regains possession, it is
said: "That after the regress of the dissei-
see the law adjudges, as to the disseisor him-
self, that the freehold has continued in the
disseisee, which rule and reason doth extend
as well to corn as to trees or grass, etc. The
same law, if the feoffee, or lessee, or the sec-
ond disseisor, sows the land, or cuts down
trees or grass, and severs, and carries away,
or sells them to another, yet after the regress
of the disseisee he may take as well the corn
as the trees and grass to what place soever
[214]they are carried; for the regress of the dis-
seisee has relation as to the property, to con-
tinue the freehold against them all in the
disseisee ab initio, and the carrying them out
of the land cannot alter the property."

So, in United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591
[22: 210], it was held that timber standing
upon lands occupied by Indians cannot be
cut by them for the purposes of sale, although
it may be for the purpose of improving the[215]
land, as the Indians had only the right of
occupancy, and the presumption was against
their authority to cut and sell the timber.
In such case the property in the timber does
not pass from the United States by severance,
and they may maintain an action for unlaw-
ful cutting and carrying it away. To the

same effect is E. E. Bolles Wooden-Ware Co.
v. United States, 106 U. S. 432 [27: 230]

In Wilson v. Hoffman, 93 Mich. 72, the same principle was extended to a plaintiff in ejectment, who was held entitled to maintain an action for trover for logs cut by the defendant during the pendency of the suit, which had been determined in the plaintiff's favor, although the defendant was in possession of the land under a bona fide claim of title adverse to the plaintiff. This is but another application of the doctrine which allows the plaintiff in ejectment to recover mesne profits upon the theory that the land has always been his, and that the defendant illegally obtained possession of it. See also Morgan v. Varick, 8 Wend. 587; Busch v. Nester, 62 Mich. 381, 70 Mich. 525.

In Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9, it was held In Moores v. Wait, 3 Wend. 104, a person that where goods had been leased as furniture with a house, and had been wrongfully entered into possession of wild lands under a taken in execution by the sheriff, the landlord contract of sale giving him the right of entry could not maintain trover against the sher- and occupancy, reserving to the landlord the iff, pending the lease, because he did not land as security until the payment of the have the right of possession as well as the consideration by withholding the deed. It was held that he had a right to enter and enright of property at the time. The case was distinguished from one where the thing was joy the land for agricultural purposes, but attached to the freehold, and the doctrine of that he had no right to cut timber for any Liford's Case was reiterated, that where other purpose than for the cultivation, imtimber is cut down by a tenant for years the provement and enjoyment of the land as a owner of the inheritance may maintain farm; and that the owner of the inheritance, trover for the timber notwithstanding the who had never parted with his title, might lease because the interest of the lessee in it maintain an action of trover for it against remained no longer than while it was grow- anyone in possession, although a bona fide ing on the premises, and determined instant-purchaser under the occupant. This was also upon the principle that the vendor had ly when it was cut down. See also Mears v. never parted with title to his land. But see London & S. W. Rwy. Co. 11 C. B. N. S. 850; Scott v. Wharton, 2 Hen. & M. 25; Moses Randall v. Cleaveland, 6 Conn. 328; Elliot v. Smith, 2 N. H. 430; Starr v. Jackson, 11 Bros. v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517.

Mass. 519.

In Burnett v. Thompson, 51 N. C. (6 Jones, L.) 210, the plaintiff had a life estate pur autre vie in a lease of Indian lands for ninety-nine years, and also a reversion after the expiration of the term. A stranger entered and cut down *cypress trees and carried them[216] off. The plaintiff was permitted to recover. It was held that "if there be a tenant for years or for life, and a stranger cuts down a tree, 423

These cases obviously have no application to one where there has been a conveyance of the fee of the land prior to the cutting of the timber, and no re-entry or analogous proceeding on the part of the vendor for a breach of a condition subsequent.

