short, that the company, if it saw it to do the subject, state legislation interrupting in

, could, beyond the power of Ohio to pre terstate commerce even for a limited time vent it, refuse to stop within that state only, whatever might be its object and howtrains that started from points beyond its ever essential such legislation might be for limits, or even trains starting in Ohio des- the comfort, peace, or safety of the people tined to places in other states.

of the state, was a regulation of interstate In the argument at the bar, as well as in commerce forbidden by the Constitution of the printed brief of counsel, reference was the United States. made to the numerous cases in this court ad- After observing that the argument in bejudging that what are called the police pow- half of the defendant rested upon the erroers of the states were not surrendered to the neous assumption that the statute of Georgeneral government when the Constitution gia was such a regulation of interstate comwas ordained, but remained with the several merce as was * forbidden by the Constitution[291) states of the t'nion. And it was asserted without reference to affirmative action by with much confidence that while regulations Congress, and not merely a statute enacted adopted by competent local authority in or by the state under its police power, and der to protect or promote the public health, which, although in some degree affecting the public morals, or the public safety have interstate commerce, did not go beyond the been sustained where such regulations only necessities of the case, and therefore was incidentally affected commerce among the valid, at least until Congress intervened, states, the principles announced in former this court, upon review of the adjudged cases, adjudications condemn as repugnant to the said: "These authorities make it clear Constitution of the United States all local that the legislative enactments of the states, regulations that affect interstate commerce passed under their admitted police powers, in any degree, if established merely to sub- and having a real relation to the domesserve the public convenience.

tic peace, order, health, and safety of One of the cases cited in support of this their people, but which by their necessary position is Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. operation, affect to some extent for 299, 303, 308, 317, [41: 166, 169, 171, 174], a limited time the conduct of commerce which involved the validity of a statute of among the states, are yet not invalid by

Georgia providing that "if any freight train force alone of the grant of power to con[290]shall be run on any railroad in this state on gress to regulate such commerce; and, if not

the Sabbath Day (known as Sunday) the obnoxious to some other constitutional pro superintendent of such railroad company, or vision or destructive of some right secured the officer having charge of the business of by the fundamental law, are to be respected that department of the railroad, shall be in the courts of the Union until they are liable for indictment for a misdemeanor in superseded and displaced by some act of Coneach county through which such trains shall gress passed in execution of the power grantpass, and on conviction shall be punished.ed to it by the Constitution. Local laws of

Provided, always, That whenever the character mentioned have their source any train on any railroad in this state, hav- in the powers which the states reserved and ing in such train one or more cars loaded never surrendered to Congress, of providing with live stock, which train shall be delayed for the public health, the public morals, and beyond schedule time, shall not be required the public safety, and are not, within the to lay over on the line of road or route meaning of the Constitution, and considered during Sunday, but may run on to the point in their own nature, regulations of interwhere, by due course of shipment or consign- state commerce simply because, for a limited ment, the next stock pen on the route may time or to a limited extent, they cover the be, where said animals may be fed and field occupied by those engaged in such comwatered, according to the facilities usually merce. The statute of Georgia is not diafforded for such transportation. And it rected against interstate commerce.

It esshall be lawful for the freight trains on the tablishes a rule of civil conduct applicable different railroads in this state, running alike to all freight trains, domestic as well over said roads on Saturday night, to run as interstate. It applies to the transportathrough to destination: Provided, The time tion of interstate freight the same rule pre of arrival, according to the schedule by which cisely that it applies to the transportation the train or trains started on the trip, shall of domestic freight.” Again: "We are of not be later than eight o'clock on Sunday opinion that such a law, although in a limmorning.” This court said: “The well-set-ited degree affecting interstate commerce, is tled rule is that if a statute purporting to not for that reason a needless intrusion uphave been enacted to protect the public on the domain of Federal jurisdiction, nor health, the public morals, or the public safe. strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, ty, has no real or substantial relation to but, considered in its own nature, is an or. those objects, or is a palpable invasion of dinary police regulation designed to secure rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the well-being and to promote the general the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby welfare of the people within the *state by(292) give effect to the Constitution.”

which it was established, and therefore not The contention in that case was that the invalid by force alone of the Constitution of running of railroad cars laden with inter- the United States." state freight was committed exclusively to It is insisted by counsel that these and the control and supervision of the national observations to the same effect in different government, and that, although Congress cases show that the police powers of the had not taken any affirmative action upon states, when exerted with reference to mat


liability is incurred by any carrier, that car. | the reverse side of the contract. Those conrier alone shall be held liable therefor in ditions do not affect the questions here prewhose actual custody the cotton shall be at sented, but it was proved that the railway the time of such damage, detrinient, or loss. and the steamship companies agreed that the

“2. That the rate of freight for transpor- place of delivery of the cotton under the contation of said cotton, specified in the margin tract between them should be the wharf at hereof, is quoted and guaranteed with the Westwego. distinct understanding and only on condition The mode in which the railway company that the weight of said cotton is truly and and the steamship company transacted busicorrectly represented and stated; that said ness was as follows: Upon the shipment of rate only includes the charge for transporta cotton, bills of lading would be issued in tion, and the specification of said rate shall Texas to the shipper. Thereupon the cotton

not be taken as any guide for construction or would be loaded in the cars of the railway 351]evidence to extend this *contract in other company and a way bill indicating the num.

respects, or to bind the Texas & Pacific Rail- ber and initial of the car, the number of the way Company to transport or to become in bill of lading, the date of shipment, the numanywise responsible for said cotton after de ber of bales of cotton, the consignor, the conlivery thereof to its next connecting carrier, signee, the date of the bill of lading, the numbut shall only bind said company to protect ber of bales forwarded on that particular said rate.

way bill, the marks of the cotton, the weight, "5. It is further agreed that in case said rate, freights, amount prepaid, etc., would cotton is found at point of delivery to have be given to the conductor of the train bring. been injured by any of the excepted clueuses ing the car to Westwego. Upon the receipt specified in this bill of lading, the burden of of the way bill and car at Westwego, a proof shall be upon the owner of said cotton "skeleton” would be made out by the clerks or claimant to establish that such injury re- at that place for the purpose of unloading sulted from the fault of the carrier.

the car properly. It contained the essential "6. That the said cotton shall be trans- items of information covered by the way bill, ported from the port of New Orleans to the and had also the date of the making of the port of Liverpool, England, by the Elder, skeleton. When this skeleton had thus been Dempster, & Co. steamship line, with liberty made out and the car had been pushed in on to ship by any other steamship or steamship the side track in the rear of the wharf, it line; and upon delivery of said cotton to said would be taken by a clerk known as a "check ocean carrier at the aforesaid port this con- clerk," and with a gang of laborers, who acttract is accomplished, and thereupon and ually handled the cotton and were employed thereafter the said cotton shall be subject by the railway company, the car would be to all the terms and conditions expressed in opened; and as the cotton was taken from the bills of lading and master's receipt in the car bale by bale the marks would be exuse by the steamship or steamship company amined to see that they corresponded with or connecting lines by which said cotton may the items on the skeleton, and the same were be transported; and upon delivery of said then checked. The cotton thus taken from cotton, at usual place of delivery of the the car was deposited at a place on the wharf steamship or steamship lines carrying the designated by the check clerk, and it would same, at the port of destination, the respon- remain there until the steamship company sibility of the carriers shall cease.”

came and took it away. After the checking The facts out of which the case arises are of the cotton in this * way to ascertain that[353) these: The railway company had warehouses the amounts, marks, and general information and yards in New Orleans where its road ter- of the way bill were correct, the skeleton minated. Westwego is branch station or would be transmitted to the general office terminal opposite that city. The company of the Texas & Pacific Railway Company in had a wharf with tracks and an office and New Orleans, which thereupon would make sheds on it—the wharf having been con- out what was designated as a “transfer structed over the Mississippi river so that cars sheet" that contained substantially the in. could be run upon the railroad tracks in its formation contained in the way bill, and rear and unloaded, and so that vessels could which being at once transmitted to the come to its front to receive freight placed on steamship company or its agents was a noit. The cotton in question was unloaded at titication understood by the steamship comthe wharf at various dates from October 22d pany's agents that cotton for their line was to November 4th, 1894, and was burned while on the wharf at Westwego ready for them on the wharf in the evening of November to come and take away. Upon the receipt 12th, 1894.

of these transfer sheets the steamship comOn each of the bills of lading are the fol. pany would collate the transfers relating to lowing words: “T. & P. contract No. 44.” such cotton as was destined by them for å It does not appear that the shippers were in particular vessel, advise the railway com

formed what were the terms of that contract. pany with the return of the transfers that (352]* It was in proof, however, that it was in sub- this cotton would be taken by the vessel

stance a contract with the Elder, Dempster, named, and would thereupon send the vessel & Co. steamship_line to connect with the with their stevedores to the wharf at WestTexas & Pacific Railway Company and re-wego. The clerk at Westwego would go ceive from the latter 20,000 bales of cotton around the wharf and by the aid of the transduring the months of October, November, and fers returned from the steamship agents December, 1894, on the conditions specified on point out to the master or mate of the ves.



land. But until Congress acts on the sub-1 We think the statute in question is one of
ject the power of the state over bridges that class, and in the absence of any legisla-
across its navigable streams is plenary.” It tion by Congress the statute is a valid exer.
was consequently adjudged that the city oro cise of the power of the state over the sub-
dinance was not to be deemed such a regu- ject."
lation of interstate commerce as, in the ab- So, in Richmond & A. Railroad Co. v. R.

of national legislation, should be 4. Patterson Tobacco Co. 169 U. S. 311, 315 deemed invalid.

[42: 759, 761], it was adjudged that a stat(R95) *In Cardwell v. American Bridge Company, ute of Virginia defining the obligations of

113 U. S. 205, 208 [28: 959, 900], it was held carriers who accepted for transportation that a statute of California `authorizing a anything, directed to points of destination bridge without a draw or opening for the beyond the termini of their own lines or passage of vessels to be constructed over a routes was not, in its application to inter. navigable water of the United States within state business, a regulation of interstate that state was not, in the absence of legisla- commerce within the meaning of the Constition by Congress, to be deemed repugnant to tution. This court said: "Of course, in a the commerce clause of the Constitution. | latitudinarian sense any restriction as to The court referring to prior cases, said: "In the evidence of a contract relating to inter. these cases the control of Congress over nav. state commerce may be said to be a limitaigable waters within the states so as to pre- tion on the contract itself. But this remote serve their free navigation under the com- effect, resulting from the lawful exercise by mercial clause of the Constitution, the power a state of its power to determine the form of the states within which they lie to au- in which contracts may be proved, does not thorize the construction of bridges over amount to a regulation of interstate comthem until Congress intervenes and super- merce.”. And the court cited in support of sedes their authority, and the right of pri- its conclusion the case of Chicago, M. & St. vate parties to interfere with their construc- P. Railway Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137 tion or continuance, have been fully consid. [42: 688, 692], which involved the validity ered, and we are entirely satisfied with the of state regulations as to the liability of soundness of the conclusions reached. They carriers of passengers, and in which it was recognize the full power of the states to regu- said: “They are not in themselves regulalaie within their limits matters of inter- tions of interstate commerce, although they nal police, which embraces, among other control in some degree the conduct and liathings, the construction, repair, and main-bility of those engaged in such commerce. tenance of roads and bridges and the estab. So long as Congress has not legislated upon lishment of ferries; that the states are more the particular subject they are rather to be likely to appreciate the importance of these regarded as legislation in aid of such commeans of internal communication and to merce, and as a rightful exercise of the poprovide for their proper management than a lice power of the state to regulate the relagovernment at a distance; and that, as to tive rights and duties of all


and corbridges over navigable streams, their power porations within its limits." is subordinate to that of Congress, as an act Now, it is evident that these cases had no of the latter body is, by the Constitution, reference to the health, morals, or safety of made the supreme law of the land; but that the people

of the state, but only to the pub-(207) until Congress acts on the subject their lic convenience. They recognized the fundapower is plenary. When Congress acts di- mental principle that, outside of the field di. rectly with reference to the bridges author- rectly occupied by the general government ized by the state, its will must control so under the powers granted to it by the Confar as may be necessary to secure the free stitution, all questions arising within a navigation of the streams." The doctrines state that relate to its internal order, or that of this case were reaffirmed in Huse v. Glo- involve the public convenience or the general rer, 119 U. S. 543 (30: 487).

good, are primarily for the determination In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, of the state, and that its legislative enact162 V. S. 650, 662 [40: 1105, 1109], the ments, relating to those subjects, and which question was presented whether a state en- are not inconsistent with the state Constituactment requiring telegraph companies with tion, are to be respected and enforced in the lines of wires wholly or partly within the courts of the Union if they do not by their state to receive telegrams, and on payment operation directly entrench upon the auof the charges thereon to deliver them with thority of the United States or violate somo due diligence, was not a regulation of inter- right protected by the national Constitution. state commerce when applied to interstate The power here referred to is, to use the

telegrams. We held that such enactments words of Chief Justice Shaw, the power “to [296]did not in any * just sense regulate interstate make, ordain, and establish all manner of

commerce. It was said in that case: "While wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, it is vitally important that commerce be- and ordinances, either with penalties or tween the states should be unembarrassed without, not repugnant to the Constitution, by vexatious state regulations regarding it, as they shall judge to be for the good and get on the other hand there are many occa- welfare of the Commonwealth and of the sions where the police power of the state can subjects of the same.” Com. v. Alger, 7 be properly exercised to insure a faithful Cush. 53, 85. Mr. Cooley well said: "It and prompt performance of duty within the cannot be doubted that there is ample power limits of the state upon the part of those in the legislative department of the state to who are engaged in interstate commerce.' adopt all necessary legislation for the pur.

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into that section was handled exclusively by party and received by the other for transporthe employees of the Michigan Central Com: tation, the deposit being accessory merely to pany, and the Grand Trunk Company paid such transportation. 3. No further orders that company a fixed compensation per hun- or directions from the Grand Trunk Com. dred weight for such work as well as for the pany were expected by the receiving party. use of its section.

Except for the occurrence of the fire, the Goods coming into that section from the goods would have been loaded into the cars Grand Trunk Railroad to be carried over the of the Michigan Central Company, and for road of the Michigan Central Company, warded, without further action of the Grand after being unloaded were deposited by the Trunk Company. 4. Under the arrangeemployees of the latter company in a certain ment between the parties, the presence of the place in the Grand Trunk section, from goods in the precise locality agreed upon, and which they were loaded into the cars of the the marks upon them, 'P. & F., St. Louis,' Michigan Central Company by its own em- were sufficient notice that they were there for ployees, whenever that company was ready transportation over the Michigan road toto receive them; and after being so placed wards the city of St. Louis; and such was the employees of the Grand Trunk Company the understanding of both parties.". Referdid not further handle such goods.

ring, to the section of the freight building Whenever the agent of the Michigan Cen- specially used by the Grand Trunk Company, tral Company saw any goods deposited in the the court said: “It was a portion *of the[358) section of the freight building used by the freight house of the Michigan Company, in Grand Trunk Company and which were to which a precise spot was selected or set be carried over the line of the former com- apart, where the defendant might deposit pany, he would call on the agent of the latter goods brought on its road and intended for company in the building, and from the way transportation over the Michigan road, and bill exhibited by the agent of the Grand whichi, by usage and practice and the expecTrunk Company take a list of such goods, tation of the parties, were then under the and would then for the first time learn their control of the Michigan Company, and to be place of destination, together with the loaded on to its cars at its convenience, withamount of freight charges due thereon. out further orders from the defendant.” From the information thus obtained a way We do not think that the judgment in bill would be made out by the Michigan Cen- Pratt v. Railway Company controls the detral Company for the transportation of the termination of the present case. goods over its line of railway, and not be important particulars the two cases are ma

terially different. In the Pratt Case the The goods referred to in the Pratt Case couri proceeded upon the ground that the were taken from the Grand Trunk cars on goods were deposited in a section of a freight the 17th day of October, 1865, and deposited building set apart by the conneccing carrier, in the apartment of the freight building used the owner of the building, for goods coming by the Grand Trunk Company in the place over the line of the first carrier to be transassigned for goods so destined.

ported in the cars of the connecting carrier 7 At the time the goods were forwarded from to the place to which they were consigned, Montreal the way bill in accordance with the goods having been unloaded cy the emusage in such cases was made out in dupli- ployees of the connecting carrier and by cate, on which were entered a list of the them deposited in that section, to be put by goods, the names of the consignees, the such employees into the cars of that carrier places to which they were consigned, and the at its convenience. It was a case in which the charges against them from Liverpool to De goods passed under the complete control and troit. The conductor having charge of the supervision and into the actual custody of train containing the goods would take one of the connecting carrier from the moment they these way bills, and on arriving at Detroit were deposited in the section set apart for would deliver it to the checking clerk of the them. Grand Trunk Company, “from which said In the case at bar, the facts plainly indiclerk checked said goods from the cars into cate that although the goods had been placed said section.” The other copy would be for- by the first carrier upon the wharf, and alwarded to the agent of the Grand Trunk though that was the place at which the Company at Detroit. “It was the practice steamship company was to receive or usually of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, received goods from the railway company before forwarding such goods, to take from for further transportation, they were not in

bill in the custody of said checking the actual possession or under the actual clerk, in the manner aforesaid, the place of control of the connecting carrier at the time destination and a list of said goods, and the of the fire. The connecting carrier had not amount of accumulated charges, and to col. given a mate's receipt for the cotton or aslect the same, together with its own charges, sumed control of it. True, it had received of the connecting carrier.”

