other, as a part of the same plan or induced by the same motive, they may be shown to reduce the probability of innocence; and for this purpose, subsequent representations are equally admissible with prior ones, for it is the repetition of them that is significant, and a subsequent instance reduces the probability of innocence equally as well as a prior one, and the criminality of prior or subsequent acts or representations does not affect their admissibility, if they are otherwise relevant."

The case of Commonwealth v. Lubinsky, 182 Mass. 142 (64 N. E. 966), was a false pretense case. It was said in the opinion:

"As bearing upon the intent with which the defendant obtained the goods from Walkowich, it was competent for the government to show, if it could, that the goods were obtained by the defendant pursuant to a general or common plan or scheme of fraud on his part. And for the purpose of showing such a plan or scheme it was competent for the government to introduce testimony tending to show that at or about the same time he fraudulently obtained goods from other parties by the same or similar pretenses which he appropriated to his own use and for which he did not pay. The different transactions must be connected with the one in question as parts of a general or common scheme or plan to defraud in order to justify their admission as evidence. But when so connected the evidence of fraud which they furnish is competent as bearing upon the intent with which the goods were obtained in any one of the transactions embraced in the general plan or scheme. Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 588 (27 N. E. 593); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571 (16 N. E. 452); Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray (Mass.), 173, 197; Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457. The fact that the evidence might also be admissible to prove the commission of other crimes did not render it incompetent for the purpose for which it was admitted."

The exception is more broadly stated by Justice Story in Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135, than is necessary for us to adopt. He says:

1

"In most cases of conspiracy and fraud, the question of intent, or purpose, or design in the act done, whether innocent or illegal, whether honest or fraudulent, rarely admits of direct and positive proof; but it is to be deduced from various circumstances of more or less stringency, and often occurring, not merely between the same parties, but between the party charged with the conspiracy or fraud and third persons. And in all cases, where the guilt of the party depends upon the intent, purpose, or design, with which the act is done, or upon his guilty knowledge thereof, I understand it to be a general rule, that collateral facts may be examined into, in which he bore a part, for the purpose of establishing such guilty intent, design, purpose, or knowledge.'

In State v. Wilson, 72 Minn. 522 (75 N. W. 715), it was said:

"The general rule is that, when offered simply for the purpose of proving a defendant's commission of the offense charged, evidence of his commission of other independent crimes is inadmissible. But there are exceptions, or rather apparent exceptions, to this rule. One of these is where the crime in question is one of a system of similar crimes in the commission of which the defendant is habitually engaged. This exception is particularly applicable to cases where the defendant is engaged in the commission of a system of successive frauds of the same kind; as, for example, a system of successive forgeries or of successive cheats or swindles of the same general nature. It is therefore competent to show that the defendant had been engaged in practicing like or similar cheats, as tending to prove a criminal intent."

In the case of State v. Brady, 100 Iowa, 191 (69 N. W. 290), a case cited and quoted from by this court in People v. Hoffmann, 142 Mich. 531, the defendant was overseer of the poor at Ottumwa. He was indicted for cheating by false pretenses. The offense alleged in the indictment occurred on or about July 11, 1893. It grew out of the filing of a claim for three dollars

pretended by the defendant to be for transportation furnished a woman and three little children. Upon the trial the prosecution was permitted to introduce all the claims presented by the defendant during the year of 1893, upwards of 500 in number and aggregating upwards of $1,400. In the Hoffmann Case we quoted from the Iowa case the following:

* *

"It seems to us that the evidence was also admissible for the purpose of proving a systematic scheme or plan on the part of the defendant to cheat and defraud the county, thus negativing the idea that the presentation of the claim in question was accidental, or through oversight, or mistake. The jury may well have found, from the evidence complained of, that the filing of the claim, and the receipt of the warrant charged in the indictment, was a part of a plan or scheme adopted by the defendant to cheat and rob the county. For this purpose, as well as for the purpose of establishing the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the claim, the evidence was admissible."

In the Hoffmann Case the charge was obtaining money from the State by false pretenses. The amount obtained, $56.34, was procured by the defendant, then coroner of the county of Wayne, by means of a bill for alleged services of himself as coroner and for other alleged expenses growing out of the violent death of one Mrs. Josephine Summers, who was represented by him to be a stranger although a resident of the city of Detroit. This was the specific offense charged in the information. Upon the trial some 40 bills or vouchers of the defendant upon similar blanks used in the Summers case and upon which defendant procured various sums from the State were received in evidence; there was also received evidence tending to show the falsity of the representations contained in these various bills or vouchers; the circumstances were similar to those in the Summers case and tended to show a system to defraud. This court there fully

considered the admissibility of such proof and affirmed the conviction. An examination of the record in that case discloses that the dates of the various bills do not appear, and it is not established by the record whether they were before or after the Summers case.

In the case of People v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, the charge was manslaughter by abortion. Evidence of other criminal operations was received. In considering the cases dealing with the admissibility of this class of testimony it was said:

"Some of these authorities would seem to be border cases, but they illustrate the tendency of the courts to allow the introduction of this class of testimony to repel the inference that the cause was an accidental one, in cases where such an inference might otherwise obtain. Upon principle and authority, it is clear that where a felonious intent is an essential ingredient of the crime charged, and the act done is claimed to have been innocently or accidentally done, or by mistake, or when the result is claimed to have followed an act lawfully done for a legitimate purpose, or where there is room for such an inference, it is proper to characterize the act by proof of other like acts producing the same result, as tending to show guilty knowledge, and the intent or purpose with which the particular act was done, and to rebut the presumption that might otherwise obtain."

See, also, State v. Merry, 20 N. D. 337 (127 N. W. 83); State v. Walton, 114 N. C. 783 (18 S. E. 945); Kramer v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 299; Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Trust Co., 19 C. C. A. 286 (72 Fed. 413); Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 342; State v. Rosenberg, 162 Mo. 358 (62 S. W. 435, 982); Carnell v. State, 85 Md. 1 (36 Atl. 117); Queen v. Hamilton, 1 Cox Cr. Cas. 244; Reg. v. Dossett, 2 C. & K. 306; People v. Ascher, 126 Mich. 637; citation and consideration of numerous other authorities will be found in People v. Hoffmann, supra, People v. Sea

206-Mich.-42.

man, supra, and in Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Grat. (Va.) 862. f

We conclude that the testimony of similar transactions subsequent to the date of the act alleged in the information was properly received. These transactions were shortly after that date, were of like character, between the same parties and were a part of the same system or scheme to defraud. When testimony of this character is received the trial judge should carefully guard its use by appropriate instructions, and limit the purpose for which it is received. This was done in the instant case.

The court properly overruled defendant's motion for a directed verdict. There was an abundance of testimony to take the case to the jury. Defendant's confession, the evidence of the man who went to the various stations from which defendant shipped bolts, and where bolts would have been found if defendant had purchased the bolts he claimed he had; the testimony of numerous parties from whom defendant purchased bolts that they had not sold him any bolts at approximately the time in question, the dealings and transactions of the parties all tended to establish the claim of the prosecution. The case of People v. Perry, 197 Mich. 47, is quite in point. It was there said:

"It has been held that proof of the falsity of the representation need not necessarily be direct; it is sufficient if the evidence establish facts tending legitimately to show its falsity. It is said that as defendant is usually in a position to know the truth or falsity of the representation, slight evidence of its falsity is sufficient for his conviction, in the absence of countervailing evidence of its truth."

We have examined the charge of the court and the defendant's requests to charge. The charge of the court was a fair one and fully protected the rights of the defendant; such of defendant's requests as he was