ROBERT R. PRENTIS, Henry C. Stuart, and Joseph E. Willard, Individually and as Constituting the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, and R. T. Wilson, Clerk of the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, Appts., V. ATLANTIC COAST LINE COMPANY. ing to recklessness such that, if the defend- | 209]ant in error were at *bar for his conduct in the premises, would be held to show malice of the degree calling for punitive damages." And it is urged, after considerable discuszion, that "the interrupted attempt was to show that the defendant in error, by reason of his conduct in the very matter in controversy, was not entitled to and did not have the peculiar character in respect to which he claimed to have been injured; namely, a character for probity in office." CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COMWe are not able to concur in the conclusion. A charge of using an office to procure an indictment as part of a conspiracy to blackmail could not be justified or in any SAME, Appts., V. PANY. [No. 271.] SAME, Appts.. V. [No. 272.] SAME, Appts., V. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD SAME, Appts., V. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COM- degree excused by the facts offered to be CHESAPEAKE WESTERN RAILWAY. proved. One might be a careful and zealous officer and not stop to investigate the characters of prosecuting witnesses. Besides, the charge was not of careless credence of an accusation of crime against innocent men, but of a scheme deliberately planned, through a "nefarious indictment," to use the words of the libel, to extort money from innocent men. We think, therefore, that the trial court was right in rejecting the proffered evidence as irrelevant. We could not hold otherwise, unless we should hold that crime and credulity are one and the same thing, and we repeat that the mere neglect to investigate the character of witnesses is not equivalent to such disregard of the rights of others as to be tantamount to deliberate design, certainly not a deliberate design to blackmail. We say "mere neglect," because this was all the offer amounted to. It was already in evidence for what it was worth that Hudson was a stranger to Tal-State bott. It is not necessary to give the testimony. We will assume that it might have been contended plaintiffs in error were not connected with either the printing or publishing of the first article or the second (there were two), or with either. The instruction asked and the instructions given by the 210] court *are too long to be copied and difficult to summarize. They are set out in the opinion of the court of appeals, and it will be seen from them that those given by the court, which were not objected to, embodied all, as the court of appeals held, that was contained in the instruction refused, adapt. ed to the testimony and the consideration which the jury might give to its various phases. Judgment affirmed. relief 1. Injunctive against railway passenger rates as fixed by the Virginia Corporation Commission may be granted by a Federal court if such rates are confiscatory, although, for some purposes, the commission is a court, since proceedings to establish rates are legislative, and therefore are not comprehended by the provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 720, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 581, forbidding Federal courts from enjoining proceedings in state courts, which provision looks to the NOTE. eral courts-see notes to Garner v. Second On enjoining proceedings in FedNat. Bank, 16 C. C. A. 90; Central Trust Co. v. Grantham, 27 C. C. A. 575; and Copeland v. Bruning, 63 C. C. A. 437. On conclusiveness of judgments generally -see notes to Sharon v. Terry, 1 L.R.A. L.R.A. 142; Wiese v. San Francisco Musical 572; Bollong v. Schuyler Nat. Bank, 3 Fund Soc. 7 L.R.A. 577; Morrill v. Morrill, 11 L.R.A. 155; Shores v. Hooper, 11 L.R.A. 308; Bank of United States v. Beverly, 11 L. ed. U. S. 76; Johnson Steel Street Rail Co. v. Wharton, 38 L. ed. U. S. 429; and Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 42 L. ed. U. S. 355. As to conclusiveness and effect of judg ments as between Federal and state courts 2. The establishment of railway passen ger rates by the Virginia State Corporation Commission is not res judicata in a suit which seeks injunctive relief on the ground that the rates are confiscatory, although such commission, for some purposes, is a court, and acted only after hearing and investigation, since proceedings to establish rates are legislative, and not judicial, in their nature. [Judgments of what tribunals are con Mr. William A. Anderson argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants: The definitions of a court, as given by law writers and lexicographers, are various; but it will be found that the tribunal whose orders the plaintiffs in these suits seek to nullify satisfies all of the essential requisites of a court of justice as given by these authorities. See Webster's Dict., Century Dict., Standard Dict., 3 Bl. Com. pp. 24, 25. See also Fuller v. Colfax County, 4 McCrary, 537, 14 Fed. 177. The great object of these suits is to enjoin and stop litigation in the state courts, clusive, see Judgment, III. g, h, in Digest and to bring all the litigated questions be Sup. Ct. 1908.] fore the United States circuit court. This Courts enjoining railway rates -ex-is one of the things the Federal courts are hausting remedy in state courts. 