"Sec. 4641. On hearing such petition, the probate court shall examine every executor and administrator upon oath as to the truth and correctness of his account before the same is allowed; but such examination may be omitted when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and there is no reason to doubt the justness and correctness thereof; and the heirs, legatees, and devisees may be examined on oath upon any matter relating to the account of any executor or administrator whenever the correctness thereof is called in question. If from such examination the account is found just and correct the probate court shall allow and settle the same, and upon satisfactory evidence shall determine the rights of the persons to the residue of said estate, and, unless partition is asked for and directed as hereinafter provided, make a decree accordingly, and assigning said residue to the persons thereto entitled by law.

contingent, must be presented to the pro-
bate court within the time limited in said
order, and any claim not so presented is
barred forever; such claim or demand may
be pleaded as an offset or counterclaim to an
action brought by the executor or admin-[218]
istrator. All claims shall be itemized, and
verified by the claimant, his agent or attor
ney, stating the amount due, that the same
is just and true, that no payments have
been made thereon which are not credited,
and that there are no offsets to the same to
the knowledge of affiant. If the claim be
not due, or be contingent, when presented,
the particulars of such claim must be stat-
ed. The probate court may require satis-
factory vouchers or proofs to be produced in
support of any claim."

"Sec. 4514. No action at law for the re-
covery of money only shall be brought in
any of the courts of this state against any
executor, administrator, or guardian upon
any claim or demand which may be present-
ed to the probate court, except as provided
in this Code. No claim against a decedent
shall be a charge against or lien upon his
estate unless presented to the probate court
as herein provided within five years after
the death of such decedent: Provided, That
this provision shall not be construed as af-
fecting any lien existing at the date of such
death: Provided, further, That said provi-
sion shall not be construed as affecting the
right of a creditor to recover from the next
of kin, legatee, or devisee to the extent of
assets received. This provision shall be ap-
plicable to the estate of persons who died
prior as well as to those who may die after
adoption of this Code."

"Sec. 4642. In such decree the court shall name the persons and the proportion of [217] parts to which each is entitled, and if *real estate, give a description as near as may be of the land to which each is entitled; and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same; and a certified copy of any decree of distribution of real estate may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds in every county in this state in which are situated any of the lands described in such decree; and such register of deeds shall enter in his reception book the name of the deceased as grantor, and the names of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, as grantees, and shall make in such reception book so many "Sec. 4517. Upon the allowance or disalseparate grantor and grantee entries for lowance of any claim the court shall make such decree as there are persons taking real its order allowing or disallowing the same. estate in such county under said decree." The order shall contain the date of allow"Sec. 4509. At the time of granting let-ance and the amount allowed, the amount ters testamentary or of administration, the court shall make an order limiting the time in which creditors may present claims against the deceased for examination and allowance, which shall not be less than six months nor more than one year from the date of such order; said order shall fix the time or tinies and place in which the court will examine and adjust claims and demands of all persons against deceased. No claim or demand shall be received after expiration of the time so limited, unless for good cause shown, the court may, in its discretion, receive, hear, and allow such claim upon notice to the executor or administrator, but no claim shall be received or al lowed unless presented within one year and six months from the time when notice of the order is given, as provided in the next section, and before final settlement, and the allowance or disallowance of any claim shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for or against the estate.

"Sec. 4510. The order prescribed in section one hundred and two shall be published according to law, and shall be notice to all creditors and persons interested.

"Sec. 4511. All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same be due, not due, or

disallowed, and be attached to the claim
with the offsets, if any."

lowance or disallowance of any claim in
"Sec. 4522. In case of appeal from the al-
whole or in part, the district court shall cer-
tify to the probate court the decision or
judgment rendered therein."

the district court.
Section 4665 provides for an appeal to

Section 4668 provides for serving notice
of appeal.

court shall try the case as if originally com-
Section 4672 provides that the district
menced in that court.

be made up as in civil actions, and the is-
Section 4673 provides that pleadings shall
sues of fact tried as in other actions.

*Section 4676. In case of a reversal or [219]
modification of the order appealed from the
district court makes such order as the pro-
bate court should have made, and certifies
its judgment to the probate court.

"Sec. 4730. The probate court may, at
any time, correct, modify, or amend its rec-
ords to conform with the facts in the same
manner as a district court."

State ex rel. Lindekugel v. Sibley County
Probate Ct. 33 Minn. 94, 22 N. W. 10, was

"1. The Probate Code of this state makes no provision for the formal discharge of an administrator, but the necessary legal effect of an order of the probate court allowing the final account of the administrator and its final decree of distribution, assigning the whole of the estate to the heirs Iand distributees, is to remove the estate of "The omission of the land from the inven- the deceased from the jurisdiction of the tory, and the subsequent discovery of the court, and to render the office of administrareal estate of the deceased which was not re- tor, which depends upon such jurisdiction, duced to assets by the administrator or dis-functus officio. 2. After the estate has been tributed to the heirs, do not operate to revive the administration and open the judgment or warrant further proceedings. The land descended to the heirs, subject to the claims of administration upon it. The effect of a decree assigning the real estate to the heirs is simply to discharge it from the administration, and, of course, the final discharge of the administration must discharge the lien of the creditors."

rected the judgments to be certified to the probate court as claims duly established against the estate of the intestate, and it was done, but the administrator refused to take any steps for the payment of either of the judgments. Thereupon the relator herein presented to the probate court a petition asking it to issue à citation to the trust company, as such administrator, requiring it to file an account of any property in its possession belonging to such estate, and to report what disposition had been made of the property inventoried as belonging thereto, and to pay so much of the judgments as could be paid from such property. The court refused to entertain the petition, or to make any order in the premises, for the sole reason that it had no jurisdiction to take other or further steps in the administration of the es

the respondents was an admission of such facts, and upon them the district court awarded judgment, denying a peremptory writ of mandamus, and discharging the alternative writ. The relator appealed from the judgment to this court.

same day, by its order, which was duly pub lished, limited the time for presenting claims against the estate to six months from (222) the date of the order. All claims against the estate presented to the court within the time limited and allowed by the court wer paid by the administrator in the due course of administration. Thereafter, and on March 31, 1896, the administrator filed with the court its petition, representing that it had fully administered the estate, paid all the debts against the estate allowed by the court, and the expenses of administration, and asking for the allowance of its final ac count, and the distribution of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto. Such proceedings were thereafter duly had upon the petition, that the court, on April 27, 1896, allowed the final account of the administrator, and made and entered its detate. The relator then sued out of the discree of distribution of the residue of the es trict court of Ramsey county an alternative tate, describing it, and thereby assigned the writ of mandamus based upon the facts here property therein described and all other es stated, which was directed to the probate tate of the intestate in the state of Minne-court and the judge thereof. The answer of sota to his heirs and distributees, naming them, and determining the share of each. "Afterwards, and on November 21, 1896, the Security Trust Company filed with the probate court its petition, representing that in drafting such final decree certain clerical errors were made, stating them, whereby "The question presented by these facts for certain parcels of real estate were errone- our consideration relates solely to the legal ously described therein, and other parcels effect of the final decree of distribution, asomitted therefrom, and praying that the de- signing the residue of the estate of the decree be amended so as to correct the errors. cedent to the heirs and distributees made by The court made its order so correcting the the probate court after the settlement and decree. Neither the order allowing the ad- allowance of the final account of the adminministrator's account, nor the final decree of istrator. Stated concretely, the question is: distribution, has ever been opened or set Did the jurisdiction of the *probate court [224] aside. On or before December 15, next fol- over the estate in question cease, and the oflowing, all the heirs and distributees named fice of administrator become functus officio, in the decree transferred and conveyed to the by force of the order of the court allowing Matteson estate, incorporated, all the prop the administrator's final account, and its erty so assigned to them by the final decree. final decree of distribution assigning the But the Security Trust Company still has in residue of the estate? We answer the quesits possession and now holds certain stocks tion in the affirmative. The jurisdiction of as collateral security under a pledge made to the probate court in Minnesota is not conit by the intestate for the payment of a debt ferred by the common law, nor by any statowed by him to it at the time of his death. ute of the state, but by our Constitution, and The value of the stocks exceeds the amount is limited to 'jurisdiction over the estates of of the debt which they secured. No order deceased persons and persons under guardhas ever been made by the probate court in ianship.' Const. art. 6, § 7. It follows that, terms discharging the administrator. The in cases where a court of probate acquires Black River National Bank, a nonresident jurisdiction over the estate of a particular. creditor of the intestate, on January 4, 1897. decedent, such jurisdiction is ended, and the made application to the probate court for office of administrator, which depends upon leave to file its claim against his estate, and such jurisdiction, becomes functus officio, [223] have it allowed and paid out of the assets whenever such estate passes by operation of of the estate. This was denied by the court law from its final control. No argument for the reason that the administration of can make this obvious proposition clearer, the estate had been closed, and the court had for it is self-evident that, if the jurisdiction no further jurisdiction in the premises. Af is limited to the estate of such deceased perterwards the bank and another nonresident son, and the sole basis of such jurisdictioncreditor each brought an action on their re-the estate-passes from its control, and the spective claims, which had never been pre sented to the probate court, against the trust company, as administrator, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Minnesota. Such proceedings were had therein that judgment, on April 17. 1899, was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in each case for the full amount claimed against the administrator. That court di

right to the possession and control thereof vests by operation of law in the heirs and distributees, it has no longer any jurisdiction in the premises. It is true that our Probate Code contains no provision for the formal discharge of an administrator, but the necessary theory and effect of its provi sions as to the settlement of his account and the final decree of distribution, as interpret

ed by the repeated decisions of this court,
are to devest the probate court of further
jurisdiction when such final decrce is made,
and to render the office of administrator
functus officio, unless such decree is set aside
on motion, or reversed on appeal. A clear "Lastly, it is urged by the relator that the
illustration of this proposition is found in administrator still has certain stocks in his
the decision of this court in the case of Hur-possession belonging to the estate, and that
ley v. Hamilton, 37 Minn. 160, 33 N. W. 912, it may also have after-discovered personal
holding that the probate court had no juris- property of the intestate which it has not
diction to entertain proceedings for the par- disclosed to anyone. There is no basis for
tition of the real estate of a decedent among this assumption in the admitted facts, ex-
the heirs and devisees after the administra- cept that the trust company holds certain
tion was closed, and the land assigned to stocks as collateral to secure its individual
them in common by a final decree of dis- debt against the intestate. But, were it
tribution, for the reason that, when such de- otherwise, the fact still remains that all
cree was entered, the property passed out of such stocks and after-discovered property, if
the control of the court, and it had no fur- any, passed by the decree to the heirs and
ther jurisdiction."
distributees, for it assigns to them, not only
the property therein specifically described,
but also all other estate of the deceased in
the state of Minnesota. It follows that the
probate court rightly declined to issue the
citation."

tue of the power of the court to amend its
records to conform with the facts; that is,
to make the records *speak truly as to the [226
past official acts of the court. Gen. Stat.
1894, § 4730.

The court then proceeded to cite and ap[225] prove previous decisions, and particularly the language of Mitchell, J., in the case of Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255, hereinbefore quoted. Other observations were made by the court pertinent to the case before us, as follows:

Some criticism is made, in the brief of the defendant in error, of the decision of the supreme court of Minnesota in this case; that the issue was feigned and an imposition upon the supreme court, and that the purpose of the decision was to forestall the decision of this court.

the consideration of this case." But that decision is cited and relied on by the plaintiff in error, not as an adjudication of the facts in controversy here, but as an inter

"It is, however, urged by counsel for the relator that the removal of the property (that is, the estate) from the jurisdiction of the probate court in nowise affects the continuance in office of the administrator of an estate. To hold otherwise, it is claimed, If, indeed, the judgment of the supreme would be a devesting of the probate court court in that case were relied on as adjudg of all authority to execute its decree of dis- ing a case which had already passed into tribution, leaving the administrator in pos- judgment in the circuit court of the United session of the estate, and the heirs and dis- States, we might readily agree, as urged by tributees remediless. It necessarily follows the defendant in error, that the decision of from the concession of counsel, although not the supreme court of Minnesota "should reintended by him, that the office of adminis-ceive little, if any, weight, by this court in trator becomes functus officio when the estate is removed, as the result of the decree of distribution, from the jurisdiction of the court, for the office of administrator springs out of and depends for its continued exist-pretation of the statutes of the state. Cases ence upon the jurisdiction of the court over may be found of decisions made by a the estate. As well might it be claimed that state supreme court, even in exposition of the branch of a tree can live and put forth state statutes, after the institution of litigaits leaves and blossoms after its roots are tion in a Federal court, wherein this court dead, as to claim that the office of adminis- has refused to follow such a decision, if in trator can survive the jurisdiction of the it the state court has departed from its precourt over the estate of which administra-vious decisions, which were in force and retion was granted. It is not necessary for lied upon by the Federal suitor. Burgess the probate court, if it could do so, to re- v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 33, 27 L. ed. 365, 2 tain jurisdiction to enforce its final decree Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Carroll County v. Smith, of distribution; the remedy of the distribu-111 U. S. 556, 28 L.. ed. 517, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. tees in case their respective shares of the 539. residue of the estate are withheld from them by the administrator is an action in the district court against him or against him and his bondsmen. Schmidt v. Stark, 61 Minn. 91, 63 N. W. 255.

Here, however, the supreme court of Minnesota, in its last opinion, did not depart from or modify its previous decisions *on the subject. On the contrary, it based [22′ its reasoning and conclusions upon its frequent previous decisions.

"It is further urged on behalf of the relator that neither the probate court nor the Nor are we permitted on the record in administrator considered that the allowance that case to impute to the parties therein an of the final account and the entry of the deattempt to mislead the court or to impropcree of distribution ended the jurisdiction of the court, for it afterwards, on the petition of the administrator, amended such decree. It is immaterial what they considered, for the view of either as to the effect of the decree could not change its legal result. The decree was corrected, not in the exercise of any jurisdiction over the estate, but by vir

erly invoke its jurisdiction. The case seems to have gone before the probate court, the district court, and the supreme court, in the usual course of procedure, and the decision finally rendered by the supreme court must be received by us as a valid exposition of the law.

The conclusion to which we are brought,

We are now to consider whether such a suit can be successfully maintained in a Federal court by a nonresident owner of a claim against the estate of a decedent.

by an examination of the statutes of the by giving to creditors out of the state state of Minnesota and of the decisions of greater privileges in the distribution of esthe courts of that state in construing and tates than creditors in the state enjoy. It applying them, is, that had a suit against is easy to see, if the nonresident creditor, by an administrator of an estate been brought suing in the Federal courts of Arkansas, acin the courts of that state, after the expira-quires a right to subject the assets of the tion of the period limited by the order of the estate to seizure and sale for the satisfaeprobate court, in which creditors may pre- tion of his debt, which he could not do by sent claims against the deceased for exam-suing in the state court, that the whole esination and allowance, and after an allow- tate, in case there were foreign creditors, ance of the administrator's final account, might be swept away. Such a result would and a final decree of distribution, such suit place the judgments of the Federal court on could not have been maintained. a higher grade than the judgments of the state court, necessarily produce conflict, and render the state powerless in a matter over which she has confessedly full control. Besides this, it would give to the contract of Some general principles have become so a foreign creditor made in Arkansas a wider well settled as to require only to be stated. scope than a similar contract made in the One of these is that a foreign creditor may same state by the same debtor with a home establish his debt in the courts of the United creditor. The home creditor would have to States against the personal representative await the due course of administration for of a decedent, notwithstanding the fact that the payment of his debt, while the foreign the laws of the state relative to the admin- creditor could, as soon as he got his judg istration and settlement of decedents' es- ment, seize and sell the estate of his *debtor [229] tates do in terms limit the right to estab- to satisfy it, and this, too, when the laws of lish such demands to a proceeding in the the state in force when both contracts were probate courts of the state. Union Bank v. made provided another mode for the comVaiden, 18 How. 503, 15 L. ed. 472; Law-pulsory payment of the debt. Such a difrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215, 36 L. ed. 130, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440; Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608, 37 L. ed. 867, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.

906.

ference is manifestly unjust and cannot be supported. . . The administration laws of Arkansas are not merely rules of practice for the courts, but laws limiting the rights Another principle, equally well settled, is of parties, and will be observed by the Fedthat the courts of the United States, in en-eral courts in the enforcement of individual forcing claims against executors and admin-rights. It is possible, though not

istrators of a decedent's estate, are admin- probable, that state legislation on the subistering the laws of the state of the domicil,ject of the estates of decedents might be purand are bound by the same rules that govern posely framed so as to discriminate injuthe local tribunals. Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 498, 11 L. ed. 1074. [228] *“The circuit courts of the United States, with full equity powers, have jurisdiction over executors and administrators, where the parties are citizens of different states, and will enforce the same rules in the adjustment of claims against them that the local courts administer in favor of their own citizens." Walker v. Walker, 9 Wall. 745, sub nom. Walker v. Beal, 19 L. ed. 814.

In Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536, it was decided that while a nonresident creditor may get a judgment in a Federal court against a resident administrator, and come in on the estate according to the law of the state for such payment as that law, marshaling the rights of creditors, awards to debtors of his class, yet he cannot, because he has obtained a judgment in a Federal court, issue execution and take precedence of other creditors who have no right to sue in the Federal courts, and if he do issue execution and sell lands, the sale is void.

riously against the creditor living outside of the state; but if this should unfortunately ever happen, the courts of the United States would find a way, in a proper case, to arrest the discrimination, and to enforce equality of privileges among all classes of claimants, even if the estate were seized by operation of law and intrusted to a particular jurisdiction."

In Morgan v. Hamlet, 113 U. S. 449, 28 L. ed. 1043, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583, it was held that the statute of Arkansas, that "all demands not exhibited to the executor or administrator, as required by this act, before the end of two years from the granting of letters, shall be forever barred," begins, on the granting of letters of administration, to run against persons under age out of the state.

The doctrine of the case of Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. ed. 536, was approved in Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 615, 37 L. ed. 871, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 906, wherein it was held that the administration laws of a state are not merely rules of practice for

The reasoning of this case is worthy of the courts, but laws limiting the rights of quotation:

parties, to be observed by the Federal courts
in the enforcement of individual rights.

"The several states of the Union necessarily have full control over the estates of de- In Pulliam v. Pulliam, 10 Fed. 55, 78, the ceased persons within their respective lim- distinction between ordinary statutes of its, and we see no ground on which the va- limitation and statutes of administration of lidity of the sale in question can be sus-the estates of decedents, limiting the time tained. To sustain it would be in effect to nullify the administration laws of the state

within which creditors must prove their
claims, is pointed out in respect that the lat-