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1. A suit to restrain officers of a state from
taking any steps by means of judicial proceed-
Ings, in execution of a state statute to which
they do not hold any special relation, is
really a suit against the state within the
prohibition of the 11th amendment of the
Federal Constitution.

2.

8.

"the State of Alabama, William C. Oates, aз Governor of the State of Alabama, and William C. Fitts, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama."

After setting out their appointment as receivers, the order of the court below authorizThe circuit court of the United States sit-ing the institution of the present suit, the ting in equity is without jurisdiction to enjoin the institution or prosecution of criminal proceedings commenced in a state court. The power of the Federal courts to interfere by habeas corpus with the trial of indictments found in state courts, on the ground that the state statutes under which the indictments are found are repugnant to the Federal Constitution, laws, or treaties, will not be exercised in the first instance, unless there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to require it, but the party will be left to make his defense in the state court.

[No. 130.]

Argued October 26, 1898. Decided January
3, 1899.

official character of the several defendants,
the ownership by the Memphis & Charleston
Railroad Company of the bridge in question,
the above act of February 9th, 1895, the
manner in which that company acquired the
right to construct and own the Florence
bridge, the charters of the railroad company
granted by Tennessee and Alabama, the pur-
chase in 1850 of the bridge by the railroad
company under the charter granted by Ala-
bama, and its management of the bridge un-
der the charter of the Florence Bridge Com-
pany, the plaintiffs averred that the act in-
corporating the bridge company was a con-
tract between the state and the owners of the
bridge; that the rights acquired by that
under its charter passed to the
company
Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company;
that the rates of toll fixed by the act were

arbitrary, unreasonable, and amounted vir
tually to the confiscation of the plaintiffs'
property, and that the act was in violation
of the Constitution of the United States in
that such a legislative enactment deprived
the owners of the bridge of their property
without due process of law, and denied to
them the equal protection of the laws.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama in favor of the plaintiffs, the appellees in this court, making perpetual certain injunctions against taking any steps under a statute of Alabama fixing the tolls to be charged on a bridge across the Tennessee river, and providing penalties in case of violation, on the ground that the said statute was repugnant to the Federal the act imposing a penalty for demanding or It was further alleged that the clause in Constitution. Judgment of the Circuit receiving higher rates of toll than those preCourt reversed, with directions to dissolve scribed was intended and had the effect to dethe injunction restraining the institution or prosecution of indictments or other criminal proceedings in the state court, and to dismiss the suit brought by the receivers against the Attorney General of the State of Alabama and the Solicitor of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of the State, etc.

Statement by Mr. Justice Harlan: An act of the general assembly of Alabama, approved February 9th, 1895, prescribed certain maximum rates of toll to be charged on the bridge across the Tennessee river between the counties of Colbert and Lauderdale in that state, and known as the Florence bridge. It also declared that should the owners, lessees, or operators of the bridge, by themselves or agents, demand or receive from any person a higher rate of toll than was prescribed, he or they should forfeit to such person twenty dollars for each offense, to be recoverable before any justice of the peace or notary public and ex officio justice of the peace of either of the counties named. When that act was passed the cases of Samuel Thomas v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company and Central Trust Company of New York v. Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company were pending in the court below; and on the 14th day of February, 1895, Charles M. McGhee and Henry Fink, receivers of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad in those causes, having first obtained 1817]leave to do so,-*filed a bill in the name of themselves and the railroad company against

ter the plaintiffs from questioning by legal
proceedings the validity of such legislation.
except by a bill in equity, the plaintiffs prayed
After stating that they were remediless
that "process of subpoena be issued to and
served upon the state of Alabama, the said
Wm. C. Oates, as governor of the state of
Alabama, and Wm. C. Fitts, as the attorney
general of the state of Alabama," requiring
them, "in behalf of the state," to answer the
bill, and that "an injunction be granted pro
hibiting and restraining the said Wm. C[518]
Oates, as governor of the state of Alabama,
and the said Wm. C. Fitts, as the attorney
general of the state of Alabama, and all per-
sons whomsoever from instituting any pro-
ceeding against the complainants or either
of them under the forfeiture clause above
set out in the 2d section of said act of the
general assembly of Alabama."

Subpoenas to appear, answer, or demur to the bill, were issued and served upon defendant Oates, as governor, and upon defendant Fitts, as attorney general of the state. A subpoena was also issued against the state," and served upon the defendant Oates, as governor.

A temporary injunction was issued, restraining and enjoining William C. Oates, as governor of Alabama, and William C. Fitts, as attorney general of the state, and "all persons whomsoever, from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings" against the plaintiffs, or either of them, under the for

feiture clause contained in the above act of
February 9th, 1895.

The defendants appeared specially for the purpose of moving, and did move, that the bill be dismissed upon the ground that the suit was one against the state, and prohibited by the Constitution of the United States.

of any proceeding against the plaintiffs or either of them, by niandamus or otherwise, to compel the observance and obedience of the act in reference to the rate of tolls fixed thereby over the Florence bridge, and from instituting or procuring to be instituted any proceedings against the plaintiffs or either of them for the forfeiture of the franchise of The plaintiffs, by leave of the court, the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Comamended their bill by adding thereto para-pany in and to the bridge on account of the graphs to the effect that frequent and numer- refusal to charge the rates of toll over it ous demands had been made by persons on fixed by the act. foot, on horseback and in vehicles, of the toll-gate keeper at the bridge to pass them over at the rate of toll fixed by the act, and upon the refusal of the toll-gate keeper to permit them to pass by the payment of the rates so fixed, and his requiring them to pay the rates of toll fixed by the plaintiffs, they had paid the tolls so required of them under protest and had threatened to institute suit or suits against the plaintiffs under the penalty clause of the act, and had also threatened to procure proceedings to be instituted in the courts by the governor and attorney general in the name of the state, by a mandamus or otherwise, to compel the plaintiffs to pass people over the bridge at the rates fixed by the act; that those persons had also threatened to procure proceedings to be instituted in the name of the state for a forfeiture of [519]the franchise of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company in and to the bridge property because of the failure and refusal to observe and obey the requirements of the act in reference to the rates of toll to be charged over the bridge; and that the persons so protesting and threatening suits were too numerous to be made parties to that suit. Special reference was made to William H. Gilliam, a resident citizen of Colbert county, Alabama, as one of the parties or persons who had made threats of such suits and proceed ings.

*At a later date in the progress of the cause[520] the plaintiffs, by leave of the court, inserted the following averments in the bill:

"Complainants would further show unto your honors that at the fall term 1895 of the circuit court of Lauderdale county, Alabama, a large number of indictments-some one hundred in number-were found by the grand jury of said court against Thomas Clem and G. W. Brabson, who are the tollgate keepers at the public crossing of said bridge for complainants, the receivers of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company. These indictments were found under section 4151 of the Criminal Code of Alabama, which reads as follows: '4151 (4401). Any person who, being or acting as an officer, agent, servant, or employee of any turnpike company, macadamised road company, or other incorporated road or bridge company, takes, receives, or demands any greater charge or toll for travel or passage over such road or bridge than is authorized by the charter of such company, or, if the charter does not specify the amount of toll to be charged or taken, fixes, prescribes, takes, receives, or demands any unreasonable charge or toll, to be determined by the jury, must, on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars.' Complainants allege and show unto your honors that these indictments were improperly and wrongfully found against said The bill was amended by making Gilliam toll-gate keepers, and they are being ima party defendant, and by adding, before the properly prosecuted thereby, because the rate prayer for general relief, a prayer "that an of toll which they have charged is only the injunction be granted prohibiting and re-rate which has heretofore been fixed by the restraining the said William C. Oates, as the governor of the state of Alabama, and the said Wm. C. Fitts, as the attorney general of the state of Alabama, and the said Wm. H. Gilliam and all persons whomsoever, from instituting or procuring the institution of any proceedings against these complainants, or either of them, by mandamus or other wise, to compel the observance and obedience of said act in reference to the rate of tolls fixed thereby over the said bridge, and aiso from instituting or procuring to be instituted any proceeding against these complainants, or either of them, for the forfeiture of the franchise of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company in and to the said bridge on account of the refusal to charge the rates of toll over it fixed by said act." Subsequently an order was made, enjoining and restraining William C. Fitts, as attorney general of the state of Alabama, and William H. Gilliam and all persons whomsoever, until the further order of the court, from instituting or procuring the institution

ceivers, which was fixed by them before the
passage of said unconstitutional act of the
general assembly of Alabama reducing the
tolls, and is the same rate of tolls which
have been charged for more than twenty
years by the Memphis & Charleston Railroad
Company for the use by the public of said
bridge, and the tolls so charged by said toll-
gate keepers were authorized by this court,
and said indictments have been found and
are being prosecuted in violation of the au-
thority of this court and of its orders in the
premises, and in violation of the constitu-
tional rights and privileges under the Con-
stitution of the United States, secured* to[521]
the owners of said bridge in the charging of
tools before crossing it. A. H. Carmichael is
the solicitor for said judicial circuit, and as
such is engaged in the prosecution of said
indictments."

