U. S. 484 [23: 579]; Town of Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S. 494 [23: 583]; Marcy v. Township of Oswego, 92 U. S. 637 [23: 748]; Wilson v. Salamanca, 99 U. S. 499 [25: 830]; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278 [26: 138]; Northern Bank v. Porter Township, 110 U. S. 608 [28: 258]." After referring to what was said in Town of Coloma v. Eaves and Buchanan v. Litchfield, the court thus concludes its opinion: "We think this case comes fairly within the principles of those just cited; and that it is not governed by Dixon County v. Field and Lake County v. Graham, but is distinguishable from them in the essential particulars above noted."

It is contended that the present case is controlled by Sutliff v. Lake County Commissioners, 147 U. S. 230, 235, 237-8 [37: 145, 149], rather than by Chaffee County v. Potter. The action in the Sutliff Case was upon coupons of bonds issued by a county of Colorado, each bond reciting that it was issued under and by virtue of and in compliance with the act of Assembly entitled "An Act Concerning Counties, County Officers, and County Government, and Repealing Laws on These Subjects," approved March 24th, 1877, and it was certified in each bond that "all the provisions of said act have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond." It was a vital fact in that case that there was no recital in the bonds that the indebtedness thus created was not in excess of the constitutional limit. Still, the defense was that the bonds in fact increased the indebtedness of the county to an amount in excess of the limit prescribed by the State Constitution, and therefore were illegal and void. The court, upon the facts certified and in the light of previous decisions, held it to be clear that "the plaintiff, although a purchaser for value and before maturity of the bonds, was charged with the [272]duty of examining the records of indebted ness provided for in the statute of Colorado, in order to ascertain whether the bonds increased the indebtedness of the county beyond the constitutional limit; and that the recitals in the bonds did not estop the county to prove by the records of the assessment and the indebtedness that the bonds were issued in violation of the Constitution. "In those cases," it continued, "in which this court has held a municipal corporation to be estopped by recitals in its bonds to assert that they were issued in excess of the limit imposed by the Constitution or statutes of the state, the statutes, as construed by the court, left it to the officers issuing the bonds to determine whether the facts existed which constituted the statutory or constitutional condition precedent, and did not require those facts to be made a matter of public record. Marcy v. Oswego Twp. 92 U. S. 637 [23: 748]; Humboldt Twp. v. Long, 92 U. S. 642 [23: 752]; Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S. 83 [28: 360]; Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 682 [32: 1065, 1068]; Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355, 363 [35: 1040, 1043]. But if the statute expressly requires those facts to be made a matter of public record, open to the inspection of everyone, there can be no implication that

it was intended to leave that matter to be determined and concluded, contrary to the facts so recorded, by the officers charged with the duty of issuing the bonds." After referring to Dixon County v. Field, above cited, the court proceeded to show the precise grounds upon which the decisions in Lake County v. Graham and Chaffee County v. Potter were rested: "That decision [Dixon County v. Field] and the ground upon which it rests were approved and affirmed in Lake County v. Graham and Chaffee County v. Potter, above cited, each of which arose under the article of the Constitution of Colorado now in question, but under a different statute, which did not require the amount of indebtedness of the county to be stated on its records. In Lake County v. Graham each bond showed on its face the whole amount of bonds issued, and the recorded valuation of property showed that amount to be in excess of the constitutional limit; and for this reason, as well as because the bonds contained no recital upon that point, the county was held not to be estopped to[273} plead that limit. 130 U. S. 682, 683 [32: 1068]. In Chaffee County v. Potter, on the other hand, the bonds contained an express recital that the total amount of the is sue did not exceed the constitutional limit, and did not show on their face the amount of the issue, and the county records showed only the valuation of property, so that, as observed by Mr. Justice Lamar in delivering judgment: "The purchaser might even know, indeed it may be admitted that he would be required to know, the assessed valuation of the taxable property of the county, and yet he could not ascertain by reference to one of the bonds and the assessment roll whether the county had exceeded its power, under the Constitution, in the premises." 142 U. S. 363 [35: 1043]. The case at bar does not fall within Chaffee County v. Potter, and cannot be distinguished in principle from Dixon County v. Field or from Lake County v. Graham. The only difference worthy of notice is that in each of these cases the single fact required to be shown by the public record was the valuation of the property of the county, whereas here two facts are to be so shown, the valuation of the property, and the amount of the county debt. But, as both these facts are equally required by the statute to be entered on the public records of the county, they are both facts of which all the world is bound to take notice, and as to which, therefore, the county cannot be concluded by any recitals in the bonds."

