of local administration. Subject to constitutional limitations presently to be noticed, the power of the legislature over such corporations is supreme and transcendent; it may, where there is no constitutional inhi[243]bition, erect, change, divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public good to require." 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. p. 93, § 54. In any view of the case there is no escape from the conclusion that the city of Covingtion has no contract with the state exempting the property in question from taxation, which is protected by the contract clause of the national Constitution. Marvin v. Ellis, 9 Fed. Rep. 367; Coffin v. Haggin, 11 Fed. Rep. 219; Fountain v. Angelica, 12 Fed. Rep. 8; Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S. 138, 29 L. ed. 114; Detroit v. Dean, 106 U. S. 537, 27 L. ed. 300; McLean v. Valley County, 74 Fed. Rep. 389. The court erred in refusing to hold the bonds in controversy void because they created a debt by loan in one year greater than that allowed by the Constitution of Colorado. Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 32 L. ed. 1065; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 32 L. ed. 1060; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83, 28 L. ed. 360; Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, 37 L. ed. 1044. The court erred in holding that the bonds Ferceiving no error in the record of which this court may take cognizance, the judg-in controversy were valid obligations of Lake ment is affirmed. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. HARRY H. DUDLEY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 243-255.) 1. Coupons of bonds made by a county, payable 2. 1888 from the general rule that an assignee One who is not the real owner of coupons, county. Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 138; Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 29 L. ed. 132; Doon Twp. v. Cummins, 142 U. S. 366,35 L. ed. 1044; Nesbitt v. Riverside Independent Dist. 144 U. S. 610, 36 L. ed. 562; Sutliff v. Lake County Comrs. 147 U. S. 230, 37 L. ed. 145; Graves v. Saline County, 161 U. S. 359, 40 L. ed. 732. The court erred in holding that Lake county could, by receiving the benefit of and paying the interest on the bond issue in controversy, validate the same. Marshall County Supers. v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 772, 18 L. ed. 556; Clay County v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579, 26 L. ed. 856; Anderson County Comrs. v. Beal, 113 U. S. 227, 28 L. ed. 966. The payment of interest will not validate a municipal bond issue without authority of law. Graves v. Saline County, 161 U. S. 359, 40 L. ed. 732; Merchants' Bank v. Bergen County, 115 U. S. 384, 29 L. ed. 430. Messrs. John F. Dillon, Edmund F. Richardson, Harry Hubbard, John M. Dillon, and Daniel E. Parks, for respondent: The plaintiff was a bona fide holder, or enArgued December 14, 15, 1898. Decided titled to the rights of a bona fide holder, of [No. 177.] February 20, 1899. N WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United the coupons in question. Douglas County Comrs. v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 46; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 0 States Circuit Court of Appeals for the U. s. 147, 27 1. ed. 431. A bona fide holder is a purchaser for value without notice, or the successor of one who was such a purchaser. McClure v. Oxford Twp. 94 U. S. 429, 24 L. ed. 129. Eighth Circuit to review a judgment of that See same case below, 49 U. S. App. 336. The court erred in holding that under the thereon. If any previous holder of the bonds in suit was a bona fide holder for value, the plaintiff can avail himself of such previous holder's position without showing that he has himself paid value. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 27 94 U. S. 104, 24 L. ed. 46; Marion County Comrs. v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278, 24 L. ed. 59; Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51, 24 L. ed. 681; San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U. S. 312, 24 L. ed. 816; Nauvoo v. Ritter, 97 U. S. 389, 24 L. ed. 1050. The recital in the bonds is conclusive in favor of the bona fide holder that the debt limit prescribed by the statute and by the Constitution has not been exceeded. Marcy v. Oswego Twp. 92 U. S. 637, 23 L. ed. 748; Turner v. Woodson County Comrs. | tiff's cause of action, if any he ever had, upon 27 Kan. 314; Independent School Dist. v. certain named coupons in suit, was barred Stone, 106 U. S. 183, 27 L. ed. 90; Buchanan by the statute of limitations. 