the territory of the state where the person affected by it has his domicil. Statutum personale ubique locorum peronam comitatur, in ordine ad bona intra territorium statuentis sita, ubi persona affecta domicilium habet.'" We rely on the distinction suggested by Paul Voet. [WILLES, J.-A good illustration is afforded by the case of Santos v. Illidge, 8 C. B. N. S. 861 (E. C. L. R. vol. 98), where some members of the Court held that a *contract for the sale of slaves,

*70] prohibited by the 5 G. 4, c. 113, is void where entered into by British subjects, though in a country where slavery is lawful. ERLE, C. J.-A foreign Company has a locus standi here; and so, no doubt, has an English Company in a foreign country. We make no inquiry as to the constitution of a foreign Company, any more than we should into the generation of an individual suing here.] This is a contract made by the defendants in relation to the conveyance of goods by their railway in this country. It can only be regulated by the general law which for the benefit of the public defines their powers to contract. The 17th section of the 2 Vict. c. xlii., prescribes equality of charge in respect of all passengers and goods: and their rights and liabilities are in no degree altered by the circumstance of a subsequent statute (16 & 17 Vict, c. clvi.) enabling them to extend their powers of carrying across the Channel. Nothing is done by the Company on the French territory except the landing and shipping of passengers and goods there. No part of the transit takes place in that country. In several of the cases where equality of charge has been enforced) the journey has been performed partly on the Company's own line and partly on lines not under their control, and even out of England: see Crouch v. The London and North Western Railway Company, 14 C. B. 255 (E. C. L. R. vol. 78).

T. Jones, in support of the rule.-The substance of the evidence given by M. Bourdaloux, the French advocate, is, that, in France, an ordinary carrier may make what contract he pleases; there is nothing to hinder him, if he so please, from charging double for colis groupés. We may therefore assume that this was a lawful contract in the place where it was made: the only question is, whether there is anything in any of the Company's acts to render such a charge illegal. *71] [KEATING, J.-Where a contract is made in one country, to be performed in another, by which law is the contract to be governed?] "The interpretation of the contract must be governed by the law of the country where the contract was made,-lex loci contractus; the mode of suing, and the time within which the action must be brought, must be governed by the country where the action is brought,-in ordinandis judiciis, loci consuetudo ubi agitur: Per Tindal, C. J., in Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 N. C. 151, 159 (E. C. L. R. vol. 27), 4 M. & Scott, 695, 704 (E. C. L. R. vol 30). [WILLES, J.-In Allen v. Kemble, 6 Moore's P. C. 314, it was held, that, if a bill of exchange is drawn in one country and payable in another, and the bill is dishonoured, the drawee is liable according to the lex loci contractus, and not according to the law of the country where the bill was made payable. It was upon that principle that interest was given at the current rate of the country where the dishonoured bills were drawn (California), in the case of Gibbs v. Fremont, 9 Exch. 25.t] The law was so laid down by Lord Eldon in Male v. Roberts 3 Esp. N. P. C.

163, where the question arose as to a plea of infancy to an action for necessaries supplied in Scotland. Before the passing of the 16 & 17 Vict. c. clvi., the Company were limited to the carrying of passengers and goods between London and Folkestone and Dover. That Act authorizes them to establish vessels for the conveyance of passengers to Calais and Boulogne, and to take "tolls" in respect of such steamvessels (s. 15). By s. 16 a maximum toll is given for passengers, which by s. 17 is to be charged equally. But there is no equality clause for the sea-transit of goods: the difference of charge here may therefore be referred to that part of the journey. [ERLE, C. J.-That would be matter of proof.] Cur. adv. vult.

*ERLE, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court: (a) This was an action to recover back sums alleged to be overcharges for packed parcels carried from Boulogne to London.

[*72

It appeared that the defendants were a Railway Company under 6 W. 4, c. lxxv., and other statutes, and a Steam-packet Company under the 16 & 17 Vict. c. clvi., by which latter Act they were authorized to maintain a packet communication between Boulogne and Folkestone. The contract under which the money was paid was made at Boulogne with the Company, trading under the last-mentioned Act, according to the tariff published at Boulogne, and known to the plaintiff before he made any of the consignments in respect of which the alleged overcharges were made: and the question is, whether he has a right to treat that contract as a nullity, and, after receiving the consideration for which the price was paid, claim to alter the contract and fix a lower price, and recover back the excess which as he alleges he has paid.

As a general rule, the lex loci contractus governs in deciding whether there was illegality in the contract; and, according to the law of France, there was nothing illegal. The Company were carriers under no legal restriction, and having capacity to make their contracts as they might think most for their own interest.