It thus appears that in the Sutliff Case the court neither modified nor intended to modify, but distinctly recognized, the principle announced in Chaffee County v. Potter, namely, that the recital in the bonds that the debt thereby created did not exceed the limit prescribed by the Constitution estopped the county from asserting, as against a bona fide holder for value, that the contrary was the fact.

We have made this extended reference to adjudged cases because of the wide difference among learned counsel as to the effect

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of our former decisions. This course has al. The remaining five bonds owned by the so been pursued in order to bring out clear: plaintiff corporation were also purchased ly the fact that the present case is controlled from Stanley, who received them directly by the judgment in Chaffee County v. Potter. from the county in exchange for warrants

The views of the circuit court, as expressed that he owned and held. There is no reason 1274Jin its charge in * this case and as enforced by why upon the surrender of county warrants

its peremptory instruction to find for the de- for county bonds he was not entitled to the fendant, cannot be approved without over- benefit of the rule above declared as to the ruling that case. It was expressly decided conclusiveness of the recital in the bonds, or in the Chaffee county case that the statute why he may not be regarded as much an inunder which the bonds there in suit (the nocent holder of the bonds exchanged for bonds here in suit being of the same class) county warrants as of the other bonds purauthorized the county commissioners to de- chased by him in open market. There is no termine whether the proposed issue of bonds proof that at the time of such exchange he would in fact exceed the limit prescribed by had or was chargeable with knowledge or the Constitution and the statute; and that notice that the debt created by the bonds exthe recital in the bond to the effect that such ceeded the constitutional limit; consequentdetermination had been made and that the ly, in taking the bonds in exchange he was constitutional limitation had not been exentitled, for the reasons heretofore given, to ceeded, taken in connection with the fact that rely upon the truth of the recitals contained the bonds themselves did not show such re- in them. When the board of county comcital to be untrue, estopped the county, un- missioners, proceeding under the act of 1881, der the law, from saying that the recital was offered to exchange county bonds for the not true. We decline to overrule Chaffee warrants held by him, he was entitled under County v. Potter, and upon the authority of the circumstances disclosed to assume it to that case, and without re-examining or en be true, as recited in the bonds, that the conlarging upon the grounds upon which the stitutional limit was not being exceeded. decision therein proceeded, we adjudge that

It is insisted with much earnestness that as against the plaintiff the county of Gun- | the principles we have announced render it nison is estopped to question the recital in impossible for a state by a constitutional prothe bonds in question, to the effect that they vision to guard against excessive municipal did not create a debt in excess of the consti- indebtedness. By no means. If a state tutional limit, and were issued by virtue of Constitution, in fixing a limit for indebtedand in conformity with the statute of 1881, ness of that character, should prescribe a and in full compliance with the requirements definite rule or test for determining whether of law.