3. A Federal circuit court, on principles of comity, should not entertain a suit by which injunctive relief is sought against railway passenger rates as fixed by the Virginia State Corporation Commission, in advance of the appeal to the highest state court from the order fixing the rates, which is given by the state Constitution as of right to any aggrieved party. [For other cases, see Courts, VI. d, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] States immunity from suit - enjoining state officers. 4. A bill filed in a Federal court against a state commission to restrain its members from enforcing railway passenger rates established by such commission, on the ground that such rates are confiscatory, is not bad as an attempt to enjoin legislation or as a suit against the state. [For other cases, see States, IX. c, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [Nos. 270-275.] Argued October 16, 19, 20, 1908. Decided A November 30, 1908. PPEALS from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia to review decrees enjoining the enforcement of railway passenger rates as fixed by the Virginia State Corporation Commission, on the ground that such rates are confiscatory. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. see notes to, Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Morgan, 21 C. C. A. 478, and Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 49 C. C. A. 468. On premature commencement of action generally-see note to American Bonding & T. Co. v. Gibson County, 76 C. C. A. 159. On suits against a state-see notes to Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Com. 8 L.R.A. 399; Carr v. State, 11 L.R.A. 370; Beers v. Arkansas, 15 L. ed. U. S. 991; Hans v. Louisiana, 33 L. ed. U. S. 842; and Tindall v. Wesley, 13 C. C. A. 165. On suits against state officers as suits against state-see notes to Sanders v. Saxton, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 727; Ex parte Young, 13 L.R.A (N.S.) 932; and Beers v. Arkan. sas, 15 L. ed. U. S. 991. expressly prohibited from doing. cantile Co. 176 U. S. 317, 44 L. ed. 485, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254-257, 23 L. ed. 345, 346. United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mer These are really suits against a state. Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 31 L. ed. 216, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 27 L. ed. 448, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 27 L. ed. 468, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91; Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co. 109 U. S. 446, 27 L. ed. 992, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 292, 609; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 29 L. ed. 805, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 608; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 440, 44 L. ed. 1143, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 386, 46 L. ed. 962, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650. The Virginia tribunal, in its origin and constitution, differs essentially from the railroad commissions passed upon in the Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191, and from the Minnesota Railroad Commission considered in Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 33 L. ed. 970, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702, and from the Texas Railroad Commission discussed in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 388-413, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1020-1028, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047. If there is a reasonable doubt as to the constitutional validity of the organic and statutory enactments of Virginia which are attempted to be impeached by the appellees, that doubt must be solved in favor of the validity of those laws. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 718, 25 L. ed. 501; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 684, 32 L. ed. 256, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 393, 40 L. ed. 194, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43. If there is any reasonable doubt as to whether the United States circuit court had, jurisdiction of these cases, it was error for the court to take jurisdiction of them. 1 Desty, Fed. Proc. p. 340; Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 109 U. S. 278-284, 27 L. ed. 932-935, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207; Peper v. Fordyce, 119 U. S. 469, 30 L. ed. 435, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 287; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 1 L. ed. 718. Mr. John W. Daniel also argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants: This prohibition necessarily includes all steps taken by the court or its officers under its process, from the institution of the suit until the close of the final process of execution. United States v. Collins, supra. If the nature of an administrative question involve the exercise of the judicial faculties for its solution, it may be made a judicial question, and referred by law to the jurisdiction of the courts. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372; United States v. Halleck, 1 Wall. 439, 17 L. The state corporation commission fulfils every definition and description of a judicial court ever given by any judicial expoundered. 664; United States ex rel. Riverside Oil of, or any intelligent commentator on, the jurisprudence of the English-speaking peoples. Co. Litt. 58a; 3 Bl. Com. 23, 25; People ex rel. Garling v. Van Allen, 55 N. Y. 31; White County v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 22 L.R.A. 402, 36 N. E. 237; 11 Cyc. Law & Proc. pp. 653, 654. No court of the United States can enjoin proceedings in a state court, with the single statutory exception made by the national bankrupt law when such law is in operation; and the further exception, taken from equity principles in the case of concurrent jurisdiction, that the Federal court had assumed prior jurisdiction. Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179, 2 L. ed. 587; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612-625, 12 L. ed. 841-846; Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 298, 19 L. ed. 922; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L. ed. 666; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 257, 23 L. ed. 346; Citizens' Bank v. Board of Liquidation (Louisiana ex rel. Citizens' Bank v. Board of Liquidation) 98 U. S. 140, 25 L. ed. 114; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 125, 13 L. ed. 921; Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257, 20 L. ed. 635; French v. Hay (French v. Stewart) 22 Wall. 253, 22 L. ed. 858; Bolling v. Lersner, 91 U. S. 595, 23 L. ed. 367; United States v. Collins, 4 Blatchf. 156, Fed. Cas. No. 14,834; Fisk v. Union P. R. Co. 6 Blatchf. 362, Fed. Cas. No. 4,827; Fisk v. Union P. R. Co. 10 Blatchf. 518, Fed. Cas. No. 4,830; Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curt. C. C. 469, Fed. Cas. No. 3,416; Hamilton v. Walsh, 23 Fed. 420; Chaffin v. St. Louis, 4 Dill. 24, Fed. Cas. No. 2,573; McWhirter v. Halsted, 24 Fed. 828; Hale v. Bugg, 82 Fed. 33; United States v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Co. 176 U. S. 317, 44 L. ed. 485, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 154-165, 43 L. ed. 401-405, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119; Spear, Federal Judiciary, 321; M'Kim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279, 3 L. ed. 342; Simpkin's, Suit in Equity in Federal Courts, p. 337; 1 Rose, Code of Federal Procedure, pp. 166, 167-170, § 720; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. pp. 31-35 Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 47 L. ed. 1074, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 698. Where a court has the power to refer a question of rate making to a court under the law of a state, it is competent for that court to hear and adjudicate it. Re Janvrin, 174 Mass. 514, 47 L.R.A. 319, 55 N. E. 381. Mr. A. Caperton Braxton also argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants: There are certain functions which are so interwoven and blended as to make it somewhat a matter of opinion and viewpoint, if not of mere taste or fancy, as to how they should be classified. Rate making might, in some aspects, be regarded as one of these hybrid functions. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 354, 28 L. ed. 176, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, 1 L.R.A. 744, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 325, 35 Fed. 874; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 196, 40 L. ed. 939, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 391, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 700; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 397, 38 L. ed. 1023, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 216, 40 L. ed. 946, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 167 U. S. 499, 505, 42 L. ed. 253, 255, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 896; McChord v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 183 U. S. 495, 46 L. ed. 295, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 321, 48 L. ed. 199, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88. Attention is invited to the very striking analogy between the principles involved in the prescribing of rates by the Virginia commission, and the action of the Federal courts in prescribing future rules for the distribution, without discrimination, of coal cars, and commanding the observance of such rules by the carrier. United States ex rel. Kingwood Coal Co. v. West Virginia Northern R. Co. 125 Fed. 252. in state courts. Federal courts cannot enjoin proceedings, P. Belt Line R. Co. v. Com. 103 Va. 289, 49 S. E. 39, an appeal from an order of the Dillon v. Kansas City Suburban Belt R. commission prescribing car-weighing rates, Co. 43 Fed. 109; Hemsley v. Myers, 45 Fed.