Even if the railway legislation for England could be construed to have an extra-territorial effect, and to impose on an English railway Company in France, the capacities and incapacities with which they are affected in England, still that point does not now arise, because the statute creating the Steam-packet *Company leaves that [*73 Company free to make any contracts for goods which they may choose. It contains no regulations for charges in respect of goods, although by ss. 16 and 17 it establishes a maximum for the charges in respect of passengers. Section 15, relating to tolls, possibly may refer to the tolls of the Whitstable Company purchased by the defendants under this statute. Certainly there is nothing to connect it expressly with the transit of goods.

Part of the argument was addressed to the consideration of what was reasonable and equal. But, except in cases within the provisions of the Railway Acts, as a general rule, a contracting party who has made a contract must abide by it: and we have no jurisdiction to alter contracts by reference to equality.

In this ground of decision the Court is unanimous: but, if the parties should resort to a Court of error, I desire to add, that, in my (a) The case was argued before Erle, C. J., Willes, J., and Keating, J. C. B. N. S., VOL. XII.—5

separate opinion, the defendants are also entitled to judgment, if the railway legislation of England does apply to the contract made by this Company in France.

The statute 6 W. 4, c. lxxv., s. 133, empowered this Company to charge what to it should seem proper in respect to parcels not exceeding I cwt. Under this statute the law is clear: any charge which to the Company has seemed proper is made lawful, or, rather, is declared to be so, for it was lawful by the common law.

Under the 2 Vict. c. xlii., s. 17, the Company is commanded to charge equally to all persons in respect of all goods of a like description. This command the defendants have in my opinion obeyed: they have charged equally to all persons for all goods coming under the description of packed parcels without making any difference between them and parcels called enclosures in former decisions. The Company

has a right to divide goods into classes, by descriptions appro*74] priate to the different classes it chooses to make. And the

charges for parcels which they choose to make under the first Act are not affected by the second Act, if the jury distinguishes the different descriptions, and finds the charge for each description made equally to all customers. The cases which are supposed to decide that an extra charge for a packed parcel is unlawful, do not make this distinction. In them the Company claimed to charge extra to carriers for packed parcels, and not to charge extra to customers not carriers, for what they called enclosures, which were in reality packed parcels. The question for the jury in each of those cases was, whether one aggregate of small parcels made up by a customer not a carrier, was of a like description with the same aggregation made up by a carrier; and the jury have found that it was: and upon that finding the Courts have held that the extra charge for a packed parcel to a carrier was against the command in the last-mentioned statute or similar statutes analogous thereto: see Parker v. The Great Western Railway Company, 7 M. & G. 253 (E. C. L. R. vol. 49), 7 Scott N. R. 835, and 11 C. B. 545 (E. C. L. R. vol. 73), and Crouch v. The Great Northern Railway Company, 9 Exch. 556,† and 11 Exch. 742.†

It is not necessary for the decision of the present case for me to say more on this point, or to go into an examination of the authorities, because the Court agrees in the judgment on the first point. On the second point, I repeat that I express only my own opinion exclusively.

WILLES, J.-I concur entirely with the judgment pronounced by my Lord, simply upon the ground that the Railway Acts do not apply to sea-transit, and that the 16 & 17 Vict. c. clvi. makes no provision. for equality of charges in respect of the subject-matter in question,— *75] *the whole provision being only for charges in respect of passen. gers, none in respect of the carriage of goods; and the obligation of the carrier at common law being to charge reasonably, but not to charge equally.

KEATING, J.-I concur, upon the grounds stated by my Lord. Rule absolute.

VAN TOLL v. THE SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

April 17.

The plaintiff, a passenger by the South Eastern Railway, on arriving at the terminus at London Bridge, deposited in the cloak-room there a bag containing wearing apparel and jewellery to a value considerably exceeding 107., receiving as a voucher a ticket on the back of which was printed the following notice :-"The Company will not be responsible for articles left by passengers at the station, unless the same be duly registered, for which a charge of 2d. per article will be made, and a ticket given in exchange; and no article will be given up without the production of the ticket, or satisfactory evidence of the ownership being adduced. A charge of 1d. per diem, in addition, will be made on all articles left in the cloak-room for a longer period than twenty-four hours. The Company will not be responsible for any package exceeding the value of 101."

