C. A.

1903

CASTLE

COMPANY

v.

ATKINSON.

Cozens-Hardy

Ꮮ.J.

and, for the reasons given by the Master of the Rolls and my brother Mathew, it seems to me plain that the clause contemplates an unfettered arbitration as to the proper amount SPINNING to be paid for redemption of the employer's liability, and not one hampered by any limitation of that amount. The employers in effect contend that they may apply to the county court judge to determine whether a sum which they offer is sufficient, but I can see no foundation for this contention in the language of clause 13. It is for the county court judge to fix what in his opinion is the proper sum to be awarded, and he is not to be placed in the position of being unable to make any award at all in one point of view, i.e., if he thinks that the limited amount named by the employer is not sufficient. It is not for us to say whether it would be convenient or desirable that the employer should have power to specify in his application a limit beyond which he is not willing to go, as was done here; and, if the Act is to be amended in that respect, it must be by the Legislature and not by us.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors for workman: Bower, Cotton & Bower, for J. B. Pownall, Ashton-under-Lync.

Solicitors for employers: William Hurd & Son, for Chapman & Brooks, Manchester.

E. L.

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

AYLWARD v. MATTHEWS.

Employer and Workman-Workmen's Compensation-Building-Temporary Wooden Structure-Crane Platform-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), s. 7, sub-s. 1.

A temporary wooden structure of a substantial nature, such as a platform sixty-two feet in height for a steam crane, to be used in the construction of a building, may be a building within the meaning of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.

APPEAL against the award of the judge of the Lambeth County Court upon a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.

The applicant for compensation, Aylward, was employed by the respondent Matthews, who had contracted for the erection. of a platform for a steam crane, which was to be used in the construction of a board school building. The platform, which was of timber, was supported by three long legs, which respectively consisted of upright baulks of timber placed in the form of a hollow square, each side measuring four and a half feet, and connected with cross-pieces of wood. These legs were let into the ground, and surrounded at the base with bricks or other heavy materials to keep them fixed. Upon the crosspieces of the legs planks were placed, upon which ladders rested, thus forming a scaffolding by means of which the platform was being erected. The platform was about sixty-two feet above the ground. The respondent's business was that of a contractor for the erection of such crane platforms, and, when the erection of a crane was completed, he had nothing to do with the building operations carried on by means of it, upon the completion of which he removed the crane and platform. The applicant, while engaged in the erection of the crane platform, fell from a ladder forming part of the scaffolding in consequence of the breaking of a plank upon which the ladder rested, and sustained injuries in respect of which he claimed compensation. At the time of the accident

C. A.

1905

Jan. 18.

C. A.

1905

the school buildings had not reached a height of thirty feet, the foundations only having been laid. The county court AYLWARD judge decided that the crane platform was a building within the meaning of s. 7, sub-s. 1, of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, and that, as it exceeded thirty feet in height and was being constructed by means of a scaffolding, the applicant was entitled to compensation.

v.

MATTHEWS.

Minton-Senhouse, for the respondent. A temporary structure of wood, such as was being constructed in the present case, for the purpose of erecting a building, cannot be regarded as itself a building for the purposes of the Act. No one would in common parlance say that the respondent in this case had contracted for the erection of a building. [He cited McNicholas v. Dawson & Son (1); McCabe v. Jopling. (2)]

"

John O'Connor, for the applicant. The term "building may fairly be applied, according to the ordinary use of language, to such a structure as this crane platform. A building may be of wood. The facts that the building was not intended to be permanent, and that it was erected for the purpose of constructing another building, are really immaterial.

Minton-Senhouse, in reply.

COLLINS M.R. In this case the county court judge has found as a fact that a certain wooden structure, exceeding thirty feet in height, the object of which was to form a platform for a steam crane to be used for the purpose of erecting a building, and which was being constructed by means of a scaffolding, was itself a "building building" within s. 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. The county court judge's finding of fact concludes the question, unless we are in a position to lay it down as a matter of law that such a wooden structure cannot be said to be a building. I confess that at first sight I was somewhat startled at the notion that a temporary wooden platform, erected for a crane to be used in the process of constructing a building, could itself be a building for the purposes of the Act. In dealing, however, (1) [1899] 1 Q. B. 773. (2) [1904] 1 K. B. 222.

C.A.

1905

v.

Collins M.R.

with an Act framed as is the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, it is hardly possible to apply any ordinary rule of construction or principle to the interpretation of its provisions; AYLWARD and one can only do one's best to discover its meaning by MATTHEWS. consideration of the language used in connection with the objects at which its provisions appear to be aimed. The Act would appear to have contemplated, among other things, the risks which would arise, in the case of the erection or repair of buildings exceeding thirty feet in height by means of scaffolding, of workmen falling from the building or the scaffolding, or of things falling upon workmen below. These are risks which would certainly be incident to the erection by means of a scaffolding of a structure of the kind with which we are dealing in this case, as much as to the erection of permanent buildings of brick or stone. The question is really I think one of fact, and I do not feel myself in a position to say as a matter of law that a structure of the kind in question cannot be a building. There are various instances of wooden buildings, as for instance in Norway, where churches are frequently built of wood. It would be impossible to say that a church, if constructed of brick or stone, would be a building, but that, if constructed of wood, it would not be a building. Suppose that at some large engineering works a permanent structure were erected of brick to carry a crane for the purpose of lifting big guns or machinery: could it be said that such a structure was not a building? If such a structure is a building, I do not see how, as a matter of law, it can be laid down that a structure such as that in question cannot be a building because it is made of wood, and is only temporary. For these reasons I think the appeal must be dismissed.

MATHEW L.J. I am of the same opinion. The argument for the employer really involves the conclusion that a structure cannot be a building for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, unless it is constructed of brick or stone. I see nothing in the Act to indicate any such limitation. The structure in question, which was being carefully built up to form the platform for an engine and crane, and was of a very

C.A.

1905 AYLWARD

V.

MATTHEWS.

substantial nature, may reasonably be said to be a building. I do not think the facts that it was built of wood, and not of brick or stone, and that it was only intended to be temporary, necessitate the conclusion in point of law that it could not be a building.

Employer and Workman-Compensation · - Accident — Scaffolding Ladder used as Scaffold-Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37), s. 7.

A workman, employed on a building which was under repair and exceeded thirty feet in height, fell from a ladder, on one of the rungs of which he was standing for the purpose of doing work which was necessary on the building. The ladder had been used on previous occasions and on the same day for a similar purpose. On a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, the county court judge held that the ladder was scaffolding within the meaning of the Act, and made an award in favour of the applicant. On appeal:

Held, that there was no legal principle on which a ladder could be excluded from the category of possible scaffolding, and that, as there was evidence on which the county court judge could arrive at his conclusion of fact, the Court was bound by his finding.

APPEAL of the respondents from an award of the judge of the Liverpool County Court upon an application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.

The applicant was the widow of a workman who had been in the employment of the respondents, who were building contractors. The workman in the course of his employment was standing upon one of the rungs of a ladder in order to get at the work upon which he was engaged. He fell from the ladder and sustained injuries which caused his death. Upon the hearing of the application the judge gave judgment as follows: