1905 was as follows: "I hereby give you notice that Mr. GODLONTON the tenant of this house, has no right of property or beneficial FULHAM AND interest in the furniture goods and chattels, a list of which is HAMPSTEAD hereunto appended, which are now in and upon the said v. PROPERTY COMPANY. premises and which you have distrained upon for rent due to you from the said Mr. ; and I hereby declare that the said furniture goods and chattels are the property of myself as and being a lodger in the said house. I further give you notice and declare that no rent is due from me to Mr. on account of the rent of the lodgings I occupy in this house. And I give you notice that the list of articles hereto annexed is a correct inventory of the furniture goods and chattels referred to in the above notice or declaration." This declaration was signed at the end of it by the plaintiff; and on a subsequent part of the same piece of paper there was written an inventory of the plaintiff's goods, which was not otherwise signed by him. The plaintiff's goods were sold under the distress, and he brought this action in the county court claiming damages for illegal distress and trespass. The county court judge found that the plaintiff was a lodger and that the goods described in the inventory were his; but he held that, although the inventory was sufficiently identified in the declaration, the plaintiff had not "subscribed" the inventory as required by the Act, and gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. Cockle, for the plaintiff. The declaration refers to and identifies the inventory, and the signature at the end of the declaration is a sufficient signature or subscription of the inventory annexed thereto. Subscribed," in s. 1 of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, means signed, and this inventory was signed or subscribed within the meaning of this Act. Roskill, K.C. (H. Simmons with him), for the defendants. as shall be sufficient to discharge the lodger, of the furniture, goods, and chattels referred to in the declaration." By the provisions of this Act a landlord is deprived of his common law right, and the conditions upon which he can be so deprived are fully set out. All those conditions must be strictly and rigidly complied with before the lodger can claim the protection given to him by the Act: Thwaites v. Wilding (1); Morton v. Palmer. (2) Sect. 1 of the Act provides that the lodger must make a declaration, and also that to the declaration there must be annexed a correct inventory "subscribed by the lodger." That means that the inventory itself must be subscribed or signed, and the signing of the declaration cannot be a strict compliance with the provision requiring that the inventory shall be subscribed. LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. The learned county court judge decided this case against the plaintiff upon the ground that he had not rigidly complied with the terms of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871, on the authority of Thwaites v. Wilding. (1) In that case it was held that the conditions. prescribed by the statute must be strictly complied with, and with that I agree. In the present case a proper declaration was made and signed by the plaintiff, which states "that the list of articles hereto annexed is a correct inventory," and the inventory was written on the same piece of paper, but was not otherwise signed or subscribed. In my opinion the inventory was sufficiently "subscribed" within the meaning of the Act. This appeal must therefore be allowed. KENNEDY and RIDLEY JJ. concurred. 1905 GODLONTON V. FULHAM AND HAMPSTEAD PROPERTY COMPANY. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for plaintiff: Dyson Smith & Marchant. Solicitors for defendants: Steadman, Van Praagh & Gaylor. (1) (1883) 12 Q. B. D. 4. (2) (1881) 45 L. T. 429. W. A. 1905 Jan. 27. SPENCER, WHATLEY & UNDERHILL v. FORSTER & CO. County Court — Jurisdiction Remitted Action - Amendment - Claim for Unliquidated Damages-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), ss. 65, 87. An action, commenced in the High Court by a writ specially indorsed with a claim for 331. 12s. for demurrage at a specified rate in respect of the detention of the plaintiffs' wagons, was remitted to the county court under s. 65 of the County Courts Act, 1888. At the trial the plaintiffs failed to prove an agreement to pay demurrage : Held, that the county court judge had power to amend the particulars of claim by substituting a claim for unliquidated damages. APPEAL of the plaintiffs from the Marylebone County Court. The action had been commenced in the High Court by a writ specially indorsed with a claim for 331. 