The same distinction was taken in Farrant v. Thompson, 5 Barn. & Ald. 826, in which

the particular tenant may bring trespass, with the property in the timber which had and recover dajuages for breaking his close, been cut while the lands belonged to the treading down his grass, and the like. But state of Michigan. Had this act of forfeitthe remainderman, or reversioner in fee, is ure not been passed, there could be no ques. entitled to the tree, and, if it be converted, tion that, under the case of Schulenberg v. may bring trover and recover its value. The Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 [22:551], this timber reason is, the tree constituted a part of the would have belonged to the state of Michland, its severance was waste, which is an in- igan, and no other action therefor could have jury to the inheritance, consequently the been brought by the United States. party in whom is vested the first estate of But conceding all that is contended for by inheritance, whether in fee simple or fee tail the plaintiffs with respect to the revestiture (for it may last always), is entitled to the of the title' to the lands by this act, it does tree, as well after it is severed, as before; not follow that the title to the timber which his right of property not being lost by the had been cut in the meantime was also rewrongful acts of severance by which it is vested in the United States. As was said in converted into a personal chattel.” See also Schulenberg v. Harriman, the title to the Halleck v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574.

tinber remained in the state after it had been While these cases run counter to some of severed. But it remained in the state as a those previously cited, they are all distin. separate and independent piece of property, guishable from the one under consideration and if the state had elected to sell it a good in the fact that the plaintiff was the owner title would have thereby passed to the purof the inheritance, and had the legal title to chaser, notwithstanding the subsequent act the land at the time the trespass was com- of forfeiture. It did not remain the proper. mitted. We see nothing in them to disturb ty of the state as a part of the lands, but as the doctrine announced by this court in a distinct piece of property, although the Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44 (22: state took its title thereto through and in 551], that tiniber cut upon the lands prior consequence of its title to the lands. From to the forfeiture belongs to the state. The the moment it was cut the state was at liberfact is that nothing remained of the original ty to deal with it as with any other piece of[218] title of the United States but the possibil personal property. Brothers v. Hurdle, 32 ity of a reversion, a contingent remainder, N. C. (10 Ired. L.) 490 (51 Am. Dec. 400). which would be an insufficient basis for an

We know of no principle of law under action of trover. Gordon v. Lowther, 75 N. which it can be said that timber which was C. 193; Matthews v. Hudson, 81. Ga. 120; the property of the United States by an act

the property of the state when cut becomes Farabow v. Green, 108 N. C. 339; Sager v. of Congress resuming title to the land from Galloway, 113 Pa. 500. To sustain this action there must be an immediate right of in the meantime have been removed hundreds

which it was cut, although the timber may possession when the timber is cut. This of miles from the lands, and passed into the might arise if the severance of the timber in hands of one who knew nothing of the source volved a breach of obligation on the part of from which it was derived. It may be, in the tenant, hut if the timber were cut by a such a case, that if the state sues for and rethird person, the question would be as to the right to the timber so cut as against the accountable to the United States for the pro

covers the value of such timber, it might be trespasser, and unless the case of Schulen. ceeds in case the government resumed title to berg v. Harriman is to be overruled, it must the lands. be held to be that of the state.

Two cases cited by the Solicitor General 2. As the United States can take title to lend support to the doctrine that the resump[217]the timber involved in this case only through tion of title by the United States operates

its ownership of the lands, it remains to con: upon the timber already cut, as well as upon sider whether the act of March 2, 1889, (25 the lands. In the first of these, Heath v. Stat. at L. 1008, chap. 414), forfeiting the Ross, 12 Johns. 140, the action was in trover lands granted loy this act to aid in the con for a quantity of timber cut upon lands for struction of a railroad from Marquette to which the plaintiff had applied for a patent Ontonagon, operated by relation to revest in before the timber was cut. The patent was the United States title to the timber which not granted until after the timber was cut. had been cut during the winter of 1887 and The patent was held, upon well-settled prin1888 and prior to the act of forfeiture. This ciples, to relate back to the date of applicaact provided that “there is hereby forfeited tion. The defendant knew he had no title to the United States, and the United States to the lot or right to cut the timber. The hereby resumes title thereto, all lands here plaintiffs were held entitled to recover. tofore granted to the state of Michigan The other case is that of Musser v. McRae,

which are opposite to and cotermin. | 44 Minn. 343. In that case an act of Conous with the uncompleted portion of any gress granting lands to the state of Wisconrailroad, to aid in the construction of which sin in aid of the construction of railroads, said lands were granted or applied, and all provided that it should be lawful for the such lands are hereby declared to be a part agents appointed by the railway company, of the public domain."

entitled to the grant, to select, subject to the The position of the plaintiffs must neces. approval of the Secretary of the Interior, Barily be that this act of forfeiture not only from the public lands of the United States, revested in the United States the title to the deficiency” lands within certain indemnity lands as of a date prior to the cutting of the limits. It was held that the issuance of a timber in question, but also revested them patent to the railway company for the lands

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so selected was evidence that the company had complied with all the conditions of the grant, and was entitled to the lands described therein, and that the title passed from the United States at the date of the selection. And it was further held that where, after the lands had been so selected, but prior to the [219]issue of the patent, *timber had been wrongfully cut and removed by trespassers, the title acquired by the patents must be held to relate back to the selection of the lands, so as to save the purchasers to whom the lands had been granted, a right of action for the timber wrongfully removed from the land, or its value.

