Certificates of Merit for Soldiers. CERTIFICATES OF MERIT FOR SOLDIERS. A certificate of merit cannot be issued under section 1216, Rev. Stat., to a soldier who applies for the same after his discharge. It is contemplated by that section that the applicant shall continue to be, at the time of the issuance of the certificate, a soldier of the United States. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 9, 1878. SIR: In answer to your letter of the 17th ultimo, inquiring whether a certificate of merit can be granted under section 1216 of the Revised Statutes to a soldier who applies for the same after his discharge, I have the honor to say: The words of the section referred to contemplate, in my opinion, that the soldier at the time the certificate is granted should be then in the service of the United States. The words of this section are in præsenti; and in considering the section in connection with section 1285, I am of opinion that it contemplates that the applicant shall continue to be at the time of the issuance of the certificate a soldier of the United States. The section 1216 and the first clause of section 1285 are derived from the seventeenth section of the act of March 3, 1847 (9 Stat., 186). This section provides for the case of a non-commissioned officer who shall distinguish or may have distinguished himself in the service, and authorizes the President to attach him by brevet of the lowest grade of rank, with the usual pay of such grade, to any corps of the Army, and further provides that when any private soldier shall so distinguish himself the President may in like manner grant him a certificate of merit, which shall entitle him to additional pay at the rate of $2 per month. It is quite clear that the portion of the section which relates, to non-commissioned officers cannot be executed unless they are actually in the service at the time, and when the provision in reference to the private soldier is found in the same section, and the President is directed in like manner to grant him a certificate of merit which shall entitle him to additional pay at the rate of $2 per month, it is intended that the applicant for such certificate shall still be in the service of the United States, and that the special benefit to be derived to Bond of Corporation Engaged in Distilling. him from the possession of the certificate shall be the pay of $2 a month in addition to the pay which he continues to receive from the Government. I should be very glad in the case stated in your letter of a gallant soldier who had been severely wounded and afterwards discharged from the service, if I could reach the conclusion that he was now entitled to a certificate of merit, but I believe the result to which I come is demanded by an examination of the statutes. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. GEORGE W. MCCRARY, Secretary of War. CHAS. DEVENS. BOND OF CORPORATION ENGAGED IN DISTILLING. The stockholders of a corporation engaged in the business of distilling cannot properly be accepted as sureties upon the bond required of the corporation by section 3293 Rev. Stat., even if their individual liability for the debts of the corporation is, by the terms of the charter, limited to the amount of their stock. Such stockholders being already jointly and severally liable, under the provisions of section 3251 Rev. Stat., for the taxes imposed upon the spirits manufactured by the corporation, no additional security for the payment thereof would be gained by their suretyship. The liability imposed upon the stockholders by the internal-revenue law is a liability distinct from that which they are under as such to the public with whom the corporation deals; it is a liability imposed by reason of the business in which the corporation whereof they are stockholders is engaged. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have received your letter of the 10th instant proposing the following inquiry: "Can stockholders in a distilling corporation, whose individual liability for the debts of the corporation is limited either by the terms of the charter or the general laws of the State, be lawfully accepted as the sole sureties upon a bond required of the corporation by section 3293 of the Revised Statutes?" The purpose of requiring sureties upon bonds given under Bond of Corporation Engaged in Distilling. section 3293 is to provide for the United States a security additional to that which it would otherwise have; and the inquiry therefore resolves itself into this: Are the stockholders of a distilling corporation, such as you have described, jointly and severally liable under the terms of the statute for taxes imposed upon the distilled spirits manufactured by the corporation; and, if not, may they properly be received as sole sureties upon a bond required of the corporation, this responsibility in other respects being general? If so liable, it is obvious that no additional security is gained by their suretyship upon the bonds of the corporation. It is a question to be determined rather by the laws of the United States than by the liability which the stockholders are under by virtue of the State law under which their corporation is formed. That law may properly limit their liability as stockholders to the amount of their stock, and yet if they are stockholders in a corporation engaged in the business of distilling, it is for the United States to determine what their liability shall be for the taxes or penalties which are imposed by virtue of the revenue law upon the subject of distilling. In order to determine the liability of stockholders in such a corporation to the United States, it is necessary to refer to section 3251 of the Revised Statutes, where it is said: "Every proprietor or possessor of, and every person in any manner interested in the use of, any still, distillery, or distilling apparatus, shall be jointly and severally liable for the taxes imposed by law on the distilled spirits produced therefrom," &c. In reference to this section an opinion was rendered April 23, 1876, from this Department, to the effect that the section includes stockholders of private corporations engaged in distilling, they coming within the expression "every pro- . prietor or possessor of, and every person in any manner interested in the use of, any still," &c. The reference to those interested is sufficient to include them for the purposes of the section. I see no reason to question the soundness of that opinion; and if it be sound, it follows that the security of the United States is in no manner increased if a stockholder is allowed to sign the bond of the corporation, as he is already, from his Bond of Corporation Engaged in Distilling. position as stockholder, liable as a person interested to the payment of the taxes. My attention has been called to an opinion rendered by this Department on April 23, 1877, in which it was held that the word "person" as employed in chapter 4, Title XXXV, of the Revised Statutes, includes a corporation engaged in distilling spirits, so that the corporation may give the bond required by the internal-revenue law, and perform the other acts required by that law of distillers, in its corporate capacity. This opinion simply held that such construction should properly be given to the statute as to hold that artificial persons, as well as natural persons, might assume the liabilities of those engaged in distilling. It is quite true that the private fortunes of those who hold stock in a corporation may constitute no part of its corporate property, and that the only liability which they may be under for the payment of the debts of the corporation may be liquidated by the surrender of their stock. This is an obligation, however, to the creditors of the corporation only with whom it is engaged in commercial transactions. When the United States imposes a liability upon the artificial person engaged in the business of distilling, which liability includes not merely the corporation itself but all those interested in any manner in the use of its stills, distillery, or distilling apparatus, and makes them jointly and severally liable for the taxes imposed by law, they cannot escape that liability by reason of the fact that as stockholders merely they are only liable to the creditors of the corporation to the amount of their stock. The liability imposed by the United States is a liability distinct from that which they are under as stockholders to the public with whom the corporation deals, and is a liability imposed by reason of the business in which the corporation of which they are stockholders is engaged. I find therefore nothing inconsistent in the opinions rendered by this Department on April 23, 1876, and April 23, 1877, and that now rendered. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. JOHN SHERMAN, Secretary of the Treasury. Court-martial Jurisdiction. COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION. A quartermaster's clerk (i, e., a civilian employed in that capacity) is not amenable to court-martial jurisdiction. Nor are superintendents of national cemeteries, appointed under sections 4873 and 4874 Rev. Stat., amenable to such jurisdiction. The statutes of the United States, in so far as they declare what persons or classes of persons are thereby made liable to military law and subjected to the jurisdiction of military courts, reviewed. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 15, 1878. SIR: By your letter of the 12th ultimo, inclosing a communication from the Judge-Advocate-General, dated the 10th of same month, my attention is directed to the question whether civilian clerks employed by quartermasters, and also superintendents of national cemeteries, are amenable to the jurisdiction of a court-martial, which question had some time previously been presented to me by your Department for an opinion thereon. I have now the honor to submit the following in response to that inquiry: On the 2d of June, 1876, my predecessor, Judge Taft, gave an opinion, upon a call from the Secretary of War, dated the 5th of May, 1876, in which he held "that the clerk of a quartermaster is so employed in the military service of the United States as to be amenable to the jurisdiction of a court-martial for any violation of the sixtieth article of the Articles of War." It would seem, however, that he subsequently contemplated a reconsideration of that opinion, for I find that on the 6th of December, 1876, a letter was addressed to him by the Secretary of War, asking his advice as to whether superintend ents of national cemeteries are subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial, in which the Secretary requests this question to be considered in connection with the question of the amenability of a quartermaster's clerk to the same jurisdiction, then "understood to be under re-examination." But nothing further having been done by Judge Taft in connection with the latter question, and he having given no opinion upon the other question mentioned up to the time of his retirement from office, a renewal of the request for an expression of the views of the Attorney-General in regard to the amenability |