12s. for demurrage in respect of the detention of the plaintiffs' wagons at the agreed rate of 3s. a day for each wagon. The plaintiffs took out a summons for judgment under Order XIV., on which an order was made under s. 65 of the County Courts Act, 1888, remitting the action to the county court for trial. At the trial the plaintiffs failed to prove any agreement by the defendants to pay demurrage, and an application was thereupon made to the deputy county court judge to amend the particulars by substituting a claim for unliquidated damages for the detention of the plaintiffs' wagons. The deputy county court judge held that, under s. 65 of the County Courts Act, 1888, only a claim for liquidated damages could be remitted, and that, as the plaintiffs could not support their claim for demurrage, he had no power to convert the claim into one for unliquidated damages for detention, and he accordingly nonsuited the plaintiffs.. The plaintiffs appealed. R. W. Turner, for the plaintiffs. The judge had jurisdiction to amend the particulars so as to enable the plaintiffs to claim unliquidated damages. By s. 65 of the County Courts Act, 1888, where an action is remitted to the county court, "the action and all proceedings therein shall be tried and taken in such court as if the action had been originally commenced therein." The effect of those words is to put the action for all purposes in the same position as it would have been if it had been begun in the county court, and, therefore, s. 87 of the Act, which empowers the judge to make "all such amendments as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties," applies to a remitted action, and under that section the judge had power to make the amendment asked for. [He was stopped.] Schwabe, for the defendants. The refusal to allow an amendment was right. The plaintiffs were asking the judge to substitute a claim for unliquidated damages for a claim for a liquidated demand, which was the action which had been remitted. There is no power to remit an action in which unliquidated damages are claimed: Bassett v. Tong (1); and a county court judge cannot amend the claim in a remitted action so as to convert the action into a claim for unliquidated damages, for it is not within the jurisdiction of a county court to try an action commenced in the High Court for unliquidated damages, and a judge cannot amend so as to give himself jurisdiction: In re Hopper and Warburton. (2) The language of s. 65 supports the defendants' contention, for it is "the action" which has been remitted, not a totally different action, which is to be tried as if it had been begun in the county court, and to which the powers of amendment conferred by s. 87 are to apply. The plaintiffs are in effect asking to be allowed to discontinue one action and to commence a fresh one, which could not have been remitted to the county court. If the amendment can be permitted, it will always be open to a plaintiff to proceed by way of a specially indorsed writ and Order XIV., thereby getting the advantage of being able to compel the defendant to state his defence on oath, and then, if the action is remitted, the plaintiff can change his claim into one for unliquidated damages, although, if the plaintiff cannot prove that a liquidated sum is due, he is not entitled to apply (1) [1894] 2 Q. B. 332. (2) (1863) 32 L. J. (Q. B.) 104. 1905 SPENCER, WHATLEY & UNDERHILL v. FORSTER & Co. 1905 for judgment under Order XIV., and ought to bear the costs of SPENCER, doing so; but when once the case has been remitted, the county court has no power to deal with those costs. WHATLEY & Turner, in reply. Bassett v. Tong (1) was not a case which had been remitted, and is not in point. When once a case has been remitted, rightly or wrongly, it becomes a county court case for all purposes, with all the powers of amendment conferred by s. 87: Dierken v. Philpot. (2) LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. This case raises a question of considerable importance, and one worthy of consideration by the Court of Appeal if it should be thought advisable to take the case to that Court. At first sight there seems to be a great deal of force in the argument for the defendants. It is said that it has been decided in Bassett v. Tong (1) that the language of s. 65 of the County Courts Act, 1888, is so specific that an action for unliquidated damages cannot be remitted to the county court, and therefore that, as this action could not have been remitted if the claim in the first instance had been for unliquidated damages, the county court judge was right in holding that he had no jurisdiction to make the desired amendment. It is not disputed that if the action had remained in the High Court the amendment could have been made, and if it had been commenced in the county court, as it might have been, the claim being under 501., the amendment could also have been made, because a county court judge has the same powers of amendment in cases within his jurisdiction as a judge of the High Court. The question therefore comes to this: Are we bound as a result of the decision in Bassett v. Tong (1) to hold that the county court judge in the case of a remitted action has only jurisdiction to try the action in the actual form in which it has been commenced, without having the power of amending the proceedings so as finally to decide the real question between the parties? It is provided by s. 65 that when an action is remitted to the county court "the action and all proceedings therein shall be tried (1) [1894] 2 Q. B. 332. (2) [1901] 2 K. B. 380. |