A similar notice printed in large characters was posted up in the office; but the plaintiff swore that she did not see it. She was not asked whether or not she had seen the notice on the back of the ticket; but she produced it when she applied for the bag. Through the negligence of the Company's servants, part of the contents of the bag were abstracted whilst it was in their custody :

Held, that the Company, having received the deposit, not as carriers, but as ordinary bailees, upon the terms contained in the printed notice,--which the plaintiff, having the means of ascertaining them, must be taken to have consented to be bound by,-were not responsible for the loss; and that the case was neither within the Carriers' Act (11 G. 4 & 1 W. 4, c. 68), nor the Railway Traffic Act, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31.

THIS was an action charging the plaintiffs as carriers with the loss of goods intrusted to them.

The declaration stated, that, in consideration that the plaintiff would deliver to the defendants (being public carriers of goods for hire) certain goods of the plaintiff to be by the defendants safely and securely kept and retained and redelivered to the plaintiff on request, for reward to the defendants in that behalf then and there paid, the defendants promised the plaintiff safely and securely to keep the said goods, and to redeliver the same to the plaintiff on request: Averment that the plaintiff did deliver to the *defendants, and the defendants [*76 accepted the said goods of the plaintiff for the purpose and on the terms aforesaid, and that the plaintiff afterwards, and within a reasonable time in that behalf, requested the defendants to redeliver the same to the plaintiff; and that, although all conditions had been. fulfilled, and all things had happened, and all times had elapsed necessary to entitle the plaintiff to maintain this action, yet the defendants did not redeliver the same to the plaintiff, and did not safely and securely keep the same, but so negligently conducted themselves in the premises that a great part of the said goods, to wit, to the value of 301. (describing them), had been and were wholly lost to the plaintiff, and the rest injured and destroyed: Special damage: Claim 407.

The defendants pleaded,-first, non assumpsit,-secondly, that the plaintiff did not deliver to the defendants, nor did they accept the said goods, for the purpose and on the terms alleged,-thirdly, that they were induced to make the alleged promise by the fraud and misrepresentation of the plaintiff,-fourthly, that they made the said promise and accepted the said goods upon and subject to a certain condition, that is to say, that they would not be responsible for the same if the value thereof (which was then unknown to the defendants) then exceeded 107., and that the value of the said goods

did then exceed 107,-fifthly, that they did safely and securely keep the said goods, and redelivered the same to the plaintiff on request, according to their said promise in that behalf. Issue thereon.

The cause was tried before Erle, C. J., at the sittings at Westminster after last Michaelmas Term, when the following facts appeared in evidence: The plaintiff, a lady who resided at Guildford, came thence to the London Bridge terminus of the South Eastern Railway *on the morning of the 6th of August, 1861, with a leather bag

*77] containing some articles of wearing apparel, a gold watch, and

several gold rings, of the value all together of about 401. On her arrival, she deposited the bag with a servant of the defendants in the cloak-room, paying 2d., and receiving from him a ticket bearing the number 722, and having printed on the back of it in very small type the following notice:

"The Company will not be responsible for articles left by passengers at the station, unless the same be duly registered, for which a charge of 2d. per article will be made, and a ticket given in exchange: and no article will be given up without the production of the ticket, or satisfactory evidence of the ownership being adduced. A charge of 1d. per diem, in addition, will be made on all articles left in the cloak-room for a longer period than twenty-four hours. The Company will not be responsible for any package exceeding the value of 107."

A gentleman who had on the same day deposited an umbrella in the cloak-room, by some mischance had received a ticket also numbered 722. Having sent a messenger with his ticket to the station, the messenger, instead of the umbrella, brought back the plaintiff's travelling-bag; and when the plaintiff returned to the station in the afternoon, the bag was not to be found, and she went away desiring that, if found, it should be forwarded to her at Guildford. When the owner of the umbrella discovered the mistake, he returned the bag to the cloak-room, and it was sent to Guildford, but, on its arrival there, it was found to have been opened, and some of the contents were missing.

Upon the question being left to them, the jury found that the bag had been opened and the contents *abstracted from it while in *78] the custody of the Company; and that the Company had been guilty of negligence.

It was admitted by the plaintiff that no intimation was given to the Company's servant at the time the bag was deposited that it contained jewellery, or that its value exceeded 107. And it was proved that a copy of the notice, printed in large letters, was hung up in the office where the goods were received: but there was no proof that the plaintiff had read either that or the endorsement on the ticket; and she herself stated that she had not seen the former.

On the part of the defendants, it was submitted that the plaintiff was bound by the terms of the notice, which constituted the contract between the parties.

On the other hand, it was insisted, that, even assuming that the notice had been proved to have come to the knowledge of the plaintiff, the case was within the 7th section of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 31), which enacts that the Company