that limit has already been exceeded, or is We have assumed thus far that the plain- being exceeded by any particular issue of tiff corporation was a bona fide purchaser or bonds, all who purchase such bonds would holder of the bonds to which the coupons in do so subject to that rule or test, whatever suit were attached. Upon this question we might be the hardship in the case of those concur in the views expressed by the circuit who purchased them in the open market *in[276; court of appeals. Speaking by Judge Thayer, good faith. Indeed, it is entirely competent that court said: "The testimony contained for a state to provide by statute that all obin the present record shows, we think, with. ligations, in whatever form executed by a out contradiction, that the plaintiff was a municipality existing under its laws, shall bona fide holder when the suit was brought be subject to any defense that would be alof at least five of the bonds which are in- lowed in cases of non-negotiable instruments. volved in the present controversy, because it But for reasons that everyone understands holds the title of Joseph Stanley, who was no such statutes have been passed. Munichimself an innocent purchaser of said bonds ipal obligations executed under such a statbefore maturity, for the price of ninety- ute could not be readily disposed of to those eight cents on the dollar. The rights which who invest in such securities. Stanley acquired by virtue of such purchase It follows that the circuit court erred in inure to the plaintiff, by virtue of its pur- directing the jury to return a verdict for the chase of the bonds from Stanley in June, defendant. 1892, and this without reference to any What has been said renders it unnecessary knowledge which the plaintiff may have had to consider various questions arising upon

at the latter date affecting the validity of exceptions to specific rulings in the circuit [275]the securities. *A bona fide holder of com court as to the admission and exclusion of

mercial paper is entitled to transfer to a evidence, and as to those parts of the charge
third party all the rights with which he is to which objections were made. Those rul.
vested, and the title so acquired by his in- ings were inconsistent with the principles
dorsee cannot be affected by proof that the herein announced.
indorsee was acquainted with the defenses As neither the circuit court nor the circuit
existing against the paper. Commissioners court of appeals proceeded in accordance
of Marion County v. Clark, 94 U. S. 278, 286 with the principles herein announced, the
[24: 59, 62]; Hill v. Scotland County, 34 judgment of each court is reversed, and the
Fed. Rep. 208; Dan. Neg. Inst. 4th ed.) 8 cause is remanded for further proceedings
803, and cases there cited." 49 U. S. App. consistent with this opinion.
399, 413.

It is so ordered.


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"3. Said eating house is used by said J.

B. Thomas for serving and furnishing to the

inmates of said Central Branch of the Na

tional Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 276–285.) their daily #food or rations, and is the only[278)

place so provided at said National Home, and Governor of soldiers' home not subject to is known as the mess room of the said Cen. state law as to use of oleomargarine. tral Branch of the National Home for Dis

abled Volunteer Soldiers, situate on the A governor of a soldiers' home which is under grounds purchased, held and used by tho

the sole jurisdiction of Congress is not sub- United States therefor, and the acts comject to the state law concerning the use of plained of herein consisted in causing oleooleomargarine, when he furnishes that article to the inmates of the home as part of the margarine to be served and furnished, on the rations furnished for them under appropria. 2d day of March, 1897, as food and as part of tions made by Congress therefor.

the rations furnished to the inmates thereof,

under appropriations made by the Congress (No. 353.]

of the United States for the support of said

inmates; and that no placard in size not less Argued and submitted January 10, 1899. than 10 x 14 inches, having printed thereon Decided February 27, 1899.

in black letters not less in size than 1%

inches square, the words 'oleomargarine A PPEAL from acouorder Appeals for the salinando used here,' was displayed in said

States Circuit of eating . Sixth Circuit affirming the order of the Cir- “4. The affidavit in the cause is made in cuit Court of the United States for the conformity with an act of the general assem. Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, bly of the state of Ohio (Ohio Laws, vol. 92, discharging the appellee, J. B. Thomas, govo page 23), passed in 1895, and entitled 'An ernor of the soldiers' home in the county of Act to Amend Section 3 of an Act Entitled Montgomery, Ohio, from the custody of a “An Act to Prevent Fraud and Deception in constable under a mittimus from the justice the Manufacture and Sale of Oleomargarine of the peace before whom he was tried and by and Promote Public Health in the State of whom he was convicted and sentenced to pay Ohio," s passed May 16, 1894.” a fine of $50 and to be imprisoned until such Section 3 of the act, as so amended, reads fine was paid, for a violation of the Ohio act as follows: of 1895 (92 Ohio State Laws, 23) in relation “Sec. 3. Every proprietor, keeper, manato the use of oleomargarine. Affirmed. ger, or person in charge of any hotel, boat,

See same case below, 82 Fed. Rep. 304, and railroad car, boarding house, restaurant, eate 58 V. S. App. 431, 87 Fed. Rep. 453.

ing house, lunch counter, or lunch room, who

therein sells, uses, serves, furnishes, or disStatement by Mr. Justice Peckham: poses of or uses in cooking, any oleomarga77] In this case complaint was made by af- rine, shall display and keep a white placard

fidavit by the dairy commissioner of Ohio in a conspicuous place, where the same may against the appellee, alleging that on March be easily seen and read, in the dining room, 2, 1897, he violated the act of the legisla- eating house, restaurant, lunch room, or ture of the state of Ohio, passed in 1895 (92 place where such substance is furnished, Ohio State Laws, 23), in relation to the use served, sold, or disposed of, which placard of oleomargarine. Appellee was arrested shall be in size not less than ten by fourteen and brought before a justice of the peace, and inches, upon which shall be printed in black declined to plead to the charge on the ground letters, not less in size than one and a half that the act complained of in the affidavit inches square, the words 'oleomargarine sold of the complainant was performed by him as and used here,' and said card shall not con. governor of the soldiers' home, located in the tain any other words than the ones above county of Montgomery and state of Ohio, described ; and such proprietor, keeper, manand what he did was done by the authority ager, or person in charge shall not sell, serve, of the board of managers of the home. He or dispose of such substance as or for but therefore moved to dismiss the complaint for ter, when butter is asked for or purported to want of jurisdiction in_the magistrate. be furnished or served.” This motion was denied. He then consented In addition to the above statement, referto be tried without a jury upon the follow-ence was made to *the following acts of Con [279] ing agreed statement of facts:

gress providing for the creation and govern “1. That on the 2d day of March, 1897, ment of the National Homes for Disabled Joseph E. Blackburn was and now is the Volunteer Soldiers, viz.: Act of March 3, food and dairy commissioner of the state of 1865, chap. 91 (13 Stat, at L. 509); act of Ohio.

March 21, 1866, chap. 21 (14 Stat. at L. 10); "2. That on the 2d day of March, 1897, J. act of March 3, 1875, chap. 129 (18 Stat. at B. Thomas was and now is the duly chosen L. 343, at 359). By the last-cited statute, and acting governor of the Central Branch of on page 359, it is made the duty of the manthe National Home for Disabled Volunteer agers of the home, on or before the first day Soldiers, located in the county of Mont- of August in each year, "to furnish to the gomery, state of Ohio, and as said governor Secretary of War estimates, in detail, for was in charge of the eating house at the said the support of said home for the fiscal year Central Branch of the National Home for commencing on the first day of July there Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.

after; and the Secretary of War shall an

nually include such estimates in his esti- | diers, incorporated under said act, in and mates for his department. And no moneys over said territory." shall, after the first day of April, 1875, be drawn from the Treasury for the use of said home, except in pursuance of quarterly estimates, and upon quarterly requisitions by the managers thereof upon the Secretary of War, based upon such quarterly estimates, for the support of said home, for not more than three months next succeeding such requisition. And the managers of said home shall, at the commencement of each quarter of the year, render the Secretary of War an account of all their receipts and expenditures for the quarter immediately preceding, with vouchers for such expen-peace before whom he was tried. Upon the ditures; and all such accounts and vouchers hearing the court made an order discharging shall be authenticated by the officers of said appellee. 82 Fed. Rep. 304. The state appealed home thereunto duly appointed by said man- from that order to the circuit court of apagers, and audited and allowed as required peals for the sixth circuit, where it was af-[281) by law for the general appropriations and firmed (58 U. S. App. 431, 87 Fed. Rep. expenditures of the War Department." 453), and the state then appealed to this court.