4. That when [245] v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 138; the question of incurring liability for the Douglas County Comrs. v. Bolles, 94 U. S. erection of necessary public buildings was 104, 24 L. ed. 46. submitted to popular vote, the county had already contracted debts or obligations in excess of the amount allowed by law. The circuit court of appeals properly held that the bonds did not create a debt by loan in any one year greater than that allowed by the Constitution of Colorado. Sutliff v. Lake County Comrs. 147 U. S. 230, 37 L. ed. 145; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 32 L. ed. 1060. In the absence of any statutory public record, a county or municipality may be estopped, by recitals in bonds, from showing that when the bonds were issued there was an aggregate outstanding indebtedness rendering the issue of the bonds illegal. Marcy v. Oswego Twp. 92 U. S. 637, 23 L. ed. 748; Humboldt Twp. v. Long, 92 U. S. 642, 23 L. ed. 752; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 138; Sherman County v. Simons, 109 U. S. 735, 27 L. ed. 1093; Dallas County v. McKenzie, 110 U. S. 686, 28 L. ed. 285; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499, 25 L. ed. 330. [244] *Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court: This action was brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado by the defendant in error Dudley, a citizen of New Hampshire, against the plaintiff in error the board of county commissioners of the county of Lake, Colorado, a governmental corporation organized under the laws of that state. Its object was to recover the amount of certain coupons of bonds issued by that corporation under date of July 31st, 1880, and of which coupons the plaintiff claimed to be the owner and holder. Each bond recites that it is "one of a series of fifty thousand dollars, which the board of county commissioners of said county have issued for the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, by virtue of and in compliance with a vote of a majority of the qualified voters of said county, at an election duly held on the 7th day of October, A. D. 1879, and under and by virtue of and in compliance with an act of the general assembly of the state of Colorado, entitled 'An Act Concerning Counties, County Officers, and County Government, and Repealing Laws on These Subjects,' approved March 24th, A. D. 1877, and it is hereby certified that all the provisions of said act have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond." One of the questions arising on the record is whether Dudley had any such interest in the coupons in suit as entitled him to maintain this suit. The evidence on this point will be found in the margin.† tAt the trial George W. Wright was introduced as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. He stated at the outset that Dudley was the owner of the bonds, but his examination showed that he had really no knowledge on the subject, and that his statement was based only upon inference and hearsay. In connection with his testimony certain transfers or bills of sale to Dudley of bonds of the above issue of $50,000 dated December 5th, 1888, purporting to be "for value received" by Susan F. Jones, executrix of the estate of Walter H. Jones, deceased, of bonds Nos. 55 to 64, both inclusive, and Nos. 65 and 66; one dated February 11th, 1885, by David Creary, Jr., J. H. Jagger, Henry D. Hawley, and L. C. Hubbard, all of Connecticut, for bonds Nos. 80, S1, and 82, and Nos. 83 to 86, both inclusive, the consideration recited being $5,380.56, "paid by Harry H. Dudley of Concord" in the county of Merrimac and state of New Hampshire; one dated March 20th, 1885, by the Nashua Savings Bank of Nashua, New Hampshire, for twenty bonds, Nos. 92 to 111, both inclusive, the consideration recited being $11,869.45, "paid by Harry H. Dudley of Concord," New Hampshire; one dated March 20th, 1885, by the Union Five Cents Saving Bank of Exeter, New Hampshire, of bonds Nos. 112 to 129, both inclusive, the consideration recited being $10,695, "paid by Harry H. Dudley of Concord," New Hampshire; one, undated, by Susan F. Jones, "for value received," of bonds Nos. 55 to 64, both inclusive, and Nos. 65 and 66, together with coupons falling due in 1884 of bonds Nos. 55 to 69, both inclusive; and one dated December 10th, 1884, by Joseph Standley, of Colorado, of twelve bonds, Nos. 68 to 79, both inclusive, and six bonds, numbered 67 and 87 to 91, both inclusive, the consideration recited being $15,887.50, "paid by Harry H. Dudley of Concord," New Hampshire. were introduced in evidence as follows: One Here were transactions which, if genuine, Indicated the actual payment by Dudley in 1882 and 1884 