upon the government by allowing a location of the claim to be made upon a defective or insufficient assignment. The purchaser must look to every part of the title which is essential to its validity. (Brush v. Ware, 15 Pet., 93.)

As the government is not free from fault in neglecting to take proper action upon the location for more than fifty years, and has silently acquiesced in the occupancy of the premises by the present owner and his grantors under said entry by withholding it from entry or other disposition, equity and justice would seem to require that his title should be quieted and that a patent should issue without further consideration.

But as he would also, for the same reason, be entitled to have entry upon which the patent issues free from the claim of any unknown heirs of Brashear, no valid reason can be perceived why he should not be allowed to substitute cash for the warrant, so that the patent issued thereon would issue solely to his benefit, free from other claim. The entryman upon making such substitution would be entitled to whatever interest the widow of Brashear had in the warrant, but as that interest cannot be ascertained by the Department in the absence of proof of the same character as that required to establish the validity of the warrant location, the decision of your office, reinstating the entry and allowing Borders to furnish proof of the validity of the assignment of the entire interest in the warrant, is affirmed, with this condition, that if the applicant will make affidavit that he has endeavored to obtain such proof, stating the extent and character of his inquiry, and that it is not obtainable, you will then allow a substitute to be made of cash for the warrant, but you will not deliver the warrant except upon the application of all parties having any right, title or interest in it, and upon submission of satisfactory proof that they are heirs, or representatives of the heirs, of John W. Brashear living at the time of his death. The substitution of cash for the warrant should not be allowed until every effort has been made to procure the necessary proof required to show the validity of the assignment and it is evident that it cannot be obtained.

In the case of Robert M. Stitt (33 L. D., 315), cited by your office, it was said that an entryman will not be permitted to relinquish his entry, or allow it to be cancelled and withdraw his scrip, where the entry can be confirmed and where the only obstacle to confirmation is the arbitrary refusal of the entryman to supply the necessary proof. Upon the same principle, a substitution of cash for a warrant should not be allowed where the only obstacle to the confirmation of the location is the refusal of the locator or transferee to endeavor to procure the necessary proof to establish the validity of the location with the

warrant.

Your decision, as thus modified, is affirmed.

MINING CLAIM-PATENT PROCEEDINGS—EQUITABLE ACTION.

ALASKA PLACER CLAIM.

Proceedings for patent to a mining claim embracing land lying partly within one land district and partly within another, conducted wholly within one land district, and the allowance of entry thereon covering the entire claim, are in no wise effective as to the lands lying without such land district, and do not constitute substantial compliance with law as to such lands, within the meaning of sections 2450 to 2457 of the Revised Statutes, such as would warrant confirmation of the entry in its entirety under said sections.

Acting Secretary Campbell to the Commissioner of the General Land (S. V. P.) Office, July 10, 1905. (G. N.B.)

July 13, 1904, you submitted, for approval by the Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney General under section 2451 of the Revised Statutes, your decision under section 2450 of the Revised Statutes, in the case of suspended mineral entry No. 1676, Montrose land district, Colorado, made October 3, 1901, by Edward Henry, for the Alaska placer claim, survey No. 15,416, accompanied by a letter, addressed to the Secretary of the Interior, explaining certain special features of the case which in your judgment call for equitable consideration under sections 2450 to 2457, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes.

The record shows that while a portion of the Alaska claim lies in the Durango land district, Colorado, entry embracing the entire claim was made in the Montrose district, and no proceedings whatever were had in the Durango district.

In your letter of explanation you say:

Notwithstanding the fact that notice of the application for patent in this case was not posted in the land office at Durango, Colorado, as required by law, I recommend the confirmation of said entry No. 1676, for the following reasons: First. A careful examination of the entire record convinces me that the application for patent, and the entry were allowed in good faith.

Second. The failure to post copy of the notice of application for patent in this case, in the land office at Durango, Colorado, was not the fault of the claimant.

Third. The question is one solely between the government and the claimant, as no adverse claim nor protest has been filed.

And lastly. To cancel said entry and compel the claimant to commence proceedings for patent de noro would be a hardship, which in my judgment should not be imposed upon him.

Section 2457 of the Revised Statutes specifies the character of suspended entries which are to be decided by the Commissioner of the General Land Office "upon principles of equity and justice, as recognized in courts of equity, and in accordance with regulations to be settled by the Secretary of the Interior, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner, conjointly," under section 2450, and submitted for approval under section 2451, as those "where the law has been sub

stantially complied with, and the error or informality arose from ignorance, accident, or mistake which is satisfactorily explained.” You state, in substance, that this case does not come within any of the regulations adopted under section 2450 (General Circular, January 25, 1904, pp. 245-250), and for that reason you submit the same as a special case, not covered by the rules. (General Circular, p. 247.)

Under the facts disclosed by the record, the question first presented is, whether this is a case "where the law has been substantially complied with." If not, there is nothing to justify equitable consideration under the statute.

An application for patent under the mining laws is required to be filed in the proper land office." (Sec. 2325, Revised Statutes.) This means that the application must be filed in the office of the land district where the land applied for is situated. The officers of a land district have no jurisdiction or control over lands outside the limits of their district. They cannot allow entry for land not within the district for which they are appointed. In other words, there is no authority of law for the officers of one land district to dispose of land lying in another district.