The plaintiffs asked that Carmichael, as such sclicitor, be made a party defendant; that all needful process issue against him; and that a restraining order be issued en

joining him and all other persons from the
prosecution of said indictments.

The next step in the proceedings was the suing out of writs of habeas corpus by Clem and Brabson, who were under arrest on process issued on the above indictments. Each of the petitioners was released upon his own recognizance in the sum of $150, conditioned that he would appear in court from day to | day until discharged.

Gilliam filed an answer, insisting upon the validity of the act of the legislature which had been assailed by the bill as unconstitutional.

that A. H. Carmichael, as solicitor for the eleventh judicial circuit of Alabama, be enBy a supplemental bill it was averred that joined and restrained temporarily and until writs of arrest had been issued upon the the further orders of the court "from instiabove indictments against Clem and Brab- tuting or prosecuting as such solicitor any son, and placed in the hands of the sheriff, indictments or criminal proceedings against who in execution thereof had arrested or anyone for a violation of the alleged unconwould arrest the said employees of the re-stitutional act of the legislature of Alabama ceivers. It was further alleged that these described in the bill." criminal proceedings were in contempt of the order of the court below appointing the receivers, as well as in violation of the injunction which the court had issued, and which still remained in force, "enjoining the said governor, attorney general, and all persons whomsoever from instituting any suits or proceedings" under the above act of the state. After referring to the indictments and the purpose on the part of the state officers to proceed under them, the plaintiffs prayed that the act of February 9th, 1895, be de- *A decree pro confesso was taken against [523] clared repugnant to the Constitution of the the governor and attorney general of the United States, and invalid, inoperative, null, state, as well as Carmichael, as solicitor and void, and that an injunction be granted, aforesaid, all in their respective official ca"prohibiting and restraining William C. pacities. But that decree was set aside, and Oates, as governor of the state of Alabama; the cause was heard upon demurrers by the William C. Fitts, as attorney general of the various defendants. The demurrers were state of Alabama, W. H. Gilliam, and A. H. overruled, and answers were filed by the govCarmichael, solicitor as aforesaid, and all ernor and attorney general of the state and other persons whomsoever, from instituting by the solicitor of the eleventh judicial cirany proceeding against these complainants cuit. There were also motions to dissolve or either of them, their servants or agents, the injunction granted in the case, upon the under the forfeiture clause set out in said ground that there was no equity in the bill, 2d section of said act of the general assembly and that the injunctions were in violation of of Alabama;" that said officers "and all per- the Constitution and statutes of the United sons whomsoever be restrained and enjoined States. from instituting or procuring the institution The final decree in the case was as follows: of any proceeding against these complainants "This cause coming on to be heard, the subor either of them, their agents, servants, or mission at the former term of the court is employees, by a mandamus or otherwise, to hereby set aside, and, it being made to apcompel the observance and obedience to said pear to the court that the defendant Willact in reference to the rate of tolls fixed iam C. Oates has ceased to be the governor thereby over said bridge, and also from insti- of the state of Alabama, it is thereupon [522]tuting or procuring to be instituted any pro- ordered that the said cause be discontinued ceeding against these complainants or either as to him, and the cause is now resubmitted of them for the forfeiture of the franchise of at this term of the court for final decree upthe Memphis & Charleston Railroad Com- on the pleadings and testimony offered by pany in and to said bridge on account of the the parties, and upon due consideration refusal to charge the rates of toll over it thereof it is considered by the court that the fixed by the said act;" and that "the said complainants are entitled to relief. It is defendants and said Carmichael, solicitor as thereupon ordered, adjudged, and decreed aforesaid, and all persons whomsoever, be restrained and enjoined from prosecuting Alabama referred to and set up in the origithat the act of the legislature of the state of said indictments against the said servants, nal bill of complaint in the cause, which agents, and employees of the complaintnts, or from interfering in any way, under and by act was approved February 9th, 1895, and virtue of the color of said unconstitutional entitled 'An Act to Fix the Maximum of act, with the rights, privileges, and franchises and property of the complainants, their servants or agents, with regard to said bridge."