Upon these facts the appellee was convicted by the magistrate before whom he was tried, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $50, and to be imprisoned until such fine was paid. He refused to pay the fine, and applied to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio, western division, for a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the state tribunal before which he was tried had no jurisdiction to try him. The writ was granted and the constable made return thereto, setting up that he held appellee under the mittimus from the justice of the

By the act (chapter 902) approved August 4, 1886 (24 Stat. at L. 222, at 251), it was also provided that "hereafter the estimates for the support of the Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers shall be submitted by items." Also by the act (chapter 1069) approved October 2, 1888 (25 Stat. at L. 505, at 543), it was "Provided further, That it shall be the duty of the managers of said home, on or before the first day of October in each year to furnish to the Secretary of War estimates, in detail, for the support of said home for the fiscal year commencing on the first day of July thereafter, and the Secretary of War shall annually include such estimates in his estimates for his department." Also by the act (chapter 420) approved June 11, 1896 [280](29 Stat. at L. 413, at 445), an appropriation was made for the support of the home at Dayton, Ohio, and for "the cost of all articles purchased for the regular ration, their freight, preparation, and serving."

Messrs. Charles H. Bosler and Otto J.
Renner for appellant.

Messrs. Judson Harmon and D. W. Bow-
man for appellee.

*Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the[281] facts, delivered the opinion of the court:

The act of the legislature of the state of Ohio, passed May 16, 1868, ceding jurisdiction to the United States, if it had remained in force would have prevented the state of ficials from taking jurisdiction in this case. Congress, however, by the act of January 21, 1871, ceded back and relinquished the jurisdiction that had been granted, and provided that it would claim or exercise no jurisdicti n thereafter, except as therein mentioned.

The material portions of the acts of March 3, 1865, and March 21, 1866, have been enacted in the Revised Statutes of the United States, being sections 4825 to 4837, both inclusive.

On the third of April, 1867, the legislature of the state of Ohio passed an act ceding jurisdiction to the United States over the lands and their appurtenances within the state of Ohio, which might be acquired by donation or purchase by the managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers within the state of Ohio, for the uses and purposes of the asylum.

By the act, chapter 24, approved January 21, 1871 (16 Stat. at L. 399), Congress ceded back to the state of Ohio jurisdiction over the place named, and relinquished such jurisdiction on the part of the United States, and the act contained the following: "And the United States shall claim or exercise no jurisdiction over said place after the passage of this act: Provided, That nothing contained in this act shall be construed to impair the powers and rights heretofore conferred upon the board of managers of the National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Sol

If we assume, what the state court decided, that the provisions of the state statute relating to the sale of oleomargarine were intended to apply to and cover the soldiers' home, the question then arises whether the state had the power to legislate so as to control the governor of the home, acting under the direction of the board of managers and by the authority of Congress, in regard to the internal administration of the affairs of the home, and in respect to the conditions upon which an article of food might be provided by the governor under such directions and authority.

The home is a Federal creation, and is under the direct and sole jurisdiction of Congress. The board of managers have certain powers granted them (Rev. Stat. § 4825), and among other things to make by-laws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with law for carrying on the business and government of the home..

home are "officers and soldiers who served
The persons entitled to the benefits of the
in the late war for the suppression of the
rebellion," and also other soldiers and sail-
ors. The inmates are subject to the rules[282]
and articles of war, the same as if they were
in the army. Rev. Stat. §§ 4832, 4835.

Under the statutes above cited, in which it is provided that the board of managers shall furnish to the Secretary of War, in each year,

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estimates, in detail, for the support of the land, in opposition to the language of the act
home for the succeeding fiscal year, it would of Congress ceding back the jurisdiction the
naturally be the duty of the governor of each United States received from the state. The
home, in order to enable the board of man government is but claiming that its own of-
agers to perform their own duty, to report ficers, when discharging duties under Feder-
to the board the same kind of detailed esti al authority pursuant to and by virtue of
mates that the board is by law directed to valid Federal laws, are not subject to arrest
report to the Secretary of War, and which or other liability under the laws of the state
are to be included by the Secretary in the in which their duties are performed.
estimates for his department. At all events, The claim is made that neither the board
the duty is laid upon the board of managers, of managers nor the governor of the home
by the very terms of the statute, to make can, through their officers or by himself, vio-
these estimates in detail. It is admitted in late the statute law of a state having ju.
the record that the oleomargarine com- risdiction, when the acts constituting the
plained about herein was served and fur- infringement are not necessary for the gov-
nished by the appellee as food and as part ernment and management of the home for
of the rations furnished the inmates under the purposes for which it was incorporated,
the appropriations made by Congress for the or authorized by any act of the United
support of such inmates.

States, From these facts the inference is plain This claim might be conceded and still the that oleomargarine had been included in the conviction of the appellee would be invalid, detailed estimates for rations to be furnished because we find in this record the authority the inmates, and that the appropriation for of the United States for the act of the govrations included oleomargarine as part there- ernor. The statutes above referred to, when of. Otherwise we should have to infer a | taken in connection with the admitted facts, dereliction of duty on the part of the board of show an appropriation by Congress for the*[284! managers in not making out estimates in de- purchase of oleomargarine as part of the reg. tail, and we should adopt an inference con- ular rations of the inmates of the home. The trary to the admission, which states that the act of the governor in serving it was authoroleomargarine was furnished as food under | ized by Congress, and it was therefore legal, an appropriation Congress. The appropria- | any act of the state to the contrary notwithtion does not precede the detailed estimates, standing. but is made subsequently and is presumably

Under the facts herein the state court had enacted with reference thereto. Congress no jurisdiction to try the appellee for the has therefore in effect provided oleomarga- offense charged in the written complaint rine as part of the rations for the inmates made to the magistrate. See authorities of the home. It is given them in the mess cited in Re Waite, 81 Fed. Rep. 359. room of the institution and under the rules Assuming, in accordance with the decision and regulations for feeding them there. In of the state court, the act of the Ohio leg. making provision for so feeding the inmates, islature applies in its terms to the soldiers' the goverrior, under the direction of the home at Dayton, in that state, we are of board of managers and with the assent and opinion that the governor was not subject approval of Congress, is engaged in the inter- to that law, and the court had no jurisdicnal administration of a Federal institution, tion to hear or determine the criminal and we think a state legislature has no con- prosecution in question, because the act comstitutional power to interfere with such man- plained of was performed as part of the duty agement as is provided by Congress.

of the governor as a Federal officer, in and (283) *Whatever jurisdiction the state may have by virtue of valid Federal authority, and in

over the place or ground where the institu- the performance of that duty he was not
tion is located, it can have none to interfere subject to the direction or control of the leg.
with the provision made by Congress for fur- islature of Ohio.
nishing food to the inmates of the home, nor The authorities cited in the case of Re
has it power to prohibit or regulate the fur- Waite, supra, and those cited by the learned
nishing of any article of food which is ap- circuit judge in this case, fully support the
proved by the officers of the home, by the view we have taken herein. The cases of
board of managers, and by Congress. Under l'ennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (25: 648),
such circumstances the police power of the parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 394, 395
state has no application.

[25: 717, 725), Re Loney, 134 U. S. 372 [33:
We mean by this statement to say that 949), Re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1 (34: 55], all
Federal officers who are discharging their concur in upholding the paramount author-
duties in a state and who are engaged, as ity of the Federal government under circum-
this appellee was engaged, in superintending stances similar, in effect, to those set forth
the internal government and management of in this record.
a Federal institution, under the lawful di- Some of the same authorities also show
rection of its board of managers and with that this is one of the cases where it is prop-
the approval of Congress are not subject to er to issue a writ of habeas corpus from the
the jurisdiction of the state in regard to Federal court, instead of awaiting the slow
those very matters of administration which process of a writ of error from this court to
are thus approved by Federal authority. the highest court of the state where a de-

In asserting that this officer under such cision could be had. One of the grounds for circumstances is exempt from the state law, making such a case as this an exception to the United States are not thereby claiming the general rule laid down in Ex parte Royall, jurisdiction over this particular piece of 117 U. S. 241 [29: 868],Whitten v. Tom


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