In this case the register and receiver of the Montrose land district undertook to entertain patent proceedings and to allow entry for a mining claim embracing land a portion of which is not within their district, but which lies in the adjoining Durango land district. The Department is of opinion that, with respect to the land in the Durango district, there is no authority of law for the action taken, and that, therefore, this is not a case "where the law has been substantially complied with," as to that portion of the claim. No application for patent was filed in the Durango office, no notice was posted in that office or on the claim in that district, and therefore no proof of notice was, or could have been, filed in that office. There was no lawful notice to adverse claimants, if any there were, as to the land in the Durango district. As to that part of the claim there has been no assumption under the statute "that the applicant is entitled to a patent" and "that no adverse claim exists," and there has been no opportunity for conflicting claimants, if any, to file adverse claims. In short, not only has there not been substantial compliance with the law, but there has been no compliance with law at all, in so far as the portion of the claim in the Durango district is concerned. This being true, it follows that the case is not one as to which equitable considerations under the statute may be applied. Therefore, your de cision and recommendation cannot be accepted; and the record is returned to your office for further consideration, and for such action. in the premises as the facts and the law may justify.

The Department knows of no reason why the entry may not be allowed to stand as to that portion of the claim which lies in the

Montrose land district, should the claimant so elect, provided the patent proceedings in that district have been regular, and the law fully complied with. Or, should the claimant prefer, he may be allowed, under additional patent proceedings in the Durango district, to be conducted in all respects in conformity to law, to make supplemental entry for the portion of the claim in that district, and thus obtain patent for the entire claim. In that event, the proof of expenditure in labor and improvements on the claim, which accompanied the proceedings in the Montrose district, if found sufficient and regular, should be accepted in the proceedings in the Durango district.

MINING CLAIM-PLACER LOCATION-CONFORMITY TO SYSTEM OF PUB

LIC LAND SURVEYS.

HOGAN AND IDAHO PLACER MINING CLAIMS.

The fact that a placer mining location, if made to conform as nearly as praeticable to the system of public-land surveys and the rectangular subdivisions of such surveys, as required by section 2331 of the Revised Statutes, would embrace small portions of land not valuable for placer mining, constitutes no reason for failure to conform the location to such system and legal subdivisions, where, if so conformed, the land embraced in the location would be as a whole more valuable for placer mining than for agricultural purposes.

It is no objection to the validity of a placer location that it embraces veins or lodes as well as placer deposits.

Acting Secretary Ryan to the Commissioner of the General Land (F. L. C.)

Office, July 19, 1905.

(A. B. P.)

September 11, 1903, the Crooked River Mining and Milling Company made entry for the Hogan and Idaho placer claims and eight lode claims known as the Orion, the Pineapple, the Buffalo Queen, the Little Fritz Fraction, the Alaska No. 3, the Alaska No. 4, the Friday, and the Friday Fraction, all included in survey No. 1834, Lewiston, Idaho.

June 7, 1904, your office directed the local officers to notify the company that it would be allowed sixty days within which to show cause why the placer claims should not be made to conform to the United States system of public-land surveys, and stated that on failure to make such showing, or to appeal, the entry, to the extent of the placer claims, would be canceled without further notice.

The company has appealed to the Department.

Placer mining claims located after May 10, 1872, are required by law to conform as nearly as practicable with the United States system of public-land surveys, and the rectangular subdivisions of such

surveys; and this is true whether the claims be located tipon surveyed or unsurveyed lands. (Revised Statutes, sec. 2331; Miller Placer Claim, 30 L. D., 225, 227; Wood Placer Mining Company, 32 L. D., 198, 199-on review, Id., 363.)

The Hogan and Idaho claims were located, in 1902 upon unsurveyed lands, and were surveyed for patent February 5-11, 1903. They are very irregular in form, vary in width from about 200 feet to about 1,200 feet, adjoin each other end on end, and are so located as to embrace within their lines the Crooked River for a distance of about three and one-half miles. They do not even approximate conformity with the system of the public-land surveys, but are wholly at variance with such system, which, as was said in the case of Miller Placer Claim, supra," affords no warrant for cutting the public lands into lengthy strips of such narrow width."

In the company's appeal it is stated, in substance and effect, that the lands adjacent to the placer claims are not valuable for placer mining, but contain, and in part have been located for, veins or lodes of gold and silver; and for these reasons it is contended that the placer locations could not be conformed to the system of public-land surveys. There is nothing in the record to show the conditions to be as thus stated, but even if there were, the company would be in no better situation, and its contention could not be sustained.

In the first place, assuming that the land embraced in the Hogan and Idaho locations are of sufficient placer value to be patentable under the placer law, and that the adjacent lands are non-placer in character, as stated, a rearrangement of the lines of the locations to meet the requirements of the law in respect to conformity to the system of public-land surveys, considering that tracts as small as ten acres in area, in square form, are recognized as legal subdivisions under the mining laws (sec. 2330, Revised Statutes), would not necessitate the inclusion of the adjacent non-placer lands to such an extent as to affect the validity of the locations on that account. It not infrequently occurs that tracts of land small portions of which are not valuable for placer mining are embraced within placer locations where the lands as a whole are in fact more valuable for placer mining that for agricultural purposes.. There is, therefore, nothing in this phase of the company's contention.

The other phase of the contention is equally untenable. It is a well recognized fact that both classes of mineral deposits-that is, veins or lodes, and placer deposits are frequently found to exist in the same land, and it is no objection to the validity of a placer location that it embraces veins or lodes as well as placer deposits.

It is usually a simple matter, in locating placer claims, even upon unsurveyed lands, to conform the locations to the system of publicland surveys. The law's requirement in this respect as to unsurveyed