At this stage of the proceedings the plaintiffs dismissed the cause so far as the state was made a party defendant, and amended the bill by striking out its name as a defendant, as well as the words "in behalf of the state." The cause was then heard upon a motion by the governor and attorney general to dismiss the bill upon the ground that the suit was one against the state in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

Upon the filing of the last amendment to the original bill, it was ordered by the court

Tolls to be Charged by the Owners, Lessees,
or Operators of the Road Bridge across the
Tennessee River, between the Counties of
Colbert and Lauderdale, and Known as the
Florence Bridge, and to Fix the Penalty for
Demanding or Receiving a Higher Rate of
Tolls,' is violative of the constitutional
rights of the owners of said bridge and of the
complainants as their representatives, in
that it fixes a rate of tolls for said bridge
which are not fairly and reasonably compen-
satory, and it is therefore hereby declared to
be invalid and inoperative, and the injune-
tions heretofore granted in the cause are
hereby made perpetual. It is further
ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the de-

fendants pay the costs of this proceeding, Com. Rep. 209; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v.
for which let execution issue."
Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567.

Messrs. William J. Wood and William C. Fitts, Attorney General of Alabama, for appellants:

In cases where state is a party on the record the question of jurisdiction is decided by inspection.

Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 852, 6 L. ed. 231.

A suit against the officers of a state as representing the state's action and liability, and thus making it the real party against which the judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform its contracts, cannot be maintained.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 389, 38 L. ed. 1021, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 35 L. ed. 363; Covington & L. Turnp. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176.

A court of equity has no supervisory power or jurisdiction over public officials or public bodies, and only takes cognizance of actions against or concerning them when a case is made coming within one of the acknowledged heads of equity jurisdiction. People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 394; Moses v. Mobile, 52 Ala. 198.

Injunction will not lie to restrain the action or discretion of executive officers of the state.

Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 18 L. ed. 437; State, Taylor, v. Lord, 28 Or. 498; People, Sutherland, v. The Governor, 29 Mich. 320, 18 Am. Rep. 89.

The present doctrine of this court is that the charge for rates must be reasonable, the rights of the public considered, and that each case must be examined in the light of its peculiar facts and circumstances.

Smith v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819; Covington & L. Turnp. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247,4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 56.

Messrs. Milton Humes and Paul Speake, for appellees:

The suit is clearly brought in the proper forum, regardless of the amount involved or the citizenship of the parties.

Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689; Re Swan, 150 U. S. 637, 37 L. ed. 1207; White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 67; Ex parte Chamberlain, 55 Fed. Rep. 706; Ledoux v. La Bee, 83 Fed. Rep. 761; Clark v. McGhee, 59 U. S. App. 69, 87 Fed. Rep. 791, 31 C. C. A. 321.

A bill of this character is the method best calculated to test the constitutionality of the act, and thus to settle litigation and prevent a multiplicity of suits.

The suit is not one against the state within the meaning of the 11th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 21 L. ed. 447; Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460, 21 L. ed. 189; Litchfield v. Webster County, 101 U. S. 773, 25 L. ed. 925; Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 114 U. S. 311, 29 L. ed. 200; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 23 L. ed. 623; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 29 L. ed. 185; Re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 37 L. ed. 689; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 41 L. ed. 632.

An injunction will lie against officers of the state to prevent the execution of laws which violate rights under the Constitution of the United States.

Central Trust Co. v. Citizens' Street R. Co. 82 Fed. Rep. 1; Indianapolis Gas Co. v. In dianapolis, 82 Fed. Rep. 245; Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Boyle, 82 Fed. Rep. 705.

The act of February 9, 1895, impairs the obligation of the contract embraced in the charter of the Florence Bridge Company, whereby that company and its successors are granted the right to fix rates within a certain limit, that is, not to exceed "the present rate of ferriage at said ferry."

Stone v. Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. 62 Miss. 642, 52 Am. Rep. 193; Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636.

The act of February 9, 1895, is in violation of the Federal Constitution, in that it deprives appellees of their property without due process of law.

Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 330, 29 L. ed. 644; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819.

*Mr. Justice Harlan, after stating the[524] facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court:

The principal question before us is whether this suit is one of which a circuit court of the United States may take cognizance consistently with the Constitution of the United States.

From the history given of the proceedings below it appears that the circuit court adjudged

That the legislative enactment of February 9th, 1895, was unconstitutional and void in that it did not permit the owners of the Florence bridge, and the plaintiffs as their representatives, to charge rates of toll that were fairly and reasonably compensatory; and,

That the defendants Fitts and Carmichael, holding respectively the offices of attorney general of Alabama and solicitor of the eleventh judicial circuit of the state, should not institute or prosecute any indictment or criminal proceeding against anyone for violating the provisions of that act.

Is this a suit against the state of Alabama? It is true that the Eleventh Amendment of Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, the Constitution of the United States does 134 U. S. 459, 460, 33 L. ed. 982,983, 3 Inters. 'not in terms declare that the judicial power

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of the United States shall not extend to suits | vidual, but in their representative, capacity against a state by citizens of such state. But it has been adjudged by this court upon full consideration that a suit against a state by one of its own citizens, the state not having consented to be sued, was unknown to and forbidden by the law, as much so as suits against a state by citizens of another state of the Union, or by citizens or subjects of foreign states. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10, 15 [33: 842, 845, 847]; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22 [33: 849]. It is therefore an immaterial circumstance, in [525]*the present case that the plaintiffs do not appear to be citizens of another state than Alabama, and may be citizens of that state. What is and what is not a suit against a state has so frequently been the subject of consideration by this court that nothing of importance remains to be suggested on either side of that question. It is only necessary to ascertain, in each case as it arises, whether it falls on one side or the other of the line marked out by our former decisions.

We are of opinion that the present case comes within the principles announced in Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 485, 496-500, 505 [31: 216, 223, 226-228, 230]. It appears from the report of that case that the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, in Cooper v. Marye, made an order forbidding the attorney general of Virginia and other officers of that Commonwealth from bringing suits under a certain statute of Virginia, in its name and on its behalf for the recovery of taxes, in payment of which the taxpayers had previously tendered tax-receivable coupons. The state officers did not obey this order, and having been proceeded against for contempt of court, they sued out writs of habeas corpus, and asked to be discharged upon the ground that the circuit court had no power to make the order for disobeying which the proceedings in contempt were commenced. This court said that the question really was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit in which that order was made, the sole purpose and prayer of the bill therein being by final decree to enjoin the defendants, officers of Virginia, from taking any steps in execution of the statute the validity of which was questioned.

It was adjudged that, although Virginia was not named on the record as a party defendant, nevertheless, when the nature of the case against its officers was considered, that Commonwealth was to be regarded as the actual party in the sense of the constitutional prohibition. The court said: "It follows, therefore, in the present case, that the personal act of the petitioners sought to be restrained by the order of the circuit court, reduced to the mere bringing of an [526]action *in the name of and for the state against taxpayers, who, although they may have tendered the tax-receivable coupons, are charged as delinquents, cannot be alleged against them as an individual act in violation of any legal or contract rights of such taxpayers." Again: "The relief sought is against the defendants, not in their indi

as officers of the state of Virginia. The acts sought to be restrained are the bringing of suits by the state of Virginia in its own name and for its own use. If the state had been made a defendant to this bill by name, charged according to the allegations it now contains-supposing that such a suit could be maintained-it would have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the court by process served upon its governor and attorney-general, according to the precedents in such cases. New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 284, 288, 290 [8: 127, 128, 129]; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 96, 97, [16: 717, 725]; Rule 5 of 1884, 108 U. S. 574 [20: 901]. If a decree could have been rendered enjoining the state from bringing suits against its taxpayers, it would have operated upon the state only through the officers who by law were required to represent it in bringing such suits, viz., the present defendants, its attorney general, and the commonwealth's attorneys for the several counties. For a breach of such an injunction, these officers would be amenable to the court as proceeding in contempt of its authority, and would be liable to punishment therefor by attachment and imprisonment. The nature of the case, as supposed, is identical with that of the case as actually presented in the bill, with a single exception that the state is not named as a defendant. How else can the state be forbidden by judicial process to bring actions in its name, except by constraining the conduct of its officers, its attorneys, and its agents? And if all such officers, attorneys, and agents are personally subjected to the process of the court, so as to forbid their acting in its behalf, how can it be said that the state itself is not subjected to the jurisdiction of the court as an actual and real defendant?"

One of the arguments made in the Ayers Case was that the circuit court had jurisdiction to restrain by injunction officers *of[527] the state from executing the provisions of state enactments void by reason of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States. In support of that position reference was made to Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 [6: 204]. But this court said: "There is nothing, therefore, in the judgment in that cause, as finally defined, which extends its authority beyond the prevention and restraint of the specific act done in pursuance of the unconstitutional statute of Ohio, and in violation of the act of Congress chartering the bank, which consisted of the unlawful seizure and detention of its property. It was conceded throughout that case, in the argument at the bar and in the opinion of the court, that an action at law would lie, either of trespass or detinue, against the defendants as individual trespassers guilty of a wrong in taking the property of the complainant illegally, vainly seeking to defend themselves under the authority of a void act of the general assembly of Ohio. One of the principal questions in the case was whether equity had jurisdiction to restrain the commission

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