person ought not to use or have in his possession for use for trade any weighing machine which can be called at the time false or unjust. Judgment for the appellants. Case remitted. 1904 LONDON V. PAYNE & Co. (No. 2). Solicitor for appellants: W. A. Blaxland. Solicitors for respondents: Lamb, Son & Prance. W. A. AMBLER AND FAWCETT v. GORDON. Ancient Lights-Prescription-Light necessary for Special Purpose or Business A right to a special amount of light necessary for a particular business cannot be acquired by twenty years' enjoyment to the knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement. In considering the question of the right to relief for interference with ancient lights, it is a question of fact whether the user of the premises is one which requires an ordinary or a special amount of light. It cannot be predicated as a matter of law whether any particular business, e.g., an architect's, is an ordinary business in the sense that it only requires an ordinary amount of light. Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores, [1904] A. C. 179, discussed. AWARD in an arbitration stated in the form of a special case. The plaintiff Ambler was an architect, and the plaintiff Fawcett was a solicitor. The defendant was the Bishop of Leeds. By the agreement of reference, after reciting that the plaintiffs were the owners of certain premises in Cookridge Street, Leeds, and that the defendant was erecting a cathedral opposite the plaintiffs' premises, and that the plaintiffs contended that the cathedral when erected would interfere with the light to which they were entitled and which had been hitherto enjoyed in connection with their premises, and that the plaintiffs were threatening legal proceedings against the defendant, but that by way of compromise it had been agreed that all disputes and differences should be referred to arbitration, it was agreed by clause 1 (inter alia) that all disputes and differences" as to the damage sustained or to be sustained" 1905 Jan. 14. 1905 AMBLER v. GORDON. by the plaintiffs" in respect of the interference with or obstruction of light" to the plaintiffs' premises or to the occupier thereof by or through the erection of the cathedral be referred to the award and determination of two arbitrators, or to their umpire; and by clause 9 it was provided that the arbitrators or their umpire might in the award direct either party to do or submit to any act or execute any written instrument. The arbitrators appointed an umpire, who held the reference, and after waiting, at the request of the parties, for the decision to be given in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores (1), made his award in the form of the following special case: The plaintiffs are the owners of certain premises situate and being Nos. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, and 37 on the west side of Cookridge Street, Leeds, and the defendant is erecting a cathedral opposite these premises, and the plaintiffs contend that the cathedral has interfered with the light to which they are entitled and which has hitherto been enjoyed in connection with their premises. The plaintiffs' premises may be described as follows: Nos. 25, 27, and 33 are shops the windows of which were formerly ordinary dwelling-house or office windows, but in or since 1889 the old fronts were taken out and large shop fronts were substituted. No. 31 is now a shop, but was formerly an archway closed in by a door through which some light was admitted, but the shop was put in in or about 1899. The front of No. 27 has not been altered. The other numbers refer to entrances to the upper parts of the buildings, which, as to the rooms over Nos. 25 and 27, are used, and have been used for upwards of twenty years past, by the plaintiff Ambler as an architect for the purposes of his offices, including a drawing office on the first-floor, for which a special amount of light is required; and at the north end they are occupied, and have been occupied for upwards of twenty years past, by a tenant of the plaintiffs, a cloth merchant, who during such period has used a part of the first-floor for the purpose of perching or examining and matching cloth, for which also a special amount of light is required. The other (1) [1904] A. C. 179. parts of the premises are not used for any purpose requiring a special amount of light. All the lights are ancient, except as to the additional amount of light coming through the new shop fronts. The width between the plaintiffs' premises and the cathedral varies from 57 ft. 9 in. to 62 ft. 3 in., and the tower at the north end of the cathedral is distant 92 feet from the plaintiffs' premises. The height of the main wall of the cathedral is 50 feet, and the height of the tower taken to a point halfway up the spire is 116 feet. With the exception of the spire opposite No. 37 and a point opposite No. 31, where calculating half-way up a gabled roof an angle of only 44 degrees from the vertical is shewn, an angle of light of more than 45 degrees from the vertical remains for the whole of the ground-floor and upper windows of the plaintiffs' premises, and a slight but not material interference of light is caused to those parts of the plaintiffs' premises for which no special amount of light is required. The cathedral is not so long as the plaintiffs' premises, and at each end of the cathedral there is an open street admitting a large amount of light to the plaintiffs' premises. The site of the cathedral was formerly occupied by old buildings and was partly vacant land. The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to damages in respect of all the premises, and in particular to damages in respect of the special user of parts of the first-floors as before mentioned, as the rentals at present obtained, or at which the premises so occupied by the plaintiff Ambler were estimated previous to the erecting of the cathedral, will not be obtainable again. The plaintiffs also claim that the agreement of reference constitutes a submission to arbitration for the purpose of assessing all damages sustained by them in respect of the interference with or obstruction of light to their premises, irrespective of whether or not such damage is sufficiently material or substantial to entitle the plaintiffs to an injunction in an action. The umpire awarded and found that, notwithstanding the defendant's buildings, there remained sufficient light to the 1905 AMBLER บ. GORDON. 1905 AMBLER V. GORDON. plaintiffs' premises for all purposes of ordinary user, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for interference with such ordinary user; but, if the umpire was entitled to take into account damages which the plaintiffs had sustained in respect of loss of light to those parts of the premises used for occupation in respect of which a special amount of light was required, then he awarded 6007. damages to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs. At the request of both parties the umpire submitted the following question for the opinion of the Court :— Whether on the foregoing facts the umpire was bound by the decision in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores (1), and, therefore, could not award damages to the plaintiffs, or whether he could award damages in respect of interference with such special user of light as aforesaid. Bankes, K.C., and Longstaffe, for the plaintiffs. [The arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment. In addition to the cases there mentioned, the following were referred to: Kine v. Jolly (2); Rushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri, Ld. (3)] Cur. adv. vult. Jan. 20. BRAY J. read the following judgment:-This is a special case stated by an umpire in his award. The plaintiffs were the owners of eight houses in Cookridge Street, Leeds. The defendant was the Bishop of Leeds, and was erecting a cathedral on a piece of land opposite, partly vacant and partly occupied by old buildings; and the plaintiffs complained that the erection of the cathedral interfered with their ancient lights. The matters in dispute were referred to arbitration by an agreement between the parties dated December 1, 1902. Mr. Blashill was appointed umpire, and the reference proceeded before him. After the evidence was closed he was asked to defer making his award till the House of Lords had given their decision in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores (1), (1) [1904] A. C. 179. (2) [1905] W. N. 2. (3) (1905) 21 Times L. R. 183. and subsequently to state his award in the form of a special case. This he did, and by his award, after stating certain facts, awarded and found as follows: "Notwithstanding the defendant's buildings, there remains sufficient light to the plaintiffs' premises for all purposes of ordinary user, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for interference with such ordinary user; but, if I am entitled to take into account damages which the plaintiffs have sustained in respect of loss of light to those parts of the said premises used for occupation in respect of which a special amount of light is required, then I award 6007. damages to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs"; and he submitted to the Court the following question: "Whether on the foregoing facts I am bound by the decision in Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores (1), and, therefore, cannot award damages to the plaintiffs, or whether I can award damages in respect of interference with such special user as aforesaid." This is the question which I have to decide. Mr. Bankes, on behalf of the plaintiffs, took three points. First, he said that the umpire had found that an architect's business was not an ordinary business; that this was wrong in law; that an architect's business was an ordinary business, and, as he had found that the light was insufficient for this business, he had found that it was insufficient for an ordinary business, and therefore, according to the law as laid down in Colls' Case (1), there had been an actionable interference with the plaintiffs' ancient lights, and the plaintiffs were entitled to the 6007. damages; and, as an alternative to this, he contended that the question whether an architect's business was an ordinary business was a mixed question of law and fact, and the umpire must have misdirected himself or misunderstood Colls' Case (1), and I ought to send the case back for him to state the facts more fully. Secondly, he contended that the twenty years' enjoyment had given the plaintiffs a right to the special light. Thirdly, he contended that by the agreement of reference the defendant had agreed to pay for actual damage sustained whether there was actionable interference or not. I will examine these contentions. First, what is meant by (1) [1904] A. C. 179. 2 G VOL. I. 1905. 2 1905 AMBLER v. GORDON. Bray J. |