notice that the goods were on the wharf and This court, in view of these facts, said: could be taken into possession, but such no“We are all of the opinion that these acts tice did not put the cotton into the actual constituted a complete delivery of the goods custody of the connecting carrier. The opto the Michigan Central Company, by which portunity given it to take possession or its the liability of the Grand Trunk Company mere readiness to take possession was not was terminated. 1. They were placed with under the contract equivalent to placing the in the control of the agents of the Michigan cotton in the actual '* custody of the steam-[359] Company. 2. They were deposited by one'ship line. The undertaking of the railway

said way

late the relative rights and duties of all per cities on the route, if in the contingency sons and corporations within its limits. named in the statute the required number of Urtil displaced by such national legislation trains stop at each place containing three as Congress may rightfully establish under thousand inhabitants long enough to receive its power to regulate commerce with foreign and let off passengers. It seems from the nations and among the several states, the evidence that the average time required to validity of the statute, so far as the com- stop a train, and receive and let off passenmerce clause of the Constitution of the gers is only three minutes. Certainly, the United States is concerned, cannot be ques- state of Ohio did not endow the plaintiff in tioned.”

error with the rights of a corporation for Consistently with these doctrines it can- the purpose simply of subserving the convennot be adjudged that the Ohio statute is un ience of passengers traveling through the constitutional. The power of the state by state between points outside of its territory. appropriate legislation to provide for the “The question is no longer an open one,” this public convenience stands upon the same court said in Cherokee Nation v Southern ground precisely as its power by appropriate Kansas Railway Co. 135 U. 8. 641, 657 [34: legislation to protect the public health, the 295, 302], “as to whether a railroad is a pub public morals, or the public safety. Wheth- lic highway, established primarily for the er legislation of either kind is inconsistent convenience of the people, and to subservo with any power granted to the general gov- public ends, and therefore subject to governernment is to be determined by the same mental control and regulation. It is because rules.

it is a public highway and subject to such In what has been said we have assumed control that the corporation by which it is that the statute is not in itself unreasona- constructed and by which it is to be maintained ble; that is, it has appropriate relation to may be permitted, under legislative sanction, the public convenience, does not go beyond the to appropriate property for the purpose of a[302) necessities of the case, and is not directed right of way, upon making just compensaagainst interstate commerce. In Hannibal tion to the owner, in the mode prescribed by & St. J. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, law.” In the construction and maintenance 473 (24: 527, 531), reference was made to of such a highway under public sanction the some decisions of state courts in relation to corporation really performs a function of statutes prohibiting the introduction into a the state. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 544 state of cattle having infectious diseases, and [42: 819, 848). The iff in error ac in which it was contended that it was for the cepted its charter subject necessarily to the legislature, and not for the courts, to deter-condition that it would conform to such mine whether such legislation went beyond reasonable regulations as the state might the danger to be apprehended, and was there from time to time establish, that were not fore something more than the exertion of the in violation of the supreme law of the land. police power. This court said that it could In the absence of legislation by Congress, it not concur in that view; that as the police would be going very far to hold that such an power of a state cannot obstruct either for-enactment as the one before us was in iteign or interstate commerce “beyond the ne self a regulation of interstate commerce. It cessity for its exercise,” it was the duty of was for the state to take into consideration

the courts to guard vigilantly against "need all the circumstances affecting passenger (801 ]less intrusion" upon the field *committed by travel within its limits, and, as far as prac

the Constitution to Congress. As the cases ticable, make such regulations as were just to above cited show, and as appears from other all who might pass over the road in question. cases, the reasonableness or unreasonable It was entitled, of course, to provide for the ness of a state enactment is always an ele convenience of persons desiring to travel ment in the general inquiry by the court from one point to another in the state on dowhether such legislation encroaches upon na- mestic trains. But it was not bound to ig. tional authority, or is to be deemed a legiti. nore the convenience of those who desired to mate exertion of the power of the state to travel from places in the state to places beprotect the public interests or promote the yond its limits, or the convenience of those public convenience.

outside of the state who wished to come in. In our judgment the assumption that the to it. Its statute is in aid of interstate statute of Ohio was not directed against in- commerce of that character. It was not terstate commerce, but is a reasonable pro- compelled to look only to the convenience of vision for the public convenience, is not un. those who desired to pass through the state warranted. The requirement that a rail. without stopping. Any other view of the road company whose road is operated with relations between the state and the corporain the state shall cause three, each way, of tion created by it would mean that the di. its regular trains carrying passengers, if so rectors of the corporation could manage its many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to affairs solely with reference to the interests stop at any station, city, or village of three of stockholders, and without taking into conthousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient sideration the interests of the general pubto receive and let off passengers, so far from lic. It would mean, not only that such di. being unreasonable, will greatly subserve the rectors were the exclusive judges of the man. public convenience. The statute does not ner in which the corporation should disstand in the way of the railroad company charge the duties imposed upon it in the in. running as many trains as it may choose be- terest of the public, but that the corporation tween Chicago and Buffalo without stopping could so regulate the running of its interat intermediate points, or only at very large state trains as to build up cities and towns

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