These cases are distinguishable from the one under consideration in the fact that the plaintiffs had an inchoate title to the lands, a title which no one could disturb, and which the state was bound to perfect by the issue of a patent, provided the plaintiffs followed up their application. We do not think the doctrine of these cases ought to be extended.

The issue presented for decision is the right of the United States to recover in an action of trover the proceeds of timber cut from the land by a trespasser while the legal title was in the state, but after the period had elapsed when the right in the United States to assert a forfeiture had arisen. The decision of the court is that a recovery cannot be had, because at the time of the severance of the timber by the trespasser the legal title was in the state. It is thus in effect decided that it was in the power of a trespasser, while the legal title to the land and its incidents was in the state, to destroy the value of the land by severing and appropriat ing the timber, and that there exists no remedy by which the right of property of the United States can be protected. Such a consequence strikes me as so abnormal that I cannot bring my mind to assent to its cor3. Nor are the plaintiffs entitled to avail rectness; and, thinking as I do that it inthemselves of the rule that in an action of volves a grave denial of a right of property, trover a mere trespasser cannot defeat the not only harmful in the case decided, but plaintiff's right to possession by showing a harmful as a precedent for cases which may superior title in a third person without show-arise in the future, I state the reasons for ing himself in privity or connecting himself my dissent. with such third person. The cases in which At the outset it becomes necessary to dethis principle is applied are confined to those termine the nature of the rights of the state where the plaintiffs were either in possession and those of the United States created by of the property or entitled to its immediate and flowing from the act of donation. That possession, and thus showed a prima facie the land from which the timber was cut be right thereto. It has no application to cases longed to the United States at the time of wherein the plaintiff has shown no such right the grant goes without saying. It was conto bring the action. Jeffries v. Great West-veyed by the act of Congress to the state, ern Railway Co. 5 El. & Bl. 802; Weymouth not for the use and benefit of the state, but[221] v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co. 17 Wis. 550 for the sole purpose of aiding in the con[84 Am. Dec. 763]; Wheeler v. Lawson, 103 struction of a railroad. The state had no N. Y. 40; Halleck v. Mixer, 16 Cal. 574; right to dispose of the land except for the Terry v. Metevier, 104 Mich. 50; Stevens v. declared object; and while it is true that a Gordon, 87 Me. 564; Fiske v. Small, 25 Me. power to sell the land was vested by the 453. Counsel are mistaken in supposing act in the state, it was a power which the that the plaintiffs had an immediate right to state could only call into being as the work the possession of this timber. They had no progressed, and, to quote from the act, "for right to the possession of the land until Con- the purposes aforesaid and no other,"gress passed the act of March 2, 1889, forfeit- that is, the specific object stated, namely, the ing the grant. Up to that time the title was construction of the railroad referred to. in the state, and until then the United States The granting act clearly imported that in had no more right to enter and take posses- the event of a forfeiture before the land had sion than they would have had to take pos- been earned and conveyed by the state, the session of the property of a private individu-land should be restored to the United States al. in its integrity. As the plaintiffs failed to show title to or right of possession to the timber in question, there was no error in the action of the court of appeals, and its judgment is therefore affirmed.

220] *Mr. Justice White, with whom concur
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting:

The United States donated the land from
which the timber was cut to the state of
Michigan in aid of a contemplated railroad.
The donating act dedicated the property thus
conveyed to the state, for the sole purpose of
aiding in the construction of the railroad,
and it contained a provision that if the road
was not built within a designated period the
land conveyed was to revert to the United

States. The road was never built, and the granted land was forfeited by act of Congress, because of noncompliance with the conditions contained in the grant.

I submit that the effect of the act of Congress was to create a trust in the land and to vest the legal title thereto, with incidents such as timber, in the state of Michigan for the purposes of the trust, to hold. primarily, for the benefit of the owners of a line of railroad if constructed, and, secondarily, for the benefit of the United States, in the contingency that a forfeiture was declared for a breach of the condition subsequent as to the time of completion of the road. The state, in all reason, was bound to restore the land and timber which passed to its possesion to the United States, upon the declaration of the forfeiture, retaining no benefit whatever from the land for itself by reason of such custody and control. Being clothed with the legal estate in the land, the state,

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