—when such an appeal is actually pending 289; Whitney v. Wilder, 4 C. C. A. 510, 13 in the supreme court of appeals, no one can U. S. App. 180, 54 Fed. 554; Reinach v. question its being, in the strictest sense, a Atlantic & G. W. R. Co. 58 Fed. 44; Riggs v. judicial case, in a judicial court, the proJohnson County (United States ex rel. Riggs ceedings in which the Federal circuit courts v. Johnson County) 6 Wall. 195, 18 L. ed. are prohibited by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 720, U. 776; Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 265, 15 L. ed. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 581, from enjoining. 394; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 624, 12 L. ed. If, therefore, the proceeding is a judicial 846; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 257, 23 cause when it gets into the supreme court of L. ed. 346; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 341, appeals after appeal, then, ex necessitate, 24 L. ed. 659; Chaffin v. St. Louis, 4 Dill. it must have been equally a judicial cause 19, Fed. Cas. No. 2,572. while before the commission, before the appeal. This is but another demonstration of the fact that the commission is, in truth and in fact, a court. Even in a case originally brought in a state court, and afterwards removed to the Federal court, the latter court cannot enjoin proceedings in another case still pending in a state court, although such injunction might have been granted by the state court in which the removal suit was originally brought. The highest court of the state itself has repeatedly held the Virginia state corporation commission to be a court, and expressly in the exercise of its rate-making functions. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Tidewater R. Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179, 2 L. ed. Co. 105 Va. 131, 52 S. E. 852; Newport 587. It is immaterial that the state court has already rendered its judgment, and that the injunction is merely against the enforcement, or carrying out, or giving effect to, such judgment. Murray v. Overstoltz, 1 McCrary, 606, 8 Fed. 110; Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. Co. 18 Fed. 617; Dillon v. Kansas City Suburban Belt R. Co. supra. Where a Federal right has been ignored or misconstrued or abused by a state court which has originally had rightful jurisdiction of the controversy, the party must seek his remedy by appeal, first, to the highest state tribunal having jurisdiction, and then to the Supreme Court of the United States. Re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 219, 31 L. ed. 408, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. | 269; Hemsley v. Myers; Riggs v. Johnson County; and Peck v. Jenness,—supra. An appeal is not a new case, but, ex vi termini, imports the pre-existence of the same case in the tribunal appealed from, the appeal being necessarily a mere continu- | ation of the original suit. Cohen v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 409, 5 L. ed. 292; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 204, 205, 16 L. ed. 631, 632. There can surely be no question as to the supreme court of appeals of the state being a judicial court of record in the strictest and fullest sense. When an appeal is actually pending in that court from a ruling of the commission prescribing rates of charge, as was the case in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Com. 102 Va. 599, 46 S. E. 911, an appeal from an order of the commission prescribing demurrage rates; and in Norfolk & News Light & Water Co. v. Peninsular Pure Water Co. 107 Va. 700, 59 S. E. 1099; Com. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 106 Va. 61, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1086, 117 Am. St. Rep. 983, 55 S. E. 572, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1124. The following cases are sufficiently analogous to those involved in these appeals to serve as pertinent illustrations of the practical application of the rule laid down in § 720 of the Revised Statutes, forbidding Federal circuit courts to enjoin proceedings in a state court, even though the function being exercised in such proceedings might properly be classified as legislative rather than judicial: Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. Co.; Re Sawyer; and Fitts v. McGhee, supra. For the lower court to have enjoined the Virginia commission in June, from taking any proceedings towards the enforcement of its own order entered in April, in a proceeding still pending before the commission, and from which order an appeal of right lay to the supreme court of appeals of the state, with absolute right of supersedeas, on substantially the same terms as those upon which the injunction was asked for and granted, was a palpable violation of the inhibition of § 720 of the Revised Statutes. Such an error is jurisdictional. Diggs v. Wolcott, supra; M'Kim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279, 3 L. ed. 342; Sargent v. Helton, 115 U. S. 350, 29 L. ed. 413, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78. All of the matters and things involved in these suits are res judicata, and can be reopened only by the supreme court of appeals of Virginia, or the Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal. Grignon v. Astor, 2 How. 337, 11 L. ed., bidden when there is an adequate remedy at law applies only where the remedy at law is as practical and as efficient as the remedy afforded by equity. 290; Sargeant v. State Bank, 12 How. 384, 385, 13 L. ed. 1033, 1034; Marsteller v. Marsteller, 132 Pa. 517, 19 Am. St. Rep. 604, 19 Atl. 344. The doctrine is not, by any means, limited to what is technically called, or commonly referred to as, a "court." It extends as well to boards, commissioners and other officers who are required to exercise even quasi-judicial functions. Southern R. Co. v. Washington, A. & M. V. R. Co. 102 Va. 491, 46 S. E. 784; Orleans v. Platt, 99 U. S. 683, 25 L. ed. 406; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 723; Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 35 Am. Dec. 662; Culross v. Gibbons, 130 N. Y. 447, 29 N. E. 841; People ex rel. Myers v. Barnes, 114 N. Y. 317, 20 N. E. 609, 21 N. E. 739; Brooks v. Morgan, 36 Ind. App. 672, 76 N. E. 333; Holliston v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 195 Mass. 299, 81 N. E. 205; State v. Corron, 73 N. H. 434, 62 Atl. 1050, 6 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 486. See also Cooper v. Hunt, 103 Mo. App. 9, 77 S. W. 483; Close v. Huntington, 66 Kan. 354, 71 Pac. 812; Longinette v. Shelton (Tenn. Ch. App.) 52 S. W. 1084. Even if the rate order was a legislative act, the Federal circuit court was without jurisdiction to enjoin it. McChord v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 183 U. S. 494, 46 L. ed. 293, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. Mr. Alfred P. Thom argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Alexander Hamilton, William B. McIlwaine, H. T. Wickham, George H. Taylor, Henry Taylor, Jr., S. S. P. Patteson, Henry L. Stone, Joseph I. Doran, Lucian H. Cocke, and John K. Graves, filed a brief for appellees: The bills of the six appellees show in each case a right to equitable relief in the court below against the threatened invasion of a right or rights secured by the Constitution of the United States. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 52 L. ed. 714, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441. No individual interest of any of the defendant members of the state corporation commission of Virginia is necessary to give jurisdiction. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 43 L. ed. 535, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 544, 47 L. ed. 587, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 398; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 389, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1020, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Ex parte Young, supra. The rule that recourse to equity is for Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 215, 7 L. ed. 655, 657; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 349, 33 L. ed. 909, 914, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554; Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 514, 32 L. ed. 1008, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 12, 43 L. ed. 346, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 206, 30 L. ed. 933, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 940. The proper and the only mode of judicial relief against a tariff of rates established by or enforceable by a commission is by a bill in chancery, asserting its unreasonable character and its conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Only a court of equity is competent to meet such an emergency and determine once for all, and without a multiplicity of suits, matters that affect not simply individuals, but the interests of the entire community. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 460, 33 L. ed. 982, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 702; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 397, 38 L. ed. 1023, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 518, 42 L. ed. 839, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 381, 46 L. ed. 605, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Haverhill Gaslight Co. v. Barker, 109 Fed. 694; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 180, 44 L. ed. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Ex parte Young, supra. The equity jurisdiction of the Federal courts cannot be impaired or diminished by the statutes of the several states regulating the practice of their own courts, even though a remedy is created by such statute which may be the full equivalent of the jurisdiction of the Federal chancery. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 395, 38 L. ed. 1022, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 169' U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Smyth v. Ames, Rep. 418; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 19 201, 30 L. ed. 932, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 940; L. ed. 260; McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574, 37 L. ed. 853, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 936; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202, 37 L. ed. 1052, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75; Eyre v. Everett, 2 Russ. Ch. 381. The doctrine of res judicata has no appli cation where a rate has been fixed by the legislature of a state or by some rate-making agency of a state. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Chicago, |