on his purchase of bonds of many thousand dollars. Dudley's deposition was taken twice; first on written Interrogatories, January 14th, 1895, and afterwards, March 2d, 1895, on oral exami nation. In his first deposition Dudley was asked The board of county commissioners by county, and he answered: whether he owned any bonds issued by Lake "Yes, I own certheir answer put the plaintiff on proof of tain Lake county bonds which I hold under writhis cause of action, and made separate de- ten bills of sale transferred to me from several fenses upon the following grounds: 1. That different parties." Being asked whether he the bonds to which the coupons were at- owned any bonds of Lake county, Colorado, tached were issued in violation of section 6, numbered 92 to 111 inclusive, 83 to 86, incluarticle 11 of the Constitution of Colorado, sive, 55 to 64 inclusive, 68 to 79 Inclusive, 80 and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof. to 82 inclusive, 65, 66, and 67, and 87 to 91 in"I own, under the afore2. That the aggregate amount of debts which clusive, he answered: the county of Lake was permitted by law to said bills of sale, bonds mentioned in interrogatory 3." He was then asked (interrogatory 4) incur at the date of said bonds, as well as if in answer to the preceding interrogatory he when they were in fact issued, had been said that he owned any of said bonds or the reached and exceeded. 3. That the plain-coupons cut therefrom, to state when he pur ́[246] accordingly entered upon that verdict. Upon writ of error to the circuit court of appeals the judgment was reversed, Judge Thayer dissenting. 49 U. S. App. 336. no? At the close of the plaintiff's evidence in chief the defendant asked for a peremptory instruction in its behalf, but this request was denied at that time. When the entire [247]evidence on both sides was concluded, the 1. In the oral argument of this case some defendant renewed its request for a peremp- inquiry was made whether Dudley's right to[250] tory instruction, and the plaintiff asked a maintain this action was affected by that like instruction in his favor. The plain- clause in the first section of the judiciary [248]tiff's request was denied, an exception to act of August 13th, 1888, chap. 866 (25 Stat. the ruling of the court being reserved. Other at L. 433, 434), providing that no circuit or instructions asked by the plaintiff were re-district court of the United States shall fused, and in obedience to a peremptory in- "have cognizance of any suit, except upon struction by the court the jury returned a foreign bills of exchange, to recover the con[249]*verdict for the defendant, and judgment was tents of any promissory note or other chose A. I think this answer is sufficient. Q. If you are successful in the suit brought upon the coupons heretofore attached to the bonds mentioned in said bill of sale, do you not intend to pay the amount of those coupons so recovered to the grantors in said bill of sale, less any legiti mate expenses attendant upon the prosecution of this case? A. Yes, my understanding in the matter would be something might be paid them. Q. Is there something to be paid them different from the amount involved in the suit represented by the coupons cut from said bonds? A. I should think there was. Q. In what respect is the difference? A. They would not be paid the full amount. Q. What deduction would you make? A. I do not know just what deduction would be made. Q. When you took this bill of sale, did you execute some sort of a written statement back to the grantors of said bill of sale? A. No, sir. Q. Did you make a verbal agreement at the time with them or any of them? A. No, sir. Q. Were you present when the bill of sale was drawn? A. No, sir. Where was it drawn? A. My impression is that it was drawn at Hartford, Conn., this particular one that you refer to. Q. Yes. Who represented you at the drawing of the bill of sale? A. I have no knowledge of being repre sented there. Q. When did you first know that such bill of sale had actual existence? When I received it. Q. When was that? A. It was in the year 1894. chased the same, from whom he purchased them, It should be stated that before the witness When Dudley gave his second deposition his attention was called to his answer to interrogatory 4, in his first deposition, in relation to the bill of sale running to him from Craig [Creary], Jagger, Hawley, and Hubbard. We make the following extract from his last deposition, giving questions and answers as the only way in which to show what the witness intended to say and what he intended to avoid saying: Q. You also say in the answer to which I have referred, that the consideration in the said bill of sale was $5,380.56. Did you pay that consideration for the bonds mentioned in the bill of sale? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you pay any part of it? A. No, sir. Q. Why was that bill of sale made to you, Mr. Dudley? A. I think I have answered that in some interroga- I cannot tell the date. Q. A. Q. Then you knew nothing of it until some nine years after it was made? A. That was the first I knew of it, the year 1894. In reference to the bonds referred to in the bill of sale from Stanley, the witness testified: Q. When did you first know of the existence of the bill of sale? A. I think it was in the year 1894. Q. Some ten years after it was made? A. Do you want me to answer that? 9. Yes. A. I received it as I have stated heretofore, that was the first I knew of it. Q. Are you personally acquainted with Joseph Stanley? A. I am not; no, sir. Q. Did you ever meet him? A. Don't remember that I ever met him. Q. Did you at any time ever pay him $15.877.50 for the bonds mentioned in his bill of sale to you? A. No, sir. Q. Is it not a fact that Mr. A. I have anStanley still owns these bonds? swered in a former deposition that I hold a bill of sale of certain bonds of Joseph Stanley. Q. Do you refuse to answer the last question I asked of you, yes or no? A. I prefer to answer it as I have stated above. Q. If you should recover in this suit, are not the amounts represented by the coupons cut from the bonds mentioned in the Stanley bill of sale to be paid to Joseph Stanley less the expenses of this suit? A. I could not answer that definitely. Q. Why not? A. Because I haven't enough knowledge of the matter to answer it definitely. Q. You have no knowledge of it at all personally, have του ? A. Mv understanding of the matter in action in favor of any assignee, or of any had been made, except in cases of promissubsequent holder if such instrument be pay-sory notes negotiable by the law merchant able to bearer and be not made by any cor- and bills of exchange." 18 Stat. at L. 470, poration, unless such suit might have been chap. 137, § 1. prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made." The provision on the same subject in the act of March 3d, 1875, but which was, of course, displaced by the clause on the same subject in the act of 1888, was as follows: "Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suit founded on contract in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover thereon if no assignment would be, Joseph Stanley would have a certain amount of money if the suit was won. Q. Was not the bill of sale drawn in Denver,-the Stanley bill of sale? A. I have no actual knowledge where it was drawn. Q. Do you know who had the bill of sale before it was sent on to you in 1894 ? A. I do not think I have any actual knowledge. Q. Did you have any sort of knowledge? A. Yes. I imagined it came from Rollins & Son. Q. By letter? A. It came through the mail. Q. Have you the letter now? A. I do not think that I have; no, sir. Q. What did you do with it? A. I could not swear that it was. Q. It came in December of 1894, did it not? A. I should say it did. As to the bonds referred to in the bill of sale by Susan F. Jones, executrix, the witness testified: Q. What did you pay for that bill of sale, Mr. Dudley? A. For consideration not named in the bill of sale. Q. That does not answer my question. What did you pay for it? A. I do not remember as I paid anything. Q. Do you remember that you did not pay anything? A. It is my impression that I did not. 9. Were you present when it was drawn? A. No, sir. Q. In the event you recover a judgment in this case, are not the amounts of the coupons belong. Ing to the bonds mentioned in the bill of sale from Mrs. Jones to be paid to Mrs. Jones, less her proportion of [the expenses of] the case? A. I could not state definitely about that. Q. Why? A. For the reason that I answered similar questions above. Q. Going back to the bonds of Mr. Stanley, I will ask you one or two other questions. Is Mr. Stanley a citizen of Colorado? A. I think he is. Q. Now, why did you not include in this case the coupons belonging to the Stanley bonds for 84, 85, and 86, and the coupons to bonds 68 to 72, included in the Stanley bill of sale of 1888, and the coupons on 67, 87-91 for 1884-'5? A. If they were not included I do not know why they were not. Q. Is Mrs. Jones a citizen of the state of Colorado? A. I think she is. Q. Were not those bonds of Stanley and Jones assigned to you in order that you might as a citizen of another state bring suit upon them and upon the coupons belonging to them in the Federal court in Colorado? A. I should answer that by referring to my answer in former deposition to interrogatory 9. In reference to the other bills of sale and the bonds mentioned in them, the witness testified: Q. In your answer to interrogatory 4 of your former deposition you also say that you own bonds of Lake county by the written bill of sale from the Nashua Savings Bank, numbered 92111, both inclusive, together with all coupons originally attached and unpaid. You also say that the consideration for the said bill of sale is $11,689.45. Did you pay any part of that, Mr. Dudley? A. No, sir. Q. Were you present Without stopping to consider the full scope and effect of the above provision in the act of 1888, it is only necessary to say that the instruments sued on, being payable to bearer and having been made by a corporation, are expressly excepted by the statute from the general rule prescribed that an assignee or subsequent holder of a promissory note or chose in action could not sue in a circuit or district court of the United States unless his assignor or transferrer when the bill of sale was drawn? A. No, sir. Q. When did you first know that there was such a bill of sale? A. As soon as I received it, in the year 1894. Q. In the event of a recovery in this case, are not the amounts of the coupons belonging to the said bonds to be paid over to the Nashua Savings Bank, less their proportion of the expense of this litigation? A. I do not know how much will be paid them. Q. Do you know anything about it? A. Indirectly, yes. Q. Do you mean by that you have some hearsay evidence upon it? A. Yes; I have an impression from hearsay that the bank would have some equivalent for these bonds if suit was won. Q. You say here that you own bonds of Lake county by virtue of a bill of sale from the Union Five Cent Savings Bank of Exeter, numbered 112-129, inclusive, together with all coupons, the first being No. 4, and the subsequent ones being consecutive up to and including No. 21. What is the date of that bill of sale? A. I think it was dated March 25th, 1885. Q. Were you present when it was made? A. No, gir. Q. When did you first know of its existence? 4. In the year 1894. Q. At the time that you were informed of the existence of the others? A. Nearly at the same time, I should say. Q. Did you pay the bank of Exeter $10,695, or any other sum for the bonds mentioned in that bill of sale? A. No, sir. Q. You also say in the same answer to the same interrogatory in your former deposition that you hold a bill of sale and assignment from Susan F. Jones for coupons Nos. 55 to 64 and Nos. 65 to 66 for the years 1886, '7, '8, 1891, also coupons amounting to $600 from bonds 55-6-7-8-9-60 falling due in the year 1894. What is the date of that bill of sale and assignment? A. I could not tell. Q. When did you first know of its existence? A. I should say in 1894. Q. Did you pay anything for it? A. No, sir. Q. Did you ever have in your possession any of the coupons or any of the bonds to which this examination has thus far been directed? A. Strictly speaking, I don't think I ever had them in my own possession. I have seen some of the bonds and handled them, had them in a safe. Q. Where? A. In Boston. Q. When? A. Well, I should say in the year 1893. Q. But that was before you knew they had been assigned to you by bill of sale, was it not? A. I was really handling them as agent for other parties. Q. Who were the other parties you were handling them as agent for? A. I don't know as I was exactly an agent. I was an officer of another company. They came into our hands. Q. What was that company? A. E. H. Rollins & Sons. 9. Were you a stockholder of that company? A. Yes. Q. Are you now? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is not that the only interest which you have in these bonds or any of them-your interest as a stockholder in the firm of E. H. Rollins & Sons? A. Yes, probably it is. could have sued in such court. It is imma- | 2. There is, however, a ground upon which By the fifth section of the above act of March 3d, 1875, it is provided "that if, in any suit, commenced in a circuit court or removed from a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed [251]*thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined, either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which it was removed, as justice may require, and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just." 18 Stat. at L. 470, 472, chap. 137. This provision was not superseded by the act of 1887, amended and corrected in 1888. 25 Stat. at L. 433. Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 339 [40: 444, 449]. tended to be passed for the transfer. This court held that within the meaning of the act of 1875 the case was a collusive one, and should have been dismissed as a fraud on the jurisdiction of the United States court. It said: "The arrangement by which, without any valuable consideration, the stockholders of the Virginia corporation organized a Pennsylvania corporation and conveyed these lands to the new corporation for the express purpose and no other purpose is stated or suggested-of creating a case for the Federal court, must be regarded as a mere device to give jurisdiction to a circuit court of the United States, and as being in law a fraud upon that court, as well as a wrong to the defendants. Such a device cannot receive our sanction. The court below properly declined to take cognizance of the case." And this conclusion, the court observed, was "a necessary result of the cases arising before the passage of the act of March 3d, 1875." From the evidence in this cause, of Dudley himself, it is certain that he does not in fact own any of the coupons sued on and that his name, with his consent, is used in order that the circuit court of the United States may acquire jurisdiction to render judgment for the amount of all the coupons in suit, a large part of which are really owned by citizens of Colorado, who, as between themselves and the board of commissioners of Lake county, could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal court, but must have sued, if they sued at all, in one of the courts of Colorado. It is true that some of the coupons in suit are owned by corporations of New Hampshire, who could themselves have sued in the cir cuit court of the United States. But if part of the coupons in question could not, by reason of the citizenship of the owners, have been sued on in that court, except by uniting the causes of action arising thereon with causes of action upon coupons owned by persons or corporations who might have sued in the circuit court of the United States, and if all the causes of actions were thus united for the collusive purpose of making "a case" cognizable by the Federal court as to every issue made in it, then the act or 1875 must be held to apply, and the[253] trial court on its own motion should have dismissed the case without considering the merits. Prior to the passage of the act of 1875 it had been often adjudged that if title to real or personal property was put in the name of a person for the purpose only of enabling him, upon the basis of the diverse citizenship of himself and the defendant, to invoke the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States for the benefit of the real owner of the property, who could not have sued in that court, the transaction would be regarded in its true light, namely, as one designed to give the circuit court cognizance of a case in violation of the acts of Congress defining its jurisdiction; and the case would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Maxwell's Lessee v. Levy, 2 Dall. 381 [1: 424]; Hurst's Lessee v. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. 70, 80; M'Donald v. Smalley, 1 Pet. 620, 624 [7: 287, 289]; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 216 [12: 666,673]; Jones v. League, 18 How. 76, 81 [15: 263, 264]; Barney v. Baltimore City, 6 Wall. 280, 288 [18: 825, 827]. These cases were all examined in Lehigh Mining & In Williams v. Nottawa, 104 U. S. 209, Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U. S. 327, 339 [40:211 [26: 719, 720], this court said that Con444, 449]. In the latter case it appeared that gress when it passed the act of 1875 extenda Virginia corporation claimed title to lands ing the jurisdiction of the courts of the in that commonwealth, which were in the United States "was specially careful to possession of certain individuals, citizens of guard against the consequences of collusive Virginia. The stockholders of the Virginia transfers to make parties, and imposed the corporation organized themselves into a cor- duty on the court, on its own motion, withporation under the laws of Pennsylvania, in out waiting for the parties, to stop all furorder that the Pennsylvania corporation, af- ther proceedings and dismiss the suit the ter receiving a conveyance from the Virgin- moment anything of the kind appeared. ia corporation, could bring suit in the cir- This was for the protection of the court as cuit court of the United States sitting in well as parties, against frauds upon its juVirginia, against the citizens in that com- risdiction." [252]monwealth *who held possession of the lands. The contemplated conveyance was made, but no consideration actually passed or was in So, in Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U. S 138, 146 [29: 114, 117], which was a suit upon coupons, brought